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 5 
Introduction 
 
‘Der endgültige Zusammenbruch im Westen, ja das Ende des Krieges schien unmittelbar 
bevorzustehen. Doch es kam anders.’1 
 
‘One reaches the conclusion that these six short weeks saw one of the most successful advances of 
any British army – indeed of any army ever formed.’2 
 
‘The movements of great states are often directed by as slender springs as those of individuals.’3 
 
‘Geschichte ist immer das Ergebnis konstruktiver Reflexion.’4 
 
One day in the late summer of 1944 the Allied armies were thundering across 
Northern France and Belgium, sweeping aside all German resistance and leaving 
dazed enemy units in the wake of their advance, almost literally the next they faced 
the same dogged defence they had such a tough time cracking in Normandy. It was 
an amazing feat, because, ‘Retreat does not build a strong fighting spirit in a unit…’5 
 
This book is the result of seven years’ research into a particular Kampfgruppe (Battle 
Group) that played a key role during the final stage of the Second World War in 
Western Europe. The background is the result of a long time fascination on the 
author’s part with events during the first weeks of September 1944. For a time the 
Allied troops were surging forward across France and Belgium, seemingly invincible, 
covering 250 miles in six days, then the situation was back to what it had been in 
Normandy, a slow, grinding and costly advance. The men at the top certainly 
believed the end was nigh. The SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Forces) Intelligence Summary at the end of August stated that, ‘the enemy in the 
West has had it. Two and a half months of bitter fighting have brought the end of 
the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach.’6 Barely two weeks later the 
Allies were back to the bloody slugging match they had just left behind them in 
Normandy. What had caused this sudden turn of events? Was it indeed because of a 
crisis in logistics on the Allied side, or is Van Creveld right and were logistics merely 
used as an excuse post facto?7 
 
This sudden reversal of fortunes is also reflected in the findings of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee’s (JIC) report of 5 September 1944.8 It reads ‘However, 
whatever action Hitler may now take it will be too late to affect the issue in the West 
                                        
1 Joachim Ludewig, Der deutsche Rückzug aus Frankreich 1944, Freiburg 1994, 333. 
2 Peter Rostron, The Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey GBE KCB DSO MC, Monty’s Army 
Commander, Barnsley 2010, 128. 
3 David Hume, History of England, 427, quoted in Eelco Runia, De Pathologie van de Veldslag, 
Geschiedenis en geschiedschrijving in Tolstoj’s Oorlog en Vrede, Rotterdam 1995, 119. 
4 Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der 
nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945, München 2007, 21. 
5 Robert R. Rush, A Different Perspective: Cohesion, Morale, and Operational Effectiveness in the 
German Army, Fall 1944, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 25 (1999), No.3, 477-508. 
6 SHAEF IS 23 and 24, 26.08.44, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, The European Theater of Operations, 
The Supreme Command, Washington 1954, 244-5. 
7 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, New York 1977, 227. 
8 Quoted in full in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy Vol V, London 1956, 399-401. 
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where organised German resistance will gradually disintegrate under our attack…’ 
The JIC felt that ‘Germany has suffered further catastrophic disasters. The process of 
final military defeat leading to the cessation of organised resistance has begun in the 
West.’ They were right in concluding that in this theatre of operations ‘the German 
front (…) virtually ceased to exist’ as between Antwerp and Maastricht there was no 
continuous front as such. In effect the JIC were predicting the end of the war in the 
foreseeable future, although –wisely- they did not specify a date. Their German 
counterparts shared this sentiment in early September and German commanders 
were amazed that the seemingly inevitable collapse did not happen after all. After 
the war they told Basil Liddell Hart, the well-known British military theoretician, that 
‘das Alliierte Oberkommando eine grosse Gelegenheit versäumt hatte, den Krieg im 
Herbst 1944 zu beenden.’9 In fact, at the time, they considered what happened 
nothing short of a miracle. For example, Generalleutnant Karl Sievers, the 
commanding officer of the 719. Infanterie-Division, who was despatched from the 
Netherlands to stem the Allied avalanche, afterwards wrote that ‘Das schier 
Unmoegliche gelang.’10 Likewise, Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Chef des 
Generalstabes des Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West), named the chapter dealing 
with this period ‘Das zweite “Wunder am Westwall’’.11 Another historian, Peter Lieb, 
in his groundbreaking study of the Wehrmacht in France, also called this sudden 
reversal of fortune the ‘Wunder im Westen’.12 This so-called miracle, this sudden 
reversal of fortunes, is all the more astonishing since the rout in Normandy was one 
of the major blows to German morale during the Second World War. A recent study 
about the German army concluded, ‘die (…) heillose Flucht der Truppen aus 
Frankreich war psychologisch nach Stalingrad zweiffellos der zweite grosse Einschnitt 
in der Kriegswahrnehmung der deutschen Soldaten. Die Normandie war das Verdun 
des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Nirgendwo sonst sind mehr Menschen in so kurzer Zeit, 
nämlich in zwölf Wochen, auf so engen Raum getötet und verwundet worden.’13 To 
bounce back from this was indeed nothing short of miraculous. But how was this 
possible? Was it indeed just a case of the Allies not seizing the opportunity? Trying to 
answer this question was the starting point of this study.  
 
The main questions 
One of the key players, if not the key player, in this sudden revival was Kampfgruppe 
Chill, an improvised battle group under the command of Generalleutnant Kurt Chill. 
On 4 September, the day Antwerp was captured by the British 11th Armoured 
Division he decided to set up an improvised defence behind the Albert Canal, 
ignoring instructions from the top to pull back to Germany. The next day it was in 
place. There is no doubt that this act had major consequences, for through this 
simple decision, Chill helped close the gap that began to open up in the German 
                                        
9 B.H. Liddell Hart, Jetzt dürfen sie reden, (original: The Other Side of the Hill), Zürich 1950, 518. 
10 ‘The sheer impossible succeeded.’ Sievers, OCMH MS B-004, 5. 
11 Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, Bonn 1950, 260.  
12 Peter Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und 
Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44, München 2007, 502. 
13 Sonke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, Soldaten, Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben, Frankfurt 
am Main 2011, 263. 
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front since the Allied armies had crossed the Seine.14 The Kampfgruppe was then 
responsible for delaying the British advance when it was resumed the following day. 
During the next stage, operation Market Garden, the Kampfgruppe at one stage 
played an important role in thwarting Allied intentions as well being the only unit to 
cut the ‘Corridor’ to Nijmegen and beyond. Soon after, in early October, the 
Kampfgruppe successfully blocked an Allied advance towards Tilburg and 
Woensdrecht, which in both cases had a serious impact on Allied planning. At the 
end of October two major operations began to push the German 15. Armee back 
behind the river Maas, thus clearing the Scheldt estuary, and here the Kampfgruppe 
played an important role in delaying the advance.  
 
In other words, this study is concerned with a relatively small group of soldiers in the 
fighting in the West, who definitely ‘punched above their weight’. How was this 
possible, especially in view of the period during which it took place? An answer would 
give insight not only into the dynamics of a small battle group, but, more importantly 
give an understanding of what the keys are to making it an effective fighting unit. It 
is ultimately about what and who decides the outcome of a military engagement. So 
far many studies have been devoted to leading generals on both sides. There is a 
seemingly endless lists of books about the highest echelon, both German and 
Allied.15 But was it really the men at the top who decided the outcome of battles, or 
was it rather the men at the other end of the food chain like Tolstoj for example 
believed? In ‘War and Peace’ he wrote about the relationship between great generals 
and common soldiers, that ‘ the successful outcome of a military operation does not 
depend on them [the generals], but on the man in the ranks who shouts: “We are 
doomed!” or: “Hurra!”.16 Analysing what constitute the key ingredients to a 
successful military unit this study investigates that very issue. By focusing on a 
military unit, an improvised one at that, which had to operate in circumstances 
where everything was working against it, a numerical superior enemy, a constantly 
shifting composition, little armour and few guns, and one which was nevertheless 
successful in the tasks it was set, we should be able to get a clear picture of what it 
is that still allowed it to function as well as it did. This study investigates which of the 
various explanations given during the last seventy years by sociologists, 
psychologists and historians about the Wehrmacht during World War Two are valid in 
the case of Kampfgruppe Chill. Was it political indoctrination, a strong morale, a 
sense of duty, rigid discipline, fear of reprisal or something else that allowed the 
Kampfgruppe to fight the way it did? By focusing on this one unit, it should be 
possible to evaluate and prove or disprove these theories about the resilience and 
performance of the Wehrmacht. Precisely because the Kampfgruppe was an ad-hoc 
unit the results of this research should be much more revealing since all kinds of 
factors that might explain why a regular unit performed well do not apply here. It is 
                                        
14 Ludewig, Der deutsche Rückzug, 250, Charles B. MacDonald, The European Theater of Operations, 
The Siegfried Line Campaign, Washington 1963, 124. 
15 To name just a few: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hrsg.), Hitlers militärische Elite (Bd. I und II), 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Damstadt 1998; Russel F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 
London 1981; Nigel Hamilton, Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944, Hamish Hamilton, London 
1981, and Nigel Hamilton, Monty, Final Years of the Field-Marshal 1944-1976, Hamish Hamilton, 
London 1986; John Keegan,Churchill’s Generals, New York 1991. 
16 Leo Tolstoj, Oorlog en Vrede, Arnhem 1949, 679. 
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the very core of German military efficiency during the final year of the war that is 
being investigated here. Therefore, the history of this unit is not only a case study of 
Kampfgruppen in general, and in the West in particular, which has never received 
serious investigation yet, but is also a case study for the Wehrmacht as a whole since 
it will provide an insight into both the performance and the mindset of German 
soldiers during the downfall of the Third Reich. In order to do this the motivation, 
morale, identity and structure of the Kampfgruppe, need to be examined.  
 
This study closely examines the engagements that Kampfgruppe Chill was involved in 
between 4 September and 9 November 1944. It aims to describe the peregrinations 
of the battle group which ranged in size from an understrength regiment to an 
inflated division, all within three months. The immediate results of the various 
defensive and offensive actions will be described in some detail. We shall need to 
explore the origins, actions and dissolution of the battle group. Another question to 
be investigated is the influence of Kampfgruppe Chill on the decision-making process 
of both the Germans and the Allies. More accurately: this study intends to show that 
during the time frame discussed here the Kampfgruppe had an influence that went 
far beyond the tactical level. To prove this it is necessary to move the scope outside 
the action on the battlefield. This way of looking at a unit is in line with modern 
military history which does not examine the actual battles as if they happened in a 
kind of vacuum, which was the traditional way, but instead also studies the 
interaction between what happened on the battlefield and the framework in which 
the actions took place.17 This study therefore combines the traditional description of 
troop movements, battles and engagements, i.e. the tactical level, but it also 
examines operational and strategic decisions. After having first established to what 
extent the actions of Kampfgruppe Chill influenced the operational (and military 
strategic) levels the history of the Kampfgruppe should also provide the answers to 
the following four questions: 
 
- Who decide the outcome of engagements, the men at the top, or the men 
in the ranks?  
- What does the history of Kampfgruppe Chill suggest about the key 
ingredient(s) of fighting power? 
- To what extent is the Kampfgruppe (a)typical for Kampfgruppen during the 
same time frame and in the same theatre of war?  
- To what extent is the history of the Kampfgruppe (a)typical for similar 
sized army units during the same time frame and in the same theatre of 
war and what does this suggest about the resilience of the Wehrmacht 
during the final stage of World War Two? 
 
To find answers to these key issues it is necessary to examine a number of additional 
questions. What were the origins of the Kampfgruppe and where did its constituent 
parts come from? To what extent were previous experiences relevant for the 
                                        
17 Christ Klep and Ben Schoenmaker (ed.), De Bevrijding van Nederland 1944-1945, Oorlog op de 
Flank, ’s-Gravenhage 1995, 29. Ironically the series Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg is 
criticised by some for leaning too much in this direction and not paying enough attention to the purely 
operational aspects of the war (cf. discussion in Franz Uhle-Wettler, Höhe- und Wendepunkte 
deutscher Militärgeschichte, Von Leuthen bis Stalingrad, Graz 2006, 5-6). 
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operations of Kampfgruppe Chill? What is known about the identity, morale, cohesion 
and structure of the Kampfgruppe? What is known of the personalities of its 
commanding officers, i.e. Generalleutnant Kurt Chill, the Kommandeur of the 
Kampfgruppe bearing his name, Oberstleutnant Freiherr Friedrich Von der Heydte, 
the Kommandeur of FJR 6, Major Erich Sattler and Oberleutnant Franz Kopka, the 
two Kommandeure of schwere Heeres Panzer Jäger-Abteilung 559, Oberstleutnant 
Georg Heinrich Dreyer, Kommandeur of Kampfgruppe Dreyer, as well as the various 
battalion commanders, such as Major Horst Pohl, Hauptmann Ohler, Hauptmann Rolf 
Mager and Hauptmann Leopold Von Hütz? What was the reason for the creation of 
the Kampfgruppe? What was its composition? What were the instructions it received? 
To what extent was Auftragstaktik important in this? How effective were logistics, 
maintenance and repair, and, finally, what happened to the Kampfgruppe after the 
period examined in this study? At the end it should then be possible to give the 
answers to the key questions. The last element that requires clarification is the time 
frame, 4 September – 9 November 1944. 
The time frame 
This story takes us from the zenith of the Allies’ march through Northern France and 
Belgium to the end of the autumn campaign whose main goal was to secure the use 
of the port of Antwerp. There are a number of reasons for deciding on 4 September 
as the starting point and 9 November as the final day. The basic reason for deciding 
on Monday 4 September is that this was the day that Generalleutnant Kurt Chill 
started to set up an improvised battle group, soon to be known as Kampfgruppe 
Chill. In other words the genesis of the subject of this study was on that very day. 
But there is more. The capture of Antwerp that same day marked the end of the 
glorious British advance leading the highest military to believe that ‘it seemed 
possible, even probable, that the enemy might surrender within the next few 
weeks.’18 In order to achieve this General Eisenhower, who three days before had 
taken over as commander of the ground forces from Montgomery, now a Field-
Marshal, issued a directive that same day telling Twenty-First Army Group to seize 
the Ruhr, one of Germany’s key industrial areas. The reason for the order was that 
‘enemy resistance on the entire front shows signs of collapse.’19 Since one of the 
basic tenets of military thinking is to reinforce success in this way Eisenhower hoped 
to follow up the rapid advance by knocking the Germans out of the war, something 
that seemed within reach. This was certainly also the view of the highest German 
commanders that day. They rated the capture of Antwerp as ‘a strategic blow of the 
greatest importance.’20 That the Allies did not use this opportunity, as we shall see 
below, is neither here nor there. Monday 4 September was one of the key dates in 
the struggle along the Western front. That is not the case with the date this study 
closes with, 9 November, which was simply the day on which Allied troops, more 
specifically the 1st Polish Armoured Division, cleared the last German bridgehead 
south of the river Maas (this particular stretch is known as the ‘Hollands Diep’) thus 
ending the two-month long autumn campaign against 15. Armee in the centre and 
                                        
18 Erhrman, Grand Strategy V, 395. 
19 FWD 13765, 04.09.44. 
20 OCMH MS A-862, 13.  
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western part of the province of North Brabant in which the Kampfgruppe played such 
a vital role.21  
Sources 
For any historian primary sources are his or her bread and butter. Still, beggars 
cannot be choosers and often primary sources were not available. This study is 
based on three types of sources.22 First there are the contemporary documents, 
either Allied or German, which constitute the primary sources. Then there are 
documents written close after the events, notably studies prepared by German 
officers for the Historical Division of the US Army and interviews (e.g. by General van 
Hilten for his book on the war in the Netherlands23). Finally there are memoirs, 
histories and interviews (e.g. with members of FJR 6) written long after the end of 
the war. The latter category is, no doubt the most subjective as they could serve to 
justify certain decisions and actions or use knowledge acquired after the event. The 
same problems apply to the second category, much of which was based on what the 
participants still remembered and so the strongest evidence can be found in the 
contemporary documents. But even these need to be treated carefully and only the 
so-called Intelligence and Operational Logs are in fact recorded in ‘real time’. War 
diaries, by their very nature, were always written after the event and as a result 
could and sometimes did gloss things over or simply leave facts out.  
 
With respect to German primary sources, additional problems were encountered. It 
must be borne in mind that after the war most German records were lost. For this 
study for example, in addition to the various divisions the Kriegstagebücher of 15. 
Armee, 1. Fallschirmarmee and LXVII. Armeekorps should have been the main 
sources. All of them are gone, however, either lost in the big Allied air raid on the 
Heeresarchiv in Potsdam in April 1945 or destroyed just before the end of the war to 
prevent them from falling into the hands of the Allies.24 Of the Armeekorps on the 
western front only four war diaries have survived, one of them that of LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps.25 This means that from 5 September, when the Kampfgruppe was the 
responsibility of this Corps there is detailed information, although even here there 
are gaps, especially during the first few weeks of September when the situation was 
so fluid that higher commanders often had no idea what was going on. Moreover, 
because of the German command system, the so-called Auftragstaktik, many things 
were not assigned to paper and unlike with the Allies there are e.g. no detailed plans 
of attack, usually merely the outcome is mentioned.26 Still, a lot can be deduced from 
what was written down. However, where LXXXVIII. Armeekorps was not in control, 
which means for the time frame from 5 October until 9 November, when the 
                                        
21 Further east there were still German units left on the left bank of the river (1. Fallschirm-Armee) 
and it was not until 3 December that the last of them was pushed back from the remaining salient 
around Venlo. Since Kampfgruppe Chill was not involved there, that is outside the scope of this study. 
22 I have copied this model from Scheil, Präventivkrieg Barbarossa, Fragen, Fakten, Antworten, 
Schnellroda 2011, 32. 
23 D.A. van Hilten, Van Capitulatie tot Capitulatie, Leiden 1949. 
24 Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg, 10. 
25 The others are: LXXXI AK, XXV AK and LVIII PzK (Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg, 9). 
26 A case in point is the attack on Geel on 10 September for which the battle plan could only be 
reconstructed using British PoW interrogations (cf. 3.2). 
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Kampfgruppe Chill became the responsibility of LXVII. Armeekorps, there was no 
primary German source at all and other sources needed to provide the necessary 
information about the various engagements the Kampfgruppe was involved in.  
 
Secondary sources, written close after the events like the memoirs and the studies 
prepared by German officers for the Historical Division of the US Army in the fifties, 
the so-called OCMH studies, purport to be reliable, but in fact are often notoriously 
inaccurate and therefore need to be used with the utmost care. This meant that it 
was often a real challenge to reconstitute the course of the engagements from 
German sources alone and the answers needed to be found elsewhere. Fortunately 
the Allied war diaries (some of which offered gold dust while others contained only … 
dust) are available and these shed some light on certain engagements, with the 
emphasis on some. Many war diarists were meticulous, noting down every detail and 
preserving as many documents as possible, while others clearly could not be 
bothered.27 In this way at least the Allied side of the story could be told in some 
detail. But the German side remained largely hidden in obscurity. Fortunately there 
was more information to be found in Kew, Ottawa and Washington. In addition to 
the war diaries this study also uses other Allied sources, such as Intelligence Logs, 
Operational Logs, Intelligence Summaries and Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports. 
These provided a lot of new information, the Logs because they were in ‘real time’ 
and the Intelligence Summaries and Reports because they contained many details 
about German units hitherto unknown. Apparently many German soldiers were quite 
willing to talk after being captured. Here, too, answers could be found to the 
question about the soldiers’ morale and motivation in the Kampfgruppe. By their very 
nature, these sources are limited, but, in addition to interviews with veterans of 
Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 conducted by Johan van Doorn in the nineties, they are 
the only ones available to give an insight into the story ‘from below’. Another source 
rarely used before are soldier’s Soldbücher which sometimes provided additional 
information. By studying sources not used previously, the actions of the 
Kampfgruppe could be reconstructed in more detail, shedding new light on what 
were until now very murky affairs. Besides these obvious sources other archival 
material rarely used in books about the land battles such as naval (Kriegsmarine) and 
air (Second Tactical Air Force) records have been included. By using this wide variety 
of sources new information has come to light, some findings more surprising and 
relevant than others, but still fairly unique in a study about the fighting on land and 
leading to some new interpretations of what actually happened. 
Outline  
This study consists of five parts following the introduction, in which the main 
questions are formulated. In Part One the theoretical framework is laid out, first by 
defining the tactical, operational and strategic levels (1.1.1), the so-called bridgehead 
strategy (1.1.2), and by explaining how the German army delegated command, the 
so-called Auftragstaktik (1.1.3). This theoretical background will help to answer the 
first question: what was the influence of the Kampfgruppe beyond the tactics of the 
battlefield? The next chapter looks at what several authors have written about the 
                                        
27 Generally the more technical the unit (e.g. artillery, armour) the better the war diary, but here, too, 
there are exceptions (e.g. Nottinghamshire Yeomanry). 
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social and psychological background of the German fighting man in World War Two 
and, more specifically, about their thoughts and findings about the Wehrmacht 
during the final stages of the war (1.2). Finally the phenomenon of Kampfgruppen is 
examined (1.3). These three paragraphs together are designed to provide the 
framework for the second question, how did the Kampfgruppe achieve what it did, in 
view of its ad-hoc nature and in order to gauge to what extent the Kampfgruppe was 
representative for the rest of the Wehrmacht? It also helps put the battle group in a 
historical perspective by providing a frame of reference with regards to morale, 
mentality and organization. Part Two focuses on the broad picture leading up to the 
time frame to be investigated (2.1). This is followed by a discussion of the Allied and 
German strategies at the time (2.2 and 2.3) and the history of the 85. Infanterie-
Division is described (2.4). This part ends with an overview of the military situation 
on 4 September and the creation of the Kampfgruppe (2.5). Part Three contains a 
detailed description of the actual battles fought by Kampfgruppe Chill. Here the 
reader finds the nitty-gritty of the fighting on a tactical level with occasional 
reference to the operational and strategic levels. This chapter examines in detail the 
battles that were fought by Kampfgruppe Chill from the day it was created until the 
day the Allied campaign to drive 15. Armee behind the Hollands Diep river reached 
its conclusion. It starts with the fighting to hold the Albert Canal which focused on 
towns like Beringen, Leopoldsburg and Hechtel and the effects on the Allied planning 
(3.1). Then the focus is on the fighting at Geel which took place at the same time 
(3.2) . Here too, the outcome led to alterations in the Allies’ planning. After Geel the 
Allies tried to break out north of there, leading to another extremely bloody, but 
neglected, battle at the village of Ten Aard (3.3). The Allied failure here had even 
more serious implications. The next chapter deals with the involvement of the 
Kampfgruppe during operation Market Garden in which it was the only German unit 
to interrupt the crucial lifeline to Nijmegen and beyond (3.4). Then the way in which 
Chill’s battle group blocked the second attempt to advance via Tilburg (3.5) and, 
almost simultaneously, via Woensdrecht (3.6) is described. This time the 
repercussions were felt as far as the highest Allied command levels. The last chapter 
(3.7) describes the delaying tactics used before Kampfgruppe Chill pulled back north 
of the river Maas. In Part Four the situation at the end of the autumn campaign is 
briefly painted (4.1) and the German and Allied operational and strategic positions 
are discussed (4.2). Part Four concludes with a brief overview of what happened to 
the Kampfgruppe following the period described in this book (4.3). Finally, Part Five 
answers the main questions by first  looking at the overall conclusion concerning the 
effects of the actions of Kampfgruppe Chill on and beyond the battlefield (5.1). Next 
explanations are given by analyzing the physical (5.2.1), conceptual (5.2.2) and 
mental (5.2.3) components of the Kampfgruppe. In the penultimate paragraphs the 
Kampfgruppe is evaluated as a case study, first for Kampfgruppen (5.3.1) and then 
for the Wehrmacht as a whole (5.3.2). Finally various points that fall outside the 
scope of this study, but still are worth noting, such as the roles of the Royal Air Force 
(5.4.1), the Kriegsmarine (5.4.2), communication problems (5.4.3) and war crimes 
(5.4.4) are looked into. This study is rounded off with a final thought (5.5). 
Geographical names 
The names of all towns, villages, hamlets, rivers and geographical features are those 
used today. So Wuustwezel is used instead of Wuestwesel, Merksem instead of 
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Merxem, Geel instead of Gheel and so on. Although there is an argument for using 
the older spelling, which can still be seen on the old ordnance survey maps used in 
the book, I decided to use the modern versions instead. There are three reasons for 
this. First of all the reader is, as it were, looking back from today’s Merksem, not 
yesterday’s. Second, the Dutch language has seen many spelling changes over the 
last fifty years and the older spelling will make identifications more difficult for 
readers unfamiliar with these. Third, for anyone wishing to go on a battlefield tour 
the new names are essential if he (or she) is to find his (or her) way round using a 
modern map, digital or otherwise.  
Personal names 
As far as was humanly possible I have tried to find out all the first names of the main 
personalities in this book. The conscientious reader will notice where I failed. But 
there is something else to take into account: some commanding officers were 
commonly known by their first names, others were not. Thus, the usual notation is 
Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks (XXX Corps), Major-General Bobby Ross (53rd 
Welsh Division), Generalleutnant Kurt Chill (85. Infanterie-Division), but also Field-
Marshal Montgomery (Twenty-First Army Group), Lieutenant-General J.T. Crocker (I 
Corps), Major-General E.H. Barker (49th West Riding Division) and Generalleutnant 
F. Neumann (712. Infanterie-Division). By and large I have followed this (arbitrary) 
custom. 
Nomenclature 
The nomenclature in this book is the one most common at the time. This means that 
all German names are as they were used then and since they are not in English, they 
are in italics. The names have been given in full when they occur for the first time 
and when they have not been used for quite a number of pages. Otherwise 
abbreviations were used as found in the original documents and on the original 
maps. The following rules applied: a Roman numeral before an Arabic numeral 
indicated a battalion sized unit, but an Arabic numeral indicated a company or the 
equivalent. Here are a few examples to illustrate the point: I./FJR 2 refers to the 1st 
Battalion of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2 and II./GR 743 indicates the 2nd Battalion of 
Grenadier-Regiment 743 whereas 2./GR 743  is the 2nd Company of Grenadier-
Regiment 743. Likewise for the artillery, I./AR 1719 is the 1st Abteilung of Artillerie-
Regiment 1719 (AR 1719 was the divisional artillery of 719. Infanterie-Division as the 
number indicates) and 1./AR 1719 is the 1st Battery of AR 1719. Another, minor, 
point is that I have consistently used German spelling when appropriate, also for the 
plural; thus one Sturmgeschütz and three Sturmgeschütze, one Jagdpanther and 
three Jagdpanther.  
 
As for the British names, here, too, I have followed what was then customary. Thus, 
the 2nd Devonshire Regiment, or 2nd Devons, but No.2 Squadron, A Company etc. I 
have also followed the custom of using Arabic numerals for units up to divisional 
level (53rd Welsh Division), Roman ones for Corps (XII Corps) and full names for 
Armies and above (Second Army).  
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PART ONE,  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
‘Ja, was war und wie war die Wehrmacht überhaupt?’28 
 
’Die Kriegführung ist eine Kunst, eine auf wissenschaftlicher Grundlage beruhende freie, schöpferische 
Tätigkeit.’29 
 
Before looking into the actions and influence of Kampfgruppe Chill it is necessary to 
lay out  the theoretical framework. This chapter consists of four paragraphs, in the 
first the tactical, operational and strategic levels are defined, in the second the 
principle of Auftragstaktik is explained, in the third an overview is given of the key 
literature concerning the mindset, motivation and morale of the German soldier on 
the Western front during the last nine months of the war, and in the final part the 
phenomenon of Kampfgruppen is looked into. 
 
1.1.1 Strategic, operational and tactical levels, definitions 
 
Since it is one of the contentions of this thesis that Kampfgruppe Chill had an impact 
that went beyond that of the battlefield and extended to the operational and possibly 
the strategic areas as well, it is necessary to define what is meant by the three levels 
of military decision-making. 
The strategic level 
Although the boundaries between all three tend to be fluid, strategy is generally 
defined as the highest level at which decisions are made, it ‘involves the art and 
science of employing armed forces with the other instruments of national power to 
secure strategic goals.’30 A German textbook published for the officers of the newly 
constituted Bundeswehr in similar terms defined strategy as ‘alle Machtfaktoren eines 
modernes Staates, einschliesslich des miltärischen’.31 Today’s manual for the British 
armed forces32 distinguishes between the political strategic and military strategic 
levels. The former, called National Strategy, ‘sets out a path, using the diplomatic, 
economic and military instruments of power to achieve the national interests.’33 The 
latter, called the Military Contribution to Strategy, is ‘the application of military 
resources to achieve national strategic objectives…’34 A similar definition was given 
by professor Beatrice Heuser, who was in charge of the research department of the 
Militärgeschichliches Forschungsamt from 2003 to 2007, and wrote, ‘Strategie ist 
Einsatz jeglicher verfügbaren Mittel, vor allem des Mittels der Streitkräfte, zu 
politischen Zwecken, mit dem Ziel, dem Gegner die eigene Politik und den eigenen 
                                        
28 Rolf-Dieter Müller und Hans-Erich Volkmann (Her.), Die Wehrmacht, Mythos und Realität, München 
1999, XI. 
29Truppenführung I. Teil, Berlin 1936, H.Dv. 300/1, 1. 
30US Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations, 1993, 6-1. It should be noted that not until the 20th 
century was there some kind of consensus about the current definition (Beatrice Heuser, Den Krieg 
denken, Die Entwicklung der Strategie seit der Antike, Paderborn 2010, 53). 
31 Von Brunn, Taktische Übungen, von den Grundbegriffen bis zum Kriegsspiel, Darmstadt 1961, 2. 
32 Army Doctrine Publications 2010. 
33 Ibid, 3-17. 
34 Ibid, 3-18. 
 15 
Willen aufzuzwingen bzw. seinem Willen zu widerstehen.’35 General Sir Rupert Smith, 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in his book on war in the 
modern world likewise distinguishes between the ‘political objective’ and the ‘military 
strategic objective’.36 The latter is achieved by ‘military force’, the former ‘as a result 
of military success’.37 Similarly, Karl-Heinz Frieser, a historian at the German 
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, notes in ‘Blitzkieg-Legende’, his seminal study 
on the attack on France and the Low Countries in May 1940, ‘In der im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg angewandten Terminologie ist die Trennlinie zwischen »operativ« und 
»strategisch« fliessend, wobei letzterer Begriff noch der rein militärischen Ebene 
verhaftet blieb’.38 Although strategy is an ambivalent term which can refer both to 
military decisions and a combination of political and military decisions, in this study I 
will follow Frieser and strategy will be seen as purely military, in order to avoid 
digressing too much in the economic, diplomatic, ethical, ideological and 
psychological aspects which could all be included in the realm of strategy. It is this 
strategy that Helmuth Graf von Moltke referred to when he wrote, ‘Strategy affords 
tactics the means for fighting and the probability of winning by the direction of 
armies and their meeting at the place of combat.’39 In this connection the famous 
British military theoretician, Basil Liddell Hart, gives an interesting definition of the 
ultimate goal of military strategy when he wrote, ‘the true aim is not so much to seek 
battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself 
produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.’40  I shall show 
that both Allies and Germans were seeking this advantageous situation and the role 
Kampfgruppe Chill played in frustrating the Allied ambitions.  
The operational level 
The next level is the operational one. Here strategic decisions are translated into 
military operations. The American Field Manual 100-5 describes it as ‘joint and 
combined operational forces within a theater of operations perform subordinate 
campaigns and major operations (…) to accomplish the strategic objectives of the 
unified commander…’41 The British army handbook gives a similar definition, ‘Joint 
campaigns and operations are constructed and directed at the operational level in 
fulfilment of national or coalition strategy. At this level, abstract strategic objectives 
are translated into practical tactical actions and then resourced…’42  Frieser defines it 
succinctly as ‘Aufgabe der oberen Führung’.43 As the aforementioned manual for the 
Bundeswehr describes it, operational assignments ‘verlangen mehr, nämlich die 
Schlachtentscheidung und damit grosse Verbände, etwa vom Korps aufwärts’.44  
During the Second World War for the German Wehrmacht this started at the level of 
an Armee and sometimes trickled down to Corps level.  
                                        
35 Heuser, Den Krieg denken, 18. This book also provides an insightful history of the development of 
the concept of strategy (17-33). 
36 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World, London 2006, 12. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, Der Westfeldzug 1940, München 2005,  8.  
39 Moltke, On the Art of War, Selected Writings, Ed. Daniel J. Hughes, New York 1993, 47. 
40 Liddell Hart, Strategy, The Indirect Approach, London 1954, 365. 
41 US Army FM 100-5, 6-2. 
42 Army Doctrine Publications 2010, 3-19. 
43 Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 8. 
44 Von Brunn,Taktische Übungen, 1. 
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However, for the Allied side there is a problem of terminology here which needs to 
be clarified. Both in the UK and the USA during World War Two military strategy was 
felt to be not only the prerogative of the decision makers at the highest level, i.e. the 
CIGS, Field-Marshal Alan Brooke, his American counterpart General George C. 
Marshall, and theatre commanders like General Dwight D. Eisenhower, but, and this 
was different from the German idea, also that of Army Group commanders such as 
Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, General Omar Bradley and General Jacob M. 
Devers, of the Twenty-First, Twelfth US and Sixth US Army Groups respectively.45 
This thinking only changed in the 1970s under the influence of, among others, the 
Yom Kippur or October War of 1973.46 British and American military theoreticians 
finally accepted, what the Germans had been saying all along, that between the 
strategic and tactical there was a third level, the operational one.47 Operational 
decisions, especially those aimed at ending the war before 1945, hugely influenced 
the events described in this study and modern definitions will therefore be used. The 
third and final level is that of tactics.  
The tactical level 
The tactical level is ‘where we find battles, engagements and fights,’48or as the 
American Field-Manual puts it ‘battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.’49 The British 
handbook describes it, using nearly the same wording, as ‘Battles and engagements 
are planned and executed at the tactical level to achieve campaign objectives as 
articulated by the operational commander within the campaign plan, using tactical 
missions.’50 Interestingly it adds that ‘Success at the tactical level does not translate 
automatically into campaign success.’51 That this is a truism was evident from the 
capture of Antwerp for example, as will be described in Parts Two and Three. 
Basically tactics can be defined as deciding how to win the battle in order to fulfil the 
goals set down at the operational level. That also means that the scale of the tactical 
level is wide open. These engagements can range from a fire fight between platoons 
or companies to the Battle of Arnhem. Tactics are the responsibility of battalions, 
regiments (English: brigades), divisions, but sometimes even Corps or Armies.52 
Tactics have always been based on four principles: ‘being stronger than the enemy, 
having superior firepower, combining fire and movement, and securing freedom of 
action’.53 Even if the enemy has more guns, men or materiel all around, it is still 
                                        
45 Liddel Hart in his book on Strategy for example (Chapter XIX) never mentions the operational level 
and gives examples of strategy (e.g. Guderian’s breakthrough at Sedan) that are in fact at the 
operational level. Also, Brooke for example found fault with Montgomery’s ‘strategy’ on 5 October 
1944 (Alanbrooke, 600). 
46 October 6 -25 1973 between Israel on one side and Syria and Egypt, assisted by other Arab 
countries, on the other. 
47 Army Doctrine Publications 2010, E-19. 
48 Smith, The Utility of Force, 13. 
49 US Army FM 100-5, 6-3. In the same section a distinction is made between engagements (small 
conflicts or skirmishes) and battles (a series of related engagements). 
50 Army Doctrine Publications 2010, 3-19. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Von Brunn, Taktische Übungen, 1. 
53 O.P. van Wiggen et al, Tactiek, Almere 2009, 7. 
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possible by manoeuvring to be stronger locally and also have more firepower there. 
In modern warfare then, and this applies to World War Two as well, the essence of 
sound tactics is ‘vuur en beweging (fire and movement)’.54 More importantly, ‘The 
successful tactician must be more nimble and move faster relative to his opponent 
(…). To do this he may well use fire and obstacles, natural and man-made, to delay 
or suppress the enemy’s ability to move’.55 It is one of the aims of this study to show 
that Generalleutnant Kurt Chill and his senior officers did just that. They moved 
quicker and responded faster, thwarting the intentions of their opponents time and 
again. Because there is a direct link between all three levels, Chill forced higher Allied 
commanders to rethink their decisions and adjust their operational aims.  
 
There is widespread agreement among military historians that the German army 
during World War Two excelled in the tactical and operational area and failed in the 
strategic dimension because that was how it trained its officers.56 The pinnacle of a 
German officer’s career was to become an Oberbefehlshaber and be in charge of an 
Armee where he could apply the skills he had honed throughout his professional 
life.57 A drawback was that this meant that the leading military in Germany were not 
involved in political strategic matters. That was Hitler’s domain to which they 
submitted all too willingly. In fact Germany’s professional soldiers even before World 
War Two believed that they could solve all strategic problems through clever 
operational actions.58 The Wehrmacht astonished the world by the speed with which 
it defeated the opposing forces during the first years of the war and in 1940 the 
German propaganda dug up the pre-war term ‘Blitzkrieg’ to describe this apparently 
revolutionary type of warfare.59 Even after 1942, when it was clear that it was losing 
the war, the German army continued to be the equal of other armies and often still 
operated more skilfully on the tactical level.60 But their opponents were on a learning 
curve. The German superiority on the battlefield was recognized by Field-Marshal 
Montgomery, one of the key players on the other side. Understanding the disparity 
between the British and the German armies, he developed the operational doctrine of 
‘Colossal Cracks’ i.e. using firepower as a substitute for superior tactics.61 Because 
the British army was ‘not very good’ and the Wehrmacht was recognized as being a 
formidable and professional foe, Montgomery developed this technique both to 
bolster morale and to avoid heavy casualties.62 Attrition was to be the key to 
defeating the Westheer. The approach turned out to be successful. Where the 
German soldier fought on, sometimes very fanatically, for a number of reasons, some 
more obvious than others (see also 1.2 below), the British soldiers, aware that the 
war was going their way, could not be expected to ‘meet the sacrificial, superhuman 
                                        
54 Ibid, 23. 
55 Smith,The Utility of Force, 14. 
56 Klep and Schoenmaker, De Bevrijding, 22-24 about the ’new military historians’; Van Creveld, ’Die 
deutsche Wehrmacht: eine militärische Beurteilung’, in Müller, Die Wehrmacht, 334. 
57 Ibid, 335. 
58 Karl-Heinz Frieser, Die deutschen Blitzkriege: Operativer Triumph – strategischer Tragödie, in 
Müller, Die Wehrmacht, 182. 
59 Frieser, Blitzkrieglegende, 5-7. 
60 Van Creveld, Die deutsche Wehrmacht, 344.  
61 Stephen Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-
45, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg 2007,6. 
62 Ibid. 
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efforts German officers frequently demanded of their troops’.63 In other words, ‘The 
real task facing British and American commanders in Northwest Europe was not to 
attempt to match the virtuosity of the best German commanders, but eventually to 
achieve victory by doing what the British army did best: to gradually grind down the 
enemy…’64 Montgomery’s operational approach meant that the Allied troops did 
indeed win the war even though the Germans sometimes had the tactical upper hand 
and won the occasional battle.  
 
Before concluding the chapter on strategic, operational and tactical levels two 
aspects, typical for the Wehrmacht, need to be looked into. The first is one of the 
more controversial operational principles, developed on the Eastern Front, the 
bridgehead strategy, which is extremely relevant for this study. 
 
1.1.2 Bridgehead strategy 
 
Since time immemorial rivers sometimes formed obstructions for advancing armies. 
It has therefore always been very important for any advancing army to seize and 
hold bridgeheads from which to develop the attack. The German army had shown 
this in a spectacular way during Fall Gelb, the attack on the West in May 1940 when 
the various bridgeheads across the river Maas had proved to be the undoing of the 
French defensive system. Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, had been a 
repeat performance, once again showing that by making fast crossings enemy 
defences could be outflanked. After 1941 the Red Army did the same to the 
Germans, proving to be tenacious in the extreme once they had even so much as a 
platoon across a water barrier. Hitler, however, had stretched this sensible military 
principle to the extreme. For him bridgeheads were always the logical beginning of a 
possible future offensive even under circumstances that made any offensive action, 
whether in the immediate or far future, completely impossible. A few examples to 
illustrate the point: the pocket at Demyansk, a huge mushroom shape on the maps 
projecting sixty kilometres into Soviet held territory, was the last foothold of the 
Wehrmacht on the strategically important Valday hills cutting the Leningrad –Moscow 
railway line and even as late as September 1942 Hitler still felt it could be the 
starting point of one arm of the encirclement of the Russian troops in the bulge 
around Toropets.65 A future offensive operation was also why Hitler ordered General 
Paulus’ 6. Armee to stand fast at Stalingrad after it had been encircled in November 
1942.66 The net result was the destruction of the German army. Likewise 
Heeresgruppe A two months later, was told to remain in the Kuban bridgehead 
because Hitler hoped to launch a new offensive on Maikop from there in the summer 
of 1943.67 Well over half a year later, in January 1944, the Germans had been 
pushed beyond the river Dnjepr, but even there tiny bridgeheads stayed in German 
hands, Hitler wanted to use the one near Khorsun as the basis of an attack on Kiev 
                                        
63 Ibid, 26. 
64 Ibid, 177. 
65 Paul Carell, Scorched Earth, Hitler’s War on Russia, Volume 2, London 1970, 249 and Earl F. 
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, Washington DC 1984, 102. 
66 Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, Washington DC 
1987, 476. 
67 Das Deutsche Reich 8, 451. 
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in a pincer movement mimicking those of 1941.68 Instead it was the German troops 
that would be encircled and almost annihilated. Similarly the ‘balcony’ around Nikopol 
not only protected the manganese ore deposits in the area but also, at least in 
theory, offered the potential for an attack to restore the link with the German 17. 
Armee in the Crimea peninsula which the Russians had cut off in October 1943.69 
The most absurd example of Hitler’s strategy is no doubt Heeresgruppe Kurland. 
Here, in the Courland peninsula, part of modern Latvia, no fewer than two armies 
with an average strength of twenty divisions, were tied up from October 1944 until 
the end of the war because Hitler refused to transfer them to Germany proper to 
assist in the defence of the Reich since he clung to the vain hope hat he might use 
Courland as a bridgehead for a renewed invasion of the Soviet Union one day.70 All 
these examples reveal the two objectives of Hitler’s bridgehead strategy: to tie down 
enemy troops and serve as the starting points of future offensive operations. This 
principle was also applied during the fighting in the autumn of 1944 south of the 
river Maas and played a big role in the German decisions as will be evident from Part 
Three. There is one final point to be made concerning the military decision-making. 
 
1.1.3 Command and Auftragstaktik 
 
In the military system, command has two extremes, High Command and Battle 
Command.71 The former refers to the strategic level, the latter to the tactical (also 
sometimes called technical) level. In between, as we saw, is the operational level. 
Traditionally in armies orders have always been given at the top which are then 
translated down. However, the German army, as early as the 1870’s and 80’s, had 
come up with an added dimension which we need to consider when assessing the 
performance of Kampfgruppe Chill, the principle of the so-called Auftragstaktik. In 
English this is usually translated as ‘mission oriented command system’. It is a 
system which basically delegates down the chain of command. What it meant in 
practice was that commanders told their subordinates what to do, but not how to do 
it. The history of Auftragstaktik goes back to the end of the nineteenth century.72 
The reason for the creation of Auftragstaktik was the realisation that the old 
principles of command, in which every detail was mapped out beforehand by the 
highest commander, no longer worked in modern warfare with its modern firearms 
causing the situation on the battlefield to be so fluid and extensive that an instant 
reaction was often required. Even as early as 1806 the Prussian rules of engagement 
decreed that ‘Weitläufige Dispositionen sind vor eine Bataille nicht zu geben…’73 
Similiarly the defeat of the French in 1870 by one foreign observer was attributed to 
‘e i n e r  u n g e h e u r e n  S u m m e   s e l b s t ä n d i g e n  U n t e r n e h m u 
n g s g e i s t [space in original] aller Stellen bis zur untersten herunter…’74 Following 
                                        
68 Nikolaus Von Vormann, Tscherkassy, Heidelberg 1954, 28. 
69 Paul Carell, Scorched Earth, 382 and Das Deutsche Reich 8, 469-478. 
70 Victor Madej, Russo-German War No. 35, 25 January to 8 May 1945, Allentown 1987, 5. 
71 Landmacht, Militaire Doctrine, Den Haag 1996, 105. 
72 This section: Stephan Leistenschneider, ’Die Entwicklung der Auftragstaktik im deutschen Heer und 
ihre Bedeutung für das deutsche Führungsdenken’, in Gross, Führungsdenken in eurpäischen und 
nordamerikanischen Streitkräften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn 2001, 175-190. 
73 Uhle-Wettler, Höhe- und Wendepunkte, 339. 
74 General Woide, Die Ursachen der Siege und Niederlagen im Kriege 1870, quoted in Uhle-Wettler, 
Höhe- und Wendepunkte, 340. 
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the 1870/1871 war against France two trains of thought developed, one was the 
Normaltaktik where the officer in charge had little room for manoeuvre and 
everything was prescribed, and Auftragstaktik which rejected all schematic solutions 
but favoured letting the officer responsible decide on the best course of action.75 The 
die was cast in favour of the latter in the Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanterie of 
1888. The concept of Auftragstaktik consists of three components and has two basic 
requirements, which are relevant for this study, since they offer the criteria to 
determine where Chill stood in this respect. First of all there is the freedom of form. 
Every situation in battle is unique, requiring unique solutions that can only be 
decided on by the officer responsible. Next there is the self-responsibility as the 
leading tactical principle because the officer is allowed to deviate from the 
assignment, at least within the given framework, the purpose or idea behind the 
assignment. The third and last principle is that orders should always be given in such 
a way that  the subordinate is clear about the intentions behind the order. The two 
conditions necessary for Auftragstaktik to work are proper training of NCOs and 
officers, who need to be able to ‘read’ situations in war quickly and correctly and 
respond likewise, and active (as opposed to passive) discipline based on mutual trust 
between superiors and subordinates. The principles of Auftragstaktik became 
gradually integrated in the German army and from World War One were an integral 
part of its tactics. 
 
In 1936 The concept was further formalised in Heeres Dienstvorschrift 300, 
Truppenführung. Without using the actual word it said in Section II (’Führung’), 
paragraph 36 that: ‘Die Grundlage für die Führung bilden der Auftrag und die Lage. 
Der Auftrag bezeichnet das zu erreichende Ziel. Der Beauftragte darf ihn nicht aus 
dem Auge verlieren.’76 In other words, it was the mission that came first and 
foremost for he subordinate. The paragraph also warned that ’Ungewissheit der Lage 
bildet die Regel.’ The next paragraph elaborated on the decision stemming from the 
mission saying that ’Aus Auftrag und Lage entsteht der Entschluss. Reicht der 
Auftrag als Grundlage des Handelns nicht mehr aus oder ist er durch die Ereignisse 
überholt, so muss der Entschluss diesen Verhältnissen Rechnung tragen. Wer einen 
Auftrag abändert oder nicht ausführt, hat dies zu melden und übernimmt allein die 
Verantwortung für die Folgen. Stets muss er im Rahmen des Ganzen handeln. (…) In 
den Wechselfällen des Krieges kann aber starres Festhalten am Entschluss zum 
Fehler werden. Rechtzeitiges Erkennen der Umstände und der Zeitpunktes die einen 
neuen Enstschluss erfordern, ist Führungskunst. Der Führer muss den Unterführern 
Freiheit des Handelns lassen…’  Several elements here are worth pointing out: a 
subordinate commander must not follow the instructions he is given blindly, but 
instead act upon circumstances that will invariably be fluid and so he is allowed to 
change the decision, always keeping the interests of the whole in mind. Freedom of 
action is specifically mentioned. No action was always a mistake and an offensive 
mentality was encouraged. 
 
In the subsection ‘Befehlserteilung’ the future officer was told how to issue correct 
orders in order to guarantee his subordinates the aforementioned freedom of action 
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and still ensure that the goal is achieved. Among other things it emphasized that 
‘Befehle dürfen nur so weit binden wie sich die Verhältnisse übersehen lassen. Doch 
wird die Lage oft verlangen, ins Ungewisse zu befehlen.’77 However, as the war 
progressed and the number of conflicts with the higher military increased, Hitler 
became more and more insistent that the ultimate decision regarding not only 
strategic, but also operational moves was his. The crisis came to a head at the end 
of 1941 when the Eastern Front threatened to collapse altogether under the Soviet 
onslaught. Hitler’s contested ‘Haltebefehl’ of 16 December 1941 was a turning point 
in this respect. Three days later Hitler relieved the Oberbefehslhaber des Heeres, 
Generalfeldmarschall Walter von Brauchitsch, of his command and from then on was 
in charge of the army himself.78 Soon Hitler insisted on receiving daily reports on all 
troop movements and ordered higher commands (Armies and Army Groups) to take 
tighter control of their subordinate units and no longer leave them room for their 
own interpretations or actions, or as the army’s chief of staff, Generaloberst Franz 
Halder, put it, ‘Die pflicht soldatischen Gehorsams lässt für Empfindlichkeiten 
untergebener Dienststellen keinen Raum, sie verlangt vielmehr schnellste und beste 
Ausführung im Sinne des Befehlenden.’ 79 In other words, allowing commanders in 
the field freedom of action, as laid down in Heeres Dienstvorschrift 300, was now 
ridiculed as ‘Empfindlichkeit’. Trusting one’s subordinates, their professional ability, 
training and personality, was now replaced by distrust. The whole tactical oncept, 
based on modern warfare and introduced at the end of the nineteenth century, was 
thrown overboard. Halder’s instruction basically meant the end of the idea of 
Auftragstaktik. However, the problem, of course, was that for the top to be able to 
make the right decisions in the first place and check and control subordinate units, 
the reports of the latter had to be truthful and correct. Here was a loophole for 
commanders who still liked to make up their own minds. Hitler realized this might 
become an issue as is evident from his first directive as commander-in-chief, the 
‘Grundsätzlicher Befehl über das Meldewesen’ on 26 December 1941. Hitler 
emphasized that reports had to be submitted in a spirit of ‘Wahrheitsliebe’ and 
‘Gewissenhaftigkeit’.80 Of course it was precisely here that commanders with their 
ears to the ground saw an opportunity to continue to use their own initiative. By 
‘fiddling the books’ especially in circumstances with little opportunity for higher 
commands to check the facts, they often still managed to do whatever they thought 
was best. Commanders pretended to be out of touch, to have a communication 
breakdown, not to have received instructions in time and –often correctly- to be 
unable to pass on instructions since they had no idea where certain units were. In 
this way, the principle of Auftragstaktik, continued to function, to some extent, until 
the very end of the war. The history of Kampfgruppe Chill epitomises this principle.81 
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1.2 The Wehrmacht in the West, 1944-1945, an overview  
 
One of the big questions after the Second World War had ended was, why had the 
Wehrmacht continued to fight for so long, even in the face of imminent defeat? Ever 
since historians have been mystified by this ‘extreme rarity of a country being able 
and prepared to fight on in war to the point of total destruction.’82 This was 
especially puzzling in the conflict in the West. Whereas on the Eastern front fear of 
bloody reprisals by the Red Army as well as saving civilians from rape, murder and 
pillage were obvious motivating factors to carry on the fight to the bitter end, no 
such incentives existed for the German soldiers facing the British, Canadians, 
Americans, French and Poles. So why, after the collapse of the front in Normandy, 
did they still continue to delay the inevitable for another eight months? Ever since 
the end of the war scholars have looked for answers in all different aspects of 
society.83 As part of this ongoing research over the years a number of studies have 
appeared which focus on how the Wehrmacht functioned, what its soldiers felt and 
thought and how they behaved, both as military professionals and as individuals. 
This paragraph intends to give an overview of the historiography of the Wehrmacht 
‘from below’.84 It discusses the articles and books on the subject that are considered 
the key texts.85 They are given in chronological order which helps to see the 
discourse as it has developed over the last sixty years. 
Shils and Janowitz 
One of the first to look into the issue were Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz in 
1948.86 These two academics had worked for the Intelligence Section of the 
Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. As such they had interviewed German 
Prisoners of War and also had them fill in questionnaires. The purpose of their paper 
is twofold, to analyze the influence of primary and secondary groups on German 
soldiers and to evaluate the impact of Allied propaganda on the fighting ability of the 
German army. They do this by interrogating POWs and holding psychological 
interviews, by studying captured documents, statements of Allied soldiers and 
reports of combat observers. Shils and Janowitz start by giving five categories of 
social disintegration in a military unit, ranging from desertion, through active 
surrender, passive surrender and token resistance to last-ditch resistance. They then 
use a definition of a primary group as one ‘characterized by intimate face-to-face 
association and cooperation’.87 Since most German soldiers were not volunteers, but 
conscripts, this strong social group was very important. Nevertheless to be militarily 
effective, such a group needs a ‘hard core’ which in their findings embrace about ten 
to fifteen per cent of the enlisted men, but is higher among the NCOs and junior 
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officers (no precise figure is given). They then explain that social cohesion was 
helped by the German replacement system in which groups were maintained as units 
as much as possible even if this meant draining them gradually.  
 
Shils and Janowitz then add a caveat. They admit that towards the end of the war 
improvised battle groups meant a deterioration of group solidarity. They claim that 
these groups ‘so diverse in age composition and background, and especially so mixed 
in their reactions to becoming infantrymen, could not very quickly become effective 
fighting units.’88 Here they touch upon the heart of this thesis. Next they discuss 
various factors that either weaken or strengthen group cohesion such as isolation, 
family ties, physical survival, honour and manliness. The latter qualities were most 
often found in those fighting until the very end. Shils and Janowitz found that 
company and battalion grade officers behaved similarly to their superiors. Being a 
good officer in the German army meant being a model to your men, being the 
authority, but one that looked after his men’s needs. They also found that senior 
NCOs and junior officers played central roles in the lives of the soldiers, more than 
battalion, regimental and divisional commanders. The NCOs had a strong sense of 
duty while the junior officers were generally well selected and educated although as 
the war progressed there was an increasing shortage of both groups. Shils and 
Janowitz felt most of the men to be ignorant of bigger issues (strategy), neither was 
nationalism relevant, but there was a strong devotion to the Führer. (As a result 
Allied propaganda, focused on counter indoctrination was, by and large ineffective.) 
In their conclusion Shils and Janowitz say that previous assumptions about why the 
Wehrmacht fought on (mainly ideology) were incorrect, rather politics and ethics 
played a minor role. Instead, the primary group is why the Landser continued until 
the bitter end. The right conditions for this had to be created and depended on 
spatial proximity, intimate communication, the attitude of the NCOs and junior 
officers and the gratification of basic needs, both mental and physical.  
 
The value of this seminal study lies in the fact that it is based on primary sources, 
namely the German soldiers themselves. For this thesis it is especially noteworthy 
what they conclude about the Kampfgruppen (although they do not use the name), 
the roles of senior and junior officers and the importance of a ‘hard core’ all of which 
are relevant for Kampfgruppe Chill. 
Van Creveld 
In 1982 Martin van Creveld, then a historian at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
wrote an aptly named book called ‘Fighting Power’.89 Van Creveld’s starting points 
were the amazing ability of the Wehrmacht to fight on, no matter how unfavourable 
the circumstances, and the findings of Colonel (ret.) Trevor N. Dupuy, who used a 
mathematical model to show that the Germans consistently ‘outfought the far more 
numerous Allied armies…’.90 Van Creveld set out to examine the question of how this 
was possible by examining what constitutes fighting power, thus hoping to find ‘the 
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secret of the German Army’s fighting power…’91 He does this by comparing it to the 
U.S. Army in World War Two. In ten chapters he looks into various aspects i.e. 
status, doctrine, command principles, organization, administration, maintaining 
combat efficiency, rewards and punishments, NCOs, and officers and leadership. Van 
Creveld’s conclusion is that lots of elements contributed to the efficiency of the 
German army, such as the exalted social status of the military and indoctrination with 
Nazi ideology, but the main factor was the internal organization. The German army, 
according to Van Creveld, because of economic and material constraints, 
concentrated on operational efficiency, consistently sending its best men to the front, 
sometimes to the detriment of administration, management and logistics. As he puts 
it, ‘It went for quality, and quality was what it got.’92 This is reflected in the principle 
of Auftragstaktik which offered officers freedom to act. To make this principle work, 
meant that the officers had to be trained to take responsibility. In contrast, Van 
Creveld writes, the US Army concentrates not on fighting power, but on fire power, 
not on the operational aspect only, but on creating a balanced organization. Finally, 
commenting on the modern trend to equate military organizations to business 
corporations, he notes that there is one crucial difference between the two, namely 
that in a military organisation there is ‘the mixture, in one combination or another, of 
discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness 
to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die.’93 This seems like a succinct 
description of the essence of fighting power. 
 
Van Creveld’s study is very useful because it adds a lot to what Shils and Janowitz 
found. Van Creveld lists many other reasons, apart from group cohesion, for the 
excellence of the German army. However, the drawback of his explanations is that 
he focuses on regular units with their well-organized training, replacement system 
and staff work, and does not address the issue of the Kampfgruppen. Although he 
recognizes their existence and admits that their flexibility is one of the ‘more 
outstanding aspects of the German Army’s performance’ the very fact that they do 
not meet all the criteria he mentions, leaves the reason for their excellence an open 
question.94 
Bartov 
The origin of Bartov’s book on the mindset of the German army on the Eastern Front 
was a PhD thesis at Oxford University in 1983. Two years later an amended version 
was published.95 Bartov’s hypothesis is that the crimes perpetrated by the 
Wehrmacht on the Eastern front were mainly the result of the conditions at the front, 
the backgrounds of the junior officers and political indoctrination. In order to prove 
this he looks at three divisions which he feels to be representative.96 In the first 
chapter he describes the conditions in Russia, the huge number of casualties, the 
mental and physical suffering and tries to find an answer to the question ‘but why 
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did the soldiers show such resilience?’ He admits that the explanation given by Shils 
and Janowitz (see above) may be part of the answer, but no more than part, since 
often there was no stable primary group in view of the casualties. There was such a 
high turnover in officers and NCOs in particular that Bartov thinks group loyalty 
cannot offer a sufficient explanation. Another factor for the tenacity was the fear of 
the Russians, but Bartov points to another contributory factor, the enthusiasm of the 
(junior) officers which he investigates in the second chapter. He shows that among 
the various age groups the majority were from middle-class backgrounds, a third of 
them members of the Nazi party, most of these being from the upper middle class. 
This made them representative of the social groups that supported Hitler. He also 
found that the bulk of the junior officers (up to the rank of Captain) were young 
(nearly half were younger than thirty-one) which means that they grew up during 
the Great Depression and witnessed the triumph of the Third Reich. These men, who 
formed the backbone of the army, were thus most likely to be influenced by the 
propaganda and indoctrination at school, university or in the various youth and 
labour organisations. In the third chapter Bartov focuses on the beliefs of the 
German soldiers which, he admits, are hard to measure. Still, he concludes that until 
the end of the war German soldiers had a continued belief in the Führer, which 
cannot be put into hard figures, but is evident from their behaviour. This strong 
influence from the Nazi Weltanschauung, which was almost like a religious belief, 
both stiffened German soldiers’ determination and legitimised the crimes against the 
Russian Untermensch even though the majority of the soldiers were not Nazis 
themselves. The last chapter details the atrocities committed by the German troops 
in the East. In his conclusion Bartov states that, even though not all soldiers were 
Nazis ‘many, if not most of them, were greatly influenced by the Nazi 
Weltanschauung and its implications regarding their conduct in the East.’97  
 
The relevance of Bartov’s book for this study is twofold. First, he wanted to write a 
history ‘from below’ specifically looking at the junior officers. Since there is no reason 
to think that the officers in Kampfgruppe Chill came from a different background his 
findings should apply here as well. Secondly, as many of the officers, especially the 
senior ones, had served on the Eastern front before 1944, the mindset of the soldiers 
is one that they took along with them to the Western front. A weakness in Bartov’s 
study is that he only looked at a limited number of units and one of his main sources 
was a book by a single veteran, Guy Sajer.98 
Fritz 
In 1995 Dr. Stephen G. Fritz, a historian at Tennesse State University, published his 
book about the ordinary Landser, with the aim of trying to understand the ‘nature of 
man at war.’99 In his conclusions he reflects on and at times questions the findings of 
Shils and Janowitz, Van Creveld and Bartov. He bases his findings on letters, 
documents and autobiographies, two prominent ones being Siegfried Knappe and –
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again- Guy Sajer.100 The book has ten chapters, including the introduction, dealing 
with various aspects of an ordinary soldier’s life. In the second chapter Fritz 
discusses the harsh basic training one of the elements which contributed to group 
cohesion. The next chapter deals with the soldiers’ baptism of fire, their first 
experience of combat which was usually so overwhelming that soldiers shut down 
and focused only on those things necessary to survive. In chapter four he tries to 
answer the question, how do men endure this? He comes up with a variety of 
answers such as humour, music, rumours, mail and resignation. He concludes that 
having mixed feelings and a whole range of emotions was the norm rather than the 
exception. If a man still broke down, the last resort was harsh discipline which in the 
Third Reich could and often did mean the death penalty. The next chapter deals with 
the effects of the terrain on the soldiers. Chapter six discusses what war did to the 
senses of the Landser. The following chapter looks at the influence of comrades 
which Fritz claims was a transformation of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft into a 
Frontgemeinschaft, both promoting a sense of egalitarianism. This spirit of equality 
was strengthened by the principle of Auftragstaktik which after all encouraged 
independent, tactical initiative. The Frontgemeinschaft became a kind of surrogate 
family and so it made sense that for many German soldiers it was important to earn 
and keep the respect of one’s peers, sometimes even taking pride in the little band 
of men they were a part of. In chapter eight the motivation of soldiers is looked into. 
Fritz states that from the experiences in World War One in Germany a picture was 
created of the typically modern warrior, a merger of technology and flesh, tough, 
pitiless and relentless. Even those who could not or would not meet this idea still 
displayed a stubborn resilience, doing their duty until the final consequence. This 
sense of duty was imbued with anti-semitism and anti-communism, but, unlike 
Bartov, Fritz does not believe that such negative ideals explain the ordinary German’s 
resilience, rather it was the celebration of the social side of National-Socialism, the 
positive ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft, a new society without class, a new mankind 
even. Chapter nine deals with the period after the war and then in the next and final 
chapter Fritz draws some conclusions. The main motivator for the Landser, he feels, 
was the idea of being part of a Frontgemeinschaft. This led to greater trust in the 
NCOs and junior officers even in trying circumstances. It also explains the lasting 
popularity of Hitler among many of the soldiers as well as the conviction that things 
might still take a turn for the better.  
 
By quoting extensively from all kinds of sources Fritz succeeds in painting a vivid 
picture of what life at the front was like for the average German soldier. For this 
thesis his insistence on the importance of the idea of Volks- and Frontgemeinschaft 
needs to be taken into account, as a possible contributory factor to the resilience of 
Kampfgruppe Chill.  
 
Rush 
In 1999 Robert S. Rush, a Sergeant-Major in the US Army and military historian who 
later got his PhD on the fighting in the Hürtgenwald,101 wrote an article in which he 
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examined morale, unit cohesion and operational effectiveness in the Wehrmacht 
through a case study of LXXIV. Armeekorps during the period September to 
November 1944.102 This article tries to correct the picture painted about the 
Wehrmacht in books so far, but Rush in particular addresses the studies by Shils and 
Janowitz, Van Creveld and Bartov. However, Rush does not just focus on group 
cohesion, he also investigates organizational structure and organizational cohesion. 
The former is defined as the formal organization of a unit, the latter as ‘the unit’s 
officers and enlisted leadership (…) and the individual soldier’s identification with the 
organization.’103 At the start of the period which Rush covers in his article, the 
German army was on the way back from France and generally morale was very low 
which was not helped by the attitude of some officers against the newly minted 
infantry, ex-sailors and airmen. Rush then goes on to describe the various battles 
fought by LXXIV. Armeekorps and its constituent divisions from September through 
November 1944. He comments on the time spent on training for German infantry. 
Rush then rejects Van Creveld’s claims about the excellent German replacement 
system since that no longer applied during the autumn of 1944. Many German 
soldiers no longer knew what regiment they belonged to or who commanded them. 
This meant, according to Rush, that as there was no primary group, the group 
cohesion Shils and Janowitz saw as the determining factor for the resilience of the 
Wehrmacht, was no longer there. Other negative influences (stressors) he found 
were that many officers were not up to scratch, there was a shortage of food and 
clothing, the weapons were inadequate, there was a lack of medical treatment and 
poor hygiene as well as miserable conditions at the front (wet, cold). Still, the 
Landser kept on fighting, often displaying a kind of fatalism instead of the ideological 
fervour found by Bartov. Rush also believes that the German soldier was caught 
between a rock and a hard place, between fear of the enemy and fear of retribution 
from the Nazi regime. He does add, however, that although below divisional level 
there was no real organisational cohesion, from divisions upwards there was a very 
strong one, because the staffs stayed together even during the retreat from France. 
His final conclusion is that since there was no primary group cohesion, no 
organizational structure or ideological fervour, the deciding factor for the ordinary 
German soldier to fight on must have been intimidation by the high command, fear 
of being executed or sent to a penal battalion.  
 
The relevance of Rush’ article for this thesis is potentially great since Rush looked at 
the same theatre of war, concentrated on the same period, examined units that were 
either seriously disorganized or under strength and included the (lack of) 
organizational structure and cohesion, something which this study also looks at. 
Whether his explanations also apply to Kampfgruppe Chill needs to be examined of 
course. 
 
Kunz 
In 2007 the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA) published a study about  
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the Wehrmacht and the last days of the Third Reich.104 This book was a (slightly)  
rewritten Ph D thesis. The author, Andreas Kunz, a historian at the University of 
Potsdam, wanted to test the generally accepted theory that the Wehrmacht had 
literally fought until ’fünf nach zwölf’.105 In order to do this he first looks at the 
political and social structure of the Third Reich, then he examines the personal, 
material and organizational effects of the war on the Wehrmacht and finally he paints 
a picture of the mindset of the Landser along a scale from ideological fervour on one 
end to fear of reprisals on the other. His sources range from official documents from 
the top (OKH, OKW etc.), to ‘petit histoire’ in the forms of letters and 
autobiographies. Since not all of Kunz’ findings are relevant for this study, I am going 
to focus on those that are. Like previous authors Kunz notes the disastrous end of 
the Normandy campaign which meant that in September the German army in the 
West had lost 516,000 men since D-Day.106 Overall it had lost 1.1 million men in 
August and September and only received 510,000 replacements.107 Especially officers 
were hit hard. In this respect September 1944 was the worst month of the war so 
far, as 317 officers a day were lost (on all theatres of war).108 Almost inevitably this 
led to a decline in quality, especially among company and battalion commanders.109 
The same could be said for more than 400,000 Luftwaffe men who were transferred 
to the army or the Fallschirm units. Because the German army was now heavily 
outnumbered and the war was effectively lost, Germany should have ended the war. 
However, as that was not an option, mainly because of Hitler, both leader of the 
state and the army, from now on it could only carry on fighting for as long as it 
could. For the military this meant that all they could was concentrate on the 
operational aspect.110 Next Kunz flies in the face of all those who believe in the myth 
of the Wehrmacht as superior to the Allies. Noting the poor material situation where 
some soldiers did not even have a rifle and units from the Ersatz Heer had to fight 
with outdated weapons. This plus the lack of proper training and the abolishment of 
the principle of Auftragstaktik, lead Kunz to conclude that the picture of the 
Wehrmacht as a superior fighting force must be false; it is simply part of the 
rhetorics of a nation that has lost the war and tries to find a reason it can live with. 
Referring to Shils and Janowitz on the one hand and Bartov on the other, Kunz feels 
that the idea of primary group cohesion has become too much of a dogma in books 
about the Wehrmacht. He refers, somewhat scathingly, to it as 
‘gebetsmühlenartig’.111 On the other hand, he admits that even the huge losses do 
not necessarily mean that individual soldiers did not look for practical and emotional 
support in their comrades. Kunz opens the final chapter by making an important 
caveat to his findings, namely that the Wehrmacht was not a uniform concept. He is 
of the opinion that all we can state with certainty today is that millions of men in 
uniform risked life and limb under the same banner. In every other respect it was a 
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multitude of individual and varied experiences. He then arrives at five (sometimes 
startling) conclusions. Still, he concludes that, a) the German leadership had no idea 
how to end the war, even long before the collapse in France, b) the military were 
subject to the political leaders, c) for the political leadership the endgame was ‘total 
war’ without any moral or other restrictions, d) the Wehrmacht was not superior in 
view of its personnel and material inferiority and e) stating that the Wehrmacht 
fought until the end, fails to do justice to the complexity of the historical facts. Most 
men fought on, because what else could they do? 
 
The book by Kunz is groundbreaking because, unlike the authors mentioned above, 
he is the first to point out that giving monocausal explanations does not do justice to 
what really happened in 1944 and 1945. This should be borne in mind when setting 
off the actions of Kampfgruppe Chill and comparing them to other units, be it other 
Kampfgruppen or regular units. It is also interesting to note that he both accepts and 
refutes primary group cohesion as an explanation. Finally, Kunz’ rather bold claim 
that the Wehrmacht was not a superior fighting force will need to be examined in the 
light of what is found about Chill’s battle group. 
Lieb 
In the same year the MGFA published another book on a different but related 
subject.112 Peter Lieb, Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst,  
wrote a PhD thesis in which he wanted to answer the question whether the war in 
France had developed into an ideological conflict like in Russia or whether it was a 
conventional war after all? Some of his findings, especially in his last Chapter, 
‘Rückzug: Der Kampf in der Defensive’ are relevant for this study.113 He finds that 
although the Allied superiority, especially in the air, was very depressing, morale did 
not begin to suffer until the collapse of the Normandy front. Lieb also concludes in 
his study that, after Waffen-SS and armoured units, the Fallschirmjäger provided the 
most reliable fighting units. In addition, as long as there were reliable leaders and 
the group stayed intact, soldiers not only kept on fighting, but consistently showed 
tactical and operational superiority. Even after the retreat from Normandy began, 
morale rose a little as the soldiers neared Germany in September and the Allied 
advance was once more blocked. Lieb attributes this to a number of factors: fear of 
reprisals after the number of court martials had risen dramatically and at least one 
third of the soldiers, mainly SS and younger soldiers still believing in a final victory 
for Germany. As long as there were good NCOs and officers even those weary of the 
war fought on. Another reason for fighting on Lieb found in the primary group which 
was partly reconstituted as many who had been wounded in Normandy returned to 
their former units. Finally, the idea that Germany was now with its back against the 
wall, must have been a contributory factor to the will to resist.  
 
A number of the elements mentioned by Lieb could certainly apply to Kampfgruppe 
Chill, since, he (partly) studies the same period covered in this book. To what extent 
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ideology, fear of reprisals and primary group cohesion were determining factors for 
Chill’s battle group will need to be looked into. 
Zimmermann 
Another book about the Wehrmacht during the last stage of the war, another PhD 
thesis and also a publication by the MGFA came out in 2009.114 Some of the findings 
agreed with Kunz’, others differed. This study by John Zimmermann, an 
Oberstleutnant (Fallschirmjäger) in the Bundeswehr, is based on official documents, 
but also on diaries, letters and autobiographies. It is divided into four parts and a 
conclusion. The first three chapters are the introduction, the framework of the last 
year of the war, the composition of the troops, the opponents and the German high 
command. Chapter four which deals with the motivation (and ‘Motive’) is most 
relevant to this study.115 Zimmermann first of all notes that although getting 
divisional staffs back from France intact was an important contributing factor to the 
sustained resistance, most of these units were devastated which caused serious 
problems for a while. Also the constant personnel changes, caused by the huge 
losses inflicted, meant that the influence of the primary group as posited by Shils and 
Janowitz was no longer there. Morale among the German soldiers really plummeted 
after the failure of the Ardennes offensive, but still most soldiers were more neutral 
than negative, as is evident from their letters. Most soldiers during this final stage of 
the war were rather ‘going through the motions’ than actually fighting, it was all 
about survival for them. Only a minority surrendered prematurely. One of the 
reasons most men fought on was for fear of reprisals, being court-martialled. The 
Wehrmacht carried out an extremely high number of death penalties, namely 19,600 
as compared to 48 during World War One.116 Still, that was only part of the 
explanation. The most important motive, according to Zimmermann, was simply the 
desire to do one’s duty in order to survive. Going through the motions was therefore 
more or less the ‘normal’ thing in Germany, for military and non-military alike. On the 
other hand, an added reason for commanding officers to fight on was because the 
chances of a rapid promotion or decorations. In addition the junior officers had 
grown up believing in the Third Reich and the Führer. Many ordinary Germans were 
attracted by the Nazi state after the Weimar Republic. Also a lot of the junior and 
senior officers were already thinking of the post-war period thinking of themselves as 
a Funktionselite.  So they wanted to avoid a repeat of 1918 at all costs. In fact, by 
fighting on they saw an opportunity to shape the end and turn it into a heroic 
demise, thereby creating a myth which would benefit them. They unscrupulously 
asked the young and the old, and in the end even women, to die for this idea. Hence 
it was also business as usual by and large for military institutions. Zimmermann’s 
final conclusion is that this should not come as a surprise, since it was what the 
German military leaders had been doing since early 1943 when it became clear to 
those at the top that the war could not be won. Eventually post-war events proved 
them right, both because the two armies in the two Germanies owed a lot to the 
                                        
114 John Zimmermann, Pflicht zum Untergang, Die deutsche Kriegführung im Westen des Reiches 
1944/1945, Paderborn 2009. 
115 Zimmermann, Pflicht zum Untergang, 389-463. 
116 Ibid, 154. 
 31 
Wehrmacht and this ‘Durchhalten und Weitermachen um jeden Preis’ earned them a 
kind of grudging admiration even from their erstwhile opponents.117  
 
Zimmermann’s study, like the ones mentioned above, throws light on the motives of 
why the military, both high and low, fought on for as long as they did and offers 
explanations that do not depend on the organizational aspect, making it very useful 
for this study of an ad-hoc unit. Still, it does not explain the military effectiveness of 
Kampfgruppe Chill.  
Neitzel and Welzer 
Most recently Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, the former a historian, the latter a 
socio-psychologist, both at the Kulturwissenschaftlichen Institut in Essen, Germany, 
published a book based on 150,000 protocols of discussions of German POWs 
overheard by the Allies and now in possession of The National Archives (TNA) in 
Kew, England, and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in 
Washington, USA.118 Their goal was to investigate the mentality of German soldiers 
during World War Two. They did not focus specifically on the questions the 
abovementioned authors looked into, but nevertheless, like Fritz, by focusing on all 
aspects of a soldier’s life, they did throw some light on some of the issues discussed 
earlier which are also of interest to this study. In particular they look at the belief in 
the final victory (Siegesglaube), the belief in Adolf Hitler (Führerglaube), and they 
compare and contrast the war and the Third Reich as frames of reference. Their final 
chapter answers the question, how national-socialist was the German army during 
the war? Their conclusion is that any war for those who have to fight it is never one 
of ideology. This applies as much to the Landser in World War Two as it does to the 
American G.I. fighting in Vietnam in the sixties or a NATO soldier engaged in 
Afghanistan today. Even aspects that have different values today, such as honour, 
toughness and willingness to die, do not distinguish the German soldier in World War 
Two from one in World War One or the Weimar era. The most important explanation 
for the willingness to kill and be killed, Neitzel and Welzer see in the transition from 
civilian life to war, because in war people commit acts they would never commit in 
other circumstances. Both killing Jews and defending your country are consequences 
of this shift of paradigm. For them ideology is not and cannot be the key factor 
which is why they call upon all of those studying the Wehrmacht ‘mit der 
Überwertung des Ideologischen aufzuhören.’119 The way people behave in war is 
banal, as banal as any other business, even though this may lead to millions of 
deaths. Relevant for this thesis is the chapter about ‘Militärische Werte’, defined as 
bravery, obedience, and doing one’s duty. Here they discuss under the heading ‘Bis 
zur letzte Patrone’ the question why the German soldiers fought to the bitter end.120 
For the higher military it was simple, according to Neitzel and Welzer, the worse the 
situation became the more they demanded a ‘fight to the bitter end’, so much so, 
that it became a central motif during the final stage of the war. For the rest of the 
army the behaviour of the group determined the behaviour of the individual soldier, 
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soldiers fought together and surrendered or died together. The behaviour of the 
group, personal dispositions and situational factors were decisive. A complicating 
factor was that the higher the rank, the more hurdles there were for a person to 
shake off the values incorporated in the military framework. Their final conclusion is 
in line with what Zimmermann had found: fighting was the norm, even just going 
through the motions still meant a person could feel that he was a good soldier. Doing 
one’s job to the best of one’s ability was the core value of all seventeen million who 
served in the Wehrmacht, whatever their function or rank.  
 
This lapidary explanation may help us understand why the men in Kampfgruppe Chill 
continued to fight, but it does not help us understand why they fought so well. 
Analysis 
It should be noted that the above list does not include the most recent study about 
the death throes of the Third Reich, The End, by noted historian and Hitler 
biographer Ian Kershaw.121 The reason for this is that Kershaw does not add to the 
various explanations given above for why the military fought on instead focusing on 
the ‘quadrumvirate’ around Hitler (Goebbels, Himmler, Speer and Bormann), thus 
filling a gap in the existing literature. However, for this study that aspect of Nazi 
Germany is not really relevant which is why Kershaw’s book is not included here.  
 
Soon after World War Two, in 1948, Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz were the 
first to look into the reasons why German soldiers fought on for as long as they did. 
They concluded that the main ground for this was primary group cohesion, loyalty to 
one’s comrades. The problem is that this does not explain why ad-hoc units like 
Kampfgruppen also fought to the end. In 1982 Martin Van Creveld wrote a book in 
which he tried to explain the superiority of the German army, in victory as well as in 
defeat. To the findings of Shils and Janowitz he added organizational elements, such 
as training, replacements and the system of Auftragstaktik. This might help explain 
why Kampfgruppe Chill fought so well, but again, like Shils and Janowitz, Van 
Creveld mainly focused on regular units. The following year another seminal study 
appeared, by Omar Bartov. He rejected the explanation given by Shils and Janowitz 
because he feels that the high turn-over in NCOs and junior officers makes a strong 
group cohesion highly unlikely. Instead he posited ideology and a continued belief in 
the Führer, as the main motivators for German soldiers during World War Two. In 
1995 Stephen G. Fritz, tried to emulate Bartov and basically agreed with him. He 
dismissed all explanations bar one, that of ideology. German soldiers fought because 
they believed in the Frontgemeinschaft, a natural extension of the Volksgemeinschaft 
in which they grew up. This is such a general explanation that Robert R. Rush four 
years later looking at units operating in the same theatre during roughly the same 
period as this study, gave a completely different explanation: fear of reprisals, not an 
ideological belief was what drove the Landser. However, as Thomas Kühne noticed in 
1999, ideology and fear of reprisals need not be mutually exclusive, rather, he adds 
‘Zeitnahe Zeugnisse legen eher die Vermutung nahe, dass sich beides gegenseitig 
verstärkt hat.’122 Moreover, he objected to the monocausal interpretations offered so 
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far. His prayers for a more balanced explanation were answered by the two studies 
published by the MGFA in 2007 in which Peter Lieb and Andreas Kunz independently 
arrived at the conclusion that there was not just one Wehrmacht, rather in 1944 was 
a collection of four million individuals who fought under the same banner. 
Nevertheless, Lieb felt that a combination of being close to the Fatherland, ideology, 
group cohesion and fear of reprisals go a long way to explain the tenacity of the 
German soldier. Kunz was ambivalent about group cohesion, but noted that the 
Wehrmacht fought on because the Nazi leadership was in charge and they had no 
other option or idea what else to do. In his book he questioned the superiority of the 
Wehrmacht, taken for granted by all previous authors. Two years later, in another 
groundbreaking study, John Zimmermann distinguished between various levels, 
senior and middle-ranking officers fought because they were already planning for the 
post-war period, junior officers to further their careers and get medals, lower ranks 
sometimes for fear of reprisals, but mostly because they simply wanted to do their 
duty, because that is what you did. This somewhat banal explanation also needs to 
be seriously examined here. Finally, in 2011 Sonke Neitzel and Harald Welzer took 
the discussion full circle so far by dismissing all claims of ideology as irrelevant. For 
them the group behaviour determined –and still determines- how soldiers behave, 
how and if they fight, irrespective of war, country or time. Which means that over 
sixty years of discussion have taken us as back to square one, Shils and Janowitz. 
 
The big question is, how to create some kind of synthesis out of these, sometimes 
contradictory, findings? All of them are based on authentic primary and secondary 
sources. A few things seem clear: a monocausal explanation can never suffice, since 
reality is always more complex, made up of more parameters than just one or two. 
Also, there was no such thing as the German soldier in World War Two (just like 
there never was the GI, the Tommy etc.). Here, too, individual responses to 
situations can vary so much that only trends can be described, such as the fact that 
more Germans fought on than gave up prematurely. This multicausality ties in with 
what Kunz, Zimmermann, Lieb and Neitzel and Welzer have found. Since Bartov 
focused on the atrocities on the Eastern Front and tried to explain these, I feel that 
he put too much emphasis on the ideological aspect. On the other hand, the 
complete rejection by Neitzel and Welzer does not seem to do sufficient justice to the 
differences between the NCOs and junior officers on the German side and those on 
the Allied side. Granted, only a minority of the Germans were Nazi’s (in 1933 before 
Hitler came to power 43.9 % voted for the NSDAP), but a recent study on the Third 
Reich said ‘there was no mistaking the pride and satisfaction of the great majority of 
Germans (…) at Hitler’s achievement in throwing off the universally hated yoke of 
Versailles.’123 For most Germans this had been the work of one man, Adolf Hitler, 
which helps to explain the sustained belief in the Führer until the end. In a similar 
vein, Fritz certainly has a point with his emphasis on the fear of reprisals, but like 
Bartov’s  his explanation seems to be too oversimplified. It is my contention that we 
shall find a combination of explanations of why the men in Kampfgruppe Chill fought 
on, which will certainly include group cohesion whether it is called that, or 
Frontgemeinschaft or ‘band of brothers’.124 Other findings that a number of authors 
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agree on are the tremendous influence and importance of competent leaders and the 
relevance of the fact that even after the long retreat from France most divisional 
staffs were still intact. The relevance of this also needs to be looked into. There is 
one last point to make. Van Creveld, although he does focus on regular units, rightly 
points out some of the excellent organizational qualities of the German army. Since 
Zimmermann also emphasizes the ‘business as usual’ aspect in this respect, 
suggesting that the organizational element of the Wehrmacht was still in force, it is 
worthwhile examining to what extent these qualities applied to Chill’s battle group. In 
this study I intend to focus on the mindset, unit cohesion, and organizational and 
operational effectiveness of Kampfgruppe Chill and see to what extent they confirm 
or contradict the findings mentioned above. As noted earlier, the problem is that 
many of these studies look at the Wehrmacht as it was set up, as it was supposed to 
function, not in a situation where much of the system had broken down, so, to what 
extent were Kampfgruppen different from regular units? 
 
1.3.1 Kampfgruppen  
 
Before zooming in on the battlefields of France, Belgium and the Netherlands and 
describing how the subject of this study, Kampfgruppe Chill, was created we should 
have a look at the phenomenon of Kampfgruppen and what exactly is meant by the 
term. The directory prepared by Allied Intelligence on the eve of the Invasion in June 
1944, defines a Kampfgruppe or battle group as ‘a temporary ad-hoc organisation 
(…) normally identified by its commander’s name’.125 It should be noted that there 
were no official rules for this. If a commanding officer decided he was in charge of a 
battle group then the information was passed on and it was named after him or after 
the unit that formed the staff or the core. In our case, for example, Kampfgruppe 
Chill was also referred to as ‘Kampfgruppe 85. I.D.’ The directory added that a 
Kampfgruppe was ‘the most fluid in the entire German army, since it consists simply 
of a variety of troops temporarily grouped together for a specific mission’.126 In other 
words, size did not come into it. This is not always understood. David Bennett in his 
recent book about Market Garden for example puts it that a battalion was ‘upgraded’ 
to a Kampfgruppe.127 This is nonsense, up- or downgrading has nothing to do with 
calling a unit a Kampfgruppe. The Kampfgruppen could and did vary in size from as 
small as an outsize platoon to roughly the equivalent of a division.128 To make 
matters even more complicated one Kampfgruppe could control another. For 
example, Kampfgruppe Dreyer was part of Kampfgruppe Chill. But this is not the 
whole story. 
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Originally the term Kampfgruppen was (and still is) used, to indicate composite task 
forces assembled for a specific mission. As the editors of Command Magazine put it 
in their book on the German forces, ‘One of the outstanding characteristics of the 
German military during World War Two was its adherence to the principle of unity of 
command. At the battle group level this manifested itself in a practice that put all 
units engaged in a single mission under one commander (…). This principle was so 
deeply ingrained in practice that battle groups were usually identified by the name of 
their commander’.129 Usually this meant combining several arms, e.g. infantry, 
armour and artillery according to what was necessary to achieve the objective. A 
good example early in the war is a Kampfgruppe of the 2. Panzer-Division under 
(then) Oberst Hermann Balck who successfully ordered a combined group of 
I./Panzer-Regiment 3, II./Grenadier-Regiment 304 and an engineer company to 
outflank the Greek defences on Mount Olympos on 16 April 1941.130 Another 
example of a much smaller one is Kampfgruppe Baumgart  which consisted of a tank 
company, a motorcycle company, an infantry company and two 8.8 cm Flak guns 
under the command of Oberleutnant Baumgart which captured a bridgehead on the 
Molodilnja river on 20 November 1941 as part of the attack on Tula.131 Rommel, too, 
in Africa formed many a Kampfgruppe if the occasion called for it. During the attack 
on the British Gazala line in the spring of 1942 Kampfgruppen Hecker and Baade for 
instance both played important roles in the breakthrough towards Tobruk.132 A late 
example, finally, from early 1943 were the four mixed armour-infantry battle groups 
of the 1. Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (SS-Obergruppen-
führer Sepp Dietrich) during the attack to recapture Kharkov on 11 March.133 Even 
though such Kampfgruppen were being created until the end of the war,134 from the 
second half of 1943 the Wehrmacht was forced on the defensive and even by 1944 
the term had by and large become a euphemism for remnants of units.135 Heavy 
losses on the Eastern Front had led to the creation of more and more of the new 
kind of Kampfgruppen as the Soviet pressure on the German army mounted. The 
order of battle of Heeresgruppe Mitte for example, listed four armies with a total of 
forty-six divisions at the start of Barbarossa in June 1941.136 Just over two years 
later, at the end of 1943, it still boasted four armies plus troops serving under 
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ostland, but this time, besides regular divisions as well as 
divisions temporarily lumped together into battle groups, it officially numbered no 
fewer than eight Kampfgruppen (including the so-called Korpsabteilungen D and E 
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made up by combining the remains of three infantry divisions into a division-sized 
battle group).137  
 
Unfortunately, so far, no serious study has been published about the phenomenon of 
the Kampfgruppen. The only book published on the subject is ‘Battle Group!’ by 
James Lucas.138 However this book has a number of flaws. First of all, in addition to 
factual errors,139 it only looks at a random number of Kampfgruppen (seventeen) 
without explaining why this number, this particular choice and whether or not, or to 
what extent, they are representative of the phenomenon as a whole. Secondly, Lucas 
does not distinguish between the two different uses of the word ‘Kampfgruppe’ in the 
German army. That is a serious flaw, since the two were very distinct. The original 
use of the term, as mentioned above, was to indicate a battle group assembled for a 
purpose, along the lines of the American Combat Commands and the British 
combined tank-infantry groups, the second referred to a hastily assembled, ad-hoc 
formation created through circumstance rather than as a result of deliberate 
planning. The first, original kind of Kampfgruppen resurfaced in the Bundeswehr. Any 
task force composed for a mission was labelled Kampfgruppe (according to its 
composition it could be called Panzerkampfgruppe, Grenadier-Kampfgruppe or plain 
Kampfgruppe).140 To make matters worse, in this book the emphasis is on this kind 
of Kampfgruppe and Lucas gives only five examples of the kind of improvised battle 
group like Kampfgruppe Chill, almost suggesting that these were the exceptions, 
which during the second half of World War Two certainly was not the case. Finally he 
calls units Kampfgruppen when in fact they were not.141 For want of useful 
secondary sources offering a theoretical framework, one had to be created. 
Fortunately, there were some primary sources available that makes it possible to 
form a picture of Kampfgruppen in the Western theatre of operations.  
 
1.3.2  Kampfgruppen in the West, 1944-1945 
 
Since there is no textbook about the Kampfgruppen, for the purpose of this study it 
is necessary to look first at some data from primary sources. An analysis by SHAEF at 
the end of October 1944 of 140 Kampfgruppen encountered since D-Day concluded 
that so far 14% of the Kampfgruppen encountered were company sized, 52% were 
battalion sized and 34% were larger than the average battalion.142 There is another 
document which provides some insight into the composition and size of 
Kampfgruppen. The Interrogation Reports based on the interviews conducted with 
POWs of the First Canadian Army between 29 August 1944 – 30 April 1945 also 
looked at the phenomenon of Kampfgruppen. The results match those of SHAEF half 
a year earlier in one respect. Out of a total of sixty-nine just one Kampfgruppe 
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(1.4%) was the size of a platoon, twenty-four (34.7%) were company-sized, thirty-
four (49.2%) were the size of a weak (two company) or strong (three to five 
company) battalion and ten Kampfgruppen (14.5%) were substantially bigger than 
the average battalion. Again the majority, about half, were the size of a battalion, 
but interestingly this time the higher and lower figures have traded places, the 
majority of the Kampfgruppen being not bigger, but smaller than a battalion. This 
reversal may just have been caused by the fact that the Canadians looked at fewer 
battle groups. But there is further evidence that the figures noted in the second 
report are more correct for the period focused on in this study. In a similar analysis 
to the Canadian one the British Second Army made an inventory of no fewer than 
thirty-five Kampfgruppen encountered during Market Garden, most of whom are 
mentioned in the narrative below (Part Three).143 A rough analysis concluded that 
nine were ‘over battalion size’ and twenty-six were ‘under battalion size’. However, 
before drawing conclusions, two Kampfgruppen need to be deleted from the 
equation since they were either a regular regiment (Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 21, 
Oberstleutnant Rolf Löytved-Hardegg) or a division (7. Fallschirmjäger-Division, 
Generalleutnant Wolfgang Erdmann) and five cannot be taken into account since no 
information is given about their sizes. This leaves twenty-eight. A more accurate 
breakdown of these along the lines of the two previous analyses reveals that ten 
(35%) were company-sized, fifteen (54%) battalion-sized and three (11%) were 
larger than the average battalion. This tally is very similar to the one found by the 
Canadians at the end of the war. An explanation for the disparity between the first 
analysis and the other two may lie in the time frame. Many of the battle groups 
looked at by SHAEF had fought in Normandy where there had been very few 
Kampfgruppen until the very end of the campaign in August. Then, during the last 
stage of the fighting, many units had completely disintegrated and were broken up 
into a large number of small sub-units all basically running for their lives. This could 
explain why there were more smaller units than in the other two analyses. Overall 
we can say that for the period described in this study, applying an average of the 
analyses by Second Army and Canadian First Army, 51% of the Kampfgruppen were 
battalion-sized, 36% were smaller and 13% were bigger. We shall see where 
Kampfgruppe Chill stands in relation to this. 
 
The intelligence officers at SHAEF also had interesting comments about the 
composition of the Kampfgruppen. They concluded that of the battalion-sized and 
larger battle groups, about 65% were ‘formed from the remnants of badly mauled 
divisions and lost personnel’, 20% were ‘formed from replacement battalions, 
committed before they could get to their divisions’, 10% were ‘formed from security 
formations previously used as line of communication troops’ and the rest was ‘made 
up of school personnel, convalescents, recruits etc.’144 As to the armament, the study 
concluded that these units were, naturally, lacking in many weapons, as well as 
having an extreme variety, but also that the emphasis was on anti-tank weapons, 
ranging from 7.5 cm Pak anti-tank guns to hand-held Panzerfäuste. Of the larger 
battle groups 15% were found to have some artillery as well. Analyzing the 
Kampfgruppen in the Interrogation Reports of the First Canadian Army concerning 
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their armament the following was found: of eleven battalion-sized Kampfgruppen no 
information was available; of the other twenty-three, just three (13%) had mortars, 
one had Pak guns, and all the others (83%) were only equipped with rifles, light 
machine-guns (both MG 34, MG 42 and Czech ones) and Panzerfäuste.145 In other 
words, they never had any heavy weapons such as artillery and very few had mortar 
and anti-tank guns. For the larger Kampfgruppen the figures were quite different. No 
information was found for one (Kampfgruppe Fuchs, February 1945) and very limited 
for another (Kampfgruppe Oldenburg, April 1945). The breakdown for the other eight 
shows that in addition to the standard equipment of rifles, machine-guns, mortars 
and Panzerfaüste, three had Pak-guns, three had some artillery and two had a few 
light (2 cm) Flak-guns. It is clear that even the bigger battle groups were seriously 
lacking in guns of all categories. Nevertheless, even though they were often without 
any serious hardware, the SHAEF report quoted earlier concluded that ‘The battle 
group system, in spite of its many defects, has been a relatively successful 
expedient, particularly in the early stages of the German attempt at stabilization.’146 
The truth of this conclusion needs to be verified in the accounts in Part Three. 
 
More generally, this study needs to examine how Chill compares to the 
Kampfgruppen mentioned above to determine how typical or atypical it was. One 
problem is that the composition and size of Kampfgruppe Chill fluctuated wildly. This 
means that the answer to this question will vary according to the moment in time. In 
other words, a comparison will have to be made after every engagement described 
in Part Three. The results then need to be collated and only then can we arrive at a 
more general conclusion both about the size and the composition of Kampfgruppe 
Chill as compared to the other Kampfgruppen in the West. One thing many experts 
agree on is that, regardless of their size, these improvised battle groups played a 
very important role for the Germans in the fighting during the second half of World 
War Two and “often showed resilience and flexibility that remain among the more 
outstanding aspects of the German Army’s performance.”147 In fact one might say 
that Kampfgruppen epitomise the German military culture steeped in the principle of 
Auftragstaktik, leaving the initiative to the commander on the ground. 
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PART TWO CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 
 
‘Der OB west musste der dramatischen Verschlechterung der Lage am 4. September weitgehend 
tatenlos zusehen.’148 
 
“”Dear Horrocks – You will capture (a) Antwerp (b) Brussels. Signed M.C. Dempsey.”149 
 
“It is difficult to understand why no serious effort was made to open the port (…) while the 
momentum of their headlong retreat still lasted…” 150 
 
To understand the circumstances surrounding the creation of Kampfgruppe Chill  on 
4 September 1944, it is necessary first to describe the events following the battles in 
Normandy which would lead to what on the German side was called the ‘Höhepunkt 
der Krise im Westen’,151 the point where the German Westheer was teetering on the 
brink of defeat. In order to do that one needs to go back to 20 August when the 
Falaise pocket was closed. 
 
2.1. The Western Front at the end of August 1944 
 
After the Allied troops had landed in Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, it took them 
well over two months to wrestle themselves free of the deadly grip in which the 
German armies held them. Operation Cobra launched by the American VII Corps 
(Major-General J. Lawton Collins) on 25 July was the turning point.152 After an initial 
hesitant start the tide turned and two days later a jubilant Major-General Leland S. 
Hobbs (30th US Infantry Division) could report that ‘This thing has busted wide 
open.’153 And wide open the gaping hole in the German frontline indeed was as 
armour and infantry raced south. Instead of pulling gradually back as urged by his 
generals, Hitler ordered a counterattack to seal the gap. This meant the German 
armour put its head even further into the noose. The Allies used this opportunity and 
while General Omar N. Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group bore down on the Germans 
from the south Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group pounded its way south. The 
Allied breakout and the encirclement of 7. Armee (SS-Obergruppenführer und 
General der Waffen-SS Paul Hausser) inside the pocket near Falaise, which was 
closed on 20 August, resulted in the destruction of nearly half of the German troops. 
About 50,000 men were taken prisoner and about 10,000 dead were found on the 
battlefield. In addition at least 400 armoured vehicles, 700 artillery pieces and 5,000 
transport vehicles were left behind. 154 Still, almost 40%, about 40,000 men, 
escaped, among them the army staff, four Generalkommandos (i.e. Corps staffs) and 
nearly fourteen divisional staffs.155 An attempt to trap those troop below the Seine 
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also only partly succeeded. Another 304 armoured vehicles, 166 artillery pieces and 
3,178 transport vehicles remained on the left bank of the lower Seine, about 25-30% 
of the equipment.156 Again the staffs got away, but an attempt to set up a new 
defensive line could not be carried out as the divisions on average now had just 
3,000 men.157 The next opportunity might be offered by the rivers Somme, Marne 
and Saône, the so-called Kitzinger line, about a hundred kilometres further north.158 
For the moment there was little that the new commander of Heeresgruppe B and 
Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West), Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, who had 
taken over from Generalfeldmarschall Hans von Kluge on 17 August, could do except 
call for more troops and try to gain time. The two functions were combined since 17 
July when Von Kluge, OB West since 3 July, also had to take over Heeresgruppe B 
from Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel who was wounded on the 17th in an attack 
by Spitfires from 602 Squadron near Vimoutiers.159 Holding these two jobs at the 
same time was a tough chore, even for a man of Model’s calibre. Meanwhile, his 
opponents had other things to worry about.  
Montgomery was content that Eisenhower had given his Twenty-First Army Group 
priority by telling the Twelfth Army group that their principal offensive mission was to 
assist its drive in the north-east (see next chapter).160 In the evening of 25 August, 
the day on which Paris was liberated, XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks) 
crossed the Seine. Speed was now of the essence. By later afternoon of that day the 
first bridge was in position and vehicles of the 43rd (Wessex) Division (Major-General 
G.I. Thomas) began to cross. Stiff fighting ensued, but counterattacks were beaten 
off. On 28 August the 43rd Division established a large perimeter east of the Seine. 
Other formations in XXX Corps now began to cross. Meanwhile XII Corps 
(Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie), to the left, had also won bridgeheads a day before. 
There the 15th (Scottish) Division (Major-General C.M. Barber) had established the 
first bridgeheads. The 53rd (Welsh) Division (Major-General R.K. Ross) and the 4th 
Armoured Brigade were going to pass through. To enable the advance to be 
continued at this pace VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor) was 
grounded temporarily. The units of the First Canadian Army (Lieutenant-General 
H.D.G. Crerar) crossed further north as well. Now that the Seine was crossed the 
pace began to quicken. British armour finally came into its own as armoured cars and 
tanks raced north. On 30 August Beauvais was cleared. Horrocks told the 11th 
Armoured Division to carry on throughout the night and try and capture Amiens. East 
of Paris the American First Army (Lieutenant-General Courtney H. Hodges) raced 
ahead just as fast, protecting the right flank of Montgomery’s Army Group. As August 
                                        
156 Ibid, 187 and Das Deutsche Reich, Bd 7, 562. 
157 Ludewig, Der deutsche Rückzug, 187. 
158 Named after General der Flieger Kitzinger who in early August had been ordered to construct a line 
there (Ludewig, Der deutsche Rückzug, 147). 
159 It happened here, in After The Battle, Number 8, 1975, 42-5. 
160 This section: L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Volume I, The Battle of Normandy, London 1962,  439-
476; L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Volume II, The Defeat of Germany, London 1968, 1-7; Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit, 657-702; C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World 
War, The Victory Campaign, Volume III, The Operations in North-west Europe 1944-1945, Ottawa 
1960, 296-303, 324.  
 41 
drew to a close it became a question of who would be fastest, the Germans pulling 
back or the Allies advancing?161  
For the time being the Allies were ahead in the race, in fact their pace quickened as 
the new month dawned. On 1 September the leading units of XXX Corps crossed the 
Somme, captured Arras and the high ground north of the town and nearly reached 
Lens. The next day Montgomery ordered XXX Corps to halt at the Carvin-Douai area 
since the First Allied Airborne Army was to drop four divisions in the Courtrai-Lille-
Ypres area (Operation Linnet). However, unfavourable weather was predicted. 
Montgomery quickly cancelled the operation and XXX Corps was allowed to advance 
the next day. Meanwhile American armour reached Tournai that night. On 3 
September the Guards Armoured Division (Major-General A.H.S. Adair) speeded 
ahead along two routes and by the end of the day they had liberated the Belgian 
capital, Brussels. The same day the 11th Armoured Division (Major-General G.P.B. 
‘Pip’ Roberts) closed in on Antwerp while XII Corps passed Courtrai and Lille 
approaching Gent. During the same period the Canadians had not been idle either. 
While I Corps (Lieutenant-General J.T. Crocker) turned left after crossing the Seine 
to secure Le Havre, II Canadian Corps (Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds) in vain 
tried to keep up with the leading units of Second Army on its right, pushing back the 
still largely intact forces of 15. Armee. On 1 September the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division (Major-General H. Foster) set off for Abbeville which it reached in the early 
hours of the following day. Opposite them the Germans where still holding the other 
bank of the Somme.  Engineers set out to construct a bridge while infantry crossed 
the river a few miles east of Abbeville to cover the operation. On 3 September the 
Canadian tanks continued their pursuit, soon followed by the tanks of the 1st Polish 
Armoured Division (Major-General Stanislaw Maczek). That day, on which the citizens 
of Brussels were celebrating their newly found freedom, Montgomery, Dempsey, 
Bradley and Hodges, met to discuss future strategy, continuing a debate that had 
been going on since the middle of August.162 
 
2.2 The Allied Strategy until 4 September 1944 
 
The end of the fighting in Normandy and the catastrophic losses suffered by the 
German Westheer, meant that the Allies needed to rethink their strategy.163 Soon a 
heated debate developed between Montgomery, still in charge of the ground forces 
when the Falaise pocket was closed, and Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, who 
was to take over as ground commander on 1 September. As August pulled to a close 
the increasingly euphemistic reports from the Intelligence Officers predicted a 
German collapse and an end to the war in the foreseeable future, although these 
sentiments were not shared by everybody. After the destruction of the German 7. 
Armee inside the pocket, the Allies could field thirty-eight divisions while another 
eight were being landed in the South of France. The Germans were clearly 
outnumbered as well as outgunned, so how best to exploit that situation? Even 
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before D-Day the planners at SHAEF had made it clear that the strategic task given 
Eisenhower ordering him to aim ‘at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her 
armed forces’ was best achieved by capturing the Ruhr area because of its economic 
importance.164 An advance from the Seine towards the Ruhr was the favoured route. 
However, considering it risky to attack along a single route, the planners advised a 
‘broad front both north and south of the Ardennes’ forcing the Germans to extend 
their forces to meet both threats. Eisenhower at the end of August decided to fall 
back on that plan. Immediately a controversy broke out. Bradley and Patton wanted 
to concentrate on a push east in the direction of the Rhine near Mannheim, while 
Montgomery insisted on the main drive being north, largely in line with the original 
SHAEF plan. After weighing the various proposals on 22 August Eisenhower told his 
subordinate commanders that Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group was to 
proceed north of the Ardennes while Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group was to strike 
south of there. To aid the British army group he assigned the First Allied Airborne 
Army (Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton) to Montgomery. Also the bulk of the 
petrol for Bradley’s army group would go to the First US Army which supported 
Montgomery’s drive. Bradley and Patton were, understandably, annoyed. But 
Montgomery had problems to take into account which the Americans did not share. 
 
One aspect he needed to consider in his strategy was the civilian population back in 
England still suffering from attacks by V-1 flying bombs launched from northwest 
France.165  On 26 August, still as commander of the ground forces, Montgomery 
issued his next directive, M 520.166 In the introduction he, correctly, said ‘The enemy 
forces are very stretched and disorganised: they are in no fit condition to stand and 
fight us.’ He stated the Intention of his directive to be ‘To destroy all enemy forces in 
the PAS DE CALAIS and FLANDERS and to capture ANTWERP [capitals in original].’ 
Only then would the Twenty-First Army Group ‘advance eastwards on the Ruhr.’ First 
Canadian Army was to clear the coast, the First Allied Airborne Army to drop in the 
Pas de Calais area, while the Second Army was to cross the Seine and ‘drive forward 
through the industrial area of N.E. France and into BELGIUM.’ The line of advance of 
Hodges’ First US Army was shifted slightly northward and it was now ordered to 
advance towards ‘the general area BRUSSELS – MAASTRICHT – LIEGE – NAMUR – 
CHARLEROI.’ Montgomery impressed the need for ‘Speed of action,’ which he 
described as ‘vital’. At the end of the directive, in paragraph 24, Montgomery added 
that ‘The proper tactics now are for strong armoured and mobile columns to by-pass 
enemy centres of resistance and to push boldly ahead…’ The twofold purpose of the 
directive was not only to destroy German forces in North-East France and Belgium, 
thus creating the basis for the advance on the Ruhr area, but also to eliminate the 
threat posed by the V-1’s by capturing the launch sites. Three days later Eisenhower 
confirmed the strategy when he wrote to his two army group commanders that the 
Allies ‘must seize the opportunity by acting swiftly (…) and by accepting risks. The 
Northern Group of Armies will cross the Seine and (…) destroy enemy forces south of 
the Somme. It will then advance rapidly across the Somme, and be prepared to 
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continue the advance to the north and north-east in order to seize the Pas de Calais 
area, the airfields in Belgium, and secure a base at Antwerp.’167 
 
Montgomery’s next directive, M 522, dated the same day as Eisenhower’s letter, only 
entailed a shift of boundaries between the various armies as a result of the decision 
(not carried out eventually) to drop airborne forces in the Tournai area on 3 
September.168 On 1 September Eisenhower assumed direct command of the ground 
forces. Montgomery was promoted to Field-Marshal. By then the situation had 
changed dramatically because of the capture of Brussels and the impending capture 
of Antwerp. Although Eisenhower warned of the growing logistical problems a day 
earlier, Montgomery still believed that ‘one really powerful and full-blooded thrust 
(…) is likely to get there and thus end the German war.’169 Montgomery’s directive M 
523, dated 3 September, radiated this optimism.170 In this short document, it 
consisted of just two pages, he described two bold aims: ‘To advance eastwards and 
destroy all enemy forces encountered.’ and ‘To occupy the RUHR [capitals in 
original], and get astride the communications leading from it into Germany and the 
sea ports.’ In detail Montgomery instructed Second Army to advance eastwards, 
starting on 6 September, towards the Rhine anywhere between Arnhem and Wesel, 
meanwhile threatening the area around Düsseldorf south of there. Also, one division, 
if necessary a Corps was directed towards Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The 
accompanying map shows one bold red arrow going nearly due north from the area 
of Turnhout and ending just south of Amsterdam. This may sound overly optimistic, 
but the idea that an advance as far as the capital of The Netherlands was likely at 
that time was shared by the German High Command. They believed that their troops 
would be unable to halt the Allies and therefore General der Flieger Friedrich 
Christiansen, Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in der Niederlanden, asked Oberbefehslhaber 
West for urgent permission to destroy the docks there because he did not have 
enough troops to turn them into fortresses.171 A document drawn up by the planners 
at the Twenty-First Army Group a day earlier was almost equally sanguine, with the 
following suggestion for the Canadian First Army, following the capture of Antwerp, 
‘Up to two divisions of Canadian Corps would follow through to mop up Northwest 
HOLLAND as far as the mouth of the RHINE, and the islands containing CD batteries 
likely to interfere with the opening of ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP [capitals in 
original].’ 172  In the third and final stage the Canadian Corps ‘crosses the Rhine and 
deals with the AMSTERDAM-HAGUE area of HOLLAND.‘173 In addition Montgomery 
gave instructions for Second Army, once it had crossed the Rhine, to head for the 
area of Osnabrück – Hamm- Münster. Clearly the expectations at the highest level 
were that the next few days would be a piece of cake, even after a two-day break to 
rest and refit before continuing on Wednesday 6 September. 
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2.3 The German Strategy until 4 September 1944 
 
At the highest levels German commanders had no idea how to deal with the Allied 
advance since the failure to halt the invasion. All that the Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht (OKW) could tell its generals was ‘auf Zeitgewinn abstellen. Wenige 
Monate können jetzt einfach entscheidend sein für Rettung des Vaterlands. (…) 
Daher Forderung Kämpfen, Verteidigen, Halten, Truppe und Führung seelisch 
stärken.’174 This directive, desperate, almost desperate in tone, was of little use to 
the commanders on the ground. While Montgomery ordered his troops to conquer 
the rest of France and Belgium, Generalfeldmarschall Model was trying to think of a 
way in which to stem the tide.175 In his Lagebeurteilung on 24 August, the first since 
being appointed as OB West a week earlier, Model simply reported to the OKW that 
his own troops were ‘burnt up’ and that there was no prospect of receiving any 
reinforcements before the end of the month. He feared that by that time the Allies 
could have reached the line of the Somme. All Model could suggest was trying to 
gain as much time as possible until then without losing cohesion. This could be done 
by pulling back to consecutive lines of the resistance, the next one being behind the 
Somme and Marne rivers. Hopefully it would hold. Model realized that everything 
would depend on the Allies not advancing too quickly. At the end of his report he 
made a somewhat bold statement, telling Hitler that, just as on the Eastern Front 
‘müssen (…) weitere rückwärtige Stellungen bis einschl. Westwall (…) vorbereitet 
werden.’ By and large Hitler accepted Model’s analysis, admitting for once that the 
forces required to hold the present line were not there. A few hours later he ordered 
the fortifications of the Westwall to be reoccupied and extended. The same day 
Model was asked if he would be prepared to accept Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von 
Rundstedt’s return as OB West. Model agreed and eventually on 5 September Von 
Rundstedt took up his old position.176 However, that was still some time in the future 
and in the meantime the Allies did not hold back, but instead unleashed their 
armour, dashing Model’s hopes of a quick recovery. As leading British units crossed 
the Somme on 30 August it was clear that the Germans withdrawing north were 
losing the race from the pursuing Allies.  
 
This meant that a gradual withdrawal behind the Somme, to which Hitler consented 
the following morning, was no longer a viable option.177 To the surprise of the 
Germans the British armour (XXX Corps) did not let up and continued the advance 
upsetting Model’s strategy of stopping them at the Somme-Marne line. Model had 
intended to insert the headquarters of 7. Armee (General der Panzertruppen Erich 
Brandenberger) to the east of 15. Armee (General der Infanterie Gustav-Adolf von 
Zangen). It was to take over from 5. Panzerarmee (Oberstgruppenführer der Waffen-
SS Josef Dietrich) which was to be relieved so that it could prepare for a 
counterattack against the right flank of the Allied advance.178 But now the Kitzinger-
line had been pierced and the troops of Heeresgruppe B were not given a moment’s 
reprieve. What should have been a systematic withdrawal was slowly, but surely 
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turning into a rout. On 31 August Model concluded that he was at the end of his 
tether as he no longer had any forces to put against what the Germans called the 
‘örtlich-operativen’ or local operational breakthrough of the Allies which had smashed 
the centre of Heeresgruppe B.179 This crisis began on 25 August and lasted until 4 
September.180 While Von Zangen’s 15. Armee was pulling back along the Channel 
coast as fast as it could, to maintain its integrity, the remnants of 5. Panzerarmee 
were being overtaken left right and centre by speeding Allied armoured units. In 
view of this the only option Model saw for Heeresgruppe B was to try and reach the 
Westwall before it was utterly destroyed. Once more Model urged the OKW  to 
occupy the Weststellung, as it was also referred to, without further delay. The next 
day, 1 September, the crisis reached its culmination point for the German High 
Command. 
 
A wedge had now definitely been driven between 15. Armee and 5. Panzerarmee by 
the British leading troops who were in the outskirts of Lille.181 The celerity of the 
advance surprised the Germans and Hitler in impotent fury described it as ‘eine 
Frechheit.’182 Model intended to close this gap and he ordered 7. Armee to set up a 
security line between Louvain and Namur. But it was too late. Communications had 
broken down all along the line and there were not enough anti-tank weapons to halt 
the Allied armour. Near Mons the remnants of six German divisions were encircled 
and after a brief battle 25,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. This was the end of 5. 
Panzerarmee as a fighting force. There was no longer a cohesive frontline between 
Lille and Charleroi. Full panic now set in among the troops and all fled east. What 
had been a hasty, but still orderly withdrawal now turned into total chaos. In an 
effort to stem the tide, Model made a public address to the soldiers under his 
command in the shape of a pamphlet ‘An die Soldaten des Westheeres!’183 He told 
them that the army had lost a battle, but not the war, stating (in capitals), ‘WIR 
WERDEN DIESEN KRIEG DOCH GEWINNEN!’ He appealed to their sense of honour 
and, betraying just how deep the crisis was, asked the soldiers if necessary to take 
the initiative themselves if their commanders were lost, ‘Überlegt selbst mit, was in 
dieser Lage das Beste und Richtigste ist [underlined in original].’ The situation was a 
test of manhood, ‘Dieser Augenblick will und soll die Waschlappen von den Männern 
scheiden.’ Model told the soldiers that the key thing now was ‘Zeitzugewinnen, die 
der Führer braucht, um neue Truppen und neue Waffen zum Einsatz zu bringen.’ He 
ended his pamphlet by saying, ‘Soldaten, wir müssen dem Führer diese Zeit 
schaffen!’ However, when he made the appeal, the race had already been lost. 
German operational instructions were reduced to ‘verbissen in hinhaltenden Kampf 
jeden Fussbreit streitig (…) machen.’184 At last, the OKW and Hitler also realized that 
the situation had fundamentally altered.  
 
On 2 September the OKW issued new instructions for the fighting in the West. The 
idea of impeding the Allied advance by successive lines of defence was finally 
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abandoned, instead Heeresgruppe B was to fight a delaying action from now on.185 
Model replied that he was hoping to hold the line Antwerp-Maas-Sedan-Metz-Moselle, 
but that he had his doubts whether this could be done.186 The OKW instruction was 
confirmed by Hitler the next day.187 Since this directive affected the actions during 
the next few weeks, and explains the relative lack of interference from Hitler, it is 
worth quoting it in full. In paragraph one, in which the general outline was given, it 
said ‘Die stark verbrauchten eigenen Kräfte und die Unmöglichkeit, rasch 
ausreichende Verstärkungen zuzuführen, lassen es nicht zu, schon jetzt eine Linie zu 
bestimmen, die gehalten werden muss und sicher gehalten werden kann. Es kommt 
darauf an, möglichst lange Zeit für Aufstellung und Heranführen neuer Verbände und 
für den Ausbau der West-Stellung zu gewinnen und durch teilschläge Feindkräfte zu 
vernichten.’ To achieve this Hitler ordered the right and the centre ‘in verbissenem, 
hinhaltendem Kampf dem Feind jeden Fussbreit Bodens streitig zu machen. Örtliche 
Einbrüche müssen in Kauf genommen worden.’ The emphasis in the new strategy 
was on gaining time and losing no more troops. Allied and German commanders at 
the highest level agreed on one thing: the door to Germany seemed to be wide open 
during those first few days of September. For Montgomery it was an opportunity, for 
Model a grave threat. As the directives for the future strategy were issued, there was 
still a yawning gap between 15. and 7. Armee and through it the Guards rushed 
capturing Brussels. Meanwhile remnants of German divisions continued to flood back 
east. One of the many shattered divisions on its way back to the Heimat was the 85. 
Infanterie-Division commanded by Generalleutnant Kurt Chill.  
 
2.4 Chill and the 85. Infanterie-Division until 4 September 1944 
 
The origins of the unit which was to play a pivotal role in the autumn fighting could  
not have been any less auspicious.188 The 85. Infanterie-Division under 
Generalleutnant Kurt Erich Chill, was one of six divisions raised in the 25. Welle 
(wave or mobilisation drive) on 10 February 1944.189 These were given the available 
numbers below 100. Until 1943 the core of German infantry divisions consisted of 
three regiments with a total of nine infantry battalions. An ever increasing manpower 
shortage required a drastic rethinking. From October 1943 these divisions were 
organized along new guidelines. From now on they were to have only six rifle 
battalions instead of nine.190 The so-called 1944 type infantry divisions compensated 
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for this reduction in battalions by getting a Füsilier-Bataillon instead of the old 
reconnaissance unit and by increasing the number of automatic weapons.191 The new 
divisions also had two regiments instead of three. Those in the 85. ID. were 
Grenadier-Regiment 1053 and 1054. As usual in the German army all other units in 
the division were numbered by putting a 1 in front of the divisional number. Hence: 
Füsilier-Bataillon 185, Artillerie-Regiment 185 etcetera (see Appendix 1). Total 
strength was 8,725 all ranks.192 The new division was to be formed around 
Grenadier-Regiment 1024 which itself had been raised only four months earlier on 20 
November 1943. As was the customary in the German army the new division was 
activated by a Wehrkreis (military district), in this case XII (Wiesbaden) which took 
care of the drafting and training. However, in view of the impending Allied invasion 
the division was not to be trained in Germany, but in the Crecy area in northwest 
France where it was subordinated first to LXXXII. Armeekorps and then LXVII. 
Armeekorps.  
 
The personnel of the 85. I.D. were generally new call-ups from Wehrkreis XII, but 
additional replacements later came from Oberbefehlshaber West and even included 
Russians (so-called Hilfswillige or Hiwi’s), Poles and Czechs.193 The officers were 
mostly veterans. The divisional staff consisted of Oberstleutnant i.G. Kurt Schuster, 
Ia (Operations), Major i.G. Weber, Ib (Supply and Administration) and Oberleutnant 
Zörkler, Ic (Intelligence).194 The two infantry regiments were commanded by Major 
(from 1 September Oberstleutnant) Georg Heinrich Dreyer (GR 1053) and Oberst De 
La Chaux (GR 1054). The division had only a limited number of vehicles, but since it 
was to be part of the strategic reserve some kind of mobility was essential. This was 
resolved by procuring large numbers of bicycles. The deadline for equipping the 85. 
I.D. was 15 May, but this was not met and the division had a thirty per cent 
deficiency in equipment. This issue was not resolved until the end of July, but it was 
not a problem as Chill’s division was initially given a reprieve. Following the invasion 
of Normandy on 6 June 1944 the 85. I.D. was ordered to assemble north of the 
Somme in the Abbeville area. It was to be ready for march within twelve hours. In 
view of the heavy fighting going on in Normandy, everybody in the division expected 
the order with tension and impatience. But the Allied deception plan ‘Fortitude’, 
intended to fool the German High Command into believing a second landing would 
be made in the Pas de Calais area, worked beyond expectation and nearly two 
months passed before the 15. Armee was finally allowed to release units into 
Normandy.195 On 31 July Chill at last received orders from the 15. Armee that his 
division was to assemble north of the Seine at Rouen ready to cross the river at a 
moment’s notice. The 85. I.D. was finally to receive its baptism of fire. Before briefly 
describing the battles in France we need to consider for a moment its commanding 
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officer, Kurt Chill, who was later to give his name to the Kampfgruppe, the subject of 
this study. 
Chill 
Kurt Erich Chill was born in West Prussia in the Prussian town of Thorn (today Torun 
in Poland) on 1 May 1895.196 After signing up as a one-year volunteer with 
Infanterie-Regiment 21, Chill fought in the First World War, initially in Infanterie-
Regiment 61 which fought at the Somme, and from 1916 as an observer in the 
Fliegertruppe (Flying Corps) in Flanders. He ended the war with the Eisernes Kreuz 
II. Klasse and the deutsches Ordenschild. After the war Chill, by then a Leutnant, 
briefly served in his old regiment before leaving the army and joining the police in 
1919. He entered service as an Oberleutnant for the Sicherheitspolizei and rose 
through the ranks, becoming a Hauptmann in 1924 and a Major with the 
Landespolizei in Merseburg in 1935. The same year he was trained at the Offizier 
Schule where he received the qualification ‘voll befriedigend’. He then decided to go 
back to the army. This decision was no doubt influenced by Hitler’s declaration on 16 
March that the army was to be expanded from 21 to 36 divisions and that general 
conscription would be introduced at the end of the year.197 Chill was not the only one 
to take this step, in fact, the rapid expansion was only possible because the army 
took over 56,000 men from the Landespolizei.198 On 1 July 1935 Chill once more 
found himself back in army uniform.  
 
Chill first served as a Major with Infanterie-Regiment 65, then in 1937 was put in 
charge of 1. Bataillon of Infanterie-Regiment 1 (1. Infanterie-Divison). It was in this 
role that he entered the war, now an Oberstleutnant. The 1. I.D. under 
Generalleutnant Joachim von Kortzfleisch, took part in the attack on Poland in the 
northern attack group (3. Armee). Rather surprisingly, considering what was to 
come, Chill did not do particularly well as a battalion commander. In the first 
assessment in Chill’s personnel file, dated 18 February 1941, Kortzfleisch is quoted as 
saying that Chill was very diligent, an excellent comrade and a good instructor, 
however he added, ‘Dagegen kann ich seine Gefechtsführung im Polenfeldzug weder 
als geschikt noch als erfolgreich ansprechen’. Obviously he had not made much of an 
impression on his superiors. Maybe that is one of the reasons Chill was sent to Halle 
in February 1940 where he served as a tactics teacher. There he did very well, 
according to the same assessment. Still, in December he found himself in charge of a 
regiment, Infanterie-Regiment 45 (21. Infanterie-Division). He was promoted to 
Oberst, but even so his divisional commander, Generalmajor  Otto Sponheimer, felt 
that Chill was not yet ready for the next step, or as the official phrase was ‘zur 
nächst höheren Verwendung noch nicht [geeignet]’. All that was to change 
dramatically over the next three years.  
 
Just one year later Sponheimer, by then a Generalleutnant, was full of praise for 
Chill. The 21. Infanterie-Division fought as part of Heeresgruppe Nord and advanced 
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as far as the town of Volkhov.199 Then the tables were gradually turned on the 
Germans and the division eventually ended up southeast of Leningrad.200 There it 
was engaged in extremely fierce fighting as part of  I. Armeekorps (General der 
Kavallerie Phillip Kleffel) which the Russians were trying to cut off. Instead, the 
Russian Second Shock Army (General Leytenant Andrei Vlassov) was surrounded and 
eventually destroyed after some hard and bloody fighting.201 Apparently the 
experiences in Russia had changed Chill for the better as a soldier as he was now 
increasingly praised for his performance. Sponheimer’s assessment is worth quoting 
in full as it gives the first inking of the new Chill. Sponheimer wrote on 8 April 1942, 
‘Charaktervolle, klare Persönlichkeit, seine Einsatzbereitschaft in schwierigen Lagen 
verdient Hervorhebung. Durch sein persönliches Beispiel reisst er mit. Durch seine 
schwungvolle und wendige Führung seines Rgt. Erzielt er stets gute Erfolge im 
Kampf, dabei auf das Wohl der Truppe bedacht. Taktisch gut beanlagt, sicher im 
Entschluss, gründlich in der Befehlsgebung. Bisher im Kriege (Ostfeldzug wiederholt 
mit der Führung eines verst.Rgt. sowie stellv. Mit der Führung der Division 
beauftragt), zeigt er Geschick und Befähigung für die Führung grössere Verbände. 
Zum Div. Kommandeur voll geeignet.’ Nevertheless, Chill would still have to wait 
another six months before finally being assigned his own division. 
 
Chill was originally supposed to command the 126. Infanterie-Division because its 
commanding officer, Generalleutnant Laux, was taking over as commander of an 
improvised Corps. However, before setting off Laux persuaded his superiors to 
nominate Oberst Harrie Hoppe (the hero of Schlüsselburg) who had been with the 
division from its inception.202 So Chill was assigned the 122. Infanterie-Division 
instead. In December 1942 he was promoted to Generalmajor. Chill did not rest on 
his laurels, but kept carving out a name for himself, so much so that half a year 
later, on 1 June 1943, he was promoted to Generalleutnant. That this promotion was 
well deserved Chill proved by leading a successful attack of his division near the hot 
spot of Nevel. On 15 October 1943 he was awarded the coveted Ritterkreuz, further 
proof that in Russia he had really honed his skills. His division was part of the 
succesful effort to block the expansion of a Russian breakthrough at Nevel which had 
surprised the Germans.203 He performed so well that he was even mentioned in the 
Wehrmachtsbericht , the daily broadcast by the German armed forces, and all of 
Germany could hear over the radio that ‘Südlich Newel scheiterten in harten 
Kämpfen alle Durchbruchsversuche des Feindes. (…) In diesen Kämpfen haben sich 
die norddeutsche 290. Infanteriedivision unter Führung des Generalleutnants 
Heinrichs und die pommersche 122. Infanteriedivision unter Führung des 
Generalleutnants Chill besonders bewährt.’204 The battle at Nevel dragged on for 
another three months, but the front north of Vitebsk held until the spring of the 
following year. By then Chill had left his division. In March 1944 he was ordered to 
set up the new 85. Infanterie-Division. His subordinates would have been reassured 
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to know that their new commanding officer, in addition to being a veteran, was 
‘sicher, ruhig und umsichtig’.205 Chill would need all these qualities in the coming 
battles. 
Baptism of fire 
After receiving the order to move to the invasion front on 31 July the division set up 
three march groups centred around Grenadier-Regiment 1053, 1054 and Artillerie-
Regiment 185 respectively.206 Progress was slow because most of the movement 
took place during the night as the Allied air forces ruled the skies. The Seine was 
crossed on 7 August and Chill learned that his division was to come under I. SS. 
Panzerkorps (SS Brigadeführer Fritz Krämer).207 There the division was to take over 
from the 12. SS. Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend (SS-Oberführer Kurt Meyer) which was 
being bled white fighting the Canadians. Although the SS-men were clinging on for 
dear life and desperate for relief they were asked to stay one more day so as to give 
Chill’s Grenadiere, most of whom had had to cycle for a week, some time to rest. 
Finally, on the evening of 9 August GR 1053 and III./AR 185 were the first units to 
occupy their new positions northeast of Falaise along the line of the Laison river.208 
Getting there had not been easy as the troops ‘had all suffered from air attacks’ and 
‘had had to march a great part of the way on paths parallel to the road and this 
cross-country marching was very tiring.’209 The following days the other units arrived 
and GR 1054 took up position to the left of its sister regiment. The Grenadiere would 
get only a few days’ respite before the balloon went up.  
 
On 14 August First Canadian Army launched Operation Tractable. The goal was to 
envelop Falaise and seal the ‘bag’ around the German troops in Normandy from the 
north. To assist the ground troops saturation bombing was asked for. The results 
were devastating for the German troops facing the onslaught and the 85. Infanterie-
Division together with its sister division, the 89. Infanterie-Division, took the brunt of 
the bombing.210 The number of those killed or wounded is unknown, but the 
Intelligence officers of II Canadian Corps noted drily that ‘casualties were heavy’ and 
that ‘85 has probably not more than two battalions left.’211 The commanding officer 
of the SS-division put it more graphically when he bluntly stated about the effects of 
the Allied bombing, ‘verwandeln die Stellungen der 85. Infanteriedivision in einen 
Friedhof.’212 In fact Chill himself reported the following day that he had only a 
battalion and a half of infantry and two guns left.213 During the first stage of the 
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operation 1,010 of Chill’s men were taken prisoner.214 As yet Füsilier-Bataillon 185 
and the divisional artillery, south of the Laison river were unaffected.215 However, 
during the second stage 171 prisoners were made from Füsilier-Bataillon 185 
meaning that, adding the wounded and killed, the battalion basically ceased to exist 
as a fighting force.216 In total, during the week that followed, 1,527 men were 
captured by the Canadians, a number which had increased to 1,834 by early 
September.217 The divisional losses were so huge that by the time it arrived in 
Belgium it was reduced to just 1,534 all ranks.218 This basically meant that Chill’s 
division was no longer a fighting force in any sense of the word. 
 
It was during this struggle that Hauptmann Leopold von Hütz, in charge of II./GR 
1054, whom we shall meet later on, won the Ritterkreuz for his bravery leading the 
remnants of his battalion near Potigny.219 Because all Flak regiments had been 
moved out of the area Chill only had three 8.8 cm Pak 43 guns left to fight the Polish 
tanks.220 The result was a foregone conclusion and at the end of the day all guns 
were destroyed and no more than two battalions of Grenadiere were left. Hitler 
purportedly said that the 15 August was the worst day of his life.221 Whether this 
report is apocryphal or not, that day was indeed the beginning of the end for the 
German army in Normandy. The following day Oberstleutnant Dreyer, commanding 
GR 1053, gathered what little infantry was left in his regiment, thus denying the 
Poles further progress for the moment. For this he, too, was awarded the 
Ritterkreuz. On 17 August the 85. Infanterie-Division was no longer holding a 
cohesive front and it was barely capable of offering determined resistance.222 The 
division was by then reduced to just one regiment, Grenadier-Regiment 1053, in 
which all the infantry was gathered, together with some artillery and smaller 
divisional troops.223 It had been a gruelling three days for Chill and he complained 
that he ‘had never known such tiredness. It caused hallucinations and a complete 
sense of non-being. (…) We craved for sleep and slept like the dead; we could have 
slept for days.’224 Still, the division had not disintegrated and looking back after the 
war Chill’s Ia, Oberstleutnant Schuster, felt that the division had performed as best it 
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could under the circumstances during its first serious battle and that at least it had 
held together.225 Luckily for Chill and his men they had been pushed eastwards and 
northwards, in effect, out of the pocket which was slowly forming.226 Now the 
retreat, that most difficult of all military manoeuvres, began.  
 
One of the major problem for Chill was trying to maintain cohesion while puling back. 
To make matters worse for the time being Dreyers Kampfgruppe was subordinated 
to the 21. Panzer-Division (Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger) and took part in the 
fighting south of the Seine where it was the last unit to cross at Rouen. Here a third 
soldier in the 85. I.D. won a Ritterkreuz, Oberleutnant Adolf Vogt, originally in charge 
of 12./GR 1054. Asked by his comrades of the 21. Panzer-Division to hold out for two 
more days so they could ferry their armoured vehicles across the river he and his 
men managed the impossible. Vogt was severely wounded and transferred back to 
the Reich where he recuperated until the end of 1944. The fact that within the space 
of two weeks Chill’s division had earned three Ritterkreuze is testimony to the 
ferocity of the fighting. One thing Chill did was keep officers who had become 
superfluous for the moment in a so-called divisional reserve, so that he could make 
use of their services whenever and wherever this was needed.227 This measure 
would soon stand him in good stead. On 29 August the non-fighting elements of the 
division were back in the area where they had originally trained, around Abbeville on 
the river Somme. Here it received reinforcements in the form of an 880-men strong 
so-called Marschbataillon228 which had only one rifle for every five men and three 
machine-guns in total. The same day Chill was ordered by 7. Armee to form a 
Kampfgruppe together with the remnants of the 84. and 89. Infanterie-Division to 
guard the Somme crossings on both sides of Péronne. The new Kampfgruppe was to 
be commanded by Generalleutnant Chill.229 Here we find the kernel of the subject of 
this study.  
 
However, the seed would not germinate yet, for a number of reasons. First of all the 
division had no troops fit for combat, it could not reach the designated area before 1 
September, the connection with the 89. I.D. had been lost since 18 August and the 
84. I.D. consisted only of a regimental staff.230 The order was moot anyway since, as 
we have seen, the Allied pursuit caught up with the retreating Germans before they 
could form a solid line behind the Somme. The division was therefore allowed to pull 
back to Brussels to be reorganized there. It arrived in Rixensart, southeast of the 
Belgian capital on 1 September. The following day it was ordered to reform in the 
Reich. In the meantime Kampfgruppe Dreyer, after having crossed the Seine was 
ordered to rejoin its parent unit.231 On 3 September the divisional staff reached 
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Turnhout, ready to move on. Dreyer and what was left of his battle group –about a 
hundred men- arrived there the following day. Then things took an unexpected turn. 
 
2.5 The picture on 4-5 September 1944 
Antwerp at last 
Monday 4 September marked the day that the crisis for the retreating Wehrmacht 
came to a head as Antwerp was liberated and the door to Germany was wide open. 
The Allies had reached what Clausewitz called the ‘culmination point’ where the 
defenders might finally halt the attackers provided they had enough troops left.232 It 
was a day that would turn out to be of crucial importance for the rest of the war. 
Little did any of the participants involved realize this at the time.233  
The previous day, Sunday 3 September, Major-General G.P.B. ‘Pip’ Roberts’ 11th 
Armoured Division had stopped just twenty-five kilometres from Antwerp. The main 
body of the 29th Armoured Brigade had laagered for the night in and around Aalst, 
while the 23rd Hussars had gone as far as Wolvertem. Roberts had decided not to 
push ahead because he ‘did not want to try getting into Antwerp in the dark – the 
possibility of chaos was much too great…’234 He was right to be cautious, because, at 
least on paper, the Germans still had sizeable forces in the town. Since 5 June the 
defence for the bigger Antwerp area had been the responsibility of Divisionsstab zur 
besondere Verwendung 136 under Generalmajor Christoph Graf Stolberg zu Stolberg. 
Stolberg’s was not a proper division, but only an administrative divisional 
headquarters without any troops. He was told to make use of the units in and around 
Antwerp and by the end of August Stolberg commanded no less than six battalions 
plus various other troops, probably as many as 10,000 men.235 On the other hand, 
these were all security forces, not front-line troops and they had only few anti-tank 
weapons except for the Flak in the outer rings which could double as such. 
Moreover, Stolberg’s troops not only needed to defend the town, but also cover the 
dock area. These troops clearly were no match for the advancing 11th Armoured 
Division. Still, in such a large urban area they could create a lot of trouble. But would 
they? 
Attack 
On 4 September the leading British troops set off as soon as they could. Roberts 
ordered an advance along the two roads leading into Antwerp from Brussels. The 
23rd Hussars and H Company 8th Rifle Brigade (RB) -infantry in halftracks- were to 
operate on the right hand side and take the road through Malines (Dutch: Mechelen), 
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and the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) plus G Company 8th RB, were to take the 
road through Boom, on the left. The group on the right started off nearest their 
objective and should be able to reach Antwerp first. The 23rd Hussars had spent the 
night in Wolvertem, a few miles north of Brussels. To get to their designated route 
they first drove as far as Vilvoorde, then turned left and took the main road to 
Antwerp. In Malines the main bridge across the Dijle was intact and the advance 
continued. The next bridge, across the Nete, was also intact and the group, racing 
through Kontich, was fast approaching Antwerp. It was now early afternoon. Then 
the leading tanks got into trouble. Just as they saw the outskirts of the town 8.8 cm 
Flak guns opened fire on them. Although the dug-in Flak site was fired at by Sextons 
from the 13th Royal Horse Artillery, the Germans would not budge and the advance 
came to a complete standstill. As dusk began to fall, the British troops decided to 
double back to Kontich where they spent ‘a very comfortable night’.236 
The second group fared better. Because they had a greater distance to cover they 
left Aalst when it was still dark. The advance was uneventful initially. The column 
stopped in Dendermonde to rest for a few hours and then the tanks and halftracks 
raced on to Willebroek to enter the main road into Antwerp. They faced two possible 
obstacles there, which might delay the advance, the bridges over the Willebroek 
Canal, and five hundred metres further up the road, over the river Rupel. Ahead of 
the advancing tanks was one of the division’s engineers, Lieutenant C.B. Ratcliffe 
(13th Field Squadron) on a recce mission. Ratcliffe saw that the canal bridge was 
wired for demolition. As he carefully tried to remove the wire and mines he was 
spotted by German sentries on the north end of the bridge. Soon after, at 08.30 
hours, the bridge was blown, thus blocking the route into Antwerp. Ratcliffe wired 
back a request for a Bailey bridge, but he knew that could be a while in coming. 
Meanwhile the leading column, C Squadron 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) under 
Major John Dunlop, had reached the crossroads at Fort Breendonck, about 1,500 
metres down the road. 
Suddenly an agitated Belgian, Robert Vekemans, himself a lieutenant and engineer in 
the Belgian army, appeared. The first tanks rumbled by, ignoring him, but he 
managed to stop the fourth one. Vekemans made it clear to Dunlop that he could 
show them a diversion which would keep them out of sight of the Germans at the 
bridges and get them across both the canal and the river. Dunlop received 
permission from his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel David N.H. Silvertop, 
and asked Vekemans to show them the way. The Belgian, in a Humber staff car, led 
the way across the canal at Willebroek, then turned north and crossed the Rupel 
over the old Enschodt bridge and from there into Boom. The German troops tried to 
blow up the main road bridge but disappeared as soon as the Sherman tanks opened 
fire. Vekemans ran forward and disconnected the fuses.237 The bridge was safe. The 
tanks swept on towards Antwerp, the Russian troops responsible for the section 
between Assche and Duffel (II./Ostbatallion 600), ran for their lives.238 
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Inside the town 
B Squadron 3rd RTR now took the lead while A Squadron turned left to enter 
Antwerp from the southwest, via Hoboken, along the river Scheldt. B Squadron had 
to fight their way into town, but after a two-hour battle the defenders were swept 
aside and at around three p.m. the leading Shermans entered Antwerp proper. It 
was a madhouse, Brussels all over. While the British tanks were being cheered by 
crowds of enthusiastic civilians and they were overwhelmed by flowers, bottles and 
kisses, the fighting was still going on. Every now and again a hand grenade would be 
thrown or a gun opened up. Especially from the left bank of the Scheldt the tankers 
came under fire and they crouched in their turrets as bullets pinged about while they 
were being waved at by pretty girls pointing out enemy positions.239 
The 159th Infantry Brigade, following the tanks, met with even stiffer opposition. 
The 4th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) supported by tanks from C squadron 
2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry (FFY) advanced on the Central Park, the heart of 
Stolberg’s defence, which they reached at four p.m. The Germans there proved a 
tough nut to crack. Three bunkers with underground tunnels linking them sheltered 
the German headquarters. The lake was an obstacle and snipers formed an 
additional problem. Fortunately for the attackers, the Russians defenders did not 
much like giving up their lives at the last moment and at 20.30 hours Stolberg was 
forced to surrender.   
The last battle of the day was between D Company 4th KSLI under Major R. 
Thornburn and the Feldgendarmerie at the Feldkommandantur on the Meir where 
the fighting went on until 10 p.m. when a fire forced the German defenders to give 
up. About 6,000 Germans were taken prisoner, many of them locked up for the night 
in Antwerp Zoo –the animals had long since gone- to protect them from the mob. 
This meant that at least 3,000 had escaped. Many of them accompanied 
Kampfkommandant Generalmajor R. Gohtsche, who that afternoon at 14.30 hours 
had been ordered by Stolberg to collect stragglers and pull back behind the Albert 
Canal and set up a defence there.240 Others joined a Kampfgruppe under 
Oberstleutnant Ludolf Von Alvensleben just north of the docks.241 Von Alvensleben 
had been in command of the vital dock sector since February 1944. The 
Hafenkommandant, Fregattenkapitän Joseph Paul Joachim Szyskowitz, was severely 
wounded. He later died in a British hospital.242 The battle for the town itself was now 
basically over and the 4th KSLI could at last join in the party and celebrate. But only 
briefly, as they would discover the following day. 
Meanwhile the 3rd Monmouthshires also arrived in Antwerp. They were told to clear 
the docks. It was an impossible task for a single infantry battalion. It was nigh 
impossible to advance rapidly because of the milling crowds and the soldiers were 
exhausted after the long march when they reached the dock area. The first attempt 
failed miserably. A Company managed to form a bridgehead near the sluice gates, 
                                        
239 Bill Close, 3 RTR, quoted in Delaforce, The Black Bull, 131. 
240 Stolberg, 10. After serving with 1. F. Armee Gohtsche in 1945 commanded Feldkommandatur 591; 
he was executed on 22 April because he was accused of ‘Wehrkraftzersetzung’ (Die Generale des 
Heeres, Bd 4, Biblio Verlag). 
241 First mention of the KGr Alvensleben is made in KTB 88 AK, 05.09.44, 18.20 hours. 
242 PAJVD. Van Cauwenbergh, Ze zijn d’er! September 1944 bevrijding van Antwerpen, Brugge 1984, 
70, erroneously gives his name as Kapitän-zur-See Mär. 
 56 
but that was it. Eugene Colson, alias Colonel Harry, who was in command of the 
dock area resistance, was deeply disappointed. He made it clear to British officers 
that he and his men had seized two bridges across the Albert Canal as well as an 
important lock and that the road to Merksem was still open. It was a waste of time. 
He was told that they had “no orders to proceed any further”.243 
A new army 
On the same day that Antwerp was captured by the 11th Armoured Division the gap 
between the 15. Armee and the 7. Armee had widened to no less than one hundred 
kilometres. Desperate times call for desperate measures and Hitler decided to recall 
an old warhorse, 69-year old Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, to take over 
as OB West, correctly judging that holding two jobs (OB West as well commanding 
Heeresgruppe B ) was too much even for Model, who could now concentrate on the 
latter. Von Rundstedt was to take over on the following day. The fall of Antwerp on 4 
September was a real shock to German commanders. In fact after the war General 
der Infanterie von Zangen, in charge of the 15. Armee, confessed that when 
retreating from the Seine he ‘had no fear that Antwerp would be taken since it was 
far behind the front line (…) When I heard on 4 September that it had been captured 
it came as a stunning surprise.’244 Early that morning Model had ordered a security 
screen to be set up behind the Albert Canal and the 15. Armee to pull back to a line 
from Gent to Brussels and Namur. The fall of Antwerp meant that the 15. Armee was 
now cut off and might be lost for good. He sent a cry for help to Hitler’s 
headquarters at Rastenburg requesting fresh divisions.245 Unless he received five 
Panzer and ten infantry divisions the door to the Reich would stand wide open, he 
suggested. His telegram jolted the German High Command into action. Both OKW 
and Hitler realised that LXXXVIII. Armeekorps (General der Infanterie Hans Wolfgang 
Reinhard) with its single division plus a few battalions could never plug the gap on its 
own. They would have to put in more troops, in fact a whole new army. But where to 
find one? 
That afternoon a phone call went out to Generaloberst Kurt Student, 
Oberbefehlshaber der Fallschirmtruppen in Berlin-Wannsee.246 He was ordered to 
form a defence behind the Albert Canal from Antwerp to Maastricht with a new army, 
to be called 1. Fallschirmarmee. A bridgehead at Hasselt was to be maintained in 
order to allow units of the 15. Armee to fall back. For the same reason the 
Woensdrecht area was to be defended. The new army was to come under 
Heeresgruppe B. Flak support was to be provided by the 18. Flakbrigade which was 
on the run from France plus thirty heavy and ten mixed Flak batteries from Luftgaue 
VI and XI.247 The idea was an extension of the Weststellung from Aachen along the 
Albert Canal to Antwerp.248 This stretch was called the Brabantstellung.249 This now 
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became Student’s responsibility. He is one of the more famous German generals and 
much has already been written of his exploits, such as the airborne operations in May 
1940 and the seizure of Crete in May 1941. What is less well-known is that among 
his peers in the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht, Student was not without his 
detractors. The main reason for this seems to be some kind of speech defect. His 
opponents accused him of being dim-witted and occasionally Goering was asked if he 
had an idiot running the Fallschirmjäger.250 Still, what mattered to Hitler and Goering 
was that while Student may have looked slow and certainly was not a military 
genius, he was known to be a ‘Steher’, a tough commander in defence, which was 
what they needed at this stage of the war.251 In addition to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, 
Student was assigned an impressive array of troops, at least on paper. Still, one of 
the divisions was a static one (the 719. Infanterie-Division), one was composed of 
convalescents (the 176. Division zur besondere Verwendung) and the paratroop units 
were spread all over Germany and would need a few days to reach the battlefield. So 
time was not on his side. But he was in for a pleasant surprise.  
Countermeasures 
Since the end of August Reinhard had not been idle. While the Allies were swanning 
into Northern France he had ordered the 719. Infanterie-Division to pack up, leave 
its positions along the Holland and Zeeland coast and proceed in the direction of 
Brussels.252 Only the so-called Turkish battalions (Turkestan Infanterie-Bataillone), 
the newly formed Sicherheitsregiment 26 for guard and security duties and Luftwaffe 
and (large numbers of) Kriegsmarine units were left behind to guard the Dutch 
coast. Altogether the troops did not equal one division.253 During August an attempt 
had been made to make the 719 I.D. more mobile by issuing it with large numbers of 
horses. The division was in the middle of this transition when the order came to head 
south.  
Because the 719 I.D. had little transport of its own on 4 September Reinhard decided 
to commandeer all buses, trains and private means of transport that his troops could 
lay their hands on. Public transport in the west of the Netherlands became virtually 
non-existent. The whole undertaking was hasty and improvised. A Corporal in 
4./Grenadier-Regiment 743 gives a vivid impression of the chaos in his diary, 
“Receive my Panzerfäuste in very bad condition at the harbour of Schiedam. Proceed 
to the railway station. Held up by air activity. To Rosendaal by train. From there 
further progress by rail is impossible. Wild flight along the rail and roads, Luftwaffe 
and Marine! Thousands of officers are trying to save their lives. March to Antwerp. 
Complete disorder. We have to protect the retreat of these cowardly bastards. (…) 
Many casualties in 12. Kompanie.” 254 That same morning Reinhard inspected the 
defences at the southern part of the Moerdijk bridges. Driving back he was called to 
the phone.255 His Chief of Staff, Oberst Curt von Eichert-Wiersdorff told him to get 
back to his own headquarters in Bilthoven without delay. There he learned that, 
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because Brussels had been lost, Heeresgruppe B instructed him to send 
Generalleutnant Sievers’ 719. Infanterie-Division to Antwerp instead.256 The division 
Ia, Major Jahnke, informed the LXXXVIII. Armeekorps that only III./Grenadier-
Regiment 743  (Major Otto Neubauer) and 2./Artillerie-Regiment 1719 could reach 
Antwerp that day because they were already in Steenbergen, no more than about 
forty kilometres away. The rest of the units on the march were not expected to 
arrive there before 5 September. To make matters worse, none of the bridges over 
the Albert Canal had been blown yet and nobody knew whether the Pioniere (combat 
engineers) would make it in time. Then Sievers had a stroke of luck.257 At Kapellen, 
fifteen kilometres north of Antwerp seven trains carrying artillery detachments, 
infantry and combat engineers from the 347. Infanterie-Division had been 
stopped.258 The bulk of the 347. I.D. (Generalleutnant Wolf Trierenberg) was already 
in Namur, thirty kilometres southwest of Liege, where it was virtually rubbed out in 
two days’ fighting against the 3rd US Armored Division.259 The extra troops were a 
Godsend. Sievers immediately ordered them to debark and he sent the engineers to 
the Albert Canal, hoping that they could blow up the bridges in time. 
Reinhard received orders from General Christiansen (Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in der 
Niederlanden) to set up a defensive screen behind the Albert Canal between Antwerp 
and Hasselt. He would receive reinforcements in the form of schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559  which was to be sent to the front as soon as it could be 
unloaded plus a battalion of Dutch SS-men, I./SS-Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm 
Nederland. 260 Reinhard was aghast. He was delighted to get 559, although it would 
not arrive until the following day, but manning a line of eighty kilometres with just 
six battalions of infantry was sheer madness. Every company (about 140 men) would 
have to cover over three kilometres. Then again he had no choice. He decided to 
send the Dutch SS-battalion to his left flank at Hasselt because they could get their 
soonest, the 719 I.D. would have to take care of the rest. Every second counted and 
Reinhard as yet had no idea what the situation was like at the canal. He decided to 
find out without further delay. 
He also received a phone-call from Stolberg in Antwerp around three p.m. asking for 
orders now that he had been assigned to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. After a few minutes 
Stolberg informed Reinhard that he could hear enemy armour approaching his 
headquarters. Reinhard told him to defend himself to the utmost when the 
connection was suddenly severed. Reinhard could only guess what had happened. 
But there was no time to be lost and he decided to proceed to the Albert Canal 
forthwith. He would never get there. All the main roads were jam-packed with troops 
streaming back towards the Heimat. It took him over two hours to reach ‘s-
Hertogenbosch and the road between that town and Tilburg was completely blocked 
by three columns that had got intermingled somehow. Reinhard could not get one 
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sensible word out of these soldiers and in frustration he had to give up the attempt 
to travel further south. He turned round and was back at his headquarters by eleven 
p.m. He decided to try again the following morning.  
Good news for Reinhard 
Reinhard only slept for a few hours and early on 5 September he drove to his new 
advanced headquarters in Moergestel (near Tilburg) where he arrived around eight 
a.m.  While his staff was settling in, he travelled on to the Albert Canal some forty 
kilometres further south. There was only one question on his mind: would his troops 
arrive in time or would the Allies win the race? As he neared the front-line Reinhard 
came across small groups of soldiers aimlessly hanging about. Angrily he told officers 
to assemble them into ad-hoc units. By accident he also stopped a Hauptmann who 
turned out to be the signals officer of the 85. Infanterie-Division. The officer had 
totally unexpected, but wonderful news for Reinhard.261  
He told Reinhard that his commanding officer, Generalleutnant Kurt Chill, had already 
set up blocking positions behind the Albert Canal, roughly between Herenthals and 
Hasselt. Chill was an energetic and experienced officer. In one of his last 
assessments, looking back on the fighting in Belgium and the Netherlands, his 
superiors described him as ’Eine in zahlreichen schweren Kämpfen im belgisch-
holländischen Raum in der Zeit vom 5.9.-11.10.1944 bewährte Führernatur, 
entschluss- und verantwortungsfreudig, zuversichtlich, tatkräftig und geschikt im 
Organisieren von Verbänden. Persönlich einsatzbereit und tapfer. (…) über 
Durchschnitt.’262 He was indeed to prove the right person in the right place at the 
right time. Chill had just arrived in Turnhout when he learned of the fall of Brussels. 
As he had found in France that orders from higher up were often slow, he decided, 
on his own initiative, to dragoon groups of stragglers and set up an improvised 
defence. One document, carried by the officers collecting the troops stated that if the 
officer in question was not obeyed the culprit would be court-martialled; it also 
suggested that Chill rallied the troops on the orders of  the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber 
für Belgien und Nordfrankreich (General der Infanterie Martin Grase).263 It is unclear 
whether that was really the case.264 What Chill did was collect all the units of 
Luftwaffe and other personnel in Turnhout, have a staff, set up specifically for this 
purpose, assess their fighting ability and then divide them into groups which were 
sent either those sectors of the Albert Canal where Chill did not expect the Allies to 
cross, or keep them further back as back-stop units.265 At noon on 5 September the 
new battle group was mentioned for the first time.266  
There are no documents stating the exact composition of Chill’s unit until four days 
later, but from a map and references in the Kriegstagebuch of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps 
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and Allied sources we can deduce that the following units were included at the 
beginning: Fallschirmjäger-Artillerie Regiment 2, Marine Ersatz Abteilung 
Wilhemshaven, 6., 16., and 21. Schiffstamm-Abteilung, Marine Artillerie 
Versuchskommando, Marine Flak Schule (Hauptmann Jahn), Landesschützenbataillon 
(Bahn) 484, Wachbataillon 737, Sicherungsbataillon 772, Marschbataillon z.bV. 301. 
Many of them were put under Hauptmann Oswald Pohl (Füsilier-Bataillon 85). In 
addition there were five Fliegerhorst Kommandature (airfield security detachments) 
in France and Belgium.267 No figures exist about the strength, but we know that 
Dreyer (Grenadier Regiment 1053) had only about a hundred men left, that Pohl was 
in charge of a small Kampfgruppe of 330 men, that Oberst Buchholz (Sicherungs-
Regiment 35) commanded 1,100 soldiers, while the airfield security detachments 
totalled 900 men. All in all Chill could muster about 2,400 men to hold the new line, 
roughly equivalent to six line battalions of medium strength. This was an impressive 
figure. However, there were hardly any machine-guns and some of the men had 
been issued Italian rifles. Moreover Chill had no artillery, no anti-tank weapons and 
no Flak. And then there was the dubious quality of the men, none of whom had been 
trained as infantry.  
They certainly formed a motley crew, these companies of air force, security and 
naval personnel among them some older Landesschützen who had been guarding 
German VIPs in Paris until very recently. We have some idea of how the process of 
gathering them went. Ten days later when some of the men were taken prisoner 
near Geel, they told their interrogators that they were all on the way back to the 
Reich. They got as far as Turnhout where they were marshalled by officers into 
barracks and – to their indignation and dismay- actually locked in.268 Subsequently 
they were sent off to join the various battle groups where they did as they were told 
even though they did not like it much. Chill and his staff organized three main 
Kampfgruppen, named Buchholz, Seidel and Dreyer after their commanding 
officers.269 Reinhard was delighted with these unexpected reinforcements and told 
the officer to go back, find Chill and inform him that from now on his division was 
subordinate to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps and also to ask Chill to report as soon as 
possible. Kampfgruppe Chill was born.  
Still, Reinhard’s worries were not over by a long shot. But he had another stroke of 
good luck that day, as he learned from Sievers. Thanks to the timely appearance of  
1./Pionier-Bataillon of the 347. Infanterie-Division under Major Dieringer, the 
previous day, all important bridges across the Albert Canal had been blown up.270 
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More amazing and as yet unknown to Reinhard, the Allies had, inadvertently, also 
come to his aid by giving him precisely what he needed most, time. 
A lost opportunity 
Monday 4 September was the day that, in hindsight, would turn out to be one of  the 
turning points of the war. It was the day of desperate German measures to plug the 
gap and man the Albert Canal line, the day that Antwerp was captured, the apogee 
of operation Overlord, and also the day that one of the major opportunities of the 
war was lost.  
Now that Antwerp had fallen, one of the Germans’ greatest fears was that the Allies 
would continue their advance as far as Bath on the Beveland isthmus, in effect 
cutting off Von Zangen’s 15. Armee which was still running for its life. It was also 
what local people, like Colson in Antwerp urged the Allies to do. Instead, a halt was 
called. The order came from Second Army, from Lieutenant-General Sir Miles C. 
Dempsey himself.271 It may have to do with a conference the previous evening 
where Montgomery, Dempsey and their American counterparts, Bradley and Hodges, 
had mapped out the future strategy.272 All eyes were now fixed firmly on the Rhine. 
If the Allies could cross the river the war might be ended before winter set in. 
Montgomery wanted Second Army to push forwards in the gap between 15. and 7. 
Armee at the pace they had maintained since crossing the Seine. They were to seize 
bridges over the Rhine between Wesel and Arnhem before the Wehrmacht could 
establish a firm front. The same evening Montgomery had asked First Allied Airborne 
Army (Major-General Lewis Brereton) to plan an operation to secure a crossing of the 
river Rhine.273 On 4 September Montgomery’s staff selected Arnhem as the crossing 
point. The Airborne Army began to plan the operation which was christened ‘Comet’. 
It was to be launched on 7 September. Montgomery wanted to go for one big, last 
push. But such a major offensive required bringing up supplies and regrouping the 
units, all of which took time.  
As related above (Chapter 2.2), Montgomery ordered his troops to renew the attack 
east (to the Ruhr) on 6 September.274 By doing so he took a calculated risk which he 
and his staff were very much aware of because on the day the advance was resumed 
they concluded that, ‘The Albert Canal and the 15th Army are our immediate 
concern.’275 Three days later the intelligence staff unequivocally stated that, 
‘Meantime 15th Army continues to extricate itself over the Scheldt to provide 
reinforcements for other parts of the front.’276 Dempsey told his army to halt for 
twenty-four hours because the troops were outstripping their administrative (logistic) 
resources. After the failure to close the Falaise Gap initially, it was the second big 
operational, or even strategic, error by Montgomery during the campaign. The 
vehicles of XXX Corps still had about a hundred litres of petrol each and could easily 
have advanced for another day. In all likelihood the 11th Armoured Division could 
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have crossed the Albert Canal (especially as most of the bridges had not been mined 
yet and some had been seized by the Belgian resistance). From Antwerp one straight 
road leads to Woensdrecht and Bergen op Zoom. Possession of those towns meant 
that there would be no way out for 15. Armee. If the Allies had acted exactly as the 
Germans feared they would cut off the Beveland isthmus and Von Zangen’s army 
would have been completely trapped against the coast. If Horrocks had ordered 
Roberts to bypass Antwerp instead of telling him to take the town this manoeuvre 
could have been executed the day before.277 But even as things stood, the operation 
might still have succeeded on 5 September. As Von Rundstedt’s Chief-of-staff, 
Westphal, wrote in his memoirs, ‘Die Trümmer der Heeresgruppe B reichten nicht 
mehr aus, eine zusammenhängende Widerstandslinie aufzubauen.’278 The results of 
continued Allied pressure would have been devastating. Von Zangen’s divisions 
would have been trapped and could only have been rescued by sea in a kind of 
German Dunkirk operation. They would certainly have been too late to interfere in 
operation Market Garden (or other operations in September). Also, pushing on might 
have secured the banks of the upper Scheldt much more quickly, providing the Allies 
with a harbour large enough to sustain the drive towards Germany. The Allies might 
indeed have been across the Rhine before autumn set in and have ended the war in 
1944. It was not to be, however.  
But it would be unfair to blame only Dempsey even though the operational level was 
his responsibility. Part of the blame certainly lies with his superiors, Montgomery and 
Eisenhower, who after all had to keep their eye on the strategy. To make matters 
worse, through Enigma decrypts Montgomery and Dempsey were being kept very 
well informed of the situation on the German end. On 5 September they learned that 
German reinforcements were trying to set up a new defensive line behind the Albert 
Canal with the 719. and 347. I.D.279 Still, they did not act on this news. As 
Dempsey’s biographer points out, it is not really fair to point the finger at Dempsey’s 
subordinate, Horrocks, either because he was concerned with the tactical battle.280 
Be that as it may, no Allied commander was aware of  the opportunity that they let 
slip through their fingers.281 Heady with excitement it would take the men 
responsible some time before they came to realise that something fundamental had 
changed and that the days of the bloody, grinding battles were back. The Americans 
made the very same mistake a few days later west of Aachen. There the ‘doorway’ to 
Aachen and Cologne was wide open and both Model and Von Rundstedt were certain 
the Americans would smash through the Westwall. But General Hodges (First US 
Army) regrouped and paused for three days, again quoting logistics as the reason, 
before resuming the attack. Here, too, much bloodshed (Hürtgenwald) could have 
been avoided had he pushed his troops on for a few more days.282 In Antwerp 
Roberts himself would soon realize the error. But while the Allies took a break the 
Germans had not been idle. They understood the danger to 15. Armee and an urgent 
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message from Heeresgruppe B read, “Landenge bei Bergen op Zoom wird offen 
gehalten. Auf Durchführung gefassten Entschluss sei nunmehr mit äusserster 
Tatkraft alles konzentrieren.”283 
A madhouse 
Tuesday 5 September is a day that will always be remembered in Dutch history as 
‘Dolle Dinsdag’ (Mad Tuesday). The whole country was in a festive mood. Schools 
and factories were all closed, people hung around in the streets which were already 
festooned with bunting and the Dutch national flag, convinced as people were that 
the liberating Allied armies could arrive any minute. Collaborators boarded trains, 
running for their lives and depots, ammunition dumps and airfields in the south of 
the country were being blown up. The confusion was partly caused by a fateful 
Dutch language BBC broadcast from London on Monday evening. The Dutch prime 
minister in exile, P.S. Gerbrandy, proudly announced that “Geallieerde strijdkrachten 
zijn Nederland binnengetrokken! (Allied armies have crossed the Dutch border!)”284 
He was wrong, but hardly anybody was in a position to check the facts and 
consequently people went mad with joy. It was in this madhouse that schwere 
Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 , soon to become the armoured component of 
Kampfgruppe Chill, arrived at the three stations where it was to unload its vehicles, 
‘s-Hertogenbosch, Tilburg and Baarle-Nassau.285 The Abteilung was the second to be 
equipped with the new heavy tank hunter, the Sd.Kfz.173 Jagdpanther.286 Originally 
all three companies were to have been equipped with the Jagdpanther. However, as 
production could not meet the demand, partly as a result of Allied bombing (MIAG 
alone was bombed no less than ten times in 1944), it was decided to equip the next 
Abteilungen with only one company of Jagdpanther, and to equip the other two 
companies with either Sturmgeschütze or Jagdpanzer IV. This solution was officially 
confirmed by Hitler himself on 11 September 1944.287 In all schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 had a total of sixteen Jagdpanther and twenty-eight 
Sturmgeschütze when they received the order to travel west from the training 
grounds at Mielau (currently: Mława in Poland). On 1 September the deployment of 
schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 had come up at the Lagebesprechung, 
the daily conference, at the Wolfschanze, Hitler’s headquarters in East Prussia. When 
informed by General-Major Wolfgang Thomale, Guderian’s successor as 
Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, that schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 
559 would not be ready until the 5th, an irate Hitler responded, ‘Sofort hierher!.’288 
By noon the unloading of the Jagdpanther and at least one of the Sd.Kfz.7/1 Flak 
half tracks in Tilburg was finished.289 At 12.30 hours the whole column assembled at 
a big local square, the Korvelplein, and then headed south for Goirle. From there it 
drove to Merksplas. Around four p.m. the Sturmgeschütze from the two trains which 
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had unloaded in Baarle-Nassau were also ready for departure and set off for the 
same village. After all of the fighting vehicles had arrived in Merksplas 559 left off for 
Antwerp, now just over thirty kilometres away, while the unloading went on 
throughout the night and the following day.  
 
In Antwerp the unreal atmosphere of the previous day continued even in the dock 
area where the main action took place, the 3rd Monmouths advancing there carried 
flowers in one hand and their firearms in the other.290 They did not meet any real 
opposition, just occasional shelling from across the Scheldt and the Albert Canal. At 
the same time the 1st Herefordshire Regiment were mopping up the eastern part of 
the town. The other British units in and around Antwerp, having been told to halt, 
spent the day cleaning and repairing equipment. The festive mood was not 
everybody’s cup of tea and the CO of the 4th KSLI, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivor L. 
Reeves, in fact had his command post surrounded with barbed wire so he could think 
straight.291 In the absence of adequate maps, Reeves sent patrols to locate the 
Albert Canal and see if any of the bridges were still intact. There were six road 
bridges plus one railway bridge. The northern two, the Albert bridge and the 
Straatsburg bridge in the dock area, were controlled by the resistance, Colson’s men. 
The next one, from left to right, were the Noorder bridge, the IJzer bridge, the 
Schijnpoort bridge and the Deurne bridge. All of these had already been blown up, 
on 4 September, or they were demolished that day. In fact the Schijnpoort bridge 
was blown up at the end of the afternoon just as C company 3rd Monmouths was 
ordered to rush it, much to the relief of its CO, Major J. Hardy, as he had considered 
the order doomed to fail.292 
As soon as he learned that the bridges across the Albert Canal had been blown, 
Roberts realised that he ‘had made a great error in not going into the town the 
evening before. I had thought that the canal went through the centre of the town 
and therefore would have been included in the battle for the main garrison (…) we 
could have taken that bridge with the greatest of ease that first night. Had I braved 
the crowds and gone into the town myself I would have realised the situation. This 
was, I think, the worst mistake I made in the campaign’.293 But it got worse, 
although this time it was not Roberts who made the mistake. That afternoon 
Horrocks visited Antwerp and he told Roberts that he was going to have to ’go 
through the tulip fields, get across the canal and get up north towards ‘s–
Hertogenbosch’.294 The light-hearted tone betrayed the optimistic estimate behind 
the order.  
The first crossing 
Roberts passed the order on to Brigadier J. Churcher of the 159th Infantry 
Brigade.295 Churcher did not like the idea of making a crossing without proper 
reconnaissance and at least a day’s planning. But orders were orders and just as 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Ivor Reeves was considering sampling some of the local wine, he 
received the order to form a bridgehead covering the Schijnpoort and Merksem 
bridges. He did not like the idea either, particularly as night would soon fall and the 
operation had to be carried out at once. 296 The crossing needed to be made under 
cover of darkness, but some of the companies had six miles to cover before they got 
to the canal. Unfortunately not carrying out proper reconnaissance would turn out to 
be costly mistake. Reeves decided to cross at two points. He would take Companies 
A, B and C with him and cross near the Schijnpoort bridge while D Company would 
try to cross further upstream at the Deurne bridge. By the end of the night the three 
companies were all across and had established themselves in various buildings, while 
D Company’s attack was stopped by heavy machine-gun fire.  
At 19.50 hours on 5 September LXXXVIII. Armeekorps received a report that the 
“enemy, aided by Partisans” had established a bridgehead in the Merksem area an 
hour and half earlier.297 Reinhard immediately ordered III./Grenadier-Regiment 743, 
supported by 1./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 to counterattack. The 
automatic, almost reflex-like counterattack was part of the principles taught German 
officers. Following an  enemy breakthrough, ‘so muss das erste Bestreben sein, den 
eingebrochenen Gegner durch Feuer zu vernichten. Andernfalls haben die in der 
Nähe der Einbruchsstelle befindlichen Teile der Infanterie und Unterstützungen den 
Feind durch sofort einsetzende kurze Gegenstösse zurückzuwerfen, ehe er in de, 
gewonnenen Gelände Fuss gefasst und sich eingerichtet hat.’298 This phenomenon of 
a hasty ‘Gegenstoss’ will come back time and again. (A hasty, immediate Gegenstoss 
should not be confused with a Gegenangriff, which was deliberate and planned 
beforehand.299 Examples of the latter will also be found in the next chapters.) The 
infantry sealed off the bridgehead, as far as possible in the dark, but a counterattack 
would have to wait until 559 had arrived later that evening. Sievers reported to 
Reinhard that fighting was especially difficult ‘durch Wohnblocks mit Elektrizitätwerk 
und Beteiligung von Terroristen’.300 Still, as dawn broke on 6 September, his troops 
finally spotted the positions of the 4th KSLI and all hell broke loose for the British.  
Because of the nature of the battleground the original order, to employ the 
Jagdpanther of Oberleutnant Zoske’s 1./559 was changed. The heavy vehicles could 
not come into their own in this built-up area with its tall factories, alleyways, narrow 
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streets and factory walls.301 They would be far too vulnerable and so it was decided 
to use Oberleutnant Edmund Haile’s 2./559 with its Sturmgeschütze to support the 
attack of the Grenadiere.302 The five Sturmgeschütze drove up and down the 
Carrettestraat covering the British positions and firing at anything that moved.303 
Movement within the bridgehead became nigh impossible and a breakout was 
completely out of the question. For the British soldiers it was a nightmare, being 
unable to move while the SPs rumbled by outside and put shells into the buildings. 
All day the fighting raged. The Grenadiere could not force the British out and neither 
could 4th KSLI enlarge the bridgehead. The British infantry gave as good as they got. 
The end result was a stalemate, even though LXXXVIII. Armeekorps received a 
report at the end of the day that only a few ‘Engländer und Partisanen’ were left 
inside the factories.304 The troops inside the bridgehead began to run out of food and 
water and by nightfall they were utterly exhausted. From the after-action reports it is 
clear that it was the presence of the Sturmgeschütze that gave the German troops 
the edge. Despite being able to prevent the enemy from annihilating the bridgehead, 
Reeves realised that it was only a matter of time before he would have to abandon 
it. Losses were mounting and reinforcements, in the form of tanks or otherwise, 
could not be brought up as it was completely impossible for the engineers to 
construct a bridge.  
But Brigadier Churcher refused the 4th KSLI permission to withdraw.305 Instead he 
would try to get supplies across under cover of darkness. Churcher decided to make 
one, final effort. He ordered the 3rd Monmouths, under Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Orr, 
to cross at the Albert bridge where the Albert Canal flowed into the dock area and 
then turn right (east) to relieve the pressure on the 4th KSLI. The infantry were 
supported by two troops of A Squadron 23rd Hussars. At eight p.m. B Company 
advanced eastwards from the docks while C Company advanced along the railway 
embankment. The two companies were to meet and advance into Merksem. Enemy 
opposition prevented the move. Orr then decided that only a night attack by his 
whole battalion would do the trick. A and D Companies were to join B while C would 
try to continue to inch its way forward along the embankment. As two of the Hussars 
tanks became bogged down the whole of A Squadron spent a very anxious night 
surrounded by an unknown number of Germans including many snipers.306 
At around three a.m. on 7 September A and D Companies of the Monmouths were 
lined up ready to advance.307 The moment the attack went off heavy rain started to 
fall and the men stumbled forward in pitch blackness towards the railway 
embankment. As they approached the embankment 3rd Monmouths were greeted by 
a hail of fire. Soon they were engaged in heavy hand-to-hand fighting. The 
Grenadiere from III./GR 743 reinforced by various companies of the 347. Infanterie-
Division (7./GR 860, 5./GR 861, 6./GR 861) and 13.(Pak)/743  plus some security 
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forces that had escaped from Antwerp during the fighting there, put up a stiff 
fight.308 On the opposite side C Company of the Monmouths finally managed to join 
the other three but all movement had now come to a standstill.  
Stalemate 
Any further advance was clearly impossible. There was nothing for it but to pull back 
the 4th KSLI. The decision was eventually taken by Horrocks himself. In the morning 
the Commander of XXX Corps decided to see for himself what the situation was 
like.309 The Sportpaleis, an indoor cycling track, overlooked the canal and Horrocks 
was taken up to the roof by Max Robinson, the battalion’s second in command, to 
get a bird’s eye view of Merksem and the factories. The roof was already being used 
by artillery observers. Brigadier Churcher and Robinson pointed out the positions 
across the canal which were all clearly visible. Then they stepped back. Horrocks 
leaned over the balcony and studied the grounds for perhaps ninety seconds. He 
turned around and said in a quiet, but urgent tone ‘you must get them back.’ This 
was a momentous decision that so far has been ignored by historians. It meant that 
for the time being the British would continue to ignore Antwerp and instead 
concentrate their efforts further east, a decision that would eventually come back to 
haunt them. The Germans had retaken Merksem and although the confrontation had 
been short the loss of life was disproportionally high. The 4th KSLI suffered 150 
casualties including 29 killed, the Germans casualties were 35 killed, and an unknown 
number of wounded.310 The civilian population had also suffered and in a particularly 
tragic event that can only be described as a war crime, German troops executed 22 
employees of the Merksem power station on 6 September. The rumours about 
‘Terroristen’ attacking them from the rear were widespread by then.311 In addition 33 
other civilians in Merksem lost their lives because of the fighting.312 
 
Oddly enough it was precisely at the moment of triumph that the Kommandeur of 
Grenadier-Regiment 743, Oberst Bosselmann, was accused by a somewhat panicky 
Generalleutnant Heinz-Helmuth von Wühlisch (Chef des Generalstabes WBN) of 
having given up his positions at Merksem.313 It was the proverbial storm in a teacup 
and Sievers managed to convince Von Wühlisch that he was completely mistaken. 
The accusation probably came from a deep seated fear that the British might still 
attack north and cut off 15. Armee. Even after the 4th KSLI had pulled back and the 
attack by the 3rd Monmouths and the 23rd Hussars was repulsed, there was still a 
lot of anxiety about British intentions. Even the new bridgehead at Beringen (next 
chapter) could not lull the German suspicions. Reinhard in fact suspected that even 
that might be linked to an attack northwards from Antwerp.314  
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What the German commanders did not know and could not know, was that they 
were completely wrong. Montgomery’s attention had already shifted further east. 
Aware of the gap between Antwerp and the Ardennes he ordered Second Army to 
advance towards the Rhine using two roads, one through Eindhoven to Arnhem and 
one through Tilburg and Zaltbommel to Renkum (west of Arnhem).315 Antwerp was 
forgotten for the moment. XXX Corps headed east looking for a point to cross the 
Albert Canal. The new eye of the storm would now be around Beringen. Soon all of 
Kampfgruppe Chill was to join the fight there. 
Strategies 
While the Twenty-First Army Group rested and refitted until 6 September in 
accordance with Montgomery’s directive M 523 (see above, Chapter 2.2), the 
Germans were still struggling to find a solution to the new situation which they 
faced.316 The capture of Antwerp on 4 september had taken them by surprise. While 
British troops were entering the city, the 719. Infanterie-Division was still on its way. 
The impact was huge and Von Zangen’s 15. Armee was effectively cut off. Unlike the 
Allies, the German commanders recognized the importance and they described it as 
an ‘operatives Ereignis ersten Ranges.’ Hitler immediately ordered measures to be 
taken to ensure that the port could not be used by the enemy for as long as possible. 
He also rescinded an earlier order for 15. Armee to break out by attacking towards 
Diest, instead telling Von Zangen to establish a bridgehead south of the Scheldt.317 
To make matters worse, there yawned a gap from Antwerp to Namur and there were 
still no reserves. Von Wühlisch reported that day that no troops could be in place 
before 6 September. The recruits of the 1. Flieger-Ausbildungs-Division (whom we 
shall meet later on) who were on their way, were a mere drop in the ocean. Quickly 
measures were taken to catch stragglers before they crossed the border into 
Germany and both National-Socialist party officials and Himmler became involved in 
this. Fanaticism was to substitute for troops and materiel.  
 
Model, once again, reiterated that the Westwall had to be occupied immediately as 
Allied armour might cross the German border where 7. Armee took over from 5. 
Panzerarmee.318 To hold the new line, along the Albert Canal to the Westwall, Model 
said, he urgently needed at least twenty-five fresh divisions and a reserve of five to 
six armoured divions.319 These were not available, but the OKW promptly issued new 
instructions. Generaloberst Student’s 1. Fallschirm-Armee was to be responsible for 
the defence of the Albert-Canal for which, in addition to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, it 
received units from Fallschirmjäger-Divisione 3., 5., and 6. The army was further to 
be reinforced by ten battalions and forty Flak batteries.320 General der Infanterie 
Günther Blumentritt, Chef des Generalstabes OB West, did not hold very high 
expectations of these measures and he thought that it was impossible at the moment 
to close the door on the Rhineland. General der Infanterie Hans Krebs, Chef des 
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Generalstabes Heeresgruppe B, concurred and he, too, felt that the current line-up of 
troops behind the Albert Canal was in no way enough.  
 
The following day Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt arrived at the new 
headquarters near Koblenz and resumed command as OB West.321 He appointed 
Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal as his new Chef des Generalstabes.322 What he 
found was staggering: the Westheer consisted of just sixteen divisions that were 
deemed combat worthy, while the other fifty-five were either weak, burnt-out, 
destroyed or being reconstituted. Eisenhower on the other hand, now controlled 
thirty-nine divisions with another eight about to join them. Apart from nine so-called 
Festungsbataillone, comprised of soldiers that were no longer fully fit for combat 
duty, new reserves would not arrive before the middle of September. Meanwhile 
Generaloberst Student and his staff arrived. After flying out of Berlin early on the 
5th, Student first saw Model at his headquarters near Verviers.323 Model told him that 
15. Armee would have to fight its way eastwards along the south bank of the Albert 
Canal, which might provide protection for Student’s troops while they were taking up 
position. Next he travelled on to Moergestel, near Tilburg, to meet Reinhard, who 
told him the relatively good news about what Chill had done. Still, Student was 
aware that the Allies held the initiative and much would depend on where and when 
they would resume the attack.  
Conclusion 
The twenty-four hour break after the capture of Antwerp meant that the Allies gave 
the German army just what it needed most, time. By turning back from Turnhout and 
setting up an improvised battle group and not continuing on his way to Germany, 
Chill had done exactly what was expected of a German officer worth his salt. Instead 
of obeying the order to carry on the retreat towards the Reich, he had made the 
decision to stay put in order to prevent the collapse of the defensive line that was 
being constructed behind the Albert-Canal. He had done exactly what was expected 
of a German officer at his best. As the Truppenführung, the manual for the German 
army put it ‘Verantwortungsfreudichkeit ist die vornehmste Führereigenschaft’, 
adding‚ ’Selbsttätigkeit, die sich in richtigen Grenzen geltend macht, ist (…) die 
Grundlage grosser Erfolge.’324 Even though a lot of the sailors, air force and security 
personnel that his officers had rounded up at Turnhout were disgruntled at the way 
they were treated, they still did what was expected of them and in this way Chill 
managed to create a defensive position north of the canal.325 This was no doubt 
Chill’s biggest contribution to the defence of the Reich. In an analysis three years 
after the events, almost to the day, Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann when 
reflecting on the Allies breaking through towards the Ruhr while simultaneously 
cutting off 15. Armee, wrote that  ‘in my opinion, which is shared by the then Chief 
of the General Staff, OB West (Gen. Blumentritt), both moments (…) together would 
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have caused the final German military collapse as early as the fall of 1944.’326 For the 
time being, as a result of Chill’s actions, this danger had been averted and there was 
a more or less coherent defence behind the Albert Canal. The door to Germany was 
still partially open, but it was gradually closing. This single action by Chill had a huge 
impact on the conflict in the West, since, as Kershaw correctly states, ‘The Allies 
never fully regained their momentum (…) until March 1945.’327 Nevertheless, the 
Germans were not out of the woods yet and the subsequent battles and 
engagements were not foregone conclusions. The German screen behind the Albert 
Canal was extremely thinly held and neither Model nor Von Rundstedt, the new OB 
West, was confident it would hold. Two days later Von Rundstedt reported to the 
OKW and Hitler. He did not mince words and made it clear that all his forces were 
not only committed to battle, but also badly depleted (‘angeschlagen’) if not 
completely smashed (‘ausgebrannt’), that he had only one hundred tanks and 
needed at least five, preferably ten divisions with Sturmgeschütz units and anti-tank 
weapons.328 For the moment the fate of the Westheer still hung in the balance and it 
was clear to both the Allied and the German commanders that the first week of 
September could be decisive. Kampfgruppe Chill itself had not been engaged in 
action yet. That would finally be the case on 6 September.
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PART THREE  THE FIGHTING 
 
This part is devoted to minutiae of the various engagements that Kampfgruppe Chill 
was involved in. The narrative opens with the initial struggle to hold the canal line to 
the successful defence and even recapture of the Belgian town of Geel. Although 
there were initial doubts about the efficacy of the Kampfgruppe, its achievements 
soon exceeded all expectations and it subsequently became the Eingreifsreserve first 
for 1. Fallschirm-Armee and from 23 September for 15. Armee being shifted from 
one endangered sector to the other in order to plug the gaps that threatened to 
open up. Chill’s battle group was so successful in this that in the end it enabled Von 
Zangen to pull back his army in an orderly fashion behind the river Maas and even 
forced Montgomery to rethink his strategy to defeat Germany. 
 
3.1. Albert Canal (6 – 13 September 1944) 
 
“Es ist wichtig zur Beurteilung der Gefechte von Panzerkräften beider Seiten zu wissen, dass 
das Gelände zwischen ALBERTKANAL und ZUID-WILLEMSVAART abseits befestigter 
Strassen, Eisenbahnlinien etc. etc. fast durchgehend versumpft war.”329 
 
The failed attempt by the 11th Armoured Division to cross the Albert Canal at 
Merksem was the first indication that things had changed since the capture of 
Antwerp. If clearer signals were needed they would soon be coming after the 
resumption of the Allied advance. Here Kampfgruppe Chill would undergo its baptism 
of fire.  
 
On Tuesday 6 September, after having halted for 24 hours, XXX Corps resumed its 
advance. The situation had now changed dramatically as the leading troops were 
soon to find out. The fighting over the next ten days would take place in an area 
between two major canals, the Albert Canal and the Maas-Scheldt Canal. This area 
forms a kind of convoluted triangle between Herentals, Lanaken and Neerpelt. Here 
the British would face the first serious resistance since the end of the fighting in 
Normandy. It is the battles in this ‘bloody triangle’ that form the subject of the next 
two chapters. The Albert Canal would first be crossed near Beringen on 6 September. 
This chapter will therefore focus on the fighting around Beringen and the resulting 
battles in Hechtel. The next chapter will be devoted to the battle for Geel which 
started one day later. But first one needs to go back to 5 September, the day the 
population of the Netherlands went wild with joy. 
The overall situation 
While Dempsey’s Second Army was told to stand down for twenty-four hours, quite a 
lot happened on the German side of the Albert Canal. At 04.05 hours Generaloberst 
Student, the new commander responsible for the front between Antwerp and 
Maastricht, had arrived at the advanced headquarters of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps in 
Moergestel (east of Tilburg) to see for himself how the situation was developing.330 
The previous day he had spoken to Generalfeldmarschall Model, Heeresgruppe B, 
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who had informed him that 15. Armee would fight its way east along the southern 
bank of the Albert Canal, thus giving Student some time to form his front. The 
capture of Antwerp completely upset this applecart, however. And there was more 
bad news for Student. When inspecting the canal himself, he saw that it had not 
been prepared for defence at all. Moreover, in some places the south bank 
dominated the northern one.  
Things looked grim, very grim indeed and everything depended on where the British 
would strike next. Student must have spent an anxious day. No doubt his mood lifted 
as he found that, apart from the crossing by the 4th KSLI in Antwerp, the Allied 
advance had come to a complete standstill. Time was of the essence to him. In 
addition to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps he was assigned ten battalions from Wehrkreis VI, 
thirty heavy and ten light Flak batteries and, of course, the core of his new army, the 
Fallschirmjäger.331 Student must have been extremely relieved by the halt as the 
majority of his troops were still a long way away from the front. In fact most had not 
reached the Netherlands yet. One of the key units for example, Von der Heydte’s 
Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6, had only that morning left Hamburg.332 It was not until 
the following morning  (6 September) that most of the troops began to arrive at the 
various stations where they would detrain. The Regiment had a long history. On 13 
February 1943 the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division had been established and FJR 6 was 
one of its three regiments, the others being FJR 2 and FJR 7. It fought in Italy and 
Russia until January 1944 when it assembled in Köln-Wahn to be rebuilt under its 
new commander, then Major Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte. In May it was 
moved to Normandy where it would engage in severe battles with its American 
counterparts of the US 101st Airborne Division. The defence of Carentan against the 
US 101st Airborne Division had earned them the sobriquet of ‘Die Löwen von 
Carentan’ (The Lions of Carentan).333 As testimony to the ferocity of the battle, 
losses had been so severe that Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 had shrunk to just a core 
around which it was to be rebuilt.334 The regiment was sent to Güstrow to be 
reconstituted. After the war Von der Heydte wrote that he felt that the battle 
strength of his new regiment was poor. The new recruits, who made up 75% of the 
new Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 were hardly trained and some of them had never 
fired a gun in anger.335  
Nevertheless Von der Heydte tried to make the best of a bad job. He demanded his 
men do their utmost and he tried to instil them with a sense of belonging to an elite 
unit. In an order he demanded from every soldier ‘the renunciation of all personal 
wishes. Whoever swears on the Prussian flag, has no right to personal possessions. 
From the moment he enlists in the Fallschirmjäger and joins my regiment every 
soldier enters the new order of humanity and gives up everything which he 
possessed before and which is outside the new order. There is only one law for him 
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334 Griesser, Die Löwen von Carentan, 170-172, says that it was reduced from 4600 to a mere 1007 
men, Von der Heydte himself thought he had just 450 men left (interview with Johan van Doorn). 
335 Friedrich Von der Heydte, “Muss ich sterben, will ich fallen…“, Berg 1987, 1. 
 73 
henceforth – the law of our unit.’ Von der Heydte added that ‘this struggle is a 
struggle for the existence of the entire German nation...’ Therefore he required every 
soldier in his regiment to ‘become as fanatical in his belief as men were at the time 
of the Crusaders of the Knightly orders.”336 Time would tell whether his exhortations 
had fallen on deaf ears or whether they would bear fruit. 
That evening Student had a conference with Reinhard, again at the advanced 
headquarters in Moergestel.337 Reinhard told him that some of his troops were still in 
transit. Of the two regiments of the 719. Infanterie-Division, most of GR 743, 
reinforced by schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, were now established north of 
Antwerp where it was engaged in battle. The other regiment, GR 723, was setting up 
positions further east behind the Albert Canal. Finally, at Hasselt, I./SS-Grenadier-
Regiment Landstorm Nederland  with six 7.5 cm Pak 40, had also reached its 
positions and dug in. In addition II./Landstorm Nederland was on its way and the 
leading units were expected to reach Antwerp the following day.338 On the plus side 
was the news that Generalleutnant Kurt Chill had single-handedly organised the 
defence of part of the new frontline and that Reinhard had got some reinforcements 
he had not counted on. Not only was he able to use the units from the 347. 
Infanterie-Division that were either held up while in transit to Brussels (see previous 
chapter) or on the way back, he also received a Flak company, 3. (Flak)/Panzerjäger-
abteilung 344, which was equipped with eight 2 cm Flak guns. The company was 
sent to Mol to reinforce GR 723.  All bridges had at last been mined, if not blown. As 
Heeresgruppe B reported, ‘ein Notdürftiger Abwehrfront’ was now in place along the 
Albert Canal.339 The initiative still lay with the Allies. All Student and Reinhard could 
do was direct troops as they arrived and wait and see where the British would strike 
next and act accordingly. They would not have to wait very long. 
A nice day’s run 
Instructed by Field-Marshal Montgomery (Twenty-First Army Group) to push ahead in 
the perceived gap in the German front, Major-General A.H.S. Adair (Guards 
Armoured Division) sent his division northeast towards the Netherlands on 6 
September.340 The first stop was to be at the Albert Canal where crossing were to be 
seized. These were to be the start line (SL) for the advance to the river Rhine that 
was planned for the following day.341 Starting from Brussels, Adair ordered the 32nd 
Guards Brigade to go to Beringen via Diest, while on the left the 5th Guards 
Armoured Brigade would travel to Geel via Aarschot. The first major obstacle was the 
Albert Canal. As usual the armoured cars of the Household Cavalry led the advance, 
A Squadron on the right was followed by the Welsh Guards Group and D Squadron 
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on the left was followed by the Grenadier Guards Group.342 Intelligence had assured 
the commanders that it would be a ‘nice day’s run’ and that there would be slight 
opposition and that only at canals and bridges.343 The troops were in for a shock. 
The Guards were sad to leave Brussels but they got a drink to cheer them up, ‘one 
for the road’. A champagne point had been opened in the Belgian capital and the 
civic authorities had handed over a warehouse full of drink. Even after the Guards 
had taken their share, huge stocks remained which were later seized by Second 
Army and the NAAFI.344 The men set off in a buoyant mood which lasted for quite a 
while. In Leuven, Diest and Aarschot they were met by the cheering crowds they had 
become used to in the last two weeks. However, the crowds gradually thinned out as 
the troops neared the Albert Canal.  
D Squadron Household Cavalry, under Major E.J.S. Ward, leading the northern (left) 
column had advanced with speed to the five bridges south of Geel, between Olen en 
Meerhout. All were blown up in their faces. They came nearest to success at 
Eindhout where they caught the German defenders by surprise. The Grenadiere had 
been sunbathing on the near side of the bridge as the British drove up. The group 
scrambled to safety as Bren guns opened fire on them. Although the British kept on 
firing, the Germans were just too fast and the bridge went up with a roar, like all the 
others. At Kwaadmechelen, where the first armoured cars arrived at 14.10 hours, the 
Household Cavalry were informed by a Belgian resistance fighter, Jozef Noels, that 
the railway bridge was still passable on foot.345 It was a job for the infantry, in other 
words. So the news was passed on to the commander of the 1st (Motor) Grenadier 
Guards, Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Goulburn who ordered No.2 Company to make the 
crossing as soon as possible.346 The Grenadiers got ready for the assault. It was now 
around five p.m. Then, only twenty minutes before the operation was to start, it was 
called off. Brigade had been informed that the Welsh Guards had already crossed the 
canal.  
Surprise 
Around one p.m. the leading armoured cars of A Squadron Household Cavalry under 
Major D. Bowes Daly reached the bridge at Beringen only to find it being blown 
up.347 However, although the wooden bridge (erected by the Germans in 1940 after 
the stone bridge had been blown up by the Belgians) was destroyed, the stone 
abutments of the original were still standing. Maybe a new bridge could be built 
there and the infantry could use the wreckage to cross? The Cavalrymen reported 
this to the Welsh Guards Group who arrived en masse about two hours later. A 
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crossing would not be a piece of cake, however. When Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. 
Gresham, CO of the 1st Welsh Guards, tried to inspect the bridge Spandau MG’s and 
mortars opened fire. It looked as if the defenders, II./GR 723 under Major 
Berenheide, were not going to take things lying down. Plans were made for an 
assault crossing in boats, covered by tanks from No.3 Troop. Starting at 15.40 hours 
the Shermans laid down suppressive fire on the houses and positions on the other 
side as well as laying down a smoke screen. In addition guns from the 55th Field 
Regiment RA, which had just arrived near Paal, also opened fire. Shells hit the 
northern ramp and embankment for almost an hour, while smoke obscured the 
canal.  
Just as the Welsh Guards were about to drag their boats down to the canal they 
spotted a civilian clambering over the wreckage of the bridge waving a white 
handkerchief. It was Remie Vaneerdewegh, who had a very pleasant surprise for the 
Guardsmen: the German defenders were withdrawing. They had obviously 
panicked.348 Not a second was lost and one after the other the Carrier platoon, the 
Prince of Wales and No.3 and 4 Companies went across, using the wreckage of the 
bridge. They ran after the retreating Germans, killing about a dozen and capturing 
twenty. They also shot up a halftrack and a lorry full of ammunition. Then they took 
up positions covering the ramp. Still, the bridgehead was only about two hundred 
metres wide. Would that be enough? Everything now depended on how fast a bridge 
could be constructed to bring tanks across. Without them the bridgehead would 
suffer the same fate as the one at Merksem which had to be abandoned that very 
afternoon. 
The German response 
As mentioned above, on the morning of 6 September, as the Guards set off from 
Brussels, Student’s Fallschirmjäger finally began to arrive. The three regiments that 
would make up Erdmann’s division (FJR 20, 21 and 24) were unloading at Roermond. 
Von der Heydte’s FJR 6 and I./FJR 2 (Hauptmann Oswald Finzel) had stopped at 
Tilburg. Meanwhile the training units (Fallschirmjäger Ersatz und Ausbildungs 
Batallione) arrived in ‘s-Hertogenbosch.349  
During the afternoon, from four to five p.m., there was a conference at the 
headquarters of LXXVIIII. Armeekorps in Moergestel at which Reinhard, Student and 
Model were all present.350 During the meeting it was decided to change the previous 
arrangements for the defence of the Albert Canal. Reinhard assigned the sector 
between Antwerp and Herentals to Sievers (719. I.D.) and he made Chill responsible 
for the sector from Herentals to Hasselt. This meant that Chill took over Grenadier-
Regiment 723.351 Halfway during the meeting news arrived that British forces had 
attacked at Beringen and Kwaadmechelen. Not yet aware that the British had 
crossed the Albert Canal at Beringen, but anxious lest they had, Model ordered Chill 
to seal off any bridgehead and annihilate it without delay.  
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Chill would also receive reinforcements. He was assigned Feld Ersatz und 
Ausbildungs Bataillon (FEB) 347 and during the meeting a phone call went to 
schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 telling its Kommandeur, Major Sattler, 
immediately to send one company to Turnhout where Chill had his headquarters.352 
There they would receive further instructions.353 Soon Oberleutnant Kopka’s 3./559 
was on its way. It was  the start of a cooperation between 559 and Chill that would 
last on and off for nearly two months. Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze were instructed to 
support the infantry of FEB 347, especially along any roads leading to Eindhoven.354 
One look at the map had told Reinhard that that was where the Guards must be 
heading. His educated guess was spot on. In addition Chill was assigned 3. 
(Flak)/Panzerjäger-Abteilung 347 with six 2 cm Selbstfahrlafetten and one drawn 2 
cm, as well as I./FJR 2 (Finzel) as soon as it arrived. Before the day was out 2. and 
1./559, the Jagdpanther Kompanie, plus headquarters were also ordered to 
Turnhout.355 They would follow close on the heels of Kopka and his men. These 
troops would have to suffice.356  
The sudden withdrawal by II./GR 723 from the bridge was of course an unmitigated 
disaster and the blame fell squarely on Oberst Vehrenkamp, commanding officer of 
Grenadier-regiment 723.  In fact, the following morning when they met, Reinhard did 
not mince words and told Vehrenkamp to wipe out the bridgehead in order to restore 
the honour of GR 723.357 Not only Reinhard was furious, Vehrenkamp’s colleague, 
SS-Sturmbannführer M. Gebhardt, commanding I./Landstorm Nederland near 
Hasselt, also had a bone to pick with the Oberst.358 Two days before, on 4 
September, Gebhardt had lent Vehrenkamp two of his precious 7.5 cm Pak which he 
now wanted back. When he sent one of his subordinates, Hauptsturmführer Gerdes, 
to fetch them he could not get through to Beringen as II./GR 723 had already 
withdrawn without informing I./Landstorm Nederland, whose whole right flank was 
now dangling in the air. While Chill began to assemble his forces and draw up a plan 
of action, Vehrenkamp had already ordered his troops to prepare for the 
counterattack. But others had beaten him to it. 
Confusion in the night 
Soon after the Welsh Guards had dug in, it began to grow dark. If they had hoped 
for a quiet night, the Guardsmen were in for a nasty surprise. That afternoon 
Generalleutnant Georg Bertram, responsible for guarding the Albert canal at its most 
                                        
352 A Feld Ersatz Bataillon or FEB was a first-line reinforcement battalion, stationed behind the line, 
which received the reinforcements from the Marschbataillone (q.v.) and held them until required by 
the division it was assigned to (in this case the 347. Infanterie-Division). Often, if casualties were 
heavy or in case of an emergency, the FEB’s were put into the line as fighting units (German Order of 
Battle, London 1994, B10). 
353 KTB 88 AK, 06.09.44, 16.35.  
354 KTB 88 AK, 06.09.44, A 141. 
355 KTB 88 AK, 06.09.44, 18.00 hour. 
356 Interestingly it was the second time Chill had received reinforcements in the form of Jagdpanther. 
The first time had been on 17th August, three weeks earlier, when some Jagdpanther from 
3./s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 654 had been attached to the 85. I.D. near Livarot, Normandy (Lodieu, La Massue, 
124). 
357 KTB 88 AK, 07.09.44, 10.00 hour. 
358 KTB 88 AK, 06.09.44, A 139. 
 77 
eastern end with the two battalions of Flieger-Regiment 22,359 learned of the British 
breakthrough at Beringen just as he was to hand over this sector to the 176. Division 
zbV under Generalleutnant Berthold Stumm.360 He immediately despatched the 
Kommandeur of FLR 22, Oberst Hans Borcherd, to investigate and, if possible, drive 
off the British. In the village of Helchteren Borcherd came across 2./FJR 21 under 
Hauptmann Arthur Jäger.  
After detraining at Roermond, Jäger’s young Fallschirmjäger had received their 
Panzerfäuste while being transported to Helchteren. During the drive they were told 
how to use the weapons. They were on their way to Beringen. Their attack, coming 
from the direction of Heusden, east of Beringen was to coincide with an attack from 
the north-west, carried out by 1. and 2. Kompanie of I./FJR 2 (the other two were 
still on their way) under Hauptmann Oswald Finzel.361 Even though this battalion had 
also arrived through Roermond there was a complete lack of communication 
between the two battalions. That and the fact that the soldiers were exhausted, 
having come straight from Germany, meant that the attack was doomed to fail. Even 
though some Fallschirmjäger got to within a hundred metres of the bridge the Welsh 
Guards, wet, hungry and equally weary, would not give an inch. Jäger pulled back to 
Helchteren, Finzel to Beverlo to get some rest. 
559 on the move 
Kopka and his men did not get much rest that night either.362 While the 
Fallschirmjäger were attacking the bridgehead 3./559 was on the move. Kopka had 
gone ahead in his Kfz. 15 Horch staff car to receive instructions in Turnhout. There, 
Oberstleutnant Kurt Schuster, Ia of the 85. Infanterie-Division, advised Kopka to 
travel to Beringen via Leopoldsburg, Heppen and Beverlo, probably unaware there 
was a much shorter route that ran through Olmen and Oostham. Kopka was also told 
to pick up the infantry, FEB 347 and the remainder of II./GR 723, in Beverlo. The 
company had to cover about ninety kilometres and although the Sturmgeschütze had 
a road speed of up to forty kilometres per hour, because of the darkness and 
occasional showers they were forced to take it slowly. In this way it took them nearly 
all night to arrive at their destination. In addition they had to stop in order to refuel 
at the railway station in Mol. Two Sturmgeschütze caught fire when petrol dripped on 
to the hot exhaust pipes. Fortunately for the crews the torrential rain quickly put the 
fires out. Kopka drove on towards Beverlo. There he fell asleep in his car, overcome 
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by exhaustion. A few hours later his 3. Kompanie arrived. It was now almost six a.m. 
and it would soon get light. The attack was about to begin.  
Building a bridge 
Construction of the bridge at Beringen, vital for the survival of the bridgehead, was 
no mean feat.363 The problems were that most of the bridging equipment was still a 
long way away and one of the piers was damaged while the other was completely 
demolished. A gap of no less than thirty metres would have to be covered by the 
British engineers.364 The work started just before it got dark and went on throughout 
the night. Work was made more difficult as it rained most of the time and there was 
no moon. In addition German mortars, machine-guns and 8.8 cm guns365 opened fire 
on the site of the bridge, some of the fire in aid of the counterattack put up that 
night mentioned earlier.  
To help out, some two hundred metres north of the bridge Belgian civilians had 
begun to collect some barges and make a footbridge over them.366 Fortunately for 
the British troops working on the bridge (and the German POWs forced to assist 
them) this served as a decoy and soon the barges drew most of the German fire. At 
04.15 hours on 7 September the Class 40 bridge was ready. However, the next 
morning, when the engineers saw in daylight what they had put up that night, they 
were horrified. The bridge looked decidedly shaky and it was quickly shored up. 
However, looks can be deceptive and it survived for many more months. But just in 
case it would not, a barge Bailey bridge was constructed just south of the bridge.  
Fifteen minutes after the bridge was ready, the waiting Welsh Guards rushed across. 
At the same time the Irish Guards Group were ordered to board their tanks and 
trucks and wait for the order to follow the Welsh Guards. As soon as the latter had 
taken Beringen the Irish Guards were to advance on Beverlo. They would have to 
spend many uncomfortable hours inside their vehicles before they could be sent 
across. In fact, it would not be until noon that they were finally on their way, 
because the Welsh Guards had run into some serious trouble in Beringen. 
Autumn Gale 
The morning of 7 September was meant to be the turning point for the Germans. 
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW) had ordered a reorganisation along the Western Front and a halt to the 
retreat. The codeword was Herbststurm (Autumn Gale).367 The reorganisation was to 
take effect from 7 September. For LXXXVIII. Armeekorps Reinhard issued an 
additional order. Herbststurm would be implemented as soon as the situation at 
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Beringen was restored.368 He would be in for a long wait. The first tanks of the Welsh 
Guards had just entered the centre of Beringen as Reinhard’s order went out. The 
Welsh Guards immediately ran into some very strong opposition. 
During the night Kampfgruppe Vehrenkamp (mainly II./GR 723, I./FJR 2 plus 3. 
(Flak)/Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 344) had formed a semicircle around the bridgehead, 
whose chief aim was to prevent Allied troops from leaving Beringen via one of the 
main roads. Four Pak (three 7.5 cm and one 5 cm) were positioned north of the 
centre where the main thrust was suspected and one 7.5 cm plus the 2 cm guns of 
the Flak platoon covered all the other exits. When dawn broke it was nearly seven 
p.m. and all hell burst loose in and around Beringen. 369 When positioning these guns 
the German defenders had made a rather curious mistake, either because they were 
new to the game or because it was simply too dark to see (it was raining heavily), or 
both. What was the problem? 
The heart of Beringen, the market square, is on a small hill which rises about ten 
metres above the surrounding countryside. The road, towards Beringen-Mijn, where 
four of the Pak-guns were positioned, first dips down very steeply and then, between 
Beringen and Beringen-Mijn the ground slowly rises again. This meant that once the 
Welsh Guards reached the market square, they would look down upon the German 
gun positions. To counterbalance this obvious disadvantage for the defenders, after 
1,600 metres on the east side of the road leading into Beringen-Mijn rose a slag-
heap, taller even than the centre of Beringen. From there German observers could 
see straight into the Allied bridgehead to direct fire. All in all, the two high points 
would play major roles in the battle, although not at first. 
It was still dark when the Welsh Guards Group crossed the Bailey bridge and entered 
Beringen at four a.m.370 An hour later, as the leading tanks of No.1 Squadron, under 
Major N.T.L. Fisher, and the infantry of No.3 Company, under Captain P.M. Beckwith-
Smith, were just entering the town, Kampfgruppe Vehrenkamp launched a 
counterattack.371 With them they had a Pioneer Kompanie of 1. Panzergrenadier 
Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. The SS-men carried just enough explosives to 
blow up the bridges once the Grenadiere had reached them. But they got no further 
than two hundred metres from the bridge. The Welsh Guards kept pushing tanks and 
infantry across and without the support of armour the German infantry could never 
break through. They pulled back to the Zwarte Beek, a stream just outside Beringen. 
Where was Kopka with his Sturmgeschütze while the counterattack was under way? 
Sturmgeschütze to the rescue 
Oberleutnant Franz Kopka had only taken a short nap when all fourteen 
Sturmgeschütze of 3./559 finally arrived in Beverlo around sunrise. It was now 
almost six a.m. on Thursday 7 September.372 Most of Feld Ersatz Battalion (FEB) 347  
under Hauptmann Sick joined 559 there. While the Grenadiere climbed aboard the 
vehicles, Kopka informed the commanders of the vehicles about his plans for the 
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attack on the bridgehead. Kopka, whose main job as we have seen was to support 
the attacking infantry had decided  to split his forces in order to be able to cover all 
directions. Kopka ordered four Sturmgeschütze to cover the main roads from 
Beringen to Beverlo, via Beringen-Mijn, and attack the Allied bridgehead from the 
north side in support of I./FJR 2 and II./GR 723. He himself would lead the main 
force of ten Sturmgeschütze in a clockwise movement round Beringen to reach the 
south side. The Grenadiere of FEB 347 would ride along on top of the vehicles. In 
this way the Guards would be attacked from two sides simultaneously. It was an 
ingenious plan. As time was not on the Germans’ side, since every hour more 
reinforcements poured into Beringen, there was no time for a proper reconnaissance. 
So, immediately after receiving instructions, the fourteen Sturmgeschütze set off. 
Kopka’s company would receive its baptism of fire.   
The four Sturmgeschütze that advanced via the road from the north, the 
Koolmijnlaan, soon reached the German lines and took up positions.373 One turned 
right and stopped close to the Albert Canal, about 350 metres from the bridge, the 
next one stopped behind a pub on the Koolmijnlaan. The third Sturmgeschütz 
proceeded for another two hundred metres and then stopped along the same road 
and the fourth took up position right behind the 7.5 cm Pak at the beginning of the 
Koolmijnlaan.  
Meanwhile the group of ten Sturmgeschütze headed south. As there were no roads 
in this direction, the vehicles rumbled towards Beringen along the railway tracks. An 
hour after assembling in Beverlo they reached the outskirts of the town. There, at 
the railway station they picked up the remainder of FEB 347. It was now 7 a.m. The 
attack was about to begin. Unable to see the bridgehead from their current position, 
the attackers now began to turn west. In front of them was open terrain, the 
northernmost part was called De Mot, the rest Muizenheide.374 It looked promising, 
but unknown to Kopka this was in fact extremely swampy ground. Soon a number of 
Sturmgeschütze became bogged down. (Later in the day most would be recovered.) 
The others pushed on and just then they ran into Cromwell tanks heading east.375 It 
was the lead squadron of the 2nd Welsh Guards which had just left Beringen. 
The Welsh Guards break out 
Just before the encounter with Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze, the Welsh Guards Group 
had slugged it out in the centre of town. Once they had reached the market square, 
on top of the hill, the combined tank-infantry group, No.1 Squadron and No.3 
Company, wanted to turn right in order to reach the Hasseltsesteenweg, the road 
leading towards Heusden and Helchteren and thence northwards to Hechtel and 
eventually, the Dutch border.376 One of the tanks of No.1 Squadron was knocked out 
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by one of the two 7.5 cm Pak 40 positioned down the road to Beringen-Mijn. After 
being hit the Cromwell tank caught fire. It then slowly rolled down the hill, towards 
the German guns, finally coming to a stop when it crashed into a house less than 
fifty metres from the Pak which had knocked it out. The house burnt down 
completely.377 Two other tanks managed to cross the square unharmed. In turn the 
Cromwells knocked out one of the Pak 40 guarding the eastern exit, the 
Koerselsesteenweg. The tanks could now leave the houses of Beringen behind them, 
which they did. They took the Hasseltsesteenweg , leading straight to Helchteren. 
Just as they entered this road, they came face to face with Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze.  
As soon as the opposing vehicles spotted each other a fire fight broke out between 
No.1 Squadron Welsh Guards and 3./559.378 Eight Sturmgeschütze379 slogged it out 
with fifteen Cromwells. The Germans were heavily outnumbered and the outcome 
was a foregone conclusion. Two Sturmgeschütze were knocked out, one by sergeant 
H.L. Williams in the lead tank, and one by dismounted infantry using a PIAT, and 
Kopka ordered his company to pull back to Beringen railway station. Kopka lost 
another Sturmgeschütz, between Koersel and Beringen.380  
The Welsh Guards Group then proceeded at high speed towards their next 
destination. Between Beringen and Heusden they ran into the next roadblock, put up 
by the Fallschirmjäger of I./FJR 21, under Hauptmann Hoffmann.381 However, the 
Germans were heavily outnumbered and outgunned. The Welsh Guards quickly 
brushed them aside and moved on only to run into the next obstacle, Aufklärungs-
Abteilung 176.382 This was one of three battalions which Oberst Borcherd had 
received as reinforcement for the attack on Beringen from the east; the others being 
2./Flieger Regiment 22 and a Landesschützen Bataillon.383 Again, the lightly armed 
German troops were quickly dealt with and the column moved on. Soon they were 
just a few kilometres from Helchteren. New German opposition, the Landesschützen 
Bataillon under Hauptmann Dietrich, had just left this village. Oberst Borcherd in his 
staff car was just behind them. Seeing tanks rapidly approaching them, the Germans, 
who had no serious anti-tank weapons, decided to take cover and let the tanks roll 
by before firing on the following infantry. However, Belgian civilians pointed out the 
Germans to the Allied troops and the result was a massacre. Scores of Germans were 
killed and Borcherd, seriously wounded himself, ordered the battalion to give up the 
unequal fight. About 150 Germans were taken prisoner.384 The Welsh Guards Group 
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was then shot at by a Pak from I./SS-Landstorm Nederland, with no discernable 
effect, and was ordered to turn left and proceed to Hechtel.  
Initially the advance continued as before, but FJR 20 under Major Franz Grassmel, 
had occupied the village the day before and they had set a trap for the approaching 
Guards. Just as the Welsh Guards entered Hechtel two Cromwells in quick succession 
were knocked out. As dusk was now beginning to fall, the Welsh Guards Group 
decided to pull back. This turned out be easier said than done. South of the village 
soldiers from FJR 24 (Major Friedrich Hübner) appeared and the Welsh lost another 
Cromwell and two trucks before they reached the relative safety of Helchteren. 
Welsh losses were six killed or missing in action. 
Another counterattack 
Meanwhile, back at Beringen, after the fight with the Cromwell tanks, Kopka had 
assembled his company around the railway station of Beringen. From this position he 
could not see the bridgehead, but he did have a view of the other side of the canal, 
where more columns of the Welsh Guards were getting ready to cross the bridge. 
The Sturmgeschütze opened fire, but could not really influence the outcome of the 
battle for the town as they were too far away. In addition the accompanying infantry 
of FEB 347 began to suffer heavy casualties when Allied artillery returned fire on 
Kopka’s group. Slowly the men and the vehicles disengaged and started to pull back 
north in the direction of Beringen-Mijn. 
During the struggle to retake Beringen, at ten a.m. Reinhard had met Chill at his 
headquarters in Oud-Turnhout.385 It was there that Reinhard told Vehrenkamp 
(Grenadier Regiment 723) to restore the honour of his regiment by eliminating the 
bridgehead. Soon after, Chill himself proceeded to Beringen-Mijn to oversee the new 
counterattacks and perhaps urge the troops on.386 All the efforts to wipe out the 
Beringen bridgehead, however, would falter in the face of tough opposition. 
The new German attacks, just after the lead column of the Welsh Guards had gone 
through Beringen, led to prolonged fighting in the town. There the Welsh Guards, 
now reinforced by X Company Scots Guards, had their hands full pushing the 
Germans out of it. The Scots Guards tried to stalk the Sturmgeschütze at the bottom 
of the road (Koolmijnlaan) with a PIAT but every time they got close their quarry 
moved out of range.387 The Scots Guards got their own back when they set up an 
O.P. in an upper window and the two company snipers shot three of the German 
crew.388 By midday most of Beringen had been cleared and the Irish Guards took 
over. The Welsh and Scots Guards were able to disengage in order to continue their 
advance. 
While the bitter fighting in Beringen was going on, the lone Sturmgeschütz which 
had taken up position nearest the Albert Canal, spotted B squadron Household 
Cavalry following the Welsh Guards Group into Beringen.389 As the commander of the 
Sturmgeschütz spotted the rear of the column crossing the Bailey bridge, he opened 
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fire on the Support Troop. Two White scout cars were knocked out in quick 
succession. All the armoured cars had already passed out of sight and were unable 
to help. One soldier was killed and two others severely wounded. The Sturmgeschütz 
remained in close observation until the medical officer, Captain R.U.F. Kynaston, 
appeared to tend to the wounded. It then withdrew, having refrained from firing 
again when it could see the badly wounded lying helplessly in the road. It was a rare 
act of compassion, like earlier at Merksem. 
Around noon Major Erich Sattler, the Kommandeur of 559,  received orders from Chill 
to hunt for enemy tanks which were said to be in the area of Leopoldsburg and 
Hechtel.390 Sattler had only just arrived in Turnhout to rest a few hours and it took 
his Jagdpanther several hours to reach their destination. In fact, 1. and 2./559 did 
not reach Leopoldsburg until late in the afternoon of 7 September, too late anyway 
to influence the fighting further south.391 Also by this time no British tanks had 
reached the area of Leopoldsburg or Hechtel. Sattler set up his headquarters in 
Leopoldsburg, in the Sacred Heart Convent.392 His companies would go into action 
the following day. 
The Irish Guards take over 
Meanwhile the Guards Division had sent another group into the fray. As mentioned 
above, at three a.m. the Irish Guards Group had been ordered to follow the Welsh 
Guards as soon as the latter had taken Beringen. This took longer than expected and 
only after waiting for what must have seemed like an eternity inside their vehicles 
and trucks, could the Irish Guards finally cross the bridge into Beringen around 
midday.393 In the lead was the 3rd Battalion, followed by the 2nd (Armoured) 
Battalion. The Irish Guards, like the Welsh Guards concentrated their troops in four 
mixed infantry-tank sub-groups covering the entire perimeter. They soon discovered 
that the edge of the town had not been cleared and they also spotted four 
Sturmgeschütze, three of them along the Koolmijnlaan road leading to Beringen-
Mijn, moving up and down and shooting into the streets. The Irish Guards suffered 
their first fatalities since leaving Normandy. Soon No.1 Squadron lost its first tank to 
the Sturmgeschütze of 3./559. In addition other high-velocity guns contributed to the 
shelling.394 Lieutenant-Colonel J.O.E. Vandeleur, commanding the Irish Guards 
Group, suspected that the fire was being directed from the towering slag-heap at 
Beringen-Mijn. As more Guards were hit, many of them officers walking around on 
reconnaissance trips, Colonel Joe, as his troops called him, became fed up. Major 
Eames, Gunner battery commander, had found an ideal O.P. in the St. Jozefcollege 
before he, too, was wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vandeleur went up to have a 
look for himself. By mid-afternoon he decided to do some shelling himself before 
launching the attack, in the hope of getting some direct hits on the Sturmgeschütze.  
He was not to be disappointed and soon two of Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze went up in 
sheets of flame. The other two pulled back. Vandeleur then ordered No.3 Company, 
under Major M. Dudley, and No.3 Squadron, under Major D.S. Fitzgerald, to attack 
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around the left flank. The problem was that they would have to cross the Zwarte 
Stroom, the stream just north of Beringen. The only crossing Major Dudley saw was 
a small wooden bridge. He decided to try anyway. After a smoke screen had been 
laid the tanks advanced, but the wooden bridge collapsed under the first Sherman. 
There was a delay as the tanks looked for another crossing-place. At last they found 
an old, disused railway bridge and at six p.m. the attack went in again. The leading 
tank was knocked out by the Sturmgeschütz nearest the Albert Canal. But the others 
got across safely and joined the infantry who had waded through the stream. 
Meanwhile the two other squadrons had concentrated their fire on the 
Sturmgeschütz which was put out of action. In retaliation the one remaining 
Sturmgeschütz knocked out one of No.3 squadron’s Shermans. Still, the attack was a 
success. Although the Irish Guards had not enough men to clear the large mine area 
completely, taking the slag-hap meant that at last the shelling diminished. At the end 
of the afternoon they had pushed back the German infantry from behind the Zwarte 
Stroom and consolidated their gains.395 All in all, the German attempts to wipe out 
the Beringen bridgehead on 7 September had come to nothing. Vehrenkamp’s men 
had failed dismally. At least twenty-five Grenadiere had been killed, many more must 
have been wounded.396  
Oberleutnant Franz Kopka cannot have been very happy either. Six of his 
Sturmgeschütze had been put out of action that day while his company had knocked 
out only five Shermans and a few scout cars.397 Basically, he had lost almost half his 
complement. This did not bode well for the future. As dusk fell he assembled the 
remaining eight vehicles around the railway bridge in Beringen-Mijn.398 The perimeter 
was secured by fifteen Fallschirmjäger from I./FJR 2. The exhausted men of 3./559 
moved into two houses on the edge of a copse, the occupants of which were 
awaiting events in their cellars. The power and water were still in working order and 
the men managed to wash a little. At around eight p.m. Hauptfeldwebel Karl Kornke, 
the commander of Sturmgeschütz 302, arrived with some lorries with provisions. The 
Sturmgeschütze were refuelled and ammunition was loaded up. The men were also 
grateful that Kornke had brought hot food along plus cold rations for two days. 
Kopka, because he suffered from a stomach complaint, in addition received some 
medicine from the health officer. Soon after finishing their suppers the crews were 
checking their machines.  
In the meantime, Kopka, as company commander, had to take care of all the 
paperwork, together with Kornke, the senior NCO. Even though he had been in life-
or-death situations only hours before, this was still expected of him. His duties 
included reporting on the fighting, ordering materials, reporting on casualties, 
looking at requests for leave etc. One request he sent in that evening was to Sattler. 
Kopka knew that the next day would be hard, with only half his unit left and he 
therefore asked Sattler to send him some reinforcements, preferably Jagdpanther. In 
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order to relax a little Kornke and Kopka had a glass of red wine. Kornke then drove 
back to Leopoldsburg while Kopka did the rounds. He found that, with the exception 
of the men on guard, everyone was fast asleep. He soon turned in himself. Disliking 
sleeping in other people’s homes, he made himself comfortable on the back seat of 
his Horch staff car, soon falling asleep from sheer exhaustion.  
Battle among the collieries 
During the evening of 7th September Generaloberst Student himself arrived at the 
headquarters of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps to discuss with Reinhard and Oberst Eichert-
Wiersdorff, the latter’s chief of staff, how to deal with the bridgehead at Beringen.399 
He issued new orders.400 The next attack was to go in at dawn on 8 September. Chill 
was to be in charge while Oberstleutnant von der Heydte, Kommandeur of 
Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6, would carry out the actual attack. The main goal was to 
blow up the bridge.401 Student had high hopes, because both FJR 6 and its 
commander had excellent reputations. Like the other German units it was nearly 
wiped out in Normandy and at the end of August it assembled in Güstrow, again 
under Von der Heydte, to be rebuilt a second time.402 Von der Heydte himself was 
also a renowned soldier. Orginially serving in the army he switched to the Luftwaffe 
in 1940 where he had served with distinction in the Fallschirmtruppe since. In an 
official army assessment he is described as a ‘Besonders passionierter Offizier, für 
welchen Beweglichkeit, Schwung und ein ausgesprochener Unternehmungsgeist 
bezeichnend sind. Dafür auch Freude am selbestständigen Entschluss und an 
Verantwortung. Offen, anständig in der Gesinnung, zuverlässig.’403 Von der Heydte 
was to show all of these characteristics, both positive and negative, which were so 
typical of him. Waiting for their trains to move at some marshalling yard close to 
Aachen Von der Heydte noticed another waiting train nearby. It contained part of a 
Gebirgs Flak-Kompanie, equipped with 2 cm Flak who had no idea how to join their 
regular unit. Von der Heydte managed to persuade these soldiers and their guns to 
join him. As he had no proper Flak himself the unit was to stand him in good stead 
during the fighting over the next two months.404 Still, the problem was that FJR 6 
was only just arriving in Tilburg during the night. It very much remained to be seen, 
therefore, if the attack could begin as planned.  
In the meantime their opponents had not been idle either. As dawn broke, new plans 
were being put into effect. The Irish Guards were still north of Beringen, on the edge 
of Beringen-mijn. Because the Welsh Guards had found that they could not deal with 
both Helchteren and Hechtel the Irish Guards were ordered to clear Helchteren while 
the Coldstream Guards Group (organised like the Irish and Welsh Guards Groups in 
infantry-tank groups) was ordered to take over from them and advance on 
Leopoldsburg through Beverlo and Heppen. From five a.m. the first columns of the 
two Coldstream Guards battalions had crossed the Beringen bridge heading for the 
starting-line near the entrance to the coal mines, just beyond the slag-heap which 
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had caused so much trouble the day before.405 Here, No.3 Squadron 2nd Irish 
Guards had set up a defensive cordon behind which the infantry, the 5th Coldstream 
Guards, began to assemble.  
The attack was to be made in four phases. First No.1 and 3 Companies were to clear 
Beringen-mijn, then the tanks could come in and No.2 Company and No.3 Squadron 
would take Beverlo. After this No.4 Company and No.1 squadron would capture 
Heppen and finally the Group would advance on Leopoldsburg, eight kilometres from 
the starting-line. That was the plan. Considering the opposition, it had a reasonable 
chance of success. It was now almost seven a.m. and slowly getting light. On the left 
of the main road, No.1 Company under Major C.H. Feilden, was assembling, to the 
right No.3 Company under Major the Marquess of Hartington, did the same.  
As FJR 6 was still a long way off, that morning, for the moment, once again, the job 
of holding the Allied attack fell to II./GR 723, together with half of I./FJR 2 (Finzel). 
Also once again, the exhausted Grenadiere and Fallschirmjäger, with no heavy 
weapons and hardly any artillery support, were no match for the combined tank-
infantry group attacking them. The only real hardware were the eight 
Sturmgeschütze of 3./559. The terrain was in the defenders’ favour though, as much 
of Beringen-mijn, just as its name indicates, consisted of gasworks, collieries and a 
railway yard. The day certainly began well for Oberleutnant Kopka. For once he took 
his enemies by surprise, making maximum use of the terrain. 
An invisible enemy 
Kopka’s action can only be described as inspired.406 As soon as he heard the rattling 
of tracks and the growling of engines to the south he climbed on to the railway 
embankment, where it crossed over the Koolmijnlaan, to get a better view of the 
grounds in front of him. He suspected that his opponents were about to renew their 
attack. He saw that the Koolmijnlaan, the main road running south, fell sharply over 
a distance of about four hundred metres before rising again. This meant that at 
ground level he was as invisible to the British troops, six hundred metres away, as 
they were to him, but also that from his position on top of the railway he was able to 
see them. Kopka noticed the two infantry columns in their halftracks assembling east 
and west of the road. Screening them he saw were some Sherman tanks. Kopka 
immediately ordered two of his Sturmgeschütze to take up position right underneath 
the railway bridge. The crews were to leave their hatches open so that he could 
shout his instructions. He told the first Sturmgeschütz to fire. The first shot was short 
and bounced back into the air. Kopka shouted corrections. The second shot was a hit 
and Kopka saw an explosion and fire. The crew of the second Sturmgeschütz fired, 
using the same coordinates. Kopka then had his Sturmgeschütze fire in turn, each 
firing a total of four times.  
Within minutes a smoke screen appeared, hiding his opponents from view, but not 
before two of the leading Shermans of the Irish Guards had been hit, both going up 
in flames. A lorry driver who tried to protect the wounded crew of the second 
Sherman by placing a captured German lorry in front of them saw this vehicle being 
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hit as well. In addition, unbeknownst to Kopka, the German shells severely wounded 
three junior officers. The burning tanks for a while completely obscured the view and 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.R. ‘Roddy’ Hill, CO of the 5th Coldstream Guards Group, briefly 
postponed the attack while sorting out the resulting chaos. To make matters worse, 
at 07.50 hours Hill was informed that there would be no barrage. The infantry would 
have to attack on its own.  
A slow start 
At eight a.m. Hill ordered his two companies to advance, carefully avoiding the main 
road which was deemed too dangerous.407 The German defenders were ready for 
them. While he was wondering why the British had not responded more aggressively 
to his shelling (probably because they could not see him) Kopka told his eight 
Sturmgeschütze to pull back slowly and take up new positions along the railway line. 
There the Fallschirmjäger of Hauptmann Finzel’s I./FJR 2 had also dug in, holding a 
line of trenches about 300 metres long.  
As a result of the German concentration behind the railway, the two advancing 
companies of the Coldstream Guards each faced different problems. On the right, 
Lord Hartington’s No.3 Company had to cope with the mining terrain. The 
Guardsmen had to climb over the walls surrounding the terrain as well as negotiating 
the many railways tracks of the huge yard. It was slow and hard work, but after two 
hours the men finally arrived at their objective, the Leysestraat. For the moment they 
were alone, because on the left, the going had been even slower. Major Feilden’s 
company had run into some serious problems as soon as they neared the railway.  
From their positions along the railway line Finzel’s men had an excellent view of the 
advancing British troops across the open grounds below them. As soon as they had 
come within range, the Fallschirmjäger opened fire. Losses were rapidly mounting 
and the advance had come to a complete standstill. When he was informed of the 
deadlock, Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, sent No.4 Company, Major J. Chandos-Pole, to 
cross the Beverlosesteenweg, sweep around the left and come in on the German 
flank. Even though this took the German defenders by surprise No.4 Company had a 
tough fight and bayonets and hand-grenades were needed to prize the 
Fallschirmjäger out of their deep trenches. But by eleven a.m. the way was clear and 
No.1 Company could resume their advance and seize their objective. Finzel and 
Kopka were forced to pull back a kilometre to the village of Beverlo. Because it had 
taken so long to take Beringen-mijn, Hill decided to go over to the second phase of 
the attack, the capture of Beverlo, without delay. There, schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 had just lost its first precious Jagdpanther, ironically, not 
to enemy action. 
The first Jagdpanther are lost 
Because Kopka had realised the previous day that he was heavily outnumbered, he 
had requested his commanding officer, Major Sattler, to send him a few Jagdpanther 
as reinforcements.408 Sattler sent the third Zug (Troop), Jagdpanther 131, 132 and 
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133, under Leutnant Heinrich Koch, to help Kopka.409The Zug left Leopoldsburg 
around eight a.m., travelled to Korspel and arrived in Beverlo about an hour later. 
There they got into trouble almost right away. Entering Beverlo they decided to head 
for the main road towards Heppen. The vehicles turned into the village proper.410 
There they met one of Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze, carrying identification number 333, 
driving back from the direction of the village centre, probably to take up position on 
the northern end of Beverlo. Unfortunately for the Germans the area they had 
entered (Eindeken) was extremely swampy and the road narrow. Jagdpanther 133 
and the Sturmgeschütz both slid off the road and ended up in narrow ditches on 
either side of the road. Jagdpanther 132 drove up and stopped behind the stranded 
vehicle. The towing cables were then attached to 133, contrary to regulations which 
said that at least two vehicles needed to be used for such a job. It seems that Koch 
in his command Jagdpanther, 131, did not stay, but instead drove on while the 
rescue attempt was being made. The heavy Maybach engines roared, the cables 
tightened and the rescue vehicle, 132, suffered such severe damage to its road 
wheels that it, too, became stuck.  In the end, none of the three vehicles could be 
rescued and the crews abandoned them, without first blowing them up as they 
should have done.411 Koch, meanwhile, in 131, had arrived at the southern exit of 
Beverlo. 
While Koch’s Zug arrived in Beverlo, all the other Jagdpanther and two 
Sturmgeschütze of 2./559 (the rest of Oberleutnant Haile’s 2. Kompanie stayed in 
reserve at Leopoldsburg) had also been sent to investigate the area between 
Leopoldsburg and Hechtel. The Jagdpanther operated in four groups of two, as laid 
down in the regulations. Sattler and his headquarter vehicles set off later. Most of 
them did not come across any British armour that morning, but that would change 
within the next few hours.  
Next stop, Beverlo 
As mentioned above, at 11.20 hours Lieutenant-Colonel Hill ordered his men to begin 
phase two of the advance on Leopoldsburg, the capture of Beverlo. This time tanks 
joined the infantry. Deviating slightly from the plan, both No.4 and 2 Companies, 
supported by the Shermans of No.3 Squadron set off in the direction of Beverlo. 
Artillery was now available and a smoke screen was put down. The Guardsmen had 
to cross some 800 metres of open ground, covered by troops from II./GR 723 and 
I./FJR 2, while Kopka’s remaining Sturmgeschütze took up positions throughout the 
village. The smoke screen was very effective and the infantry soon approached the 
village. The tanks, however, had run into trouble immediately. 
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From where he was positioned at the top of the Koolmijnlaan, Leutnant Koch in 
Jagdpanther 131 looked straight down the road.412 He had a perfect view of the 
Shermans of No.3 Squadron as they drove out from under the same railway bridge 
that Kopka had stood on early that morning. Koch did not hesitate and fired off a 
shot. But the leading Sherman had spotted him, too, and was a little quicker off the 
mark. Several shells slammed into the Jagdpanther. It was as if a giant was banging 
on the outside and the crew literally shook in their seats. Koch at once ordered his 
driver to pull back out of sight of the advancing Sherman tanks. Because of the 
distance, some 1,100 metres, the British 75 mm shells had not penetrated the 
heavily armoured sloping front of the Jagdpanther. But they had damaged the 
electrical firing mechanism rendering the tank-hunter useless. Koch quickly drove 
back and managed to reach the centre of Beverlo where a heavy recovery vehicle 
pulled back the damaged Jagdpanther to Leopoldsburg. It would be repaired just in 
time to take part in the battle of Geel two days later (see 3.2). 
Beverlo captured 
Slowly the Coldstream Guards began to enter Beverlo. It was now almost one p.m.413 
Around this time Kopka in his command vehicle, Sturmgeschütz 301, had taken up 
position at the junction in the centre of Beverlo. Incredible as it may seem in the 
midst of a battle, Kopka had dozed off for a short while. When he woke up he 
spotted a Sherman tank only 400 metres away. The two AFV’s immediately began 
firing on each other. The Sherman was hit, but not fatally and it managed to pull 
back. Kopka now carefully studied the streets in front of him. Because of the houses 
he did not spot a second Sherman tank until it was just 45 metres from him. Kopka’s 
heart pulsed in his throat. He shouted to his gunner to fire, but before he could do so 
the driver of the Sherman had put her in reverse and disappeared in the rubble of 
the inn it had just crashed into. After waiting another fifteen minutes Kopka radioed 
back that the village of Beverlo had been lost to the enemy and he sent an urgent 
request for additional infantry as well as more ammunition.414 He decided that 
discretion was the better part of valour and he pulled back as he could see more and 
more British troops entering the village.   
The Coldstream Guards captured three Pak guns and took about a hundred 
prisoners. The job of capturing Beverlo had taken them less than an hour, although 
five Shermans had been knocked out by the Sturmgeschütze of 3./559 and the Pak 
guns. This time Finzel could not repeat his success at Beringen-mijn and his band of 
Fallschirmjäger was scattered to the four winds. Finzel would need some time to 
gather them back into some semblance of order. Fortunately for him, his opponents, 
the Coldstream Guards Group, also needed time to get ready for the third stage of 
their attack towards Leopoldsburg. There was another piece of good news for the 
defenders. The two batteries of 17. and 18. SS-Artillerie Ersatz und Ausbildungs 
Regiment with their powerful 10.5 cm guns reported at two p.m. that they had finally 
arrived from De Kolonie and were in position and ready to open fire.415 Only two 
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weeks earlier these guns (together with 19. and 20. Batterie) had been in positions 
alongside the Dutch Northsea coast leading a life of leisure.416 Now, as for so many 
units in the Netherlands, the reality of war finally caught up with them. Around the 
same time Kopka (in Sturmgeschütz 301) and Kornke (in 302) took up position at the 
cemetery northwest of the village of Beverlo, from where they could cover the main 
road leading to Heppen. Once again, the German defenders did not intend to give up 
without a fight.  
Just before receiving the news of the loss of Beverlo on 8 September, Reinhard met 
with Chill at the latter’s advanced headquarters east of Mol. Chill informed Reinhard 
of his plans with regards to Beringen and also expressed his anger with Vehrenkamp. 
Chill felt that Vehrenkamp and his entire regiment, GR 723, had utterly failed.417 
Following this meeting Reinhard went forward to see for himself what the situation 
was like at the front.418 But there was nothing either Reinhard or Chill could do for 
the moment except hope that their troops would halt the Allied advance until FJR 6 
arrived when, hopefully, the tables could be turned. 
Clash of Armour 
Further east, on the morning of Friday 8 September, the Welsh Guards had renewed 
their efforts to capture Hechtel.419 Because Helchteren was continually under attack 
from Fallschirmjäger from FJR 21 (Oberst Rolf Löytved-Hardegg) and FJR 24 (Major 
Friedrich Hübner), the Welsh had to leave part of their force behind there. The Irish 
Guards Group was to take over, but their departure was delayed by Kopka’s action 
early that morning and then they had to wait for their successors to take over and 
these did not arrive until noon. For the time being the Welsh Guards would have to 
fend for themselves, which they did, fighting off one frenzied attack after another. 
Meanwhile, the attack on Hechtel was to be carried out by the Prince of Wales 
Company420 (Major J.M. Miller) and X Company Scots Guards (attached as usual to 
1st Welsh Guards), under Major P. Stewart-Fotheringham, supported by the 
Cromwell tanks of No.2 Squadron under Major J.O. Spencer. The group would not 
attack up the main road from Helchteren to Hechtel, the Hasseltsebaan, for fear of a 
repeat of the events of the previous day. Only a diversion was planned to take place 
along this road. Instead of using the main road, the attacking group, which set off 
around midday, headed northwest, across the heath and straight for the road 
running into Hechtel from Leopoldsburg (the Kamperbaan). Soon the infantry 
reached their designated starting points, X Company to the left (north) of the road, 
the Prince of Wales Company to the right (south). They were ready to begin the 
attack on the village. The supporting Cromwell tanks found the going much harder. 
The countryside reminded the Guardsmen of Aldershot, the traditional British training 
area, undulating, heavily wooded and with large patches of heath. The Cromwells 
forged their way forward carefully because of the poor visibility.  
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Around the same time the commanding officer of schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559, Major Erich Sattler set off from Leopoldsburg. He had decided to 
investigate the situation to the east which was still unclear. The road was reported to 
be free of enemies when he left.421 This would soon change as at that very moment 
Major Spencer’s No.2 Squadron was coming up from the south. Sattler was not on 
his own. Following the regulations about always working in pairs, his Jagdpanther 
(01) was accompanied by that of his Adjudant, Oberleutnant Erwin Seitz (02). They 
drove up the road encountering no opposition until they reached the pump house 
after about five kilometres. Suddenly, ahead and a little to his right, Sattler spotted a 
tank half hidden by the undergrowth. The muzzle pointed threateningly in his 
direction. Sattler wasted no time and ordered his gunner to fire. The 8.8 cm shell 
grazed the turret of the British tank, disabling the M.G. The commander of the 
Cromwell tank, 21-year old Lieutenant W.H. Griffith, responded and ordered his 
driver to reverse. He knew that his tank would not survive a second hit. The 
Cromwell disappeared out of sight. Content that he had chased his adversary away, 
Sattler resumed his advance towards Hechtel, while he and Seitz sprayed the 
countryside with their bow M.G.’s hoping to draw out any hidden tanks.  
But Griffith had only pulled back a short distance and he was biding his time. He 
knew that his 75 mm gun could never knock out a Jagdpanther unless from a much 
shorter distance and even then the best chance was to hit it in the side or, even 
better, in the rear. His patience was rewarded when Sattler passed in front of him. 
This was what Griffiths had been waiting for. The Jagdpanther was a mere forty-five 
metres away. In rapid succession Griffith’s gunner fired off four AP rounds which hit 
the engine compartment of the Jagdpanther. The engine caught fire and Sattler and 
his crew hurriedly bailed out. Sattler was the last one to abandon the vehicle, his 
foot got caught and he hit the ground head first, knocking him unconscious. He also 
suffered wounds on his arms. Looking round them the crew saw that Seitz and his 
Jagdpanther had hurriedly left the scene after seeing the vehicle in front of them 
being hit. Sattler slowly came round. His crew picked him up and got him back safely 
to Leopoldsburg. After receiving first aid he first told off Seitz while the battalion 
surgeon, Dr. Friedrich Reichel, was treating his wounds. Sattler was then sent on to 
a hospital in Eindhoven. There a Dutch surgeon operated on him, after which he was 
transferred to a hospital in Germany. Sattler was not the only victim of the advancing 
Cromwell tanks of the Welsh Guards. Oberleutnant Zoske, commanding 1. Kompanie, 
in Jagdpanther 101 was also wounded, but his vehicle survived the encounter unlike 
that of Sattler. His Jagdpanther was probably hit later that afternoon when the Welsh 
Guards attacked Hechtel itself.422 
A new Kommandeur 
After pulling back from Beverlo, Kopka and Oberfeldwebel Kornke had positioned 
their two Sturmgeschütze, 301 and 302, at the entrance of the cemetery north of the 
village.423 In this way, should the Coldstream Guards continue their attack further 
north they would be spotted right away. Just before three p.m. a dispatch rider 
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arrived and told Kopka he was to go to Heppen Station to report to Generaloberst 
Student himself. Kopka hopped on to the back of the motorcycle, but not before 
instructing his crew to pull back towards Heppen station in case they were attacked 
by more than one tank. They would not have to wait very long. 
At the railway station, which was halfway between Beverlo and Heppen, Student 
asked Kopka about his view of the situation. While the men were discussing these 
issues shells suddenly came crashing down. The British had obviously resumed their 
attack. There was no time to be lost. Student informed Kopka what had happened to 
Sattler and said that he was to take over as Kommandeur of 559. He was also 
ordered to go to Oostham and investigate whether British tanks had also broken 
through there. But he was told not to leave before he had met the liaison officer 
from FJR 6. After issuing these orders Student hurriedly left the station. After only 
having been in charge of a Kompanie for a year Kopka was now suddenly in charge 
of the whole Abteilung. According to his superiors he should be able to handle the 
job. In his assessment in 1944 it said, ’Trotz seiner Jugend gereift und ernst. Gutes 
taktisches Verständnis, gute Kenntnisse und Leistungen, sehr strebsam.’ Moreover, 
he was‘’bei Kameraden beliebt, von Untergebenen geachtet’.424  
Soon afterwards Kopka was met by Oberleutnant Hans Redding, his liaison with Chill 
and Oberleutnant Rudolf Beck, commanding 2./FJR 6, who liaised on behalf of FJR 6. 
Just after Kopka had shaken hands with Beck a British shell exploded nearby. Beck 
lost both of his legs just below the knees. Quickly Kopka and another soldier carried 
the severely wounded man into a house. There they tied off his legs with telephone 
wire. But they were too late and Beck died within minutes. Furious Kopka left the 
house. Outside he was met by his crew. Feldwebel Franz Muschiol, his gunner, 
informed him that his Sturmgeschütz had become stuck in the mud at the cemetery 
gates and could not be retrieved. Kopka had no option but to walk, or rather run, 
back to Heppen where his second command vehicle was positioned. Following the 
orders Student had given him, Kopka told his driver to head west, to find out about 
the possible Allied breakthrough in the area around Oostham. 
The good news for the Germans was that FJR 6 finally began to arrive, the bad news 
that they had no ammunition. Chill did not hesitate. He had the ammunition as well 
as the mortars and about 2,000 rounds confiscated from the train of III./GR 723 and 
handed these over to the Fallschirmjäger.425 It was evident that, understandably, 
Chill trusted the new arrivals more than Vehrenkamp’s Grenadiere, who had failed so 
dismally before. Kopka was on his way to Oostham, the new Kommandeur of 559. It 
was destined to be one of the shortest commands ever, at least initially. 
One village too far 
As Kopka was receiving his orders from Student, the Coldstream Guards Group 
began the third phase of their attack towards Heppen and Leopoldsburg.426 
Unfortunately for the attackers, the two hours which it took to prepare for this, was 
exactly the break that the German defenders needed to reorganise. Finzel gathered 
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together what was left of I./FJR 2 and together with III./GR 723 and the first arrivals 
of FJR 6, dug in about a kilometre out of Beverlo, around the railway station, halfway 
to Heppen. Also, one Jagdpanther was ordered by Kopka to take up position near the 
railway crossing from where it could cover the roads from Beverlo.427Of course, using 
a Jagdpanther in this way, alone, was against all regulations, but desperate times call 
for desperate measures. Roughly in the same area III./GR 723 had set up one 7.5 
cm Pak behind a haystack with a second gun a few hundred metres up the road. 
This was where the battle for Heppen would be fought.  
By coincidence Lieutenant-Colonel Hill had somewhat altered his original plan and 
the station happened to be the exact point which he had now chosen as the 
intermediate objective. Once again No.1 Company (Major Feilden) was in the lead, 
supported this time by No.1 Squadron. Moving through the woods on the left of the 
road the infantry reached the station without difficulty. But then the Guardsmen saw 
themselves face to face with the Jagdpanther at the railway crossing. To make 
matters worse for them, their own tanks could not reach them. The Shermans of 
No.1 Squadron had tried a wide left hook from Beverlo in an attempt to get at the 
German defenders from the side. But in the wide open fields the tanks came under 
accurate fire which stopped the advance. The squadron then tried the main road, the 
Heppensesteenweg, but this manoeuvre failed as well. As soon as the leading 
Sherman entered the road it was hit by the Pak and burst into flames. The second 
Sherman shared this fate. The four other tanks following tried to leave the roads but 
become hopelessly bogged. The remaining six tanks put down smoke and withdrew. 
Without tank support the infantry of No.1 Company were stuck. One Jagdpanther 
and one Pak had turned the tide, for the moment. 
In spite of the unexpectedly fierce resistance Lieutenant-Colonel Hill decided to 
renew the attack on Heppen with another mixed tank-infantry group as soon as 
sufficient artillery support could be arranged. This took some time and it was not 
until four a.m. that No.4 Company and No.2 Squadron made an even wider left hook 
around Feilden’s company near Heppen Station. The infantry again successfully 
negotiated the woods as far as the railway line. Then, disaster struck. The company 
commander, Major Chandos-Pole, was seriously wounded and wireless contact was 
lost with Battalion Headquarters. The tanks found the going much harder. They had 
had to swing even further out to the left than No.1 Squadron and dusk was already 
beginning to fall by the time they reached the infantry. One tank then threw a track 
and two other Shermans were knocked out by anti-tank guns. But the squadron 
pushed on through the darkening woods to get into Heppen from the west. It was 
nearly dark as the Shermans entered the village where the Jagdpanther knocked out 
the leading Sherman. As any tank was now an easy target in the light of the burning 
houses, the squadron pulled back to Beverlo. The first attempt to take Heppen had 
failed. 
Meanwhile there was still no contact between No.4 Company and the Battalion. 
Captain D.I.T. Eastman, the company second-in-command, received permission to 
take a carrier and try and locate the missing company even though it was dark by 
then and the enemy could be anywhere. He successfully accomplished his mission 
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and was awarded the Military Cross for this. All in all, the Coldstream Guards had 
suffered serious losses on 8 September, 29 soldiers had been killed and total 
casualties were around 150.428 
Oostham 
While the fighting raged around Heppen Station, a new British unit joined in the fight 
around Beringen. It was the independent 8th Armoured Brigade under Brigadier G.E. 
Prior-Palmer.429 The Brigade was one of eight independent armoured brigades of the 
Twenty-First Army Group.430 The brigades were used whenever extra armour was 
required. Sometimes a brigade as a whole was assigned, at other times the 
battalions were used individually. The 8th Armoured Brigade had landed with the 
50th (Northumbrian) Division on D-Day, had supported both the 50th and the 43rd 
(Wessex) Divisions during the fighting in Normandy and had acted independently 
since 28 August in the race into Belgium, advancing between the 11th and the 
Guards Armoured Divisions. After the Guards had left Brussels on 6 September the 
Brigade had followed at a leisurely pace, waiting for the Guards to break out of the 
Beringen bridgehead. The Brigade was composed of four battalions. Three were 
armoured, the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards (Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Byron), the 
13th/18th Royal Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel V.A.B. Dunkerly) and the 
Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry (Lieutenant-Colonel S.D. 
Christopherson), while the 12th King’s Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC, Lieutenant-Colonel 
M. Edwardes) was the Brigade’s motorised infantry battalion. All four battalions had 
spent the previous day, 7 September, in and around Aarschot, 30 kilometres west of 
Beringen. During the evening they were told to get ready to cross into Beringen 
where they were to turn left to get behind the German lines south of Geel. Only the 
Sherwood Rangers were held back for the moment. They were eventually attached 
to the 50th (Northumbrian) Division which would soon become involved in a battle 
for the town of Geel itself.  
At around seven a.m. on 8 September the other three battalions moved out and 
headed for Diest. From there they drove on and at the end of the morning they 
began to arrive west of the Albert Canal, in the area of Paal. Soon a huge traffic jam 
blocked the road leading to Beringen bridge. The 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards and 
the 12th KRRC were in the lead and slowly moved on, but the 13th/18th Royal 
Hussars were held up for three hours before they got anywhere near the canal.  
Finally, at 13.45 hours the battalions received the orders to cross and about an hour 
later the leading battalions, the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards and the 12th KRRC, 
had arrived in Beringen-Mijn. They then discovered that, although the enemy had 
been driven out off Beringen-Mijn and Beverlo, he was still very much present in 
large numbers in the woods to the west, as far as the Albert Canal. But as it had 
taken them a long time to get to Beringen-Mijn the job of cleaning up was left to the 
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13th/18th Royal Hussars who made up the rear. In spite of the shelling, mortaring 
and the occasional firing by one of the Sturmgeschütze of 3./559 the 13th/18th 
Royal Hussars managed to subdue the scattered German forces and by the end of 
the afternoon had taken some two to three hundred POWs. It was during this period 
in the fight north of Beringen that 3./559 later claimed to have knocked out a 600 
ton Belgian freighter in the Albert Canal.431 As darkness fell, the Hussars’ job was 
done and they returned to Beverlo to laager for the night. 
Kopka’s demise 
Meanwhile the other two battalions had forged on and they had found the going 
much less easy. In the lead were B Squadron 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards (Major 
Richards) and A Company 12th KRRC (Major N. Trench), while B Company (Major 
William Deedes) followed close on their heels. After arriving in Beverlo the leading 
units turned northwest and took the main road leading to Oostham as far as the 
hamlet of Geneberg. It was now three p.m. There, about one kilometre from 
Oostham, Belgian civilians informed their liberators of the presence of German ‘tanks’  
at the railway crossing straight ahead. Richards and Trench decided to split their 
forces into three columns. The four Shermans of No.2 Troop of the Dragoon Guards 
were to continue along the main road while No.1 Troop was to hook to the left and 
No.5 Troop to the right in an attempt to outflank the German defences. The 
manoeuvre did not meet with a great deal of success. The three columns all lost their 
lead tanks as soon as they got near Oostham, one (No.5 Troop) was knocked out by 
a Panzerfaust, the other two by Sturmgeschütze, one of which was commanded by 
Oberleutnant Kopka, who had arrived in the village just in time to meet the attack. 
The Shermans retaliated and managed to hit one of the Sturmgeschütze.432 
Cautiously the British tanks and infantry closed in on the village. It was now just 
after five p.m.  
After knocking out the Sherman tank at Wasseven, Kopka had driven back to the 
centre of Oostham to see how the situation was developing there. He stopped to 
inquire from an infantry officer where the British were and whether he knew of any 
other Sturmgeschütze in the area. The officer could not help him out and Kopka 
thereupon decided to return to Heppen as the clanking of Allied tanks became louder 
and louder. He left the village at full speed and had just entered the road back to 
Heppen when he spotted two Shermans (No.2 Troop) to his right. The distance 
between him and the British vehicles was less than two hundred metres. Kopka 
shouted to his driver, Unteroffizier Herbert Gallus, to drive like a bat out of hell and 
pull up behind a house which was just ahead of them. However, Gallus 
misunderstood the order and pulled up right away! The Sturmgeschütz had come to 
a halt in an open stretch between two houses in plain view of the two Sherman 
tanks. The outcome was a foregone conclusion and within seconds the first A.P. shell 
slammed into the Sturmgeschütz. The crew hastily abandoned their vehicle just as it 
was hit a second time. It burst into flames and a huge explosion ripped through the 
air. All four crew members were wounded, Kopka had shrapnel in his lungs, but they 
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still managed to crawl away until they came upon a 2 cm Flak gun of Heeresflak-
Abteilung 347. The gun commander took the four wounded men back to 
Leopoldsburg. There Kopka’s wounds were dressed and he was taken to Tilburg 
where he was operated on. Kopka was hospitalised and it took him until 17 
September to recover from his wounds. Command of 559 was taken over by 
Oberleutnant Haile, who until then had commanded 2./559.433 Not only had 3. 
Kompanie lost its commanding officer, after two days of fighting, just five 
Sturmgeschütze survived, none of them serviceable.434  
This meant that in two days’ fighting, Kopka’s 3. Kompanie had lost nine of its 
fourteen Sturmgeschütze. In return they had knocked out twelve British tanks.435 
This was not a great score. In addition, they had not been able to annihilate the 
British bridgehead or even halt its expansion. In other words, this first action had 
been an unmitigated disaster. In a report about the attack on the Beringen 
bridgehead, written three weeks later, Kopka blamed the failure and the huge losses 
on a number of factors. He wrote bitterly: ‘Due to the attachment situation, only one 
Sturmgeschütze-Kompanie was employed during the attacks on the Beeringen [sic] 
bridgehead, where strong enemy tank forces had been expected as reported by 
reconnaissance troops and infantry. When it was revealed during the battle that in 
comparison to the enemy tanks the Sturmgeschütze were outnumbered and could 
not break through in every zone, the Panther-Kompanie was also sent in. This 
piecemeal employment led to our heavy losses. The Abteilung is convinced that a 
concentrated attack by a combined force of Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther would 
have resulted in the destruction of all of the enemy tanks found there, cleaned out 
the bridgehead, and our own losses would have been significantly lower.’436  
Whatever the merits of this somewhat bold claim, Kopka was certainly right to point 
out that employing the Sturmgeschütze in a piecemeal way was a sure way to 
negate the usefulness of the assault guns. This was to become abundantly clear over 
the next few days at Geel. But other lessons were learned, which would be put to 
good use later on.  
Guards on the move 
In Beringen itself new troops had taken over. The previous evening Gevechtgroep 
(Battle Group) I of the Dutch Prinses Irene Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. De 
Ruyter van Steveninck) had arrived to secure the bridgehead. On 8 September, the 
other Gevechtsgroepen joined it, securing positions around Beringen. Around midday 
the Irish Guards Group began to hand over control of the town. At least that was the 
official description. According to one of their officers it would have been more 
accurate to say that the Irish Guards “just cleared out.”437 The Irish Guards left for 
Helchteren where they arrived as dusk fell and where they soon discovered that they 
were more or less surrounded by enemy troops attacking every now and again. In 
fact, the fighting at Helchteren went on throughout the (pitch black) night, the only 
                                        
433 KTB 88 AK, 10.09.44, A 207. 
434 KTB 88 AK, 08.09.44, Tagesmeldung. 
435 Five from the Irish Guards, five from the Coldstream Guards and two from 4th/7th Royal Dragoon 
Guards. 
436 Quoted in Jentz and Doyle, Panzer Tracts No. 9-3, Jagdpanther, Boyds 2005, 86. 
437 Fitzgerald, The Irish Guards, 467. 
 97 
light coming from the burning houses and haystacks. To add to the confusion 
infantry and armour occasionally fired on each other. It was only towards dawn that 
both sides took a few hours’ rest.  
The main event, however, took place a few kilometres further north. There the 
attack on Hechtel had begun.438 The Welsh Guards were determined to make up for 
the failure the day before. At 14.30 hours the 374th, one of the two batteries of the 
55th Field (West Somerset Yeomanry) Regiment, and the Cromwell tanks of No.2 
Squadron, fired a brief barrage on the village, particularly on the crossroads and the 
northwestern part of Hechtel. The leading troops were supposed to go in almost 
right away after this. But because of the thick terrain the infantry were delayed and 
when the first troops entered Hechtel the element of surprise had been lost. 
According to the plan there were two lines of advance, X Company Scots Guards 
(Major P.S. Fothringham) would move up on the left of the road from Leopoldsburg 
towards its objective, positions north of the crossroads, while the Prince of Wales 
Company from the Welsh Guards (Major J.M. Miller) on the right of the same road 
would occupy the western part of Hechtel. 
Further delay was caused when a convoy of ten German lorries came down the road 
from Leopoldsburg at high speed.439 The Scots Guards opened fire. The first two 
vehicles managed to escape into Hechtel, the third was shot up and the others 
turned and disappeared back to Leopoldsburg. Now Major Fothringham had the 
added worry of having to keep an eye over his shoulder as X Company penetrated 
the village. This was not an easy job. The German defenders (FJR 20, Major Franz 
Grassmel) put up a stiff resistance.  When the Guardsmen crossed a road they came 
under fire from some machine-guns and an 8.8 cm Flak in the Kerkstraat, less than 
fifty metres away. Guardsman Pettigrew, without considering the danger to himself, 
fired his PIAT through a wooden door, set fire to the gun and killed several of the 
crew. The Scots Guards then made for the Rijkswachtstraat, their intended objective, 
but were faced with a second 8.8 cm Flak on the Lommelsebaan which for the 
moment made all movement impossible. Again several PIATs were fired at the gun 
and, again the gun and its crew were disabled. Quickly the Scots Guards crossed the 
Lommelsebaan and at 18.15 hours No.13 and 14 Platoons set up positions in the 
northeast of Hechtel. The Headquarters, No.15 Platoon and the Mortar Section 
remained in the area of the church, a few hundred metres further west. 
The Prince of Wales Company had found the going even more difficult. The Welsh 
Guards had to advance over more open country and were soon stopped by several 
machine-guns dug in on the western edge of Hechtel. The tanks could not break the 
deadlock either. Because of the many hedges Fallschirmjäger could crawl close to the 
Cromwells and soon several were knocked out by Panzerfäuste. Major Miller decided 
to direct his company forward by the route taken by the Scots Guards. So the Welsh 
Guards doubled back to the Leopoldsburg road, but then the leading platoons found 
that they were unable to cross it because of the intense machine-gun fire. On top of 
that they were suddenly fired on by a Jagdpanther which had sneaked up on them 
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from the direction of Leopoldsburg.440 Cromwell tanks came up and hit the 
Jagdpanther which withdrew.441 Later other Jagdpanther continued to pop up every 
now and again to make a nuisance of themselves.  
Slowly Miller with his Headquarters and two Platoons managed to reach the outskirts 
of the village. They settled in the vicarage (see map). It was now nearly six p.m. 
Meanwhile No.1 and 3 Platoons reached the Kerkstraat. Again they were held up by 
murderous fire. There were many casualties and the British asked for a temporary 
cease fire to retrieve the wounded. The request was granted and Lieutenant H.R.E. 
Mitchley, one of the platoon commanders, was even carried back to his own lines by 
German stretcher bearers. After the end of the cease fire the fighting was resumed. 
German counterattacks were beaten off, but the Welsh Guards could not advance. 
Miller decided to call it a day, especially as No.2 Squadron had only three tanks still 
operational. All four companies dug in around the vicarage. The hold the Guards had 
on Hechtel at the end of 8 September can at best be described as tenuous. But the 
Germans had no reason to be triumphant either. 
Von der Heydte arrives 
Student’s order to Chill the previous evening, to drive back the British forces on 8 
September and blow up the Beringen bridge, had not been carried out.442 The main 
problem was that the main body, FJR 6, did not arrive until later that day. In fact, 
that morning only the second battalion, II./FJR 6, had arrived in Belgium after 
detraining in Tilburg.443 It was told to unload at Maria-ter-Heide, north of Antwerp, 
because that was where Student and Reinhard still feared an Allied breakthrough. 
The rest of FJR 6 still had to leave Tilburg. Moreover, Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte 
himself had not received the order to move to Beringen until 03.35 hours on 8 
September.444 Only at eleven a.m. did the advance guard of his regiment arrive in 
Mol. With lorries shuttling to and fro between Tilburg and Mol, a distance of fifty 
kilometres, and the regiment having to walk another ten kilometres from there to 
Oostham and Heppen, Von der Heydte did not expect to arrive much before five p.m. 
Long before that, Chill had already decided that an attack would be pointless without 
FJR 6. Von der Heydte’s regiment was a crack unit. Still, it should be borne in mind 
that the regiment that arrived in Belgium and the Netherlands was a mere shadow of 
its former self. The fresh recruits which made up 75% still had to fire their first shots 
in anger and many of the officers were equally untried in battle.445 Nevertheless, Von 
der Heydte himself, was an excellent commander although he loved to act 
independently a little too much, a quality that was to land him in trouble from time to 
time. 
                                        
440 Once again completely against regulations, unless a second Jagdpanther was in support but  
invisible to the British. 
441 Not knocked out, as the Welsh Guards claimed, because only Sattler’s Jagdpanther was knocked 
out that day near Hechtel and that was early in the afternoon, so in all likelihood this was Zoske’s 
Jagdpanther (101) as we know that he was hit and wounded that afternoon.  
442 KTB 88 AK, 07.09.44, A 169. 
443 KTB 88 AK, 08.09.44, 03.10 hours. 
444 KTB 88 AK, 08.09.44, 12.36 hours. 
445 Von der Heydte, Muss ich sterben, 1. 
 99 
But Chill had additional problems in his sector that day. Contact had been lost with 
the Dutch SS-battalion near Hasselt that morning.446 Later I./SS-Grenadier Regiment 
Landstorm Nederland was discovered to have taken up an all round defence and 
asked for more ammunition.447 For the moment they were ordered to stay in place. 
Worst of all for Chill, during the night of 7 to 8 September, the 50th (Northumbrian) 
Division had established a bridgehead south of Geel, which also required his urgent 
attention. Student was adamant that he wipe out this bridgehead as well.448 We shall 
look more closely into the fighting there in the next chapter (3.2). From 8 September 
Chill’s entire sector was under attack. The few troops under his command were now 
fully stretched if not overstretched. No reinforcements were available in the 
foreseeable future and much would depend on how skilfully Chill would be able to 
juggle his units over the next few days.  
As FJR 6 finally arrived fierce fighting was still raging in Oostham. While Kopka and 
his crew were taken to Leopoldsburg to have their wounds dressed, the British forces 
had occupied most of Oostham. B Company 12th KRRC under Major Deedes had now 
joined A Company and supported by the Shermans of B Squadron 4th/7th Royal 
Dragoon Guards they managed to consolidate their hold on the village even though 
the Fallschirmjäger were now coming to the aid of their comrades of III./GR 723. 
Normally tanks were pulled back after dark, but the situation in Oostham remained 
tense throughout the night and in this case their assistance was clearly essential.  
In view of the situation Chill decided that the attack would be undertaken by FJR 6 
on the right, supported by Sturmgeschütze from 2./559. Finzel with I./FJR 2 in 
Heppen, would make up the middle, and to the left would be unspecified units from 
Erdmann’s Fallschirmjäger-Division.449 However, the attack was delayed because the 
Fallschirmjäger were still arriving and it could not be launched that day. Chill must 
have been extremely worried as he now had two bridgeheads to contend with. The 
following days would be decisive, one way or another. At a higher level the estimate 
was remarkably optimistic. Major Berlin, Chief of Staff or Ia at 1. Fallschirmarmee, 
reported without blinking an eyelid to Heeresgruppe B that the bridgehead at 
Beringen had been sealed off, that twenty-one tanks had been destroyed and that 
the bridgehead would be annihilated the following day!450 That this very much 
remained to be seen, must have been clear to everyone involved. 
Third and final attempt 
The third and last German attack on Beringen began at three a.m. on 9 
September.451 It took place long before sunrise and it was not clear right away what 
the results were and no reports were received from Erdmann’s headquarters in Bree 
for a while. The first report, at seven a.m. was pessimistic.452 Beringen bridge had 
not been reached, Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte had lost communication with his 
two battalions and Oberleutnant Sprenger, Chill’s O1 (Ordonnansoffizier 1, in charge 
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of despatches), considered that the attack had failed. An hour later Oberstleutnant 
Kurt Schuster, Ia (First General Staff Officer in charge of operations) of the 85. 
Infanterie-Division, was on the phone. He reported that the situation of FJR 6 had 
deteriorated because of enemy armour. Also the supporting guns of 17. and 18./SS-
Artillerie Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment were running low on ammunition, they 
were down to just forty shells per gun.453 At noon a more hopeful report came in , 
saying that FJR 6 had reached Beringen, although this was not confirmed yet. The 
situation was described as tense and unclear.454 But Sprenger had been a little 
premature. Although the attackers had not reached their objective, the bridge, they 
had come very close and they had caused some havoc among the British troops 
there.  
In fact a small group of twenty-five Fallschirmjäger from III./FJR 6, led by their 
commanding officer, Oberleutnant Walter Ulmer, together with a small platoon of 
Pioniere from the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (about nine men under an 
Untersturmführer) had traversed the woods and open fields along the canal until 
they were almost within sight of or rather, within hearing distance of Beringen 
bridge.455 They could only deduce from the engine noises that they must be close to 
the bridge as a mist had gradually reduced visibility to less than fifty metres. A patrol 
was sent to see what lay ahead. After a long wait, at around eight a.m., the patrol 
returned and told Ulmer that they had come on a group of sixty vehicles parked 
around a crossroads. The crew were just sitting down for breakfast. Ulmer decided to 
go in, guns blazing, which is not saying much as his men were poorly equipped and 
had little ammunition.456 But in they went, firing and throwing hand grenades and 
this small band of men managed to create havoc out of all proportion to their 
numbers. They destroyed some thirty-three lorries, fifteen loaded with fuel and 
ammo, all belonging to the A1 echelon of the 8th Armoured Brigade who in addition 
suffered twelve casualties. 457 But the British rapidly recovered from their surprise 
and fired back with everything they had, including one of the Shermans of the 
13th/18th Royal Hussars which was parked close by. Ulmer himself was wounded 
when a brick hit him in the head and he was taken prisoner. Nor did the Germans 
reach their goal, the bridge itself. The most important reasons were the lack of 
heavy weapons and the complete lack of coordination with the eastern attack group. 
It became clear during the morning that none of Erdmann’s units had even tried to 
close in on Beringen, mainly because they had their hands full around Hechtel and 
Helchteren. Coordinating different units during counterattacks was increasingly 
becoming a problem for the Germans. But whatever the reasons, the third and final 
attempt to destroy the bridge at Beringen had failed. 
Immediately after the attack by Ulmer’s little group had begun, C Squadron 
13th/18th Royal Hussars despatched two troops from Beverlo to restore the 
situation. The mist by now had dissolved into rain and the tanks soon picked out 
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small pockets of infantry that had infiltrated through the woods between Beringen 
and the Albert Canal. About an hour later, at nine p.m., these Shermans were joined 
by a troop of B Squadron which travelled straight west from Beverlo in an attempt to 
catch retreating German troops. Confused fighting continued throughout the 
morning, but eventually the attack petered out and the Fallschirmjäger withdrew. 
Still Von der Heydte persisted in his attempts to get at the bridge and early in the 
afternoon, just after one a.m., more troops from III./FJR 6 reached the 
Tervanterheide where they began to dig in.458 Around that time another British 
division began to cross the Bailey bridge at Beringen, so that the defenders would be 
even more outnumbered than they already were. 
The 11th Armoured Division had left Antwerp the previous day (8 September) after 
handing over to the 50th (Northumbrian) Division. The 8th Rifle Brigade (RB), 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel T. Hunter, and the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment 
(RTR), the liberators of Antwerp, under Lieutenant-Colonel D.A.H. Silvertop were the 
first units to enter Beringen in the early afternoon, just as III./FJR 6, started to close 
on Beringen once more. The new units were to take over from the 8th Armoured 
Brigade which was to come under command of the Guards Armoured Division the 
following day to cover its left flank. The area from the canal to Heppen was to be 
taken over by units of the 11th Armoured Division. All of which meant that it was up 
to the infantry of the 8th RB and the Sherman tanks of the 3rd RTR, together with 
the Prinses Irene Brigade, to deal with the troublesome Fallschirmjäger on the heath. 
Rounding them up or driving them off was a slow and tiresome operation but the 
German troops had no anti-tank weapons and were basically powerless against the 
Shermans. A demand for “Panther” (presumably Jagdpanther were meant) went 
out.459However, no SPs arrived and at the end of the day a large number of Germans 
had been killed, forty-five had been taken prisoner and the new main line of 
resistance was established about four kilometres north of the bridge.460 There were 
to be no more surprise attacks on Beringen even though Student that same 
afternoon exhorted his troops, ‘Um alle Zweifel auszuschliessen, befehle ich, dass der 
Albert-Kanal bis zum letzten Mann zu halten ist. Unsere Blicke müssen in erster Linie 
nach vorwärts gerichtet sein!’461 Brave words that could not make up for the 
numerical inferiority of his troops. 
Heppen finally taken 
During the early morning I./FJR 2 had advanced from Heppen in support of their 
comrades of FJR 6, but they had suffered tremendous losses, and early in the 
morning Finzel reported that he had only thirty men left462, so he decided to fall back 
on Leopoldsburg to wait for the other two companies of his battalion to arrive. This 
meant that Heppen was now defended by the remnants of III./GR 723 who were still 
dug in on the edge of the village.463 At around 08.15 hours they had set up a number 
of Pak, covering both the main roads, the one from Oostham and the one from 
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Beverlo. Most of the Grenadiere had dug in at the southeast corner of the village. 
From there they had a clear view of any attackers coming up from Beverlo. But 
morale was not high. The men lacked ammunition and complained of the lack of 
decent food. The only support they might get would have to come from the 
Jagdpanther  and Sturmgeschütze of 1. and 2./559 back in Leopoldsburg. For the 
moment all the men could do was huddle in their trenches and wait. They would not 
have to wait long, for their opponents were getting ready to do battle at around the 
same time. 
During the night the 1st Coldstream Guards had incurred heavy losses by shellfire 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Hill amalgamated No.1 and 3 Squadrons under Major H.R. 
Allsopp. Artillery was brought up and under a heavy barrage Captain D.M.G.J. 
Willoughby (2 Company) and Major Lord Hartington (No.3 Company) ordered their 
troops forward for the assault. The tanks were to follow. This time the fight for 
Heppen was to be short and bitter. The attack went in at 08.45 hours.464 
Willoughby’s company which advanced west of the Beverlosesteenweg suffered some 
serious casualties before they reached the start-line when several soldiers were killed 
by a Pak from Leopoldsburg. But once the company had passed this point the going 
was much easier and half an hour later they reached their objective in the centre of 
Heppen. Hartington’s company meanwhile had met much stronger opposition 
because they attacked exactly where the Grenadiere had dug in. Advancing along a 
secondary road they had to clear obstacles, created by felled trees, and they ran 
straight into murderous rifle and machine-gun fire even though the Germans had 
suffered heavily as a result of the barrage. The fighting became very intense. After 
Heppen had been taken, the bodies of a German and a British soldier were found, 
still holding on to each other’s throats. While storming a farmhouse Lord Hartington, 
the company commander, was shot through the heart by a sniper. He was killed 
instantly and Sergeant-Major James Cowley took over the command of No.3 
Company as no more officers were available. He led his men successfully into 
Heppen where he reached their objective exactly one hour after the attack had 
started. Cowley later received a DCM (Distinguished Conduct Medal) for this.  
Now that the infantry had taken their objectives they could begin to secure the 
village and at ten a.m. the tanks of the 1st Battalion were ordered to join them. 
Wishing to avoid the main road because it might still be covered by the 8.8 cm Flak 
on the edge of Leopoldsburg, the Shermans of No.2 Squadron first followed the 
railway tracks towards Leopoldsburg then turned left into Heppen. There they took 
up defensive positions alongside the infantry. Then two patrols of two Shermans 
each were ordered to explore the two roads in the direction of Leopoldsburg. The 
northernmost pair could see German infantry running away and the Shermans drove 
out of Heppen at high speed. Turning a corner the lead Sherman suddenly came 
under fire from a Jagdpanther further up the road. Fortunately for the Guardsmen its 
gunner proved to be a poor shot, for the two shells he fired in rapid succession both 
missed and instead damaged two farmhouses. The Shermans turned tail and headed 
back to Heppen to take up defensive positions. But the day was not over yet for the 
Coldstream Guards. 
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About an hour later, at 12.30 hours, three Jagdpanther of 1./559 and a company of 
Finzel’s I./FJR 2, counterattacked from Leopoldsburg. Apparently Finzel’s other 
companies had arrived. As the defence of Heppen was now more or less complete 
and because more artillery had arrived, the Germans did not stand a chance. Shells 
rained down on the attackers who soon gave up and turned back to Leopoldsburg. 
Some of the Fallschirmjäger were taken prisoner. None of the Jagdpanther was 
disabled. Finzel pulled back even further and, together with the 10.5 cm guns of 17. 
and 18./SS-Artillerie Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment, set up a new defence at 
Malou, about half-way between Leopoldsburg and Balen together with some 8.8 cm 
guns of 6./schwere Flak-Abteilung 602.465 Heppen itself was to remain in British 
hands, unlike Oostham, where the story took an unexpected turn. 
Oostham evacuated 
For the defenders of Oostham (B Squadron 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards and A and 
B Companies 12th KRRC) 9 September began as the previous day had ended: 
without a moment’s peace.466 Civilians also suffered from the continuous fighting in 
their village and eight people were killed. Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Byron, CO of the 
Dragoon Guards ordered B Squadron to stay put in Oostham, together with the 12th 
KRRC (C Company would arrive later and take over from B Company), while A and C 
Squadrons were to patrol the roads between the village and Beverlo. 
B Squadron had a busy day and regularly needed to call on the artillery for 
assistance. During the night more and more of Von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger 
began to assemble around the village and they now attempted to take it back. But 
without support, now that the last of Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze had gone, all their 
efforts were doomed to fail. At one point five shells fell in the middle of a 
concentration of about sixty Fallschirmjäger with predictable results. All day long the 
sniping, mortaring and shelling continued, without any discernible result. Then, at 
18.45 hours something unexpected happened. The British units in Oostham were 
told that they would have to pull out. Because the 8th Armoured Brigade was only 
supposed to protect the left flank of the Guards Armoured Division, the attempt to 
extend the bridgehead beyond Heppen was abandoned. During the late evening all 
the British troops pulled out of Oostham and headed for an area south of 
Leopoldsburg. Their opponents, FJR 6, quickly followed their departure and Oostham 
was once again in German hands. It was a disappointing end to a battle which had 
lasted two days and cost many lives. Because of the same shifting of troops, the 
Coldstream Guards had to leave Heppen for Stal, east of Beverlo. This area had been 
cleared by the Grenadier Guards that day. Heppen was now the responsibility of the 
13th/18th Hussars.467 As infantry support they received B Company 12th KRRC. 
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The key village 
At Hechtel, the key centre on the main road to Eindhoven, 9 September was a day of 
extremely intense fighting by small bands of men over very limited territory, 
sometimes no more than one or two buildings. Yet it was here that the whole of the 
British XXX corps was being held up, for the second consecutive day.468 Although the 
two Guards companies had managed to claw their way into the village the previous 
day, they only held a few scattered positions. They were under constant attack 
throughout the night. In order to give his men some rest, Major J.O. Spencer, CO of 
No.2 Squadron Welsh Guards, had taken his headquarters up to support the infantry. 
While keeping watch from his tank he was shot by a German patrol. He would not be 
the last officer to lose his life in this small Belgian village that day. 
At five a.m. Major Franz Grassmel ordered 3. Kompanie (Oberleutnant Günther 
Plaumann) to retake the north of Hechtel, meaning the positions the Scots Guards 
had occupied the afternoon before. Plaumannn set up his headquarters in a pub only 
two hundred metres from the Guards positions. After a thorough reconnaissance of 
the surroundings, the attack went in at 06.30 hours. It failed miserably. The two 
Scots Guards platoons refused to budge in spite of losses due to accurate mortar 
fire. In the intense fighting Lieutenant Thorpe, in charge of No.13 Platoon was killed. 
By ten a.m. the platoon was virtually cut off, but still the position resisted the 
attacks. Around the same time Lieutenant-Colonel J. Gresham, who commanded the 
1st Welsh Guards, ordered his No.3 Company (Captain P.M. Beckwith-Smith) to come 
up and try and push through to establish contact with the Scots Guards around the 
church. This was possible, because after the Irish Guards had relieved them in 
Helchteren, the evening before, the whole Welsh Guards Group was now assembled 
to the west of the Hechtel.  Initially No.3 Company’s attack went well and the 
German 2. Kompanie (Oberjäger Hühnlein) was forced to pull back a few hundred 
metres pursued by the Guardsmen. However, when the company tried to cross the 
Kamperbaan, things began to go horribly wrong. A sniper killed Major H.E.J. Lister in 
charge of the Support Company. Due to the intense German fire No.3 Company only 
got as far as the church, just one hundred metres from the Scots Guards. Attempts 
by Cromwell tanks to break the deadlock failed. Only one managed to reach the 
crossroads before it was knocked out by a Panzerfaust. The crew were taken 
prisoner. But worse was to come.  
The tables are turned 
While the Guards were trying to get a firmer grip on Hechtel, some fifteen kilometres 
north of the village, at De Kolonie, a counterattack was being planned. Hauptmann 
Willie Müller, commanding II./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und Ausbildungsregiment 
Hermann Göring, assembled his troop commanders to give out orders.469 Müller’s 
battalion was one of three that had been undergoing training on the Veluwe area in 
central Holland, when it received orders on 7 September to travel to Eindhoven. 
These Fallschirmjäger distinguished themselves from the other, regular, Paratroopers 
by a blue cuff band with the inscription ‘Hermann Göring’. The battalion arrived at 
Eindhoven the following day and then travelled on to the Maas-Scheldt Canal at De 
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Kolonie. Müller ordered his battalion to go to Locht, a hamlet just north of Hechtel, 
assemble there and then advance west across the heath to establish contact with the 
troops in Leopoldsburg. He was to come under Chill’s command.470 At around one 
p.m. on 9 September the battalion began to arrive at the woods around Locht. An 
hour later the attack on Hechtel began. Müller had split his battalion into four 
columns.471 Müller also had an older type Sturmgeschütz III and two Sfls which he 
had assigned to Oberleutnant Otto Minn. 
The attack went off to a promising start and the groups soon closed in on Hechtel, 
although the vehicles assigned to Minn had trouble following the infantry because of 
the close country. When the attackers got to within 300 metres of Hechtel, all hell 
was let loose. The Guards had observed the Germans as they approached the village 
and they fired with everything they had to drive off the attackers. They were partially 
successful. Both 1. and 2. Kompanie were forced to veer to the west and there, 
outside Hechtel, they ran into some tanks from the Irish Guards which were carrying 
out a recce for the following day. In the ensuing fight the Germans were driven back. 
The left hand columns fared better. By sheer accident they entered Hechtel just as 
two Cromwell tanks were taking supplies to the beleaguered platoons of the Scots 
Guards. The British tanks hastily disappeared and the platoons, already under attack 
from the south were now completely surrounded. Still, they stubbornly held on to 
their positions until in the early evening Müller and Plaumann got together to 
coordinate their attacks. In the end the two platoons had to abandon their positions 
and pull back to the rear platoon near the church. The Welsh Guards fared little 
better. Both Miller’s and Beckwith-Smith’s companies were pushed back. When it got 
dark the Prince of Wales Company as well as No.3 Company had been forced to pull 
back to the park behind the rectory where they were forced to spend the night. 
Finally, after ten p.m. the sound of fighting began to die down and both sides settled 
down for the night.  
Part of the determination with which X Company Scots Guards had defended 
themselves that day was thanks to their commanding officer, Major P. Stewart 
Fothringham. His name had become a byword in the division for valour and that was 
why his two platoons, surrounded and outnumbered though they were, never gave 
ground until they were ordered to do so. But even Fothringham could not change the 
outcome. At the end of 9 September the British troops had been driven out of their 
positions in the northeast of village and after three days they now clung desperately 
to a few houses in the western part of Hechtel.  
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Shifting forces 
Further south the Irish Guards could finally move out of Helchteren where they had 
been under constant attack by units of Hübner’s FJR 24.472 At 11 a.m. the 2nd Fife 
and Forfar Yeomanry, another of the 11th Armoured Division’s tank battalions, took 
over and even though Helchteren was still hotly contested the Irish Guards Group set 
out to move north by a sand track to join the Welsh Guards in Hechtel. On their way 
the Irish Guards met some opposition from infantry and they captured a unique 
prisoner for a ground unit, a deep-sea diver. He was one of a marine detachment 
who had been hurriedly sent to the front, vehemently, but vainly, protesting against 
his new assignment. When he learned of the stiff German opposition in Hechtel, 
Brigadier N.W. Gwatkin (5th Guards Armoured Brigade) decided to waste no more 
time. He ordered the Welsh Guards to remain where they were and told the Irish 
Guards to go round the right flank the following morning, then clear Eksel, northeast 
of Hechtel and from there drive straight for the objective, the bridge over the Maas-
Scheldt Canal. Lieutenant-Colonel J.O.E. Vandeleur, decided to recce the terrain, 
which was when he encountered some of Müller’s companies and found, to his 
horror, that the so-called open ground over which he was to advance looked fairly 
impassable. He realized that the advance the next day would be as much an 
exploration as an attack.  
At the end of the day, at the headquarters of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps in Moergestel, 
General Hans Reinhard studied the map. He realized that, once again, he and Chill 
would have to juggle their forces. FJR 6 was now arriving in full, the last of Finzel’s 
I./FJR 2 would join their unit the following day, but his only armour, 559, had already 
lost one company and could not be committed everywhere. Reinhard was convinced 
that the Beringen bridgehead would be held because troops from Erdmann’s 
Fallschirmjäger-Division were still arriving.473 His main concern was the bridgehead 
south of Geel, which will be discussed in the next chapter (3.2). Reinhard’s estimate 
of the morale of Erdmann’s Fallschirmjäger was certainly correct in view of their 
stubbornness in Hechtel so far, but whether that was true for their fighting power 
remained to be seen, particularly now that they would have to face the whole of the 
Guards Armoured Division. Lieutenant-General Horrocks (XXX Corps) had decided to 
keep up the momentum by ordering the Guards to push on and capture a bridge 
over the Maas-Scheldt Canal (hence the assignment for Vandeleur and his men).474 
Reinhard was understandably worried about Geel, because from there to the Maas- 
Scheldt Canal was a mere four kilometres over open ground. Once Geel had fallen 
the canal was within Allied reach. Hechtel, on the other hand, was about twelve 
kilometres from the canal. Moreover, the road north ran through very close country 
which, so far, had helped the German defence. Still, in view of the Allied 
concentration of power in the Beringen bridgehead, Reinhard took a serious risk by 
focusing on Geel. The next day would show whether he had made the right decision 
or not.  
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Decision time 
Early that Sunday morning, 10 September, Kampfgruppe Chill was officially created 
The order ran ‘Fsch.A.O.K.1 stellt aus Resten 85., 84., und 89.I.D. Kampfgruppe 
unter Führung Stab 85.I.D. zusammen.’475 The other two headquarters soon returned 
to the army reserve for later use. At that moment the Kampfgruppe numbered 4,420 
men exclusive of the three battalions of FJR 6 and II./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und 
Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring.476 This meant that on the day it was created 
the Kampfgruppe numbered about 6,000 men, about half a division.  
Oostham, the focus of such bitter fighting the previous day, stayed quiet throughout 
the Sunday, that is to say, with regards to fighting, because a huge row broke out 
over who was in command of who. Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte, the self-willed 
commander of FJR 6 had obviously put his foot in it again.477 At noon he was seen 
by Reinhard who was visiting the forward headquarters of the troops under his 
command. After visiting Dreyer in Geel and Chill in Balen, Reinhard’s last stop for the 
day was, together with Chill, to see Von der Heydte at his headquarters, which was 
also in Balen. After reporting the situation there was apparently some disagreement 
between Chill and his subordinate commander, because Reinhard found it necessary 
to point out to Von der Heydte that 559 was not under the command of FJR 6, but 
rather under that of Chill. Also it appears that Chill blamed Von der Heydte for taking 
orders directly from Generaloberst Student, Oberbefehlshaber 1. Fallschirmarmee 
and that he was only kept informed (‘orientiert’). Von der Heydte denied this 
vehemently. He took his orders from Chill and was merely informed by Student about 
the orders that 1. Fallschirmarmee passed on to him through Chill. The quarrel 
reveals that there was some bad blood between Chill and Von der Heydte, both 
extremely able, but strong-willed commanders. It is also clear that Reinhard did not 
manage to sort it out that day, because the issue of who was really in charge of 
Kampfgruppe Chill would be raised at least one more time. 
Since Reinhard still was not sure where the main blow would fall, he ordered the 
Jagdpanther company of 559 to pull out and concentrate in a wood near the village 
of Tenderloo, one kilometre and a half southeast of Mol, so that it could strike where 
necessary, west towards Geel or east towards Leopoldsburg.478 This was also in line 
with how Student saw the situation. Early that morning he had personally spoken 
over the phone  to General der infanterie Hans Krebs, Chef des Generalstabes 
Heeresgruppe B, about the situation. Student said that though Hechtel had been 
recaptured he doubted whether he would be able to destroy the Allied bridgehead 
‘mit den nur vorhandenenen Inf. Kräfte ohne genügende Pz.Abwehrwaffen und ohne 
Artillerie’479 However, his opponents would decide for him. Now that it had become 
clear that the chance of a breakthrough north of Beringen was increasingly unlikely, 
Allied attention focused on Hechtel where success seemed to be within reach. 
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A difficult start 
Major-General A.H.S. Adair felt that for the Guards to resume the drive north quickly 
Hechtel would have to be by-passed.480 As Leopoldsburg also seemed to hold out, 
there was no alternative but to advance part of the way across country between 
these two centres of resistance. The risk of moving over difficult terrain, Adair felt, 
was outweighed by the chance of a surprise capture of a bridge over the Maas - 
Scheldt Canal. While the Welsh Guards Group pinned down the enemy troops in 
Hechtel, both the Irish and the Grenadier Guards would advance over the Hechtel-
Leopoldsburg road (Kamperbaan), swing right (east) and cut the main road running 
north out of Hechtel and then continue up to the canal to capture Bridge 9 or 
another one if that happened to be blown up. In fact, Bridge 9 was one of only two 
bridges still intact as all the others had been blown the previous day.481 
The morning dawned misty and cold on 10 September, but a bright sun soon cleared 
the atmosphere and shortly after ten a.m. the first tanks and armoured cars crossed 
the Kamperbaan, the Grenadier Guards group on the left, the Irish Guards group on 
the right.482 The previous night there had been an attack on the positions of the 
Scots Guards inside Hechtel, near the church, but this had been beaten off. A second 
attempt, at seven a.m. was also successfully repulsed by the beleaguered Scots. 
After this it became quieter in this part of the village. The armour of the Hermann 
Göring Regiment assembled on the northern edge of the village, in a wooded area 
called Kamert.483 From there they could cover the fields to the east. They were 
positioned precisely where the Guards would attack. A clash was inevitable. At first 
the Irish Guards Group found the going very hard, because of the terrain. For half an 
hour they moved slowly through the pines and sand-dunes. The tanks battered their 
way through the trees, slithering and churning in the soggy sand. Visibility was 
virtually nil and the troops soon lost sight of each other. The advancing group was 
also invisible to the Germans, initially, but as soon as they left the woods, the leading 
tanks of No.2 Squadron (Major E.G. Tyler) were hit. All of a sudden a fierce battle 
erupted where both sides gave as good as they got. The infantry of No.4 Company 
(Major J. Haslewood) leaped off the Sherman tanks and together they fought their 
way slowly forward in the direction of the road from Hechtel. Then, at noon, came 
the next setback. 
Between the forward British positions and the road ran a marshy stream, unmarked 
on any map.484 One tank had already bogged down there and it was clear that tanks 
could not cross it. Tyler and Haslewood reported to Battalion that, in addition to the 
Germans, the stream made this route impossible. The Grenadier Guards (followed by 
the Coldstream Guards) had been luckier. They had come across a disused railway 
track on an old artillery range. This enabled them to pass the treacherous ground. 
Upon hearing this, Lieutenant-Colonel J.O.E. Vandeleur asked Division to be allowed 
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to change over to the left with his Irish Guards Group. Adair granted him permission 
and at three p.m. the leading units withdrew. Inside Hechtel, early in the afternoon 
the Welsh Guards had again tried to reach their comrades of the Scots Guards near 
the church. But again, they failed to make contact and two more tanks were knocked 
out at the crossroads. It was now clearly up to the other battalions to break the 
deadlock at Hechtel. 
Trapped 
After the Irish Guards Group had retraced its steps, it reformed. Now No.1 Squadron 
(Major D. Peel) and No.2 Company (Captain A. Hendry) were in the lead. They 
passed through the Grenadiers and Coldstreamers, who had completely torn the 
track to ribbons and the going was appalling. ‘At every bump and turn everyone was 
shot several feet into the air,’ was the comment of one officer.485 Still, the Irish 
Guards crossed the main road from Hechtel to the Maas-Scheldt Canal and by six 
p.m. were in the village of Eksel.  
The German forces in Hechtel were now also under threat from another 
direction.486That morning an infantry-armour combat group from the 11th Armoured 
Division, which was to secure the right flank of the Guards Armoured Division, 
started their attack from Helchteren. Both the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry (FFY) 
under Lieutenant-Colonel W.G.N. Walker, and the 1st Herefordshire Regiment under 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.R. Turner-Cain, set off from the north of Helchteren village in 
the direction of Peer and Bree. Meeting only scattered opposition from I./FJR 20 they 
soon broke out in the open country east of the Helchteren – Hechtel road. The 
Sherman tanks of 2nd FFY moved up on the left and reached Wychmaal and the 
eastern edge of Hechtel at around two p.m. Together with the 1st Herefords, but 
only after some intense hand-to-hand combat, they took some 400 prisoners and 
killed at least thirty enemy soldiers for a loss of four dead and eleven wounded and 
with not a single tank lost. It was a text book example of infantry-tank co-
operation.487 Nevertheless, the operation had not been a piece of cake.488  
The Fallschirmjäger had occupied a wood east of the road with some small ridges in 
front of it. They also had an 8.1 cm mortar battery and some Panzerfäuste in 
addition to the usual small arms. Asking the infantry to advance over the open 
ground would be pointless without a great deal of fire support. After a brief recce 
and consultation, the Squadron and Company commanders decided to tackle this 
position by launching a company/squadron operation from the left flank with another 
company/squadron group providing frontal fire support. The commanders 
emphasised the necessity for fire and movement between tanks and infantry. And 
even though 2nd FFY ‘s squadrons were under strength (they were down to ten 
tanks apiece at the time) the attack was a resounding success because tanks and 
infantry moved and fired together. When machine-gun fire from previously unlocated 
positions threatened to bring the attack to a premature halt, the reserve platoon and 
two tanks were sent up. When they attempted to resume the attack the Shermans 
came under anti-tank fire which was overcome by the infantry with a bayonet 
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charge. The attack by units of the 11th Armoured Division illustrated what could be 
achieved when armour and infantry practised mutual co-operation in battle, 
something that the British troops had begun to learn the hard way in Normandy, but 
which was still not an everyday occurrence as the fighting moved north. No wonder 
then that Carlo D’Este in his book on Normandy found that, ‘Commanded by the 
highly regarded Major General G.P.B. ‘Pip’ Roberts, the 11th Armoured was generally 
considered the best British armoured division to fight in Northwest Europe.’489 
 
The noose around the Fallschirmjäger in Hechtel was being drawn ever tighter and 
they were now virtually surrounded. The only way out was a strip of wooded land 
between Wychmaal and Eksel. At the end of the day the situation would change for 
the worse in a somewhat dramatic way. Major Grassmel wishing to avoid becoming 
entrapped, gathered what was left of FJR 20, apart from the companies inside 
Hechtel, and took them to Peer, outside the encirclement. This retreat was covered 
by a platoon of infantry and one Pak.490 Now only a few platoons of Germans were 
left. 
Further South 
Major-General ‘Pip’ Roberts despatched other units, further south, between 
Helchteren and Hasselt, to mop up there and protect the flank of the 2nd FFY and 
the 1st Herefords (see above) advancing on Wychmaal.491 A second infantry-armour 
groep, the 23rd Hussars and the 8th Rifle Brigade advanced as far as the crossroads 
at Wanberg six kilometres northeast of Helchteren while a third combined group, the 
3rd Royal Tanks and the 3rd Mons approached the village of Laak, two kilometres 
south of Helchteren. Because the 15th/19th Hussars were only asked to protect the 
southernmost flank of the division that day, they did not really expect a lot of 
trouble. Still that Sunday would see one of the sharpest battles in which the regiment 
was ever involved.  
The first attempt by its B Squadron to break through the German defences west of 
Zonhoven immediately ran into trouble. As soon as the Cromwell tanks started down 
the road they were fired on by a 7.5 cm Pak. An artillery barrage by the 151st Field 
Regiment followed. This normally did the trick. But not that day. The leading tank 
was hit and immobilised, blocking the village street. Attempts to get round the 
defences were not very successful initially. The Dutch SS-men (I./ SS-Grenadier-
Regiment Landstorm Nederland), especially the so-called Jeugdstorm Kompanie 
(formed from members of the Dutch equivalent of the Hitler Youth), put up fierce 
resistance. This was no mean feat as the SS-men in the meantime had to look over 
their shoulders at the U.S. 2nd Armored Division who were on the other side of the 
canal in Hasselt. Still, they were not on their own. They were in touch with the 176. 
Division zbV and FJR 21 (Löytvedd-Hardegg).492 The Fallschirmjäger had been 
ordered to advance towards Beringen.493 The order was pointless, but the presence 
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of the Fallschirmjäger meant that the heavy fighting continued into the afternoon 
and eventually C Squadron 15th/19th Hussars had to take over from B Squadron. At 
least two Sturmgeschütze and two Pak guns were knocked out, but the Regiment in 
return suffered twenty casualties of whom nine were killed. 494 Also, no less than nine 
tanks were hit, although some could be recovered and were later put back into 
service.495 At the end of the day the Dutch SS troops were forced to pull back to 
Zonhoven where they were now almost surrounded. 
The bridge 
When the Irish Guards crossed the Lommelsebaan, the main road between Hechtel 
and the canal, in the direction of Eksel, they were fired on by three Sturmgeschütze 
from 2./559.496 The Guards fired back and, probably impressed by the superior 
numbers streaming out of the woods, the Sturmgeschütze pulled back. The Irish 
Guards moved as quickly as they could. Upon reaching Eksel they found that the 
Germans had abandoned the village.497 As dusk was fast approaching the Guards 
considered settling in for the night. The village seemed perfect for it. But then a 
Troop from A Squadron the 2nd Household Cavalry had some spectacular news for 
“Colonel Joe” Vandeleur: a fine, unmapped road leading straight to the bridge over 
the Maas-Scheldt Canal. In fact, finding the road clear had also been a surprise for  
Lieutenant J.N. Creswell, Troop Leader of No.5 Troop, who had warned his men to 
expect German resistance all the way from Eksel to the canal. The only ‘resistance’ 
they came across along the twelve kilometres to Overpelt, however, was a lone 
German soldier demanding to be taken prisoner.  
Once he reached Overpelt, Creswell had to make a decision. He realised that driving 
on was pointless, but that instead he should attempt to get behind the German 
defences around the bridge. These consisted of some infantry and one 
Flakkampftruppe (two 8.8 cm guns) from schwere Flak-abteilung 602 (RAD).498 The 
Germans at the bridge were as yet unaware of his presence.499 Arriving near a zinc 
factory, which obscured the view of the bridge, but also prevented the Germans from 
seeing his Troop, Creswell ordered the armoured cars to stop. He knew that if he 
took them any further the Germans might see them and blow the bridge. He needed 
to make a decision soon, for it was getting dark. Creswell decided that it was time for 
some unorthodox reconnaissance. He borrowed two bikes from civilians and together 
with Corporal-of-Horse S.W. Cutler raced to the factory. There they left their bicycles 
and climbed to the top of the building. Beneath Creswell were the German defences, 
as clear as if they had been marked on a map. Once he had seen enough, Creswell 
climbed back down. Before taking the bikes again the two Guardsmen were informed 
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that there were now some Germans outside the factory. Avoiding these Creswell and 
Cutler proceeded back on foot. As soon as he arrived back at his armoured car 
Creswell wired back that the route was clear. He urged the dispatch of an attack 
force immediately. Would this arrive in time? 
No go 
Around the same time that the armoured cars of Lieutenant Creswell’s Troop reached 
Overpelt, the two other Troops took the more direct route, the road running north 
from Hechtel.500 Because the side roads were all more or less impassible, No.2 and 4 
Troops were forced to follow the main road. This was a time consuming task as the 
road ran dead straight until it reached a railway crossing eight kilometres from 
Hechtel. Sturmgeschütze were hidden among the trees lining the road. The British 
troops would advance some way, then get bogged down because of enemy fire. 
Tracer shots bounced along the road like cricket balls. As soon as the German gun 
was located and fired upon it would withdraw slightly under cover of the trees and 
the whole process would start all over again. The advance which had started from De 
Locht at three p.m. did not reach the vicinity of the railway crossing, 
Karrestraterheide, until it was getting dark. Once again the advancing force ground 
to a halt as it came under intense fire from the German defences. Resistance was 
particularly fierce because the German troops there, mainly from II./Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz- und Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring, some 8.8 cm guns from 
schwere Flak-abteilung 602 plus three Sturmgeschütze from 2./559 (the other six 
were near Lommel), were told that they were the last line of defence protecting 
bridge 9 which was two kilometres further north.501 While the infantry of No.2 
Company and the tanks of No.3 Squadron Grenadiers Guards halted at 
Karrestraterheide crossroads Lieutenant Franklin, commanding No.4 Troop, had 
noticed that German defences further west appeared to be slightly less formidable. 
Upon hearing this news Lieutenant-Colonel Goulburn (2nd Grenadier Guards) ordered 
the King’s Company and No.2 Squadron to attack along the left flank. The ensuing 
battle was short and one of the Sturmgeschütze of 2. Kompanie was knocked out in 
addition to seven Pak guns and three tanks. Vehicles were burning everywhere and 
one witness described the scene as “a Guy Fawkes Night gone mad”.502 The 
opposition had been overcome, but by now it was too dark to proceed to bridge 9. 
The direct route was obviously not the solution. But had the Irish Guards, who had 
taken the side road, fared any better? 
Joe’s bridge 
After receiving the news from Lieutenant Creswell at six p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Vandeleur wasted no time.503 He immediately despatched No.1 Squadron (Major D. 
Peel) and No.2 Company (Captain A. Hendry) from Eksel where they were just 
settling in for the night. The infantry rode on top of the tanks and in the gathering 
dusk arrived at the zinc factory. The infantry de-bussed and Major David Peel, who 
was to be in charge of the battle group, and Vandeleur climbed the slag-heap to get 
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a look of the German defences for themselves. The main force seemed to be 
concentrated around the two 8.8 cm Flak guns at the northern end. It was clear that 
speed was of the essence. Vandeleur, ‘Colonel Joe’ to his men, told Peel that he 
would have to rush the bridge. Peel studied the terrain carefully. He noticed that 
about 350 metres south of the bridge the road from the zinc factory crossed the 
main road from Hechtel. The Germans should have been defending this crossroads, 
but there was no sign of enemy soldiers. It was clear that the Germans considered 
themselves sufficiently defended by their comrades at the Karrestraat railway 
crossing. There was more good news for the Guardsmen. Halfway between the 
crossroads and the bridge there was a slight bend in the road, due to the 1936 
bridge being built slightly to the east of the original site. This meant that the guns at 
the north end would not see the attackers until they were almost upon them. Right 
away one troop and one platoon slowly advanced to the crossroads. The rest of the 
Squadron kept up heavy and steady machine-gun and HE fire to discourage the 
Germans. Lieutenant Duncan Lampard in the lead tank reached the crossroads and 
was just in time to see a halftrack towing an 8.8 cm gun across the bridge. A couple 
of HE shells put paid to their plans and knocked them to one side. The scene was 
now set for the final attempt. 
Peel told Lampard that it was now up to him and Lieutenant John Stanley-Clarke with 
his platoon to storm the bridge. Unfortunately for them, by now the Germans had 
woken up to what was happening. As Lampard moved his tanks into position the 8.8 
cm guns began to fire. This did not deter the Guardsmen. The German guns did not 
have shields as they had just arrived from airfields which until then they had been 
defending, and machine-gun fire soon dispersed the crew. Just after eight p.m. the 
infantry reached the bend in the road and they fired a green Verey light as a sign to 
the other eleven tanks of No.1 Squadron to fire only on the bridge. All the gunners 
and co-drivers in the Shermans kept their right feet down on the firing buttons that 
controlled their Brownings. Then a red Verey light went up, the sign that the infantry 
were now almost upon the bridge, and the firing stopped. It was time for Lampard’s 
Troop to take over and rush the bridge. Lance-Sergeant McGurren in the lead tank 
hit the corner of a house and the engine stalled. The second tank, Sergeant Steer, 
swung past McGurren’s tank and drove straight for the bridge where the tractor was 
still burning. The Sherman crashed through the flames and explosions and, followed 
by the other two tanks and Stanley-Clarke’s infantry, Steer reached the north end of 
the bridge. Once again, as so often before in Normandy, a Flakkampftruppe had 
failed to do its work.504 
‘Colonel Joe’, who had witnessed the whole scene from the top of the slagheap, was 
dancing with excitement. But the job was not over yet. Captain Ron Hutton, 615th 
Field Squadron R.E., had the unenviable task of locating the charges and putting 
them out of order.505 He had four Guardsmen with him whom he instructed what to 
do and as soon as the infantry began to pour over the bridge Hutton and his motley 
crew followed. Hutton found both sides of the road covered by a confusion of wires 
and fuses. He removed all the initiating assemblies, having to fire through some of 
them as he had dropped his cutters, and then reported back to Vandeleur that the 
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bridge was safe. Immediately No.3 Company and No.3 Squadron crossed to reinforce 
the attackers and make sure the bridge remained in British hands. The headquarters 
and the other Squadrons set up a hedgehog around the crossroads. As Brigade 
headquarters was out of wireless touch it was not until after midnight that Vandeleur 
was able to pass the good news on to divisional headquarters The following day, the 
sign writer of the 615th Field Squadron got to work. In honour of the Irish 
commander the bridge was named ‘Joe’s Bridge’. Major Peel was commended for the 
Military Cross. 
Apart from the capture of this crucial bridge on the way to Germany, Sunday 10 
September was a historical day for another reason, because it was also the day that 
the idea for operation Market Garden was born.506 Meanwhile, the big question for 
the Guards in their new bridgehead was, how would the Germans react, or to put it 
more simply, how soon and from what direction would they launch the inevitable 
counterattack?  
Initial German response  
At the end of Sunday 10 September, Reinhard still had no idea of the extreme 
danger his troops were now in. He continued to be more worried throughout the day 
about Geel which had been captured. For that reason he decided to order 1./559 
with all its available Jagdpanther  to Geel to restore the situation there (see next 
chapter).507 Tactically this made sense, because Geel was closer to the Maas-Scheldt 
Canal. If the British troops were to throw a bridgehead over the canal north of Geel, 
they would have cut behind the whole of Reinhard’s forces still fighting further east. 
What makes less sense is that in his daily report Reinhard noted that he stood by his 
original estimate of the 9th in which he concluded that Erdmann (7. Fallschirmjäger-
Division) was strong enough to contain the British forces opposing him, but that the 
greatest threat was still posed by the enemy at Geel.508 He thought that the forces in 
this sector were still too weak, too much of a motley crew, had little or no will to 
fight and not enough artillery to support them. He therefore asked Student to send 
(what was left of) the 346. Infanterie-Division, one of the divisions of 15. Armee 
which was about to be ferried across the Scheldt, to reinforce the units near Geel.  
Obviously Reinhard was not aware of recent events between Hechtel and the Maas-
Scheldt canal. It may be that this impression was reinforced by a report at the end of 
the afternoon about the fierce resistance put up by I./ SS-Grenadier-Regiment 
Landstorm Nederland, who were still in their old positions north of Hasselt.509 One 
thing is clear, German communications were not functioning properly and Reinhard 
was in for a rude awakening that very night. The news of the capture of the bridge 
just after midnight and the German countermeasures will be discussed in full detail in 
Chapter 3.4. Suffice it to say that the British bridgehead could not be eliminated 
which basically meant that all German troops within the ‘bloody triangle’ were now 
outflanked and in danger of becoming trapped. Still, even after 11 September, the 
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fighting would rage on for a few more days, among other things by Hitler’s insistence 
‘nichts unversucht zu lassen um den Albert-Kanal zu halten.’510  
Leopoldsburg again 
Now that the focus of the British drive had shifted east, Oostham and Leopoldsburg, 
the scenes of such bitter fighting the previous three days, had fallen relatively quiet. 
Both places were still in German hands, even though attempts had been undertaken 
by units from the 8th Armoured Brigade to rectify this situation.511 Although the 
brigade was told to stay put because all it had to do was protect the flank of the 
Guards attacking Hechtel, throughout Sunday 10 September conflicting reports about 
the German strength in Leopoldsburg began to come in. Through their binoculars 
some tank commanders could see civilians walking about the town, seemingly 
without any interference. It was unclear whether there were still enemy soldiers 
within the town or whether they had pulled back further north. If that was the case, 
it would be a shame not to use the opportunity. At noon Brigadier G.E. Prior-Palmer 
ordered the 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel V. Dunkerly) to send in a 
Squadron to recce the situation while the 12th KRRC (Lieutenant-Colonel M. 
Edwardes) passed through northwards towards Mol. After conferring with the 
commanding officers Prior-Palmer changed his mind. He had by now received 
information that there were still German troops inside Leopoldsburg and in view of 
the recent fighting the brigadier decided that house clearing operations could not be 
undertaken by one battalion of infantry. Prior-Palmer thereupon decided to modify 
his plans and he ordered aggressive patrols to explore the situation. Only if the town 
was not held they were to go in and take it. The patrols were to enter Leopoldsburg 
from two directions. The 13th/18th Royal Hussars were to enter from the west and 
the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards (Lieutenant-Colonel G. Byron), plus some infantry 
from the 12th KRRC, were to come in from the east.  
B Squadron of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars set off first. They left Heppen at three 
p.m. and encountered two 7.5 cm and one smaller Pak guns near the railway 
crossing. Still, the Shermans managed to knock all three of them out. They then 
entered the village and temporarily occupied the western part taking nine POWs, six 
from Grenadier-Regiment 723 and two from FJR 6. The demoralised soldiers said 
that a force of about sixty men were still in Leopoldsburg. The Germans were then 
told to climb onto the tanks which were told to pull back towards Beverlo. While 
driving back Lieutenant J.H. Aldam spotted a munitions lorry. He ordered his gunner 
to fire at it with spectacular results.512 No British tanks were lost and the patrol was a 
resounding success. The same could not be said for the attempt to explore 
Leopoldsburg from the east. 
Both No.1 and 5 Troops from C Squadron the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards had set 
off for Leopoldsburg at six p.m. after C Company 12th KRRC had reported that the 
military camp, to the southeast of the town was deserted. The assignment was 
considered a piece of cake. But the Royal Dragoon Guards were in for a rude 
surprise. Either the actions of the Royal Hussars that afternoon had alerted the 
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Germans inside Leopoldsburg that something was up, or they were were made of 
sterner stuff than their comrades holding the western end. Whatever the reason, the 
Royal Dragoon Guards ran into serious trouble at a point about seven hundred 
metres from the eastern end of the town. The Troops had leapfrogged ahead, taking 
the lead in turn and No.5 Troop was in front as the first Sherman was knocked out 
by a Sturmgeschütz from 2./559. 513The Sherman burned like a candle. The other 
tanks fired smoke grenades and opened fire on the suspected position. In vain. 
Within minutes a second Sherman was ablaze and a third had its tracks knocked off. 
The remaining British tanks pulled back a little and although they kept firing into the 
area where they thought the Sturmgeschütz might be hiding they could not silence 
the enemy gun. A very high O.P tower was also shot up because it was thought that 
a German might be directing the fire from there. A dead German was indeed 
discovered there later, but whether or not he attributed to the British losses must 
remain a mystery. Because it was clear that Leopoldsburg could not be taken by a 
mere patrol the four Shermans returned to their harbour. Later attempts by C 
Company 12th KRRC to ‘stalk’ the Sturmgeschütz also failed to find the offender and 
Leopoldsburg was still in German hands as darkness fell on 10 September. 
Müller refuses to budge 
On Monday 11 September Reinhard tried to eliminate the newly formed Guards 
bridgehead. Before going into detail about these actions and their outcome it is 
necessary to have a look first at what happened south of the canal after the capture 
of bridge 9 by the Irish Guards. I shall start at the most hotly contested place, 
Hechtel, and then move west to Leopoldsburg and Oostham, the other two key 
towns where the Germans still held firm. 
Even though they were surrounded the Germans from I./FJR 20 and the Hermann 
Göring Regiment in Hechtel continued to resist all attempts by the Welsh Guards to 
seize the crucial crossroads that would finally open up the direct road towards the 
Dutch border.514 Incredibly, on this, the fifth day of the battle for Hechtel, the Welsh 
Guards discovered that German resistance had actually stiffened and they found it 
extremely difficult to hold on to what they already had. Hauptmann Müller 
(II./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring) was in 
charge of the northern sector, Leutnant Walter Schauf (1./FJR 20) of the southern 
one. Müller had set up his headquarters in a pub, Buitenlust, near the crossroads, 
Schauf had his headquarters in the pub across the road.  Still, the Germans were 
now too weak to undertake a counterattack, as they had two days before on the 9th, 
and the Welsh Guards managed to stick to their positions, even though these were 
still on either side of the Kamperbaan. The British now tried a new tactic. They would 
try to blast their way towards the crossroads. Infantry of No.4 Company were to 
advance from the southwestern corner of the village while M 10 Achilles SPs from Y 
Anti-tank Battery (Major Harry Tuzo) would continually fire on the German positions 
with their deadly 76 mm guns.  
                                        
513 Louche (Heppen en Leopoldsburg, 285) suggests that a Jagdpanther knocked out the three 
Shermans. That is extremely unlikely as the Jagdpanther were already fighting in Geel. 
514 This section, unless otherwise specified, Bussels, De Slag om Hechtel, 97-102 and War Diary 1st 
Welsh Guards.. 
 117 
The attack went in at ten a.m. with a devastating bombardment by five M 10’s and 
four seventeen-pounders. The Fallschirmjäger in their foxholes were powerless 
against the SPs and slowly No.4 Company made headway until they finally linked up 
with No.3 Company south of the Kamperbaan at the end of the afternoon. Then the 
SP group was fired on by two of Müller’s Sturmgeschütze and a 7.5 cm Pak gun. The 
M 10’s hastily pulled back. All afternoon Hechtel was shelled once more by the British 
and most of the village was now ablaze. Hauptmann Willie Müller was wounded at 
around three p.m. by shrapnel and taken to the cellar of the pub. Oberleutnant 
Plaumann (3./FJR 20) took over. Still the Germans would not budge and a final effort 
to penetrate their positions at seven p.m. was beaten off.  It was clear that Hechtel 
was still a hard nut to crack and it was decided to lay on a full two battalion attack 
the next day. Once again the German defenders had triumphed. 
But it was a Pyrrhic victory for the German troops inside Hechtel. They knew that it 
was only a matter of time before they would have to surrender. Generalleutnant 
Chill, who had lost touch with the troops in Hechtel (now called Kampfgruppe Müller) 
two days before, sent a patrol to find out what was going on in the village.515 This 
patrol, which approached Hechtel from the artillery range reported that Müller was 
surrounded. Chill then approached both Student and Reinhard with the request for 
permission to get the troops out. This permission was denied, because Student said 
that Müller had been ordered ‘sich nach Westen durchzuschlagen’.516 Müller had 
certainly tried to act on this order. The evening before he had consulted his fellow 
commanders, Oberleutnant Günther Plaumann and Leutnant Walter Schauf, in an 
attempt to persuade them to break out.517 They had rejected his proposal then, 
saying that they had not received any orders from Erdmann to do so. Why Müller did 
not insist again on the 11th when the situation was even more desperate is not clear. 
Whatever the reason, he decided to stay put. Hechtel would be fought over one 
more day.  
Leopoldsburg revisited 
After the somewhat disappointing reconnaissance in force the previous day, the 
actual liberation of Leopoldsburg on 11 September was a walk-over for the 8th 
Armoured Brigade, although at the same time a bit shambolic, too.518 At 09.10 hours 
Brigadier Prior-Palmer gathered his commanders for an ‘O’ Group. He had been told 
by his Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Horrocks, to take Leopoldsburg to 
make sure that the enemy could not attack the Guards’ left flank from this important 
crossroads. The idea was basically a repeat of the day before, on a bigger scale. 
While the 13th/18th Royal Hussars and the 12th KRRC would attack from the west, 
the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards would come in from the east. The Dragoon 
Guards would be supported by elements of the 1st Belgian Brigade, also known as 
the Brigade Piron after its commander Colonel Jean Piron, which had just been 
assigned to the 8th Armoured Brigade. However, the plan did not work out that way. 
All the attacks were supposed to go in at two p.m. and B Squadron 13th/18th Royal 
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Hussars together with B Company 12th KRRC entered Leopoldsburg again. This time 
there were no PaK guns to greet them as Finzel (I./FJR 2) had been ordered back to 
Balen, a few kilometres north, and within an hour British troops were in full control of 
the town centre. Enemy soldiers were spotted in the direction of Balen and some 
artillery fire was put down. The Hussars were eager to get back to their harbour now 
that they had done their share of the job, but where were the Belgians and the 
Dragoon Guards? 
At about four p.m. the first Belgians showed up. It appeared that they had advanced 
over the grounds of the military camp, which meant that they had a much longer 
way to go. This partly accounted for their delay. Another reason was that the 
Dragoon Guards were supposed to be supported by the infantry element of the 
Belgian Brigade. However, this was still on its way to Heppen and the Dragoon 
Guards were supported by the Armoured Car Squadron. Not having any infantry and 
still smarting from the loss of three Shermans and three of his men, made 
Lieutenant-Colonel Byron cautious. He therefore ordered C Squadron to advance first 
to the Hechtelsesteenweg, the road between Hechtel and Leopoldsburg, before 
turning east. While advancing cautiously through the dense woods south of the road 
the Squadron learned that Leopoldsburg was free of Germans. Hereupon the 
Squadron Leader ordered his tanks to drive to the road as fast as possible. Cheered 
by crowds the Dragoon Guards finally entered Leopoldsburg at 17.30 hours to take 
over from the Hussars. The three battalions of the 8th Armoured Brigade had their 
first official stand down since D-Day.519 So far the liberation had been easy if a little 
confused. The day would end in a minor tragedy, however. 
The Belgian armoured cars drove up to the crossroads at the northern exit of 
Leopoldsburg. At this point, known locally as Quatre-Bras, the road branched in two 
directions: north towards the village of Kerkhoven and northwest towards Balen and 
Mol. The latter road was covered by Finzel’s Fallschirmjäger who had dug in just 
outside Balen around a battery of  three 8.8 cm guns from 6./schwere Flak-Abteilung 
602.520 The crossroads were still covered by three Shermans from the 13th/18th 
Royal Hussars when No.3 and 4 Troops of the 1st Belgian Brigade took over at 16.30 
hours. Their CO, Colonel Jean Piron, had ordered aggressive reconnaissance over the 
two roads leading out of Leopoldsburg. No.3 Troop was to explore towards Balen, 
No.4 towards Kerkhoven. The latter patrol did not meet with any real resistance and 
at 17.30 hours reported that Kerkhoven had been abandoned by the enemy although 
civilians had spotted German troops a little to the east, on the northern edge of the 
artillery range. But No.3 Troop, which consisted of a scout car, three Daimler 
armoured cars, two jeeps and a motorcycle, was not so fortunate.  When they set off 
down the road to Balen one of the British crews shouted, “Where are you going with 
those peashooters?” a remark which the Belgians took in good spirit. Soon they left 
the last houses behind them and entered the open terrain which extended as far as 
Balen. Then, around five p.m., when they had travelled about three kilometres, they 
ran into serious trouble. The patrol met a barrage of combined machine-gun and 8.8 
cm fire, covering the road and was forced to pull back. The second Daimler was hit 
and two of its crew were killed. Their bodies were recovered by Belgian civilians.  
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Mention should also be made of the contribution of the Belgian resistance in 
Leopoldsburg to the liberation of their home town.521 The group attacked Germans 
(I./FJR 2 pulling back in the general direction of Balen) in the area of the railway 
station and in the area of  the airfield. The results of these actions were negligible 
(only one POW is reported), but must have made the German soldiers even more 
trigger happy than they already were. Maybe the unexpected attacks from armed 
civilians offered Fallschirmjäger sufficient excuse to execute ten more Belgian 
civilians near Balen that day. Miraculously two survived the massacre and crawled 
out from under the sand in which they had been buried. It was another of the many 
war crimes committed by German troops in this area. The front in Oostham 
meanwhile, the left flank of the original Beringen bridgehead, remained quiet 
throughout that day, understandably as both sides had enough on their plates 
elsewhere. As a belated footnote, almost literally, to the fighting that day a 
Messerschmitt Me 262 from Kommando Schenk, the first jet bomber unit in the 
world, tried to bomb the bridges at Beringen.522  
The southern flank 
Also on Monday 11 September the eastern flank of the advance was being extended 
by the 11th Armoured Division.523 At first light the tanks of the 23rd Hussars and the 
motorized infantry of the 8th Rifle Brigade pushed on until they reached Peer without 
any serious opposition. It was almost surreal for a while. They soon returned to 
normalcy. Inside Peer the main force of FJR 20 (Major Grassmel), mostly the second 
battalion, resisted fiercely, but by two p.m. the town was in British hands. The 
advance then continued in the direction of the Maas-Scheldt Canal and once again a 
few tanks were lost to Panzerfäuste before they could liberate Grand-Brogel and 
Petit-Brogel. Following this B Squadron 23rd Hussars and F Company 8th Rifle 
Brigade were sent to Caulille to secure a crossing of the canal two kilometres outside 
the town.The group found the bridge destroyed but an 8.8 cm gun knocked out two 
tanks and one carrier.  
The other combined infantry-armour group, the 2nd Fife and Forfarshire Yeomanry 
and the 1st Herefordshires, which had entered Wychmaal the previous day, 
completed the occupation. The escape route for the German troops in Hechtel in this 
direction was definitely blocked after the railway crossing in Wychmaal was secured. 
Patrols were also sent to Bree, another nine kilometres further east, where most of 
FJR 20 was now concentrating.  
The third combined group, the 3rd Royal Tanks and the 3rd Monmouths, had cleared 
up in Laak and concentrated in Helchteren. Then the 15th/19th Hussars and the 4th 
KSLI took over the crossroads six kilometres north-east of Helchteren from them. 
Starting at this crossroads the Hussars sent A Squadron to Bree, to try and, more 
importantly, seize the bridge over the Maas-Scheldt Canal (called Zuid-Willemsvaart 
there) just east of the town. If the attack was successful the Allies would have two 
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bridgeheads. The Squadron reached the outskirts of Bree without incident. Then 
enemy infantry was engaged and a Troop was sent around the north-west of the 
town but then one of the Cromwell tanks was hit. Soon afterwards the bridge was 
blown and the Hussars were told that they could return to join the rest of the 
Regiment after covering their retreat by making as much noise as possible. Later that 
day the armoured cars of the Inns of Court Regiment investigated all other bridges 
from Bree northwards, as far as Neerpelt. All had been blown and were covered by 
enemy fire from the far bank. The next big operation would obviously have to start 
from one bridgehead only, the one at De Kolonie. 
Robert’s division also made contact with the 2nd US Armored Division (Major-General 
E.H. Brooks) which had crossed the Albert Canal in the meantime. Because the 
previous day I./ SS-Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland  had prevented the 
American tankers from crossing at Hasselt where both bridges had been blown, the 
82nd Armored Reconaissance Battalion had to swing into the British sector and use 
the bridge at Beringen before exploring east on the north side of the canal.524 All of 
which meant that finally, on 11 September, both Erdmann’s Fallschirmjäger and the 
Dutch SS-troops now had their backs firmly against the Zuid-Willemsvaart. The only 
option left was to pull back behind the security of this waterway. The fight for the 
‘bloody triangle’ was all over, except at Hechtel. 
Curtain for Müller 
Before sunrise on Tuesday 12 September all British troops inside Hechtel were 
withdrawn to avoid casualties from the artillery barrage.525 This went in at 08.15 
hours and lasted for forty-five minutes. Just before the firing started someone had 
discovered that the start-line was on top of the position of the command post and 
headquarters of the Welsh Guards. This error was hastily rectified. The barrage, 
supported by mortars, machine-guns and six-pounders swept the village with a 
devastating storm of steel. Even then, the attack which went in at 08.30 hours and 
came in from the south was slow. Whenever the infantry was held up, the supporting 
tanks fired on the enemy trenches until resistance was finally broken. Even though 
their position was now hopeless, the Fallschirmjäger fought with ‘great 
determination’.526 Every point had to be cleared before the advance could be 
resumed. Still, by noon the crossroads, which had evaded the Guards for six days, 
were finally reached and an hour later most of Hechtel was in British hands. The last 
German stronghold was the Rijkswacht (National Police) building in the north-eastern 
part of the village. Oberleutnant Otto Minn and his men put up as stiff fight as their 
comrades had done and it was not until two p.m. that the Germans finally 
surrendered.  
An eerie calm settled on Hechtel. Amidst the ruins was the detritus of battle: dead 
bodies, knocked out tanks, vehicles and guns, abandoned uniforms, the smell of 
blood and death. Around the crossroads were the spoils of war. The Germans left 
behind one Jagdpanther (Sattler’s), one Sturmgeschütz, which possibly belonged to 
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2./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, and an assortment of vehicles.527 The 
Welsh Guards also took 400 prisoners, Hauptmann Müller among them, equally 
divided between II./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und Ausbildungsregiment Hermann 
Göring and I./FJR 20.  
Some Germans tried to escape the encirclement. They crawled through the woods in 
a north-easterly direction towards Eksel and, beyond, the Maas-Scheldt Canal. 
Amazingly no fewer than 89 succeeded.528 The following day Oberleutnant Heider529 
of the Sturmgeschütz Kompanie and Leutnant Zimmermann of the Stabs Kompanie, 
together with some of their own men and some from FJR 20, managed to reach their 
own lines by swimming the canal at Neerpelt. 530 Ironically Zimmermann was 
captured three days later by Belgian resistance men, but Heider reported back to 
Oberst Fritz Fullriede, the Kommandeur of Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und 
Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring.531 The men were completely demoralised 
after the intense fighting of the previous three days. Most of them were assembled 
north of Eindhoven, near Son. Little did they know that they would only have a few 
days to recover before they once more found themselves in the thick of it at the start 
of Market Garden.  
The devastation in Hechtel was enormous. A total of 124 houses had been 
destroyed, 13 of them deliberately set on fire by German troops. The final death toll 
for Hechtel is shocking. In all between 100 and 150 Germans lost their lives, 
although the exact number will never be known. On the Allied side, 62 soldiers were 
killed. But worst of all, thirty-five Belgian civilians had lost their lives, not just 
casualties of the battle, but victims of atrocities committed against them. In Hechtel 
Fallschirmjäger summarily executed no fewer than eleven civilians.532 It was a blot 
on their reputation. 
Withdrawal 
After the counterattacks on the Guards’ bridgehead failed (see 3.4), the German 
units south of the Maas-Scheldt Canal were increasingly in danger of becoming 
trapped. Therefore Model in the early evening of Tuesday 12 September told 
Reinhard to evacuate the whole area and pull his troops back behind the canal.533 
Most of the evacuation was completed during the night. In the meantime the 
positions of the 8th Armoured Brigade at Leopoldsburg and Oostham had been taken 
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over by units of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division. In the afternoon of 13 September 
the left flank of what used to be the hotly contested Beringen bridgehead was finally 
cleared by the 1st Dorsetshires and the 2nd Devonshires. Even at this late stage 
some German troops still committed atrocities. Five Belgians who were curious and 
ventured out of their houses in Oostham and Olmen were put against a wall and shot 
in cold blood, possibly by men from FJR 6.534 By the end of that day the Germans 
had finally cleared the area south of the Maas-Scheldt Canal also on the eastern end, 
where patrols from the Inns of Court found Bree free of enemy and the 11th 
Armoured Division finally had some time to‘ indulge in maintenance, rest and even a 
little entertainment’.535  
 
Conclusion 
While the fight along the Albert Canal was raging, Kampfgruppe Chill had been 
assigned regular infantry units and the first report sent to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps on 
9 September showed an impressive array of troops.536 Although Kampfgruppe 
Buchholz was now part of 719. ID, Chill could still boast 4,240 men exclusive of FJR 
6, whose three batallions had a total of 1,200 men plus.537 All in all Chill commanded 
about 5,500 infantry. More importantly he could call on five artillery batteries 
(remnants of AR 185, 17. and 18./SS-Artillerie Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment, and 
3. and 4./AR 1719) and some armour (schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 
).538 Nevertheless, one battalion (FEB 347) was in a back-up position behind the 
Maas-Scheldt Canal and only half of Chill’s troops, mainly the Fallschirm units, had 
been involved in the fighting around Beringen and Leopoldsburg. It was these 
battalions that were given the highest destination. German units received numbers 
on a scale of I to IV, I (für jede Angriffsaufgabe geeignet) being the highest and IV 
(bedingt zur Abwehr geeeignet) the lowest.539 On 10 September Chill reported that 
he had four strong battalions (FJR 6 plus Marschbataillon 352. ID), three medium 
(I./FJR 2, II./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring 
and FEB 347), two weak (II. and III./GR 723) and one that was at the end of its 
tether (abgekämpft).540 None of the troops got the highest rating, the Fallschirmjäger 
were given a II (bedingt zum Angriff geeignet), all the others were rated a IV, 
meaning that out of nine battalions the majority were fit only for a limited defence. 
Moreover, Kampfgruppe Chill had an impossibly large sector to defend. From 
Grobbendonk to Hasselt was no less than sixty kilometres which was a staggering 
stretch for what amounted to one weak division even behind the relative security of 
a waterway. Still, together with the armour of 559 and the artillery Chill had been 
able to deflect the British attack.  
 
The first battles that Kampfgruppe Chill was engaged in showed how skilful 
manoeuvring enabled a numerically inferior unit could tie down opposing forces. 
                                        
534 Rijmen, 67. 
535 War Diary 11th Armoured Division. 
536 KTB 88 AK, B 265, 09.09.44. 
537 This can be concluded from B 269 (10.09.44) where they are described as ‘stark’ i.e, 400 men or 
stronger. 
538 KTB 88 AK, B 269, 10.09.44 and B 276, 14.09.44. 
539 KTB 88 AK, B 262, 08.09.44. 
540 Ibid. 
 123 
Although the attack by 3.schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 and FEB 347 
failed in its objective, once again showing that in the attack role Sturmgeschütze 
were no substitute for tanks, the next few days, as part of the defence of Beringen, 
Oostham, the SPs were most successful. Unable to annihilate the British bridgehead, 
the Kampfgruppe did manage to block the advance towards Leopoldsburg, forcing 
the Guards to take the only other route north which ran via Hechtel where they ran 
into the Fallschirmjäger of FJR 20. So how did this effect the Allied and German 
plans? 
 
Montgomery’s operational plans as laid down in directive M 523 were frustrated 
completely. In their plans Montgomery and Dempsey had envisaged XXX Corps as 
starting their advance towards the Ruhr, anywhere between Arnhem and Wesel, on 7 
September. Because of the fierce German defence, that day the leading Guards units 
were still stuck at Beringen and Hechtel instead. Things then took a turn for the 
worse for the British and the advance crawled almost to a standstill. A request from 
the War Office to Montgomery on the 9th asking him how soon he could ‘rope off the 
coastal area contained by ANTWERP – UTRECHT – ROTTERDAM [capitals in original]’ 
in connection with the danger of the V-1 and V-2’s must have rankled in his mind 
even though he answered, somewhat laconically, that he expected to be able to do 
this ‘in about a fortnight’s time.’541 Eisenhower, reporting on the same date, was 
more cautious  and reported that German resistance was ‘stiffening somewhat’ now 
that Allied troops were closing in on the German border.542 Nevertheless he felt that 
it was ‘doubtful’ that the Germans would be able to block the Allied advance 
effectively. It was not until 11 September, when the Irish Guards captured the 
Neerpelt bridge that the first German line of defence had been cracked. It was then 
that Montgomery began to feel less sanguine about the pace of the operations when 
he informed Lieutenant-General A.E. Nye, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, that he was ‘meeting with more opposition than he had expected.’543 Chill was 
largely responsible for the German opposition the British troops now had to face. But 
there was no time for him to rest on his laurels. While successfully halting the Allied 
advance in the area of Leopoldsburg and Beringen, he also had another crossing to 
contend with on his right flank, south of Geel. There the other half of Chill’s battle 
group, Kampfgruppe Dreyer, was to face its first real test in battle. 
 
3.2. Geel (7 – 13 September 1944) 
 
“We now faced the battle for the Albert Canal, which for our part was fought with great 
bitterness in the area of Gheel.”544 
 
“Gheel… Some names seemed to embody the fate they held for us. Gheel resounded across 
our path like the blare of a gong, and brought to an end our great swan song. (…) We had 
to fight a war again, and fought a battle that stood among the fiercest of our campaign.”545 
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Another of those battles lost in the mists of military history, like the one at Beringen 
which took place almost simultaneously, is the battle for Geel. Nevertheless both 
deserve closer study as they mark the end of the Allied summer campaign or, to put 
it the other way round, the beginning of the slugging match that characterized the 
fighting on the Western Front during the autumn of 1944. While the battles were still 
raging north of Beringen and at Hechtel, British Second Army had established two 
more bridgeheads across the Albert Canal, south of  the town of Geel. These were to 
be the next focal points of some extremely intense fighting in which schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 was involved and where it inflicted, but also incurred, very 
heavy losses in the second big clash of armour against armour. This time only the 
heavy Jagdpanther of 1. Kompanie were involved. The origins of the struggle for 
Geel can be traced back to Thursday 7 September when the Irish Guards took 
Beringen and the Welsh Guards reached Helchteren. 
The first bridgehead 
That day the 50th (Northumbrian) Division was informed by Second Army that it 
would be required to cross the Albert Canal either at Beringen or south of Geel.546 
The three brigades of the division, which was commanded by Major-General D.A.H. 
Graham, were still widely dispersed. The 69th Brigade was in Aalst (between Brussels 
and Gent), the 151st Brigade was partying in Brussels and the 231st Brigade had just 
taken over from the 11th Armoured Division in Antwerp. Nevertheless, Lieutenant-
General Dempsey (Second Army) made it clear that owing to the continued German 
resistance north of Antwerp Graham’s division would have to cross the Albert Canal 
south of Geel as soon as possible. Since the 69th Brigade was on the point of moving 
to Malines, it received the order first. At noon Brigadier F.Y.C. Knox was told by 
Major-General Graham to strike swiftly. He was told to head for the canal at Het 
Punt, where the main road to Geel crossed the canal and to investigate the bridge 
sites further east at Steelen to find the most suitable place. No time was wasted and 
within an hour long columns of vehicles were leaving Aalst.  
Although speed was of the essence, it was still almost an eighty kilometres’ drive to 
the canal and the advancing recce parties from the 6th Green Howards did not arrive 
there until the end of the afternoon. They reported that all bridges had been blown 
and that they had come under rifle fire from the opposite bank. Little was known of 
the enemy forces. At eight p.m. Brigadier Knox visited the Green Howards’ 
headquarters at Zammel and told the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel G.F. 
Hutchinson, to establish a bridgehead near Het Punt that night to cover the 
construction of a bridge by the side of the original road bridge which had been 
blown. As soon as possible the 7th Green Howards would follow. Hutchinson was 
none too pleased. He had discovered that the canal had a steep bank that would 
make the launching of assault boats difficult. To make matters worse there were just 
two assault and twelve (rubber) recce boats. Moreover, only Hutchinson and the four 
company commanders had had time to take a look at the crossing site. Just as at 
Antwerp and Beringen, one of Belgium’s more formidable water obstacles had to be 
                                                                                                                           
545 Robert Woollcombe, Lion Rampant, London 1955, 128. 
546 This section, unless otherwise specified, War Diaries 50th Northumbrian Division, 69 Brigade, 151 
Brigade, 231 Brigade and Clay, The Path of the 50th, 285-295.  
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forced without proper reconnaissance. Again, a swift operation was to be carried out 
with slender resources.  
Heavy rain fell throughout the evening, but it stopped just before the crossing was to 
take place. Bright moonlight shone down on A and B Company as they carried the 
two assault boats over the top and pushed them into the water opposite Meulenberg. 
The Germans did not notice the action and the first troops reached the other side 
without a shot being fired. It was 01.30 hours on Friday 8 September. A cable was 
laid to pull the rubber recce boats and guide the assault ones. It was slow going but 
after just over three hours all four companies were across. There was still no 
response from the enemy. The responsibility for this stretch of the Albert Canal was  
Kampfgruppe Dreyer’s, named after Oberstleutnant Georg Dreyer, Kommandeur of 
Grenadier Regiment 1053. This was one of the three regiments of Chill’s original 
division and the only one more or less intact. More or less, since it was reduced to 
the size of a battalion.547 Forty-one year old Dreyer was almost the stereotypical 
Germanic warrior with his pointed face, blonde hair and blue eyes.548 He looked 
young for his age, was energetic and he was one of the senior officers who had 
helped Chill set up the blocking position behind the Albert Canal four days earlier.549 
That he was to play a key role in the autumn campaign was no accident since in his 
last assessment he was described as ‘zuverlässiche, gereifte Persönlichkeit, 
passionierter Soldat, energisch. Besitzt Tatkraft und Schwung, Führernatur.’550 
Although he was noted to be ‘Etwas empfindlich, teilweise übertriebener Ehrgeiz’, 
one of his strong points was that he possessed ‘Gutes taktisches Verständnis’.551 In 
other words, even though he apparently suffered from a ‘permanent nervous 
tremble’,552 in Dreyer his men had a seasoned veteran who could ‘read the battle’. It 
was a quality that he had already shown as a regimental commander during the 
fighting in France in August for which he would eventually receive the Ritterkreuz on 
5th November. It was also a quality that would stand him in good stead during the 
battles to come. Dreyer set up his headquarters in Geel. Apart from his own 
divisional troops Kampfgruppe Dreyer at first only consisted of some odds and ends 
from the 85. Infanterie-Division plus III./GR 723.553 The very day on which the Green 
Howards crossed the Canal he received reinforcements in the form of Flieger 
Regiment 51 under Oberst Stein.554 It was a welcome addition even though its three 
battalions totalled no more than 790 men. Another Flieger Regiment, 53 (Oberst von 
Lindenau), numbering no less than 1,300 men, was just assembling around 
Turnhout.555 These regiments were set up to provide Luftwaffe personnel with basic 
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infantry training (some of the men had barely finished this when they arrived at the 
front). Now they found themselves in the thick of the fighting. All these units would 
play a crucial role in the battle for Geel. At the height of the battle Dreyer would 
have no fewer than 3,500 men under his command. Still, that night the German units 
along the Albert Canal were literally caught napping. However, as dawn broke this 
would all rapidly change. 
It became clear that the Green Howards’ leading company, D, had advanced 
undetected to its objective at the top of Het Punt through several enemy positions. 
As it grew light the Germans realised what had happened and soon machine-gun and 
mortar fire began to rain down on the British troops and the 6th Green Howards 
were pinned down. To make things worse, Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson was 
wounded and had to be evacuated. Nevertheless, the 7th Green Howards 
(Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Cox) managed to cross successfully and by 09.30 hours it 
had joined its sister battalion. A raft was constructed, which took time, but just after 
midday six-pounder anti-tank guns and carriers were ferried across. No sooner had 
they arrived, at two p.m., than the Germans made the first counterattack. As soon as 
he had learned of the new bridgehead (consistently referred to in the German 
reports as Meulenberg), Generaloberst Student had ordered Chill to annihilate it by 
all possible means.556 Later, at eleven a.m. General Reinhard himself had come to 
inspect the front.557 He ordered the Kommandeur of I./Flieger Regiment 51, 
Hauptmann Hinrichsen, to attack and restore the situation. Obviously Reinhard was 
not happy with the way Hinrichsen organised things because within the hour he 
ordered Major Horst Pohl, the Kommandeur of Füsilier-Bataillon 85, to take over, as 
Reinhard felt that the Luftwaffe personnel organised themselves in an extremely 
‘clumsy’ way.558 Pohl and his adjudant were the only two soldiers to escape the trap 
at Falaise while the rest of the battalion was taken prisoner.559 He was ideally suited 
to this task. The thirty-year old officer was described by Chill as a ‘Frische, 
schwungvoller Offizier, taktvoll, offen und ungezwungen. Tüchtiger Batls.-Kdr. der es 
versteht seine Leute zu begeistern und mitzureissen. (…) Denkt schnell und wendig, 
entschlussfreudig.’560 No wonder that over the next weeks Pohl would be called upon 
to command ever more troops.  
The first German counterattack went in at around two p.m. It overran some platoons 
of the 6th Green Howards and forced the 7th Green Howards to withdraw from the 
road junction at Het Punt but that was as far as it went. Three further counterattacks 
followed, but they were all repulsed. The bridgehead held firm and by five p.m. 
things finally calmed down, at least along the frontline. Back at the headquarters of 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, General Reinhard and his staff were not convinced that the 
motley of troops south of Geel would be able to withstand the Allied attack for long. 
They were extremely worried that the canal line would be broken wide open and the 
daily report remarked that ‘Eigene Truppe ist besonders im Abschnitt der 85.I.D. 
stark durcheinandergewürfelt, viele Kampfunlustige Splittereinheiten älterer 
Jahrgänge aller Wehrmachtteile, die junge Mannschaft von Luftwaffeneinheiten sind 
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grösstenteils Rekruten, im Gefecht noch ungewandt. Es fehlen tatkräftige Führer, 
besonders Unterführer bei der Truppe.’561 Another problem was that ‘Häufig tritt 
wegen zu geringen Transportraumes Munitionsmangel ein. Es fehlen 
Panzerabwehrwaffen und vor allen Dingen Panzernahbekämpfungsmittel, dadurch 
verliert die Truppe das Selbstvertrauen.’562 In spite of these, very real, problems, 
Reinhard need not have worried, because the battle for Geel would develop in a 
surprising way. Still, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Chill now had to contend 
with two breakthroughs, the one at Beringen and the other south of Geel. He would 
have to make maximum use of the troops at his disposal as there were no 
reinforcements in the foreseeable future.  
The second bridgehead 
It was clear to the 50th Division that more troops were needed to capture Geel. 
During the afternoon of 8 September General Graham therefore ordered the 151st 
Brigade to leave Brussels and as soon as possible establish a bridgehead at Steelen 
to build a Class 9 folding boat bridge there. The CO, Brigadier D.S. Gordon, had kept 
in close touch with Brigadier Knox of the 69th Brigade and he soon realised that it 
would take at least one battalion to do the job. The task was assigned to the 8th 
Durham Light Infantry (DLI) under Lieutenant-Colonel H.R.D. Oldham, supported by 
two platoons from the 2nd Cheshires, the Machine Gun battalion of the division. The 
attack was launched late in the afternoon and was met with immediate enemy 
reactions. Spandau machine-gun fire raked the water and three boats were sunk. 
Mortar bombs also continued to rain down on the infantry but by eight p.m. the 
whole battalion was established on the north bank and construction of a bridge 
began right away. There was a counterattack which was beaten off and around 
eleven p.m. the lead company was just south of the Doornboom crossroads. There 
they were again counterattacked early the following morning around four a.m. and 
the situation was only restored after some fierce fighting. Still the folding bridge was 
finished as it grew light and at seven a.m. the first armoured cars of C Squadron 61st 
Reconnaissance Regiment could cross the canal. They ran into heavy opposition at 
the Doornboom crossroads.  
At Het Punt the third battalion of the 69th Brigade, the 5th East Yorkshires under 
Lieutenant-Colonel T.L. Charles, had also crossed the Albert Canal that night.563 In an 
attempt to get around the very determined opposition by Flieger Regiment 51 the 
East Yorks were ordered to attack further west, on the left flank of the bridgehead. 
Once again it was a rainy and stormy night. This helped the first two companies ( D 
and B) cross without being observed by the Germans. However, when the two other 
companies began to cross, the enemy woke up to the fact that they now had troops 
behind them and the East Yorks had to land under a hail of small-arms fire. Still, the 
attack on the houses at Het Punt went ahead as planned. Supported by the 7th 
Green Howards the East Yorks stormed the houses where, incredible but true, they 
found some of the enemy still fast asleep. Fifty prisoners were taken and eight of the 
Green Howards were liberated. By five a.m. on 9 September the bridgehead around 
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Het Punt was secure. Later that morning contact was made with the 151st Brigade 
on the right. The two small bridgeheads had now become one big one. At Steelen 
the 6th DLI (Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Green) had joined the 8th DLI and they were 
able to push the Germans back as far as Wilders (then: Willaart) three kilometres 
south of Geel. Meanwhile the 9th DLI (Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Mogg) stayed south of 
the canal ready for the main push the following day. More importantly, work on a 
class 40 bridge at Het Punt was finished at ten that evening. Finally tanks could join 
the infantry in the push north of the canal. It was clear from one look at the map 
where that next push was heading: Geel.  
Back at LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, Reinhard while convinced that he could contain the 
Beringen bridgehead, continued to be extremely worried about the situation near 
Geel because the troops fighting there ‘sind einem ersten Feindangriff nicht 
gewachsen, wenn nicht beschleunigt eine gute Truppe mindestens zwei Infanterie-
Regimenter mit Artillerie und Pak in den Abschnitt geführt werden.’564 Nevertheless, 
all the major German counterattacks that day still focussed on Beringen (see 
previous chapter). To remedy the situation slightly Dreyer was now permitted to 
employ Flieger Regiment 53 as well as various airfield defence units from France and 
Belgium, all in all some 2,200 additional Luftwaffe personnel that could be used as 
infantry.565 They would have to serve as a stop-gap measure. A more important 
reinforcement for Dreyer was in the form of artillery. He received no fewer than 
three batteries, 3. and 4./AR 1719 and 9./AR 185, which were ordered to take up 
positions to cover the bridgeheads.566 At least his Kampfgruppe now had support for 
the untrained and unreliable Luftwaffe troops. Most of these young recruits had only 
been called up during the last few months and had never seen combat before.567 On 
the plus side they had some light Flak with them. The lack of serious anti-tank 
weapons, apart from a few 8.8 cm Flak guns operated in the ground role by 
inexperienced crews, continued to worry Dreyer.  
Into Geel 
Dawn patrols sent out on 10 September by all three battalions of the Durham Light 
Infantry met with mixed responses from their opponents.568 The 6th DLI put out its 
feelers towards Geel and the first patrols actually entered the outskirts as early as 
five a.m. German troops countered with machine-gun fire along fixed lines. The 8th 
DLI tried to enlarge the bridgehead towards the east, but came under withering fire 
from 2 cm Flak guns which definitely ruled out any expansion in this direction. The 
9th DLI, meanwhile, crossed the canal and also explored east, just south of the 8th 
battalion, to arrive at the same disappointing conclusion. It was clear to Brigadier 
Gordon that, although his men were facing low grade units, the defenders of Geel 
would not be taken by surprise. It was to be a set piece battle after all. A new plan 
was drawn up. The 6th DLI was to push on into Geel while the 9th DLI would protect 
its right flank by capturing the hamlets of first Winkelom and then Laar. Each of the 
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two battalions would be assisted by a squadron of Shermans from the 
Nottinghamshire Yeomanry (the Sherwood Rangers). The 8th DLI meanwhile would 
plug the gap opening up with the 69th Brigade by advancing northwest as far as the 
main road into Geel. Anti-tank support was to be provided by the 107th Battery 
102nd Anti-Tank Regiment. Zero time was two p.m.  
Before the troops could assemble the 6th and 8th DLI had to beat off another 
counterattack by Kampfgruppe Dreyer. For a moment it was feared that this would 
interfere with the Brigadier’s plan for the attack, but after defensive fire (DF) had 
been called down the enemy attack soon broke up in confusion and preparations 
went ahead as scheduled. The artillery switched back to their original fire plan which 
was duly launched at two p.m. Back in Geel, it being a Sunday, people had attended 
mass as usual. But as soon as the artillery barrage began the civilians fled back 
home to await events. A few houses went up in flames and a number of Belgians lost 
their lives.569 D Company 6th DLI, supported by C Squadron the Sherwood Rangers, 
pressing on behind the barrage, fairly quickly reached the centre of Geel. In fact, C 
Squadron, rather to their own relief, on the way to Geel managed to knock out an 
8.8 cm Flak gun which had not put up much of a fight. Moving into the outskirts of 
the town the Sherman tanks put a shell into every suspect house they passed in 
order to reduce the danger from Spandau fire for the infantry following closely 
behind. This certainly helped progress and soon the leading troop of Shermans under 
Lieutenant Stuart Hills entered the central market square near St. Amand’s church. 
At that very moment a VW Schwimmwagen with three German officers drove up at 
high speed. Corporal Burnett spotted the amphibious car and, even though some 
Belgian civilians were riding his tank, shot it up. The three Germans ran for their lives 
but were arrested by Belgian resistance fighters soon after.  
The German defenders of Geel slowly pulled back and eventually dug in behind the 
railway crossing, a few hundred yards further north. Nevertheless, the persistent and 
accurate sniping on the way into town caused many casualties among the British 
troops and things got so bad that C and D Companies had to be amalgamated as 
they were down to three officers and fifty men.570 A Company shortly thereafter 
reached the area around St.-Dimpna’s church a few hundred metres to the east. B 
Company soon joined the others and at the end of the afternoon the whole of C 
Squadron the Sherwood Rangers was also in Geel. Almost 200 prisoners were taken 
and many German dead littered the fields south of Geel. Civilians poured out of their 
houses and cheered the British soldiers. They were offered flowers, fruit and drinks. 
Belgian flags and bunting were everywhere. The CO of C Squadron, Major Jack 
Holman, set up his headquarters in the market square confident that this position 
was consolidated.  It seemed that the battle for Geel was over whereas in fact it had 
only just begun. When Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Green, the CO of the 6th DLI, went 
forward to see the situation for himself he was hit by a piece of shrapnel from a shell 
burst nearby. He was evacuated, leaving Major G.L. Wood in command of a 
battalion, now thin on the ground in both officers and men.571 Moreover, the two 
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flanking battalions were unable to fulfil their tasks. At the end of the afternoon the 
9th DLI and B Squadron the Sherwood Rangers had fought their way into Winkelom, 
but they were unable to reach Laar because of intense German fire. Another, much 
bigger, problem was that the 8th DLI was somewhat slow in moving up to protect 
the south flank of the 6th DLI in Geel, leaving a huge gap which could be infiltrated 
at any time. The consequences would soon make themselves felt. 
Counterattack by the Jagdpanther 
While Brigadier Gordon was drawing up his plans on Sunday 10 September, his 
opponents had not been idle. At ten a.m. General Reinhard visited Dreyer at his 
headquarters in Geel.572 He was informed by the Oberstleutnant that the enemy had 
two battalions inside the bridgehead as well as some armoured cars. Obviously 
Dreyer was not aware of the fact that he was  actually facing three times that 
number. Also, Dreyer told Reinhard that only three British batteries had ranged in on 
the troops that sealed off the bridgehead. Reassured by these numbers Reinhard told 
Dreyer that he was now responsible for the annihilation of the bridgehead using all 
units around it. He should attack that evening supported by artillery, if necessary 
without any Sturmgeschütze. Reinhard then left Dreyer to prepare a plan of attack 
and went to visit Chill in Moll to see how the Beringen-Hechtel situation was 
developing.  
As told in the previous chapter, shortly thereafter he ordered 1./schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 to assemble in the woods near Tenderloo ready to strike 
at short notice in whatever direction the main danger would come from.573 But the 
problem of Geel obviously kept nagging Reinhard and at one p.m. he decided to 
order the Jagdpanther Kompanie to Geel to help restore the situation. It was a 
fortuitous decision. Rather typical for an armoured unit at this period, the 
Jagdpanther Kompanie, which was now down to fourteen vehicles, since three had 
been lost in the fighting for the Beringen bridgehead, could only muster half of their 
strength.574 This meant that seven or eight vehicles were in repair even though they 
had not been involved in any fighting yet. The Jagdpanther were too late to prevent 
the capture of the town, but they might just be in time to stop the British from 
advancing further. 
The first to notice the arrival of the lethal tank hunters at the end of the afternoon 
were the Shermans from B Squadron the Sherwood Rangers who had found their 
attack from Winkelom to Laar blocked by what they refer to as tanks, but were in 
fact Jagdpanther firing on them from positions near St.-Dimpna’s  church. Around 
the same time, probably five p.m., the Jagdpanther also inflicted the first casualties 
on the Sherwood Rangers. They knocked out three Shermans from C Squadron who 
were supporting the 6th DLI at the cemetery near St.Dimpna’s, killing the Troop 
commander, Lieutenant Ted Cooke. Further south, at Winkelom, a Jagdpanther also 
put in an appearance. Captain Highfield, the FOO with B Company 9th DLI, then 
called ‘Mike Target, Mike Target, Mike Target’. This meant that all twenty-four guns 
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of one Field Regiment (in this case the 74th) opened fire on the same target. The 
Jagdpanther were not hit, but as shells exploded all around them the vehicles moved 
off to safety between the houses.575 It was becoming clear to the British troops in 
Geel itself that something very serious was brewing. Over their radios they could 
hear the other squadrons and battalions mention the presence of German ‘tanks’ and 
just before dark it was clear that they would not have to wait long. At eight p.m. 
Kampfgruppe Dreyer, now supported by six or seven Jagdpanther launched the 
counterattack aimed at eliminating the bridgehead. It differed markedly from the 
plan drawn up by Dreyer that afternoon.576 Only the broad outline of how the 
counterattack developed is clear from documents. The various sources are conflicting 
concerning the details. For example, the number of enemy SPs (often called ‘tanks’) 
knocked out according to the British war diaries far exceeds the number of 
Jagdpanther operating in the area. Moreover, the number of Jagdpanther that were 
knocked out is a given, since there exists a very reliable source, a list drawn up after 
the war by the town of Geel giving the locations of all the wrecks, Allied and German, 
which were to be sold for scrap.577 What follows is the most logical sequence of 
events as can be deduced from the available evidence.578   
It appears that most of the time the Jagdpanther did operate in pairs, as laid down in 
their tactical guidelines.579 There are some strong indications that one stayed behind 
near St.-Dimpna’s, at least for a while, to cover the north-eastern exit of the 
bridgehead, leaving three pairs to assist in the attack.580 Once again, as with Kopka’s 
attack on Beringen, the SPs of 559 were used as tanks, a role which they were never 
intended to perform, and once again there would be a heavy price to pay. Around 
noon, during a conference with Oberst Von Lindenau, Kommandeur of Flieger 
Regiment 53, Dreyer envisaged a three-pronged attack. 581 While I./Flieger Regiment 
53 (Major Jürgens) covered the west flank of the bridgehead II./Flieger Regiment 53 
(Major Ernst Heino Leopold Eberhard Senfft von Pilsach) would undertake the main 
effort along the road from Geel to Doornboom and I./Flieger Regiment 51 would 
came in from the east.582 However, events had overtaken these plans. The loss of 
Geel to British armour meant that the main road south was now blocked and Dreyer 
had to abandon his original plan and come up with a new one. This was for 
II./Flieger Regiment 53  to form up southeast of Poiel583 and attack in the direction 
of the road from there. The troops duly formed up and waited for the Jagdpanther to 
arrive. The Jagdpanther first drove north, crossed the railway line and then via 
Holven and Elsum tried to circle the bridgehead from the west. The Flieger 
companies were now close to their starting point, but when the Jagdpanther arrived 
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at 5.30 p.m. they brought news that British infantry had joined the tanks in Geel. It 
was time to come up with version three of the plan. The whole battalion had to do 
an about turn and attack back in the direction of Geel. This manoeuvre was 
attempted, but the situation became so chaotic that by last light just two 
Jagdpanther and some of the young and inexperienced Luftwaffe men followed 
orders and attacked the 6th DLI in Geel while at least two other vehicles turned 
south towards the 8th DLI and Doornboom.584 Meanwhile the other battalions had 
attacked as agreed. Ordering these inexperienced troops to carry out such a 
complicated manoeuvre was of course a recipe for disaster. It is amazing that they 
achieved as much as they did.  
Indeed, for a large group of Luftwaffe men and two Jagdpanther to penetrate the 
positions of the 8th DLI is nothing short of a miracle, although they were helped by 
the fact that the 8th DLI did not begin its advance until eight p.m. The Germans 
overran A Company and headed for the all-important crossroads near the canal.  
Attempts by a six-pounder of the 107th Anti-Tank Battery to stop a Jagdpanther 
failed. Sergeant Teussel’s gun got off two rounds which temporarily halted the 
massive SP, but then the gun jammed.585 The Jagdpanther trundled on and as one 
British chronicler put it at the time, “the picture became very confused and no one 
seems to have had a clear idea as to what happened”.586 When Captain P.G. 
Hampson of the 8th DLI went forward along the main road from Doornboom to Geel 
to pick up some of the wounded he came upon a group of about sixty men sitting by 
the side of the road. He could only dimly see them in the gathering darkness and he 
asked them if they were D Company. He was answered by three hand grenades 
which flew towards his carrier. The carrier survived, turned around and sped back to 
Doornboom to warn Brigade headquarters.587 A second officer proceeding up the 
same road and unaware of what had just happened saw another carrier in front of 
him blown up. He told his own driver to wait while he set off to investigate on foot. 
He then heard what he thought was a tank coming down the road from Geel. He 
decided to stop it for some information. Seated on top were twelve soldiers. He 
suddenly realized that he was about to address a Jagdpanther instead of a Sherman. 
Fortunately for him it rumbled on, oblivious of his presence. Starting from the area 
north of St.-Dimpna’s the two Jagdpanther attacked southwest into the gap between 
the 9th and 8th DLI, catching A Company of 9th DLI in the open and killing several 
soldiers, among them Captain W. Rideleagh, then the only officer left in the 
company. Sergeant G.H. Self took over command and took the majority of the men 
back to safety through the German lines.  
At 22.30 hours one of the other Jagdpanther in support of that part of II./ Flieger 
Regiment 53 entered Geel via a back street to catch the defenders in the market 
square unaware.588 Probably the Jagdpanther was following the other two down 
south, but apparently lost its way. Instead of taking the road towards Stokt and 
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Doornboom it drove across some fields and ended up a hundred metres too far 
west.589 It came upon a steep bank called de Brukel (nowadays a dead-end street). 
The ground was extremely slippery and even the Jagdpanther could not get across. 
Four times the forty-five ton vehicle drove up the bank, only to slide back every time. 
In frustration the driver gave up. The Jagdpanther thereupon turned through ninety 
degrees until it got to the Waterstraat which it entered and headed back into Geel. A 
strange decision, in view of the British occupation. The driver either lost his way in 
the darkness, thinking he was heading back to Poiel where he came from, or the 
crew must have decided to bluff their way through. The reason for the move is not 
clear, what happened next is. From the Waterstraat the Jagdpanther turned right 
into the Pas, now heading straight for the Market Square where C Squadron 
Sherwood Rangers headquarters were still parked unaware of the danger they were 
in.  
To enter the market square the Jagdpanther had to make a sharp turn.590 Once it 
had done so it immediately spotted one of the Shermans guarding the four corners 
of the square. Without hesitation the German gunner fired on the Sherman. The 88 
roared, but the shot was fired in haste, missed and slammed into a house. Another 
Sherman fired at the Jagdpanther almost simultaneously, but it also missed its 
target. Then the Jagdpanther hit the Sherman it had spotted, knocking it out. Almost 
right away it was hit in turn, possibly by Corporal Burnett in his Firefly.591 He sent an 
armour-piercing shot from his seventeen-pounder into the German’s right hand track, 
immobilizing the giant SP. The crew fled the scene, but not before they had set fire 
to the Jagdpanther. Because it blocked the street the British later pushed it into the 
central square. The threat to the British troops in Geel was temporarily averted. 
Confusion all around 
All of this did not provide much comfort to Brigadier Gordon who not only kept 
receiving confused reports of German infiltrations all along the line on 10 September, 
but also because his headquarters came under direct fire at one point. Just after 
eight p.m. Brigade headquarters were moving to a new location just south of the 
Doornboom crossroads. The column had crossed over the canal by means of the 
Class 40 bridge at Het Punt when an officer ran up and warned the Brigadier that 
there were some German tanks in a sunken lane close by, whereupon Gordon is said 
to have shouted to (A Squadron) the Sherwood Rangers, ‘For God’s sake, bring your 
tanks up quickly.’592 As it was the vehicles were now caught between the infiltrating 
Germans and the canal. The road was too narrow for the long line of defenceless 
vehicles to turn around and there was no option but carry on. The headquarters 
stopped at a new destination 200 metres south of the crossroads, still too close to 
the battle for comfort and by midnight had moved on to a position just north of the 
canal. To make matters worse, the Class 9 Bridge at Steelen was useless. It had 
once again been hit by German artillery and was not thought worth repairing. 
Moreover, the two Jagdpanther, accompanied by a group of infantry, mainly from 
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II./Flieger Regiment 53 under Major Senfft von Pilsach had definitely managed to 
infiltrate through the gap between the 6th and 8th DLI albeit at some cost since 
Senfft von Pilsach himself was killed that day.593 Command was taken over by 
Hauptmann Trede.594 In an audacious sweep the German battle group got as far as 
the Doornboom crossroads before deciding to call it a day. One Jagdpanther took up 
position south of the crossroads, while the other did the same north of there.595 
Effectively the 6th DLI and C Squadron in Geel were now completely cut off. 
Ironically, they were the only ones who had a relatively quiet night. All the other 
units were in for a very restless one. 
In order to restore a continuous front-line, General Graham ordered the 69th Brigade 
to help by advancing up to the Geel road. The 7th Green Howards began their 
advance at 22.50 hours and were on their objectives just south of Poiel by 02.20 
hours. The gap between the 8th DLI and the 69th Brigade was at last plugged. 
Meanwhile the 6th Green Howards had earlier taken over positions near Doornboom, 
which was supposed to be in the rear of the bridgehead, but actually would turn out 
to be one of the focal points of the fighting. In fact, most of the infiltrating German 
troops were now in the area between Stokt and Doornboom and the vicinity of the 
crossroads. The Jagdpanther with the accompanying infantry, had taken up position 
in two of the many lanes flanked by shrubbery that criss-cross this landscape. 
Although they were completely invisible to their opponents, the German force could 
clearly be heard. The situation was confusing in the extreme. 
During the night the German troops sent up a number of parachute flares and by the 
light of these the Jagdpanther knocked out two Shermans of the Sherwood Rangers 
which proceeded to blaze furiously. A section of the 6th Green Howards in their 
carriers was hit by a shell from a Jagdpanther as they came up the road, unaware of 
the enemy positions. The section was nearly obliterated. Just before one a.m. 
Brigadier Gordon, only one hundred metres away from there with his staff, sensibly 
decided to swallow his pride and the headquarters column quickly drove back south 
of the canal out of reach of the enemy. Staying put would have spelled certain 
destruction for the soft-skinned vehicles.  
Meanwhile, more German troops were thrown into the cauldron. Learning of the 
penetration of the bridgehead, Reinhard decided to reinforce the success of 
Kampfgruppe Dreyer. He ordered II./FJR 6 (Hauptmann Rolf Mager), which had only 
recently arrived in Maria Ter Heide, to leave and move via Turnhout and Kasterlee to 
retake Geel.596 They would arrive the following morning to play their bit in the 
unfolding drama.  
Armour versus armour 
Monday 11 September was to see the culmination of the struggle for Geel. Around 
this time LXXXVIII. Armeekorps received another report about the situation there. It 
stated that ’II./Fsch.Jg.Regt. 6 passierte mit Stab und 3 Kompanien gegen 05.00 Uhr 
Divisionsgefechtsstand in Loenhout. (…) Eigener Gegenangriff aus Norden gegen 
                                        
593 PAJVD. 
594 War Diary 50th (N) Div, IS 66. 
595 War Diary 9th DLI, 11.09.44, 09.00 hours. 
596 KTB 88 AK, 10.09.44, Tagesmeldung. 
 135 
Brückenkopf nördl. Meulenberg erreichte westl. An Gheel vorbeistossend, den Raum 
südl. Davon (alte HKL). Infolge Einbruchs der Dunkelheit konnte der in Gheel erneut 
eingedrungene Feind (mit Panzern) nicht zurückgeworfen werden. Die Verbindung zu 
den südl. Von Gheel stehenden Teilen der Pz.-Jäg.-Abt. 559 ging in der Dunkelheit 
verloren. Lage ist z.Zt. dort ungeklärt.’597  
It is not known how Reinhard responded to this news. Probably his mind was 
elsewhere. Only hours before had he learnt of the capture of Joe’s Bridge at Neerpelt 
the evening before. This spectacular action meant that all German troops still along 
the Albert Canal were suddenly in danger of being outflanked. The most sensible 
thing to do would be to call off the attack at Geel and start a gradual withdrawal. 
However, Generaloberst  Student soon put a stop to that. When he was visiting Chill 
that morning Reinhard was called to the phone. Student told him curtly that the 
Führer had decided that the Albert Canal was to be held as long as possible. Both in 
Geel and Beringen the enemy was to be contained.598 Meanwhile Reinhard learned 
from Chill that some Jagdpanther had reached the Doornboom crossroads, having 
destroyed seven tanks, two anti-tank guns and ten AFV’s on the way; they were in 
desperate need of infantry and Sturmgeschütze.599 There were no reinforcements 
that Reinhard could send them, the Sturmgeschütze were by then involved in the 
attack on the Neerpelt bridgehead (see next chapter) and the Fallschirmjäger had 
not arrived yet. Moreover, they would have their hands full in Geel itself. The group 
would have to fend for itself. Later, just after midday, Kampfgruppe Chill confirmed 
the earlier report and added that the Jagdpanther were engaged in heavy fighting 
with enemy armour and that they were down to five or six vehicles.600 In fact, the 
audacious attack towards Doornboom the previous evening, meant that they had 
been hoist with their own petard. The German force was now, in fact, virtually 
imprisoned in the heart of the bridgehead. The only thing that saved it from 
destruction was the wooded landscape and the dense morning fog. 
Brigadier Gordon ordered his troops to stay put for the moment until that cleared. It 
was still far too foggy to try and dislodge the Germans near the Doornboom 
crossroads. Gradually the fog began to lift and the opponents could finally see each 
other. What followed that morning was a series of small engagements in which the 
two Jagdpanther wreaked havoc among the British vehicles, but not without 
incurring losses themselves. The vehicles of 559 were cunningly concealed around 
the houses and defiladed from the British guns. Each time one of the Shermans of A 
Squadron the Sherwood Rangers attempted to move up to engage them it was 
promptly knocked out. Soon three were ablaze. A six-pounder was hurriedly 
uncoupled from an M 14 halftrack and put into action. After it had fired two or three 
rounds the Jagdpanther fired two in reply both of which hit an ammunition truck next 
to the M 14. The driver of the halftrack hurriedly drove off, running the gauntlet 
between the German gun and the six-pounder.601 As the morning light grew stronger 
it became clear to the German force that they were more or less surrounded and 
they began to try and withdraw discreetly. They only succeeded in part. The intensity 
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of the fighting rapidly increased. While the Shermans tried to battle it out with the 
Jagdpanther the Luftwaffe men fell victim to the machine-guns of A Company 2nd 
Cheshire Regiment. The machine-gunners saw a party of about a hundred try to 
move back behind a Jagdpanther.602 They engaged them. The infantry went to 
ground and the Jagdpanther waddled back along the road. The 2nd Cheshires drove 
up in their carriers and engaged the Luftwaffe men at point-blank range as they lay 
in the open, killing fifteen and wounding over twenty. The others all surrendered.  
Elsewhere the fighting was just as intense. B Squadron the Sherwood Rangers was 
trying to push into Geel to establish contact with their beleaguered comrades there. 
It was a disaster. They lost seven tanks,603 the CO, Major Michael Gold, was severely 
wounded as was his second-in-command, Captain Colin Thomson while another 
officer, Captain John Mann, was killed. Things were not much better at Regimental 
headquarters near the Doornboom crossroads either.604 The Sherwood Rangers CO, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Christopherson, was told by a machine-gunner of the 
Cheshires, ‘I am sorry to worry you, sir, but I  should just like to confirm that the 
tank 300 yards to my left is one of yours.’ Christopherson took one look and had a 
shock as he saw a Jagdpanther. As his tank had no gun he ordered his driver to 
double back to A Squadron. There he stopped near a Firefly commanded by Sergeant 
Charity. This tank backed slightly down the sunken lane in which it had been hidden 
and found a position from which it could engage the Jagdpanther. The first two shots 
went high, but the third hit the Jagdpanther. Immediately a second Jagdpanther 
appeared, coming to the rescue of its mate. This one was hit by Sergeant Allen. It 
was now around midday. One of the Jagdpanther was knocked out, the other 
managed to escape.605 The Jagdpanther destroyed southwest of the Doornboom 
crossroads was a command vehicle and it was probably the one commanded by 
Leutnant Gerhard Kossack, the Kommandeur of 2. Zug, who was killed that day, in 
which case it bore the number 121.  
It has proved impossible to establish exactly at what time the other Jagdpanther was 
knocked out. What is known is the location, about three hundred metres north of the 
crossroads, and it also probably happened around noon.606 This Jagdpanther was 
heading back towards Geel, infantry riding along on top, when it struck C Company 
8th DLI south of the hamlet of  Stokt.607 It had not been possible to get anti-tank 
guns to C Company the previous night, but still C Company fired with every weapon 
they had. The enemy fired back and the vehicle bore straight for Company 
headquarters, but stopped just forty metres from it. Right away Sergeant J.K. 
Middleton, commanding a section of the carrier platoon, crawled about thirty metres 
with a PIAT and with his first shot disabled the Jagdpanther. An amazing feat, under 
any circumstances. The explosion killed a number of Germans. Middleton then 
machine-gunned the remainder of the Germans who turned and ran for their lives. 
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Middleton was awarded the Military Medal for this action. Just before, a second 
attempt had been made to penetrate the bridgehead from the northwest.  
Around nine a.m. the 7th Green Howards established contact with the 8th DLI in 
Stokt and there was now a more or less continuous perimeter on this side of the 
bridgehead.608 The nearest enemy troops were dug in around Larum chapel seven 
hundred metres away. Shortly afterwards the familiar clatter of tank tracks could be 
heard and D Company, which was in position in Standonk, a cluster of houses about 
five hundred metres east of Poiel, spotted a Jagdpanther and some infantry from 
I./Flieger Regiment 53 approaching from the north.609 Obviously the Germans used 
the same approach as the night before and for some reason the vehicle was 
operating on its own. Most of the Green Howards were still shaving as the enemy 
came closer. They dropped their kit, grabbed their weapons and ran outside. The 
Jagdpanther was allowed to come to within about a hundred metres. Then one of 
the Green Howards’ six-pounder guns fired and hit the SP between the wheels. A 
flame shot out. Immediately afterwards several of the PIATs were fired and the 
Jagdpanther went up in flames. The accompanying infantry went to ground and 
crawled back in the direction of Larum. It was the third Jagdpanther to be lost that 
day. After the German threat had been dealt with the situation within the bridgehead 
gradually took on some semblance of normality during the afternoon. The RAF also 
put in a brief appearance. Eight Typhoon fighter-bombers of 247 Squadron 
(Melsbroek, Brussels) tried to find the ‘tanks’ that had been reported around St.-
Dimpna’s. They could not locate them, however, and flew back without attacking.610  
By coincidence, at the same time the last German attack went underway, Lieutenant-
General Horrocks (XXX Corps) visited the 69th Brigade headquarters south of the 
canal. There are no records of what was discussed. As Horrocks was already fully 
engaged in the planning of operation Market Garden (see Chapter 3.4) he must have 
informed Brigadier Knox not to incur any unnecessary losses as his troops were soon 
needed elsewhere, the more so as the fighting in Geel had taken a turn for the worse 
for the British. While the fighting in the bridgehead had been raging all that Monday, 
the town itself had seen some ferocious fighting as well.  
In between two drinks 
The night in Geel had passed relatively quietly. Dreyer had sent most of his 
Kampfgruppe around Geel and they were now heavily engaged south of the town. 
The situation remained like this throughout most of the morning. This changed, 
however, when Hauptmann Rolf Mager’s II./FJR 6 began to arrive in the early 
afternoon. The first unit to enter Geel was 5. Kompanie, soon followed by 6. and 7. 
Kompanie. The arrival of the Fallschirmjäger rapidly made a real difference for 
Dreyer. At around one p.m. there were only three Jagdpanther left, which had 
assembled north of the railway line, and losses among the two Flieger Regimente 
had been so severe that it was not clear to them whether they could hold the line.611 
The Fallschirmjäger, with their usual panache immediately set about to retake Geel 
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as they had been ordered, led by 5. Kompanie under Fahnenjunker Heinz Köhne. 
Starting at the railway line they infiltrated towards the centre of town by moving 
from house to house keeping out of sight of the tanks of the Sherwood Rangers. In 
the town centre Köhne from a pub, ‘Het Schild van Turnhout’, and between two 
drinks knocked out a British tank.   
Whether the story of the drinks is true or not, Köhne certainly knocked out a 
Sherman, namely that of Captain Jimmy McWilliams. He and Lieutenant Stuart Hills 
had taken up positions at the north end of the town square to cover the two exits. 
They were about to consider how to execute a withdrawal when McWilliams’ tank 
was hit by Köhne. The crew tumbled out except for the driver, Corporal E.J.K. 
Higgins, who was killed. Hills was horrified, particularly as he had no idea from which 
direction the tank had been hit. About two minutes later it was his turn. They were 
hit in the sprocket assembly, but they were still able to move. McWilliams was 
informed by his driver that they had probably been hit by a Panzerfaust. Slowly, 
firing the machine-gun in what they thought was the direction the shot came from, 
the Sherman backed into the town square where C Squadron headquarters were still 
established. Since Sergeant Gordon Nesling’s Firefly was the only battleworthy tank 
now left in Geel, he was recalled from his exposed position. Nesling drove back at 
top speed along what is now the Lebonstraat, blazing away at the area from which 
he believed the Panzerfaust shot had come. He was later awarded the Distinguished 
Conduct Medal for his brave conduct. The whole of C Squadron was now down to 
five tanks and the situation was no longer tenable, the more so as the infantry were 
also in serious trouble. 
The arrival of II./FJR 6, began to make itself felt more and more as the afternoon 
wore on.612 The 6th DLI pulled back to the Market Square which C Company now 
held with just thirty men. The battalion also began to run short of food and 
ammunition and were by now pretty thin on the ground. Using the opportunity, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wood ordered A Echelon not only to provide the desperately 
needed food and ammunition, but also to reinforce D Company who were in danger 
of being overrun. Sections and parties were cut off by groups of Fallschirmjäger who 
moved slowly forward behind concentrations of artillery. Again and again the attacks 
were beaten off in some of the fiercest hand-to-hand fighting the battalion had 
experienced since landing in France. At one stage the advancing Fallschirmjäger used 
a disabled carrier for shelter. A hit from a Sherman tank blew up carrier and 
Fallschirmjäger together. At 16.30 hours two tanks managed to break through to the 
6th DLI destroying several machine-gun positions on the way. Eventually, continued 
infiltration forced the depleted battalion to fall back. At five p.m. Graham decided to 
pull the 6th DLI back from Geel.613 The move started at around six p.m. and was 
concluded two hours later. Tanks went first and last to protect the infantry, the 
fitters and the wounded in the middle. D Company, which was surrounded, had to 
fight their way out. Together with B Company they arrived back at the lines of the 
8th DLI, convinced that A and C Companies had apparently all been killed or 
captured. However, two days later the survivors turned up. Darkness brought a lull 
and a welcome respite. The battle for Geel proper was all but over. This news had 
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not reached higher headquarters yet and Reinhard continued to fret about the 
situation there. In fact he thought ‘Nach wie vor grösster Schwächepunkt: Abschnitt 
85.I.D.’ 614The main ground for his worries was that Chill ’einen Abschnitt von 36 km 
Breite zu verteidigen hat’.615 The war diarist added a footnote which suggests that 
Chill was slightly irritated by the continued reference to the 85. Infanterie-Division 
even after his Kampfgruppe had been created a day before, because it reads, ‘Die 
Division bittet deshalb, um keine falschen Vorstellungen zu erwecken, die 
Bezeichnung Kampfgruppe Chill (85.I.D.) führen zu dürfen’.616  
Retaking Geel was a minor triumph for Oberstleutnant Dreyer.617 The following 
morning he could proudly report that the old front-line had been restored.618 Both 
the British infantry and the tanks had taken a terrific beating. All in all the 50th 
(Northumbrian) Division had suffered severe casualties. In addition fifteen of its 
carriers were completely destroyed. The Sherwood Rangers noted that the two days 
in Geel had seen eleven tanks knocked out and two damaged, the highest number 
since fighting in the desert.619  But it had been a costly victory for the Germans. Most 
of Flieger Regimente 51 and 53 had either been killed (around 200) or wounded and 
on 11 September alone 192 Luftwaffe men had been taken prisoner and four 
Jagdpanther had been lost.620 Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 reported 
that it still had two operational Jagdpanther which were in position north of Geel.621 
One was under repair.622  
Relief 
On Tuesday 12 September Major-General Graham received specific orders from XXX 
Corps about the relief of the bridgehead south of Geel by the 15th (Scottish) 
Division.623 His own division was needed to take over the Neerpelt bridgehead from 
the Guards who were then free to spearhead the upcoming operation, Market 
Garden. The 15th Division under Major-General C.M. Barber, would take over the 
hotly contested area. The previous evening there had already been consultations 
between the brigades concerned.624 The idea was for the Scottish Division to take 
over as soon as possible so that it would be in a position to jump the Maas-Scheldt 
Canal as part of XII Corps effort to broaden the base of XXX Corps’ salient, an 
essential feature of Market Garden. 
Meanwhile, the battle at Geel was not really over yet. Before they could organise a 
pull-back the 8th and 9th DLI were subjected to a most horrific concentration of 
artillery and mortar fire early in the morning. A Jagdpanther continued to shell the 
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positions throughout the morning and early afternoon.625 But worse was to come for 
the Scots. During the afternoon the 15th Division moved up to debus south of the 
Albert Canal and to cross into the Geel bridgehead.626 The crossings were still under 
pretty continuous shell-fire and the Scots suffered their first casualties as a result. 
The 44th Brigade was to relieve the 151st Brigade on the right. The relief began at 
the end of the afternoon, after the 9th DLI had beaten off another counterattack 
from Winkelom, the 6th DLI going back first, followed by the 8th and 9th battalions. 
The relief of the 69th Brigade by the 44th Brigade was even more problematic. The 
5th East Yorks and 6th Green Howards could be pulled back without any serious 
problems but that very afternoon Kampfgruppe Dreyer made one last effort to wipe 
out the bridgehead. At 16.30 hours two Jagdpanther, were seen coming out of 
Elsum, infantry once again riding along.627 The counterattack, somewhat amazingly, 
was again aimed at the boundary between the 8th DLI and the 7th Green Howards, 
south of Poiel. The SPs were immediately engaged by artillery. Thereupon the two 
Jagdpanther turned tail and headed back towards their own positions near Larum. 
While driving back one Jagdpanther was hit and it was ablaze within seconds, the 
fifth and last to be lost during the battle for Geel. This was the one commanded by 
Unteroffizier Hans Rabe who was killed when his vehicle was hit by a shell that went 
through an open hatch.628 Four crewmen were burnt inside the vehicle, but one 
managed to jump out, also badly burnt, and locals could hear him screaming as he 
lay dying next to the Jagdpanther. Later they wrapped him up in a blanket and 
buried him in an improvised grave.629 In all, this last attempt to penetrate the 
bridgehead lasted well over two hours. The Germans withdrew after having set fire 
to some of the houses. Finally the Green Howards and the DLI could relinquish their 
positions and by eleven p.m. the relief was complete. This counterattack had been 
the last effort to drive the British back to the Albert Canal. It was time for a change 
of tactics for the British troops. This was exactly what the German commanders, too, 
had in mind.  
While the British troops in the bridgehead were being relieved Generalfeldmarschall 
Walter Model, Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe B, visited General Reinhard at his 
headquarters in Moergestel himself, to  discuss the situation.630 The discussion lasted 
almost an hour. As their opponents seemed to be pouring troops into the Geel 
bridgehead (the German commanders had no idea that it was a relief and not 
reinforcements), Model and Reinhard feared a renewed attack across Geel in the 
direction of Turnhout and from there north to outflank their defences north of 
Antwerp. Also, an attack from Geel towards Mol could cut off most of Chill’s units 
near Beringen. In effect, all of Kampfgruppe Chill, was in danger of being 
outflanked.631 At 18.30 hours Model authorized LXXXVIII. Armeekorps to pull the 
Kampfgruppe back behind the security of the Maas-Scheldt Canal. A quarter of an 
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hour after issuing this order Model left Moergestel and Reinhard himself drove up to 
Chill in Dessel to inform him of the decision. He told Chill to pull his troops back 
during the night.632 On his way back Reinhard saw Generaloberst Student (1. 
Fallschirm Armee) at his headquarters to inform him of the withdrawal. Student fully 
concurred and promised to send Reinhard one more battalion of Fallschirmjäger in 
view of the bloodletting of Kampfgruppe Chill.633  
Conclusion 
The battle for the Bloody Triangle between the Albert Canal, the Maas-Scheldt Canal 
and the Zuid-Willemsvaart was finally over. Interestingly enough it had all played out 
quite differently from how Reinhard had envisaged it. He had continually fretted 
about the situation at Geel, confident that Erdmann’s Fallschirmjäger would be able 
to prevent the Guards from breaking out of the Beringen-Hechtel bridgehead, but the 
exact opposite had happened. This was all the more amazing as Reinhard stated that 
’85.I.D. besteht als solche nicht, sonder nur der gekürzte Stab mit kleinen 
Restsplitterverbänden, den zahlreiche andere Splitterverbände von Heer und 
Luftwaffe angeschlossen sind’.634 This was praise indeed. And it was more than 
justified. Chill’s rag tag band of thrown together Luftwaffe men had performed much 
better than expected, whereas the situation north of Hechtel had gone completely 
out of hand. It was a tremendous achievement for Kampfgruppe Chill, especially 
considering the poor supply situation the Germans were in. Most of the men had not 
had a full food ration in weeks.635 The outstanding achievement of Kampfgruppe 
Chill, aided by the Jagdpanther Kompanie of 559, was the result of tactical insight 
and skilful manoeuvring although once again, as at Beringen, when SPs were used 
offensively they failed to achieve their objective, in this case the annihilation of the 
bridgehead, even though they did punch a hole in the British lines and caused 
mayhem for a while. The Jagdpanther would never make a proper substitute for 
tanks. Nevertheless, the armoured giants accompanied by small bands of infantry did 
manage to upset the British battle plan and even led to the retaking of Geel itself, a 
fairly unique event during this period and in this theatre of war. The fact that the 
50th Division was unable to advance any further for the moment also meant that 
Model could concentrate his resources against the bridgehead near Neerpelt and that 
he no longer had to worry that the sector between Lommel and Antwerp would be 
outflanked. The successful defence at Geel had consequences beyond merely 
stabilizing part of the front line. Ironically, the day that Geel was recaptured was the 
very day it had to be abandoned again because of the capture of Joe’s Bridge at 
Neerpelt. The fight for Geel had been very costly. After just over a week of intensive 
fighting 559 had lost no fewer than eight of its Jagdpanther, three north of Beringen 
and five at Geel, and 1. Kompanie had been reduced to nine vehicles, only three of 
which were fully operational.636 However, the effective defence in the ‘Bloody 
Triangle’ in fact forced Montgomery to revise his operational plans. The result was 
directive M 525. Before discussing this in some detail, another important engagement 
fought by Kampfgruppe Chill needs to be examined first. 
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3.3. Ten Aard (13 – 20 September 1944) 
 
“… at Ten Aard on the Escaut Canal we had a private “Arnhem”. We were puzzled as to what 
was being achieved by the severe fighting here, and by the vehemence of the enemy’s 
reaction.”637 
“15. schottische I.D. kämpft zäh und verbissen.“638  
 
If Geel and Beringen are all but forgotten battles that finally deserve to have their 
histories written, this applies even more to the battle for Aart or Ten Aard as it is 
known these days. Here is a battle which has indeed been completely gone from the 
annals of military history it seems, and when it is referred to it is sometimes wrongly 
called the battle for Geel.639 The reasons for its neglect are probably twofold, it was a 
genuine defeat during a period that the Allies were generally winning, and it was 
largely fought while Market Garden was taking place. Because the fighting at Ten 
Aard was connected to this major airborne operation, the outcome was to have 
serious consequences for Market Garden. Once again Kampfgruppe Chill and, to a 
limited degree, schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 were key players. 
It all began on Tuesday 12 September, the day that the 15th (Scottish) Division took 
over from the 50th (Northumbrian) Division south of Geel. After their take-over the 
15th Division faced the same adversary as 50th Division, an improvised battle group 
under Oberstleutnant Dreyer. Once again Dreyer was called upon to use his skills as 
a commander and once again he would have to push the troops under his command 
to the limit of their endurance.640  
A calculated risk 
As related earlier on 12 September Generalfeldmarschall Model, Oberbefehlshaber 
Heeresgruppe B, ordered a withdrawal behind the Maas-Scheldt Canal during the 
night. Exactly one day after it had recaptured Geel Kampfgruppe Dreyer abandoned 
the town, the last two hundred men from Flieger Regimente 51 and 53 clearing it 
just hours before the first Allied troops arrived at eight a.m. on 13 September.641 The 
first unit to enter Geel was the 8th Royal Scots (Lieutenant-Colonel P.R. Lane Joynt), 
one of the nine battalions that made up the 15th (Scottish) Division. The 15th had 
taken over this area from the 50th (Northumbrian) Division because the latter was 
needed in the Neerpelt bridgehead to free the Guards  Division for operation Market 
Garden. While XXX Corps was to go straight north to the establish a link with the 
three airborne divisions, VIII and XII Corps would operate on the flanks. From Geel 
the 15th Division would be in a position to lead the XII Corps break-out across the 
Maas-Scheldt Canal. As a preliminary move it was to establish a bridgehead over the 
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canal after clearing Geel and surroundings. To assist in the hoped for break-out the 
division had under command a tank battalion, the 3rd/4th County of London 
Yeomanry (CLY), known as the Sharpshooters. The division was commanded by, if 
not the tallest soldier in the British Army, certainly the tallest divisional commander, 
Major-General C.M. Barber, who, in view of his length, with typical army humour was  
naturally nicknamed ‘Tiny’. 
Dawn patrols on 13 September discovered that the enemy had pulled back. After 
learning that the Germans had cleared the area south of the Maas-Scheldt Canal, 
Barber decided to repeat the tactics that had paid so well in crossing the Seine on 27 
august, barely a fortnight before. He wanted once more to dispense with a set-piece 
battle, the traditional approach in Twenty-First Army Group, but rather operate by 
stealth.642 This meant that he would do without an extensive reconnaissance, build-
up of ammunition and all the other ingredients that normally preceded a river 
crossing. By doing so he was taking a calculated risk. Both the 44th and 227th 
Brigades were ordered to push on to the canal and see if they could get across. In 
the sector assigned to the 44th Brigade there was one road-bridge at Ten Aard and 
another one at Lock 7. For the 227th Brigade there was one road-bridge, at Donk. 
This was in fact the same as that used by 559 and Von der Heydte during their 
withdrawal twenty-four hours earlier. Anticipating success, each of the brigades was 
followed by a field company of the Royal Engineers ready to construct one Class 9 
and one Class 40 bridge as soon as crossings had been secured.  
Brigadier J.C. Cockburn (44th Brigade) decided to send two battalions along the two 
roads running out of Geel. The 8th Royal Scots (Lane Joynt) followed the road to 
Turnhout where Chill had his headquarters, seventeen kilometres away. At the same 
time the 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) under Lieutenant-Colonel C.W.P. 
Richardson would advance up the road to Retie to the right of the Royal Scots. Late 
in the afternoon both battalions were nearing the canal. On the Retie road the 6th 
KOSB were held up by a roadblock for some time and they did not reach the canal 
until eleven p.m. The bridge was blown, but the lock gates with a small bridge were 
only partially destroyed and it looked as if that might even take tanks. The Royal 
Scots arrived a little earlier at Ten Aard. They, too, found that both the road-bridge 
and the bypass had been destroyed. Both battalion commanders held an ‘O’ group. It 
started to rain and it was pitch-black. In the spirit of Barber’s orders they decided to 
try and cross the canal during that very night. 
Meanwhile the 227th Brigade had come into the bridgehead to extend it eastwards, 
an easy task since the Germans had just cleared the area. The 10th Highland Light 
Infantry (HLI) under Lieutenant-Colonel D.R. Morgan occupied Mol to the usual 
scenes of cheering civilians. After 10th HLI had established a firm base in and around 
Mol the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. 
Tweedie passed through at top speed riding on the Shermans of B Squadron 3rd/4th 
CLY. They reached the canal at Donk, a hamlet south of Dessel, as it grew dark. 
They need not have hurried because the bridge there had also been blown and the 
site was well covered by German troops. The Argylls dug in and at last light the tanks 
withdrew.  
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Worries 
Facing the Scots behind the Maas-Scheldt Canal from Herentals to Luyksgestel was 
Kampfgruppe Chill. Although following the withdrawal he had had to give up his best 
formations, the bulk of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 and 559 (see Chapter 3.4), he 
was compensated for this loss. Chill was still in command of a sizeable force. As 
noted in the previous chapter, besides his own troops, he still had Grenadier-
Regiment 723, I./FJR 2, II./FJR 6 and Kampfgruppe Dreyer (although since the 
struggle for Geel Flieger-Regimente 51 and 53 were mere shadows of their former 
selves, having lost over half their complement). On top of that II./SS-Grenadier 
Regiment Landstorm Nederland was now transferred from the 719. to the 85. 
Infanterie-Division because Reinhard and Student correctly surmised that the Allies 
no longer wanted to push north from Antwerp, but instead intended to outflank the 
Antwerp defences by a move from Geel to Turnhout. The battalion moved from 
Oostmalle, where it had been held in reserve, via Turnhout to the area around 
Retie.643 From there it went south to the canal. It would arrive there in time, but only 
just. Early in the evening, LXXXVIII. Armeekorps received extremely alarming news: 
Oberstleutnant Schuster, Chill’s Ia, reported that British troops had crossed the 
Maas-Scheldt Canal at Lock 7. A company led by Luftwaffe Major Koch (Flieger-
Regiment 53) had pulled back and said that the British had established themselves in 
the wood north of the lock gates.644 Chill despatched two companies of Landstorm 
Nederland to plug the perceived gap. The information, however, turned out to be 
incorrect and Chill learned this by midnight.645 Reinhard, higher up the hierarchy, did 
not know yet that the report was false. The very idea of a second bridgehead across 
the canal in just two days and at the exact spot he feared it most, must have come 
as a shock. In view of this threat he decided that Chill was to receive additional units. 
In the evening Major Berlin from 1. Fallschirmarmee phoned LXXXVIII. Armeekorps 
informing them that it would receive I. and III./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und 
Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring. As the two battalions were still some 
distance from the front, I./F.E.u.A.R.H.Gö. was in Loon op Zand and 
III./F.E.u.A.R.H.Gö. was in Udenhout, both villages north of Tilburg, this took time. 
Together they were about 1,600 strong. Reinhard ordered them to Arendonk with 
the utmost celerity (‘grösster Beschleunigung’) where they were to get in touch with 
Chill who would direct them to the front and restore the situation.646 There was one 
proviso, if they were not needed, the two battalions were to be returned to LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps; a clear case of wishful thinking, as they, too, would arrive not a 
moment too soon. 
Two assaults 
Of the two battalions that reached the canal, the 6th KOSB was the first one to try 
and cross it. A Company had been ordered forward to lead. Between Geel and Lock 7 
there was a wood and unseen by the Germans they marched up the road 
accompanied only by the crunching of boots and the patter of rain dripping from the 
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leaves.647 As soon as they left the security of the woods mortars and machine-guns 
opened fire on them. It got worse after the first section had crossed the small 
bridge. This section was engaged by two 2 cm guns while 8.8 cm guns and mortars 
opened fire on the rest of A company. It was clear that a trap had been set by 
II./SS-Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland which had arrived in the nick of 
time to cover this obvious crossing-place. The section that had crossed was isolated, 
two soldiers were killed and the rest, except for one, were taken prisoner. Moreover, 
the company commander, Major Duncan Rollo, was mortally wounded when he tried 
to sort out the situation and the exhausted Borderers could only lie behind the dyke, 
up to their waists in water. It was clear that the attempt to cross had failed. But 
things would get worse. The Dutch SS-men, in the best tradition of their country 
where flooding had halted enemy invaders in the past, blew holes in the dykes on 
the south side of the canal between Locks 7 and 8 and slowly, but inevitably, the 
area south of the canal became flooded. By ten a.m. there was already sixty 
centimetres of water on the road and it was quickly spreading westward. An hour 
and a half later Lieutenant-Colonel Richardson was forced to pull his battalion back 
about a kilometre, through half a metre of water. 
The second assault, by the 8th Royal Scots, took place around the time the 6th KOSB 
sank down exhausted after their failed attempt. Since all the bridges at Ten Aard had 
been completely destroyed, this crossing was made using assault-boats. Lieutenant-
Colonel Lane Joynt had decided not to cross in the obvious place. Instead the 
crossing was to take place slightly west of Ten Aard. The battalion would then turn 
east and hopefully outflank the German defences at the bridges. Beginning at 05.30 
hours a.m. the first two companies, A and B, crossed in the face of some fire and set 
up the bridgehead. Then the other companies followed. They went straight east to 
clear the big factory building on the canal, the Bloemmolens, which dominated the 
village. 648 Then the 8th Royal Scots fanned out and occupied the village. The stiffest 
opposition was east of the village, from 2 cm Flak guns. It was now time to build a 
bridge and there things started to go wrong rather rapidly. 
The supporting Field Company, 279th RE, was busy trying to build a Class 9 bridge 
while the Royal Scots were taking the village. The officer in charge, Major P.T. Wood, 
decided that the lock east of Ten Aard was the best place to build a bridge quickly.  
However, when he inspected the site he found that it was covered by Spandau and 
mortar fire as well that of a 2 cm Flak gun. To save time the bridging equipment had 
been brought up under cover of the canal bank and a bulldozer set to work to make 
a ramp up the canal dyke. But then the water level began to rise and it became 
obvious that the water would overflow the southern bank. Wood decided to blow the 
gates at once. He lit the fuses and put a charge against the eastern lock gates. It 
went off and blew a hole. Next it was time to blow the western gates. It took three 
attempts before the engineers succeeded, working under fire all the time. But it was 
too late and the southern bank collapsed anyway. It was clear that this first attempt 
to construct a bridge had failed and a ferry was now necessary. But the bridgehead 
was so narrow that the ferry site was under constant fire as well. Nevertheless, a 
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much needed six-pounder was ferried across as well as some vehicles. At 22.20 
hours the ferrying stopped, just as the Germans were beginning to stir. 
When he learned of the bridgehead Chill was not unduly worried. He told LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps that he felt confident as he outnumbered the Scots in Ten Aard. 
However, the difficult terrain (completely open) made a counterattack extremely 
difficult. Speed was of the essence therefore and he would do his utmost to settle 
the affair that same night.649 Throughout the afternoon of 14 September 
Kampfgruppe Dreyer put pressure on the 8th Royal Scots and the probing attacks 
became bolder as time wore on. Two SPs, probably Jagdpanther from 1./schwere 
Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, taunted the battalion’s positions from a copse 
northwest of the village. They parked themselves just a hundred and fifty metres 
away and fired at any movement until British artillery fire eventually drove them 
away.650 These Jagdpanther were the only two operational ones at the time.651 
The real counterattack started at ten p.m. and it came in three waves. Chill now sent 
in the only fresh reserve he had. Since III./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-
Regiment Hermann Göring under Major Werner Krahmer, was the battalion equipped 
with Flak and artillery he ordered that to set up around Retie while I./Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring, the infantry battalion 
under Hauptmann Johann Wimmer, was flung straight into the cauldron at Ten Aard. 
In a kind of modern day Trojan horses Wimmer’s where transported in buses which 
drove up to a point about two hundred metres north of the road and the by-pass 
junction. Before the startled Royal Scots could call down artillery fire the 
Fallschirmjäger were already running down the road, killing or capturing most of the 
Royal Scots forward platoon.652 The attack was so fierce that it was only halted about 
a hundred metres from the canal bank. The last attack of the day came in from the 
west and was again supported by two Jagdpanther. One was hit by a PIAT with 
unknown results, but once again a platoon of the Royal Scots was overcome. The 
fighting went on and lasted until the early hours of 15 September. The German 
troops were unable to push the Royal Scots across the canal, but they had inflicted 
severe losses and the bridgehead had now shrunk to just two hundred by seventy 
metres.  
Coming to a head 
As dawn broke on 15 September the Royal Scots were hanging on to their territory 
for dear life. The situation was confusing in the extreme as the German troops held 
positions in the bridgehead intermingled with those of the Royal Scots. However, at 
ten a.m. Wimmer’s Fallschirmjäger disengaged so that their own artillery could 
bombard the tiny bridgehead. At least it would be easier now for Brigadier Cockburn 
to send in reinforcements. However, as a result of the flooding the 6th Royal Scots 
Fusiliers (RSF) under Lieutenant-Colonel I. Mackenzie, who were supposed to have 
crossed on 14 September had to wait a full twenty-four hours, until they could go 
over to the north bank in assault boats. Finally, at noon the 6th RSF started to go 
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across between the bridge and the by-pass slightly to the east of the constricted 
bridgehead. They then moved up on both sides of the street until they reached the 
junction and the village was once again in Allied hands.  
In spite of his bravado the evening before, Chill was apparently growing increasingly 
concerned that the troops he had at his disposal might not be able to prevent the 
Scots from breaking out of their bridgehead. Through Reinhard he asked 1. 
Fallschirmarmee for III./FJR 6 which he would then place at Kasterlee to stop any 
breakthrough from Ten Aard.653 Student turned down the request, no doubt because 
he did not wish to weaken the cordon round Joe’s Bridge after the failed attack the 
day before (Chapter 3.4). Reinhard did, however, order two heavy batteries from the 
719. I.D. to support Kampfgruppe Dreyer. 654 These were already being moved east 
anyway as Sievers (719. I.D.) wanted to prevent his left flank from being rolled up 
and therefore had ordered two batteries to switch to this side of his sector. In total 
Chill could now call on eight batteries comprising 29 heavy and 21 medium guns.655 
Reinhard also ordered Siever’s division to set up a security screen of 7.5 cm Pak 
around Turnhout in case Allied armour should break out from Ten Aard which is what 
Chill feared could happen the following day.656 Obviously Chill was really worried that 
afternoon, so worried in fact that in addition to Hauptmann Wimmer’s I./ Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring  he had also ordered 
elements of II. and III./GR 723 up to cordon off the bridgehead.  
Chill’s Ia, Oberstleutnant Schuster, sent in an anxious report to LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps in the afternoon saying that the situation at Ten Aard was coming to a 
head (‘sich verschärft’).657 He need not have worried. Even as this report was being 
processed Wimmer’s Fallschirmjäger counterattacked. They suffered appalling losses, 
but they managed to push the Scots back for the second time, particularly west of 
the main road. Scottish losses were high, too. Maybe they were added to by an 
atrocity that was committed that day. According to a Fallschirmjäger who was later 
taken prisoner, one Leutnant Neumann took charge of about twenty Scottish soldiers 
who had been surprised sheltering in a house. While marching them back he was 
heard to mutter ‘Why should I bother with this shit?’ He took his MP and then shot all 
of them cold blood. About four hours later Neumann himself was killed.658 Whether 
the story happened exactly this way or not, it is certainly indicative of the bitter 
nature of this forgotten battle. The bridgehead had, once again, shrunk to almost 
nothing. The Scots only managed to hold on because all of the divisional artillery 
now mercilessly pounded the German lines. To assist the beleaguered battalions 
Second Tactical Air Force put in a rare appearance. Eight Typhoon fighter-bombers 
of 247 Squadron took off from Melsbroek, Brussels, just after four p.m. and attacked 
artillery positions near Lichtaart firing 64 rocket projectiles on to the target area. 
Almost three hours later the same number of Typhoons of 182 Squadron put up a 
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repeat performance near Kasterlee.659 The brief lull this created was used to feed still 
more Scottish troops into the cauldron.  
At six p.m. the 6th KOSB, who had made the failed attempt to cross at Lock 7 the 
day before, now went across to expand the bridgehead north- and westward. They 
arrived amidst scenes of confusion. The Borderers entered Ten Aard in the middle of 
another counterattack by Wimmer’s battalion and found the other two battalions 
fighting for their lives. In the circumstances the plan for the 6th KOSB and the 6th 
RSF to undertake a coordinated attack had to be abandoned. Brigadier Cockburn was 
also assigned a battalion of the 46th Brigade, the 2nd Glasgow Highlanders 
(Lieutenant-Colonel P.U. Campbell), to reinforce the bridgehead. It was assembling 
south of the canal as the 6th KOSB went across. In view of the constriction in the 
bridgehead, Cockburn decided that they should stay where they were until the 
situation had improved. Hopefully a bridge would be ready soon. Unfortunately this 
turned out not to be the case. Lieutenant-Colonel Wood (279th RE), had told his men 
to convert the raft of folding-boat equipment into a bridge. However, the German 
guns were zeroed in on the ferry site and they secured one direct hit after another 
on the raft, reducing it bit by bit until it sank at ten p.m. Braving the fire, the sappers 
salvaged as much of the equipment as they could. It was too dark now to carry on. 
That same day Field-Marshal Montgomery visited the divisional headquarters in Geel. 
He was there to present medals to various officers, a regular event for Montgomery 
and one designed to maintain morale, one of the two foundations of the Field-
Marshal’s operational thinking.660 The Recce Regiment provided the guard of honour. 
Montgomery commented, ’I can say that there is no one to beat the 15th Scottish 
Division today. I hope, too, that this news will get home to Scotland (…) that I came 
here today and told you that the 15th Scottish Division had done magnificently.’661 
Words to inspire and boost morale, but it must still have been a rather bizarre event 
for the Scottish officers, having a mess dinner with all the trimmings in Geel, while 
some of their comrades lay dying amidst bloody chaos just three kilometres up the 
road. 
Seesaw 
In the early morning of 16 September the bridgehead had increased to its biggest 
size yet, about seven hundred by six hundred metres, extending to just beyond the 
junction of the old and the new by-pass road. Certainly this was the right moment to 
ferry the 2nd Glasgow Highlanders across. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell’s battalion 
was to advance up the road and capture the bridge over the Witte Nete about a 
kilometre from Ten Aard. Once the bridge was secured the 46th Brigade should have 
a clear run to Turnhout as the completely open terrain offered no real opportunity for 
defence. However, Kampfgruppe Dreyer still had the initiative. Hauptmann Wimmer’s 
battalion counterattacked again from the direction of Kasterlee at 08.30 hours.662 
The 6th KOSB were hit hardest. The attack was beaten off, but the Borderers were 
pushed back towards the canal and the bridgehead shrunk for the third time. The 
most forward positions of the 6th KOSB were now round about Sint-Hubertus church. 
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It also ruled out any advance towards Kasterlee and the Glasgow Highlanders were 
told to stay south of the canal. The fighting went on all the day while once more the 
engineers attempted to build a more permanent link across the canal. Again the 
Royal Air Force tried to help out. Three squadrons from 124 Wing took off from 
Melsbroek just before four p.m. A total of twenty-three Typhoon fighter-bombers 
from 137, 182 and 247 Squadrons strafed German battery and mortar positions in 
the triangle Lichtaart-Kasterlee-Turnhout silencing them at least for a while.663 
Being unaware that he had just sucessfully blocked an attack towards Turnhout, Chill 
reported somewhat despondently to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps that Wimmer’s battalion 
had been unable to annihilate the brigehead and it looked as if the Scots might be 
preparing a counterattack.664 He had to come up with a new plan. Artillery fire had 
so far prevented Wimmer’s men from ejecting the Scots from Ten Aard and Chill felt 
that two could play that game. He told Reinhard over the phone that he now had 
twelve batteries at his disposal and was fairly sure that this should be enough to 
prevent the Scots from breaking out.665 Accordingly his intention was to limit the 
attacks and instead concentrate on sealing off the bridgehead and use artillery and 
attacks on a limited scale to keep the Scots occupied. He ordered III./GR 723 to 
extend its front and assist to the east of the village. Chill’s tactics appeared to work 
and in the evening he was a bit more optimistic.666 The Scots in Ten Aard still 
occupied the church and factory area but they were in no position to break out. Chill 
hoped to compress the bridgehead even further, but there was only so much that he 
could do with the troops at his disposal. It was clear that Hauptmann Wimmer’s I./ 
Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring was at the end 
of its tether; many officers and NCOs had been killed and the young recruits were no 
longer up to serious attacks. Hence Chill ordered I./FJR 2 to extend its front and thus 
managed to create a reserve, albeit a small one, of just one company. This would 
have to do. The main purpose now was to keep the bridgehead as small as possible 
and prevent the Scots from putting a bridge in place by constantly bringing down a 
rain of shells. So far, the artillery had done its best in this respect. The only problem 
was that ammunition was beginning to run low and bringing up new stocks would be 
hard, especially for the exotic schwere Feld Haubitze 414 (f) (ex-french Canon de 
155 C M-17) as the only stocks left were along the Dutch coast (near Alkmaar). Once 
these were exhausted the guns would be useless.  
It is obvious that artillery played a key role in this battle. The only thing preventing 
the Scots from breaking out was the German artillery. The only reason the Scottish 
battalions inside the bridgehead survived were the defensive fire (DF) tasks from the 
divisional artillery around Geel, nine batteries with a total of 72 guns. They had one 
Forward Observer in the church spire and another on top of the Bloemmolens factory 
roof who could pinpoint the artillery and use it with devastating effect even though 
they were constantly fired on themselves. One phone call from any of the 
beleaguered companies was sufficient to bring shells crashing down on the 
advancing Germans.667 It was enough, but only just. Realizing that the battle for Ten 
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Aard was getting nowhere, General Barber the day before had decided to try and 
break the deadlock by making another crossing further east. It might relieve the 
pressure on the 44th Brigade if the attention of Kampfgruppe Chill was diverted 
elsewhere.  
This diversionary attack was to be undertaken by the 227th Brigade (Brigadier E.C. 
Colville). Colville, who had received the DSO from Montgomery in Geel only the 
previous day, assigned the mission to the 2nd Gordon Highlanders under Lieutenant-
Colonel J.R. Sinclair. They were to establish the second bridgehead west of Donk. 
After the 2nd Gordons had successfully crossed the 10th HLI was to follow and 
secure Dessel on the other side. The crossing was to be made by means of barges 
and planks. While studying air photos Sinclair discovered that the map he had, 
contained many errors. In fact, the position chosen for the crossing entailed the 
crossing of not one, but two canals with a strip of land in between. Still, as the first 
one was packed with barges this should not be too difficult and the operation was to 
begin before first light on 16 September. The crossing started off well enough. 
Bargees, living on the barges with their families, assisted C Company and it reached 
the ‘island’ without mishap followed by B and D Companies. But it was now 06.30 
hours and dawn was breaking. Moving down to the lock where they would cross the 
second canal the lead companies were spotted. The Dutch SS-men along this stretch 
of the canal, II./SS-Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland, were wide awake 
now. Heavy Spandau and mortar fire rained down on the Gordons. Eventually 8.8 cm 
guns joined in and the 2nd Gordons were pinned to the ground. At noon Colville 
decided to abandon the operation and the battalion was pulled back as far as 
Achterbos, leaving C Company on the ‘island’. They spent a long day in their 
trenches until they were withdrawn as soon as darkness fell.  
At the end of the day the situation in Ten Aard was back to where it was on the first 
day, a stalemate. The only difference was that now there were three battalions 
inside the village instead of one. After three days the 8th Royal Scots were no more 
than a shadow of their former selves and Brigadier Cockburn decided to get them 
out of the bridgehead as soon as possible. This could not be done during the night as 
the fighting continually flared up, but early the following morning, at 06.30 hours, 
the exhausted Royal Scots were finally pulled out. They had lost a staggering 230 
officers and men. 
A change of plans 
Sunday 17 September was a day of plans. Barber realised that he still needed to 
come up with something to break the deadlock. The new solution he came up with 
was operation Flood.668 The idea was to enlarge the bridgehead by ordering the 
227th Brigade to make new crossings immediately to the right and left of Ten Aard 
early the following day. Planning began that morning. However, XII Corps, 
Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie, decided differently. Ritchie’s Corps was supposed to 
protect the left flank of XXX Corps after its breakout from the Neerpelt bridgehead. 
But because of  the fierce resistance at Ten Aard the 15th Division was clearly 
getting nowhere and Ritchie decided to develop the main axis of advance the 
following day from a new bridgehead further east, north of Lommel. This task was 
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assigned to the 53rd (Welsh) Division. Operation Flood was cancelled and the 15th 
Division was merely told to maintain pressure at Ten Aard, build a Class 9 bridge 
there and hold the canal line from Geel eastwards.669 Therefore even the stalemate 
they had managed to create was an important tactical and operational victory for 
Kampfgruppe Chill. The western sector, held by the 46th Brigade, would be taken 
over by the 7th Armoured Division. At noon Barber held an ‘O’ Group in Geel. In view 
of the new orders he instructed the 227th Brigade to take over from the 44th Brigade 
that night. As soon as this move had been completed, the 227th Brigade was to 
break out of the bridgehead while the 46th and 44th Brigades covered the canal line. 
It was a somewhat optimistic instruction in the light of recent events. The first move 
was made after dark when the 2nd Argylls were ferried across. The bridgehead was 
extended eastward slightly. Counterattacks kept coming in regularly, as ordered by 
Chill, to keep the Scots busy, and just as regularly they were beaten off with the help 
of the artillery.  
It is extremely ironical that Operation Flood was cancelled, just when it might have 
succeeded. Precisely because Market Garden had begun, the German commanders 
had bigger worries from the afternoon of 17 September. Units such as I. and III./GR 
723 as well as artillery and every reserve there was, were sent east to plug the holes 
created by the breakout of XXX Corps and XII Corps. Kampfgruppe Chill was soon 
threatened from that side and it was no longer as strong as it had been. Still, that 
morning before the storm burst Chill did not have an inkling of what was about to 
happen and neither did any of the other German commanders. There was also a 
conference between Reinhard and Dreyer.670 It was evident that things were not 
going the way Dreyer wanted them to. Several battalion commanders accused each 
other of shirking. Reinhard was forced (as at Beringen on 6 September) to warn the 
officers of GR 723 that the honour of their regiment was at stake. In view of the 
crippling losses his Kampfgruppe had sustained Dreyer proposed to attack only after 
dark from then on. Reinhard concurred and assigned one company of II./SS-
Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland to Dreyer to make up for the losses. Soon 
after that the Allied airborne landings began and Reinhard had other things to worry 
about. 
Also that day Oberst Fritz Fullriede, commanding officer of Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- 
und Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring, decided to inspect his troops.671 He left 
Utrecht early in the morning but because of Allied air attacks it took him a long time 
to get anywhere near the front. The first stop was at III. Bataillon whose 
headquarters were in Pomfort near Retie. Fullriede arrived in the early afternoon just 
as airborne troops were passing overhead. The Flak there was fully engaged in a fire 
fight with Allied planes. He then drove on to the front line south of Kasterlee where 
trees were blocking the road and inspected Wimmer’s I. Bataillon. Next he went to 
Bakel where he found what was left of II. Bataillon after the rest had been wiped out 
in Hechtel. Fullriede returned to Utrecht late in the evening, appaled by the mess 
(‘Durcheinander’) that he had come across. 
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The end 
At 07.30 hours on Monday 18 September another battalion of the 44th Brigade, the 
6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, began to pull out of Ten Aard. The move was completed at 
eleven a.m.  Only the 6th KOSB and the 2nd Argylls were now left inside the 
bridgehead. In compliance with Dreyer’s instructions his Kampfgruppe spent the day 
shelling the village and the first attack went in just as it began to grow dark at six 
p.m. There were, in fact, three attacks, two from the west against the 6th KOSB and 
one from the north against the 2nd Argylls. A few hundred infantry supported by two 
SPs –probably the Jagdpanther of 1./559- attacked the latter’s positions on the 
northern tip of the bridgehead. The forward platoon was in danger of being wiped 
out, but once again the Scots’ artillery came to the rescue and when the attackers 
were no more than fifty metres from the forward positions they fell back in disorder. 
These were the only attempts made that day and after they petered out around ten 
p.m. it was finally the turn of the 6th KOSB to leave the bloody cauldron. They had 
beaten off thirteen attacks.672 For the last time they stumbled over corpses down the 
street to the canal where assault boats were waiting for them. They handed their 
sector over to the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and this ended the responsibility of the 
44th Brigade for the bridgehead. Losses had been appalling. The brigade had lost 24 
officers and 514 other ranks of whom 9 officers and 134 other ranks were killed. It 
had been a bloodbath, for the Germans as well, since the number of killed ran as 
high as about 200, no fewer than 94 from I./ Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und 
Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring and 100 from Flieger Regiment 51 and 53. 
These two regiments had been bled white. Tragically, the village which had been so 
hotly contested for almost a week, at the same time had lost its significance. 
The following evening, 19 September, the 10th HLI joined the other two battalions in 
Ten Aard and the whole of the 227th Brigade was now inside the bridgehead. The 
day saw a repeat performance of the 18th. All day long German guns shelled the 
village and at last light another counterattack was launched. This was not as strong 
or determined as the previous one and it quickly broke up. It was a repeat in every 
sense: during the night another fruitless attempt was made to build a Class-9 bridge. 
Meanwhile Lieutenant-General Ritchie and Major-General Barber were considering 
two options. One was to keep on trying to advance through Ten Aard to Turnhout, 
the other was to use the bridgehead at Lommel, which the 53rd (Welsh) Division had 
established during the evening of the 17th. From there the 15th (Scottish) Division 
could advance to Boxtel and ‘s-Hertogenbosch. It was eventually decided to adopt 
the latter plan, called Operation Box, because the enemy’s resistance appeared to be 
much less tenacious there.  
The bridgehead had now outlived its usefulness and Barber decided to evacuate it 
during the night. The German commanders were not aware of this and as before 
they still feared an attack on Turnhout. In his daily summary Reinhard said that since 
his troops, Chill among them, now had so few units that ‘Angriffe aus Brückenkopf 
Aart (…) kaum nachhaltig abgewehrt werden können.’673 The same sentiment was 
expressed on 20 September. When Chill mentioned his fears that he could only 
contain the bridgehead for one more day General Krebs (Chef des Generalstabes 
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Heeresgruppe B) made it clear that that needed to be at least another forty-eight 
hours.674 To make matters worse, that afternoon Hauptmann Wimmer was wounded 
severely.675 Hauptmann Westphal took over. Chill felt that I./ Fallschirm Panzer 
Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring now had to be pulled out because 
without its inspiring Kommandeur it might fall apart. Reinhard agreed. To make up 
for it Feld Ersatz Bataillon 1719 was to move from Kampfgruppe Zuber at Reusel to 
Kampfgruppe Chill at Ten Aard. It was to be transferred that night. Reinhard still 
feared that the Scots might break out towards Turnhout. Unbeknownst to him the 
227th Brigade had begun to evacuate the bridgehead the same time FEB 1719 was 
marching towards it. The tricky operation started at 22.15 hours and was completed 
by midnight. The long ordeal for the Scots was over. The following day German 
troops entered Ten Aard and found it abandoned. They captured some equipment 
that had been left behind.676  
In the morning of 21 September Reinhard’s Chief of Staff, Oberst Eichert-Wiersdorff, 
was summoned to Student’s headquarters in Vught.677 There he learned that 
Generalfeldmarschall Model among other things agreed that LXXXVIII. Armeekorps 
had permission to fall back behind the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal if it needed to, in 
order to free units for the battle against the British troops west of Eindhoven. 
Eichert-Wiersdorff countered that this move would not really free units as the main 
problem was and remained the open terrain west of the Valkenswaard-Eindhoven 
road which was difficult to defend. Student replied that such a move would at least 
gain them some time, although naturally the Führer would have the last say before 
permission was definitely granted. Upon return to his headquarters Eichert-
Wiersdorff met with Reinhard and the Chief of Staff of 15. Armee, Generalleutnant 
Hoffmann. Reinhard disagreed with Eichert-Wiersdorf and decided it would be 
unwise to wait too long lest the retreat turn into a rout. Hoffmann agreed with 
Reinhard. The die was cast and it was decided to begin disengaging the troops along 
the Maas-Scheldt Canal the following evening, 22 September, as soon as it was dark. 
The move would have to be completed the next morning. Thus the bridgehead at 
Ten Aard was abandoned by the 15th Division just as their opponents were also on 
the point of giving up!  
The order also meant that the Jagdpanther of 1./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559 were on the move again. Leaving their stations near Turnhout they 
were called upon to fulfil an important mission, help the 59. Infanterie-Division break 
through to the bridge at Veghel in order to stop the Allied advance on Arnhem (see 
Chapter 3.4).   
Failure or success? 
The Scots had fought long and with great tenacity for a bridgehead that ultimately 
was given up. In the end this was due to the vicious circle that could not be broken, 
namely that “of being unable to build the bridge until the bridgehead was expanded 
sufficiently to deny to the enemy observation on to the building site, and at the same 
                                        
674 KTB OB West, 20.09.44, 19.00 hours. 
675 KTB 88 AK, 20.09.44, 17.10 hours. 
676 KTB 88 AK, 21.09.44, 12.15 and 12.50 hours.  
677 KTB 88 AK, 21.09.44, 11.30 hours. 
 154 
time of being unable to expand the bridgehead until the bridge was built…”.678 That 
still leaves the question: had the ferocious battle for Ten Aard been a wasteful 
exercise for the British or not? Lieutenant-General Ritchie (XII Corps) thought it had 
been useful. On 19 September he sent a letter to Barber.679 In this he said that 
Horrocks (XXX Corps) thought capturing Ten Aard had greatly helped Market Garden. 
Horrocks contributed the rapidity with which his troops had broken out of their 
bridgehead at De Kolonie to the fact that “a very great proportion of the German’s 
available resources had been drawn against the 15th (Scottish) Division front.” In 
this way, according to Horrocks, the success of Market Garden owed “a lot to what 
the 15th Scottish Division had achieved and the threat that you have developed 
against the enemy, thus forcing him to move his reserves from the vital place.”  
That seems a typical case of morale boosting and wishful thinking, since it was 
basically just one battalion, I./ Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment 
Hermann Göring, that had tipped the scales and prevented the Scots from expanding 
the bridgehead. In addition the deadlock continued even after the start of operation 
Market Garden when Chill had been forced to send two battalions of Grenadier-
Regiment 723 east to counter the new threat. There is a case for putting it the other 
way round. Because the iron cordon around Ten Aard could not be broken open, XII 
Corps did not have a bridgehead and hence could not adequately fulfil its part in 
Market Garden, covering the west flank of the advance of XXX Corps. This, in very a 
real way, contributed to the failure of Market Garden. 
Conclusion 
Once again Chill and Dreyer had triumphed over their opponents, this time even 
more dramatically than at Geel. The circumstances, terrain and weather, had been 
working in their favour. On the other hand, they had less artillery, no tanks (and only 
two Jagdpanther), little ammunition and a hodgepodge of troops. This success was 
also quite an achievement since the strength of Kampfgruppe Chill was far below 
what it had been just a week earlier. On 17 September Chill commanded just four 
battalions of which one was strong, four were average and two were in tatters, 
giving him about 1,500 men.680 Admittedly this time the sector covered by the 
Kampfgruppe was just thirty-five kilometres (Herentals to Lommel), but that still 
came out to one man every twenty-three metres, a far from comfortable situation. 
Both Chill and Dreyer had simply managed both engagements very skilfully by 
making maximum use of what resources available to them had and by continually 
counterattacking they had kept the Scots off balance all the time. In another sense 
the battle for Ten Aard was also a replay of the battle for Geel. Just as the 
Kampfgruppe had pulled back a day after taking Geel, so it was now ordered to pull 
out of Ten Aard and fall back behind the next canal. However, like the battle for 
Geel, the fight for Ten Aard was a tactical victory for the Germans with operational 
consequences for the Allies. The 15th (Scottish) Division was unable to break out of 
the bridgehead (Operation Flood), capture Turnhout and advance on Tilburg, rolling 
up the whole of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps right wing covering Antwerp and 
consequently the Scots could not block the escape route of 15. Armee just as its 
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divisions were entering the mainland, or prevent them from becoming involved in the 
Brabant side of Operation Market Garden. Also as a result XII Corps was slow in 
securing the left flank of Market Garden in effect preventing more Allied troops from 
reaching Nijmegen. This was the result of the highly successful defence conducted 
by Kampfgruppe Chill. After the start of Operation Market Garden, Chill and his 
subordinate commanders would once more need their professional skills in the 
battles to come. Even as they were pulling back behind the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal 
on the night of 22/23 September they had been anxiously watching their left flank 
for five days. Here Market Garden was unfolding and this was where the decision for 
the immediate future would be made. 
 
3.4. Market Garden (11 – 26 September 1944) 
 
“These airmen were heroes.”681 
“A tank that is mortally hit belches forth long searing tongues of orange flame from every 
hatch. As ammunition explodes in the interior, the hull is racked by violent convulsions and 
sparks erupt from the spout of the barrel like the fireballs of a Roman candle. (…) When the 
inferno subsides, gallons of lubricating oil in the power train and hundreds of pounds of 
rubber on the tracks and bogey wheels continue to burn, spewing dense clouds of black 
smoke over the funeral pyre.”682 
 
While Geel was being retaken and the fighting there reached a climax the German 
higher command had another worry, a bigger ‘pebble in their shoes’, the new 
bridgehead across the Maas-Scheldt Canal at Neerpelt. The capture of ‘Joe’s Bridge’ 
by the Irish Guards on Sunday 10 September presented them with a major problem, 
literally overnight. That is, once they found out, which was not the case right away. 
Panic  
Brigadier N.W. Gwatkin, the CO of the 5th Guards Armoured Brigade, after learning 
of the capture of the bridge, had originally intended to launch two groups, the 
Grenadier and Coldstream Guards, to cross over at first light on 11 September and 
break out towards Eindhoven. However, the Corps Commander, Horrocks, cancelled 
this order. It is clear that he did not wish to draw the attention of the Germans to 
this all-important bridgehead because operation Market Garden (the decision had 
only been taken the day before) was to be kept secret for as long as possible. As a 
result it was just a few companies of the Irish Guards who were at the bridge as 
dawn broke. They were extremely surprised after they had seized the bridge that 
there was no response, not the usual counterattack, no small-arms fire, nothing.683 
The reason was that the Germans had no idea the bridge had been lost until more 
than four hours after the event. Amazingly the first inkling that the German 
commanders had of the new bridgehead was when Oberst Halberstadt, Kommandeur 
of the 18. Flakbrigade 684, reported to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps at 1.10 a.m. that the 
Flak group at Neerpelt bridge had been defeated and that tanks had crossed the 
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bridge.685 The Chief of Staff, Oberst Eichert-Wiersdorff, immediately got in touch with 
his counterpart at 1. Fallschirmarmee, Major Berlin. Eichert-Wiersdorf had two 
important questions, first whether the bridge (consistently referred to as Broeseind 
by the Germans) could still be blown and second whether the Armee had any troops 
to engage against the bridge. While waiting for the answers from 1. Fallschirmarmee, 
Eichert-Wiersdorff ordered Halberstadt to bring up Flak units from further back. Not 
waiting for an answer he also summoned Oberstleutnant Kuske, Stabsoffizier der 
Pioniere LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, to go to the engineer battalion of  the 85. Infanterie-
Division and form an attack group. They were to try and blow up the bridge so 
British tanks could no longer cross it. To add insult to injury, twenty minutes later 
there was another report with even worse news. Hauptmann Wagner who had been 
despatched by Eichert-Wiersdorff to find out what was going on, reported back from 
Valkenswaard (about twelve kilometres from the bridge), ‘Es strömt alles zurück, 
Sturmgeschützbesatzungen, Pioniere, Flakbedienungen, Feldersatz-Batl. Offiziere 
nicht auf zu finden. Der Engländer ist mit 3 Panzern und Infanterie über den Kanal 
bei der Brücke nördlich Helchteren (Broeseind).’686  
The report established that obviously panic had set in. Certainly the unit responsible 
for the stretch west from Neerpelt, Feld Ersatz Battalion 347, was indeed on the run. 
The Kommandeur, Hauptmann Sick, was found by Reinhard himself in Westerhoven, 
ten kilometres from the canal in the early afternoon.687 He was told in no uncertain 
terms to go back at once. But by then the damage had already been done. The hasty 
retreat had all the ingredients of a nightmare scenario and if the Maas-Scheldt Canal 
had been crossed by the Allies it meant that all the efforts along the Albert Canal to 
stop the Allied advance, providing the Wehrmacht with its first breathing space in a 
month, had been in vain. It seemed as if the Allied juggernaut was on the move 
again. The significance of the bridgehead was not lost on Student. As early as 9 
September, LXXXVIII. Armeekorps had predicted that one of the axes along which it 
expected the Allied forces to advance was towards Arnhem and Wesel, a remarkably 
educated guess.688 Ten minutes after Wagner’s report, 1.40 a.m., 1. Fallschirmarmee 
ordered schwere Panzerjäger–Abteilung 559 to pull out of the line and hunt for tanks 
that had broken through. The order did not make any sense as the Jagdpanther of 1. 
Kompanie were still engaged in battle at Geel and the Sturmgeschütze of 2. and 3. 
Kompanie were south of the canal near Lommel. There was no way the order could 
be carried out and it was soon to be rescinded. However, it shows the nervous state 
of mind on the German side that night. 
It was clearly time to quell the panic once and for all. At 1.50 a.m. Wagner was told 
to get in touch with the Ortskommandant in Eindhoven, Hauptmann Schürmann, set 
up a defence and halt everyone that was still on the run. He was also told to 
summarily shoot any soldiers that tried to dodge their orders. This was not an easy 
task as Schürmann only had a mixed batch of about a hundred men, nearly half of 
them from a baker’s company.689 There are no records of deserters being shot, but 
during the day Schürmann did manage to have the bridges at Aalst and 
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Valkenswaard prepared for demolition.690 At 2.30 a.m. Student finally confirmed the 
orders for a counterattack. The Neerpelt bridge was to be retaken from the south. 
The mission was assigned to Chill. When this news was passed on to Chill, fifteen 
minutes later, he said that he had already taken the initial steps to implement the 
new assignment, which in view of his previous record rings true. However, at the 
same time Chill made it clear that time was at a premium and that he very much 
wondered if it was possible to start the counterattack before dawn of 11 
September.691 
Take the bridge 
After Wagner had given the original order for 559 to counterattack with all of its SPs 
he must have begun to realize that pulling the Jagdpanther out of Geel, where they 
were still in support of Kampfgruppe Dreyer, was not really feasible. So they were 
left out of Chill’s plan of attack. Chill assigned the mission to Hauptmann Leopold von 
Hütz, another of his energetic and outstanding officers. Von Hütz had received the 
Ritterkreuz only six days earlier, on 5 September.692 As mentioned earlier he had 
received the reward because of his bravery as Kommandeur of III./Grenadier 
Regiment 1054 during the battle for Potigny. Red-haired Von Hütz, at twenty-six was 
already a seasoned veteran in every sense of the word as he was one of the lucky 
few to be flown out of the Stalingrad pocket as late as 19 January 1943. He had only 
three fingers on his right hand, a permanent reminder of wounds received there.693 
He was described as a ‘Passionierter Soldat, ausgesprochene Führerpersönlichkeit. 
Hervorragend in der Fürsorge für die Truppe.’694 But Von Hütz was not just a young 
diehard, he was an extremely complex character as, in contrast to what is suggested 
by the above, he openly listened to the English radio, refused to give the Hitler salute 
and was even connected to the 20 July plot to kill the Führer.695 Also, he transferred 
to the Fallschirmjäger soon after and eventually would take over II./FJR 6. 
Assembling the remaining Sturmgeschütze of 2. and 3./559 in the dark took some 
time.696 They were still some distance from the bridge and also needed to find the 
infantry that was to accompany them. These were all from 14., 15. and 16. 
Kompanie, IV./FJR 6 (the heavy weapons battalion led by Hauptmann Dobbeler). All 
of these men were more or less stragglers who had lost touch with their battalion for 
the moment and two score were being roped in by the fearless Von Hütz to join in 
the attack.697 Although information about the enemy was scarce he knew that time 
was rapidly running out.   
While Von Hütz was getting ready, LXXXVIII. Armeekorps despatched three junior 
officers to find out exactly what was going on north of the Maas-Scheldt Canal.698 
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They left at 08.30 hours and did not report back until early afternoon.699 They had 
good news and bad news. The good news was that there was no enemy armour 
roaming about north of the canal, the bad news that there were very precious few 
German troops that side of the canal either. As we have seen Feld Ersatz Battalion 
347 had simply abandoned their positions. But help was on the way and in the 
meantime the British had their hands full fending off the counterattack by a small 
group of Germans south of the canal. 
Kampfgruppe von Hütz, a fancy name for what was initially a battle group of just 
four Sturmgeschütze, about forty Fallschirmjäger, a platoon of engineers to blow up 
the bridge and some towed 8.8 cm guns, was ready at 7.50 a.m.700 Chill, himself, 
energetic as ever, added to the fire power. As he saw four Sturmgeschütze, which 
had just been repaired, pass his headquarters, he personally ordered them to 
support the Kampfgruppe, thus doubling the number of Sturmgeschütze in one 
stroke.701 Like at Geel, there was a very thick fog shrouding everything in a greyish 
veil around the village of Lommel. This aided the German advance as it hid their 
movements from their opponents, but it also hindered them, because it prevented a 
proper reconnaissance. Very slowly the Sturmgeschütze moved through Lutlommel, 
only the clanking of their tracks breaking the early morning stillness. There they took 
a right turn and headed for the canal. Gradually the mist began to lift, but the last 
part of their advance was hidden by a copse along the bank of the canal.  
The Irish Guards group, like the others in the Division, had a tendency to set up their 
headquarters on a crossroads.702 Staff cars, lorries, tanks and everything else that 
was part of an armoured group headquarters were parked close together, completely 
oblivious to the fate that awaited them. They could have known of the danger facing 
them since they had just received a report from the armoured cars of A Squadron 
2nd Household Cavalry (Major D. Bowes Daly) warning them about some German 
armoured vehicles as well as infantry near De Leuken, a tiny village two kilometres 
south-west of the bridge. The Irish Guards felt that this was of no concern to them 
and they went on with their breakfasts. While A Squadron were exploring west, D 
Squadron (Major E.J.S. Ward) had assembled at the zinc factory, close to the 
crossroads, in preparation for a reconnaissance trip north. Hence, they would also 
become involved in the fracas at the crossroads. At around nine a.m. Kampfgruppe 
von Hütz was closing in on the unsuspecting Guards just south of the bridge. The 
Fallschirmjäger jumped off the Sturmgeschütze, ready for the order to advance. 
Then the group broke cover and all hell was let loose. 
Von Hütz attacks 
One of the sentries just had time to shout, ‘tanks attacking down the road,’ when the 
leading Sturmgeschütze opened fire. The first two shells crashed into the Honey 
tanks of the Reconnaissance Troop of the Irish Guards, killing seven men and 
wounding several others, among them their CO, Captain R.S. Langton. The crew of 
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the six-pounder anti-tank gun covering the 3rd Battalion’s headquarters ran to their 
positions. The commander was about to shout ‘Fire’ when an artillery officer ran 
outside and said, ‘Hold it, it may be one of ours.’703 These were his last words as the 
next shell killed both him and the crew of the six-pounder. By now everyone had 
woken up and the other six-pounders opened fire. Elsewhere confusion still reigned 
supreme. Hot metal tore through the air in both directions.  Another Guards vehicle 
that was hit almost straightaway was Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Joe’ Vandeleur’s Humber 
staff car. The vehicle was equipped with a sound system to entertain the troops by 
playing records to his troops. As a result of the explosion his records were scattered 
all over the crossroads much to Vandeleur’s dismay, but not that of his troops as 
they found his taste in music a trifle too ‘classical’.  One of the Sturmgeschütze 
managed to knock out an M10 Achilles and destroyed an AEC Matador armoured car, 
the 7.5 cm shell slicing through its gun mantlet as if it was butter. Major Peel, CO of 
No.1 Squadron and the conqueror of the bridge the day before, saw the 
Sturmgeschütz in a field only four hundred metres away. He climbed into ‘St.Patrick’, 
the Sherman of Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Vandeleur (cousin to ‘Colonel Joe’), the CO 
of the 2nd (Armoured) Irish Guards, and took aim. He hit the SP four times and set it 
alight, although a Firefly of Peel’s Squadron, shooting at the same Sturmgeschütz 
from the north side of the canal took half the credit for this. The Fallschirmjäger 
withdrew to the cover of the gardens temporarily, then renewed the attack. Major 
Peel now handed back ‘St. Patrick’ and walked from garden to garden to observe for 
Major Gordon Watson in his Sherman, ‘Ulster’. He was trying the locate the next 
Sturmgeschütz. Tragically it found him first and fired an HE shell which wounded 
Peel mortally. He was to die later that afternoon, the day after his great success 
which won him the Military Cross. 
Meanwhile the gun fire had alerted D Squadron 2nd Household Cavalry which  
became involved in the brawl. With great coolness Major Ward and the crew of his 
Staghound armoured car shot back with their puny 37-mm gun. There was no 
chance of penetrating the frontal armour of the Sturmgeschütz, but they hoped to 
distract the attention of the German SP away from the numerous soft-skinned 
vehicles long enough for a heavier gun to arrive. This was precisely what happened 
and after some tense minutes an M10 Achilles IIC belonging to the 21st Anti-Tank 
Regiment pulled into the middle of the road and destroyed the Sturmgeschütz with 
the first shot from its 17-pounder gun.  
The other Sturmgeschütze now turned right. They knocked out two more Shermans 
while Kampfgruppe von Hütz tried to storm the bridge over the fields between the 
canal and the crossroads. No matter how hard they tried, they failed to reach their 
objective because of the determined resistance of the Irish Guards. While 
manoeuvring to get in a proper firing position one of the Sturmgeschütze knocked 
down part of a house along the road to the bridge. Then, while firing its gun, it drove 
up and down the garden, accidentally crushing an improvised shelter where 
seventeen civilians were trying to find security. Twelve of them died, among them a 
father and his six children. 
                                        
703 Captain Good, CO of 374 Battery, 55th Field Regiment. 
 160 
Payback time 
Gradually the German attack petered out and by midday all was quiet again at the 
bridge. It was clear that there was no way Von Hütz’ tiny group would ever reach the 
bridge, and so the Kampfgruppe withdrew to the hamlet of De Leuken, on the 
shortest route back to Lommel, their starting point. 704 Ten Fallschirmjäger had been 
taken prisoner and 559 had lost three of its Sturmgeschütze, But the battle south of 
the canal was not quite over yet. On top of the failure Von Hütz had an added worry. 
By now the Grenadier Guards were on their way to Lommel and they threatened to 
cut off his route of retreat. The Sturmgeschütze rattled back as fast as they could, 
hoping to get there before the Grenadier Guards did. However, the first enemy 
troops they encountered were A Squadron 2nd Household Cavalry who had been out 
exploring west of the bridge. Somewhere near Lutlommel Lieutenant G.L.M. Murray 
in his AEC armoured car engaged one of the Sturmgeschütze with his 75-mm gun at 
1,400 metres. He registered a direct hit at his first attempt and scored four more in 
rapid succession when the SP was finally seen to burst into flames. It was the fourth 
Sturmgeschütz of 559 to be lost, but it would not be the final casualty of the day.  
The attack on Lommel was undertaken by a combined force composed of the King’s 
(No.1) Company of the 1st Grenadier Guards, the tallest soldiers in the British 
Army705, and  No.1 Troop, No.3 Squadron, 2nd Grenadier Guards, together with 
some M10’s and towed seventeen-pounders of the 21st Anti-Tank Regiment.706 
Captain V.P. Gibbs, the CO of the King’s Company, was to be in charge. The group 
set off from the crossroads at Karrestraterheide at 08.30 hours, stopping about a 
kilometre from Lommel to park the lorries. The infantry was to advance on foot from 
there on. Gibbs had decided to take Lommel in two stages. During the first stage the 
infantry was to advance as far as the church. As soon as those crossroads had been 
taken the M10’s and tanks would take over. While slowly advancing on Lommel, the 
Shermans of No.3 Squadron managed to knock out the fifth Sturmgeschütz of 559 
that day.707 The other three Sturmgeschütze with the remainder of Kampfgruppe von 
Hütz disappeared in the direction of Mol after which they blew up the bridge over the 
Turnhout-Hasselt Canal.708 Von Hütz was an independent spirit and had ignored 
Chill’s order ‘Lommel sei als Stützpunkt unter allen Umständen zu halten’709 and 
consequently lived to fight another day. At around 10.30 hours the Grenadier Guards 
were closing in on the village.  
Back in the village mayhem had broken out.710 Some resistance fighters had taken 
pot shots at German soldiers who had just entered the village with a couple of towed 
8.8 cm guns.711 It appears that one was actually wounded and the Germans, among 
them some Dutch speaking collaborators, furious and, no doubt anxious had 
retaliated by taking about forty Belgians hostage. They threatened to execute them if 
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the attacks continued. Ten hostages would be shot for every German. Fortunately for 
the villagers no more shots were fired and no hostages were executed. The whole 
exercise became a moot point anyway as the British attack went underway and the 
first shells crashed into the village at the end of the morning. Just after midday the 
hostages were free again. The two 8.8 cm guns were set up to cover the southern 
and eastern exits of Lommel. In vain, as Gibbs outwitted the German defences. He 
had ordered his men to turn the enemy’s flank by moving further west. Bullets and 
shells ripped through the air and the noise was devastating. But the battle was brief. 
The Grenadiers shot the German officer who appeared to be in command whereupon 
the gun crews, most of them still teenagers, left their positions. They fled back to the 
canal and safety, taking the body of their Kommandeur with them on one of the 
halftracks.  
Silence suddenly descended on the centre of the village. Then civilians poured out of 
their houses and soon the Grenadiers found themselves surrounded by cheering 
Belgians. But the battle was not over yet. A Belgian, Louis Gerrits, who had 
witnessed the withdrawal of Kampfgruppe von Hütz from his house in Lutlommel 
warned the Grenadier Guards that a column of stragglers, a halftrack towing an 8.8 
cm gun followed by a lorry and a staff car, was closing in on Lommel. The crew of 
the seventeen-pounder which had taken up position on the church square fired as 
soon as the halftrack came into view. The result was carnage. Only the staff car 
managed to get away. It was 14.30 hours and Lommel was now officially captured. 
The fighting south of the canal was over in this sector as well. All future attempts to 
annihilate the bridgehead would be undertaken from the north side of the canal.  
Changes 
Although little fighting took place, 12 September is an important date for a number 
of reasons. First, it was a turning point for the Germans south of  the Maas-Scheldt 
Canal (previous two chapters). It was the last day that any serious fighting took 
place there. From dusk German troops began to withdraw behind the Maas-Scheldt 
Canal. The area bounded by the Leopoldsburg, Albert and Maas-Scheldt Canals was 
given up. This was partly done, as explained earlier, to prevent the bulk of 
Kampfgruppe Chill from being outflanked, but it also meant a considerable 
shortening of the frontline. This had the double effect of freeing Von der Heydte’s 
regiment for the attack on the bridgehead and maintaining the (uneven) balance of 
power, according to Student.712 The withdrawal of Von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger-
Regiment 6 from its furthest positions, in Oostham and Heppen, west of Beringen, 
took most of the night and the early morning of 13 September. While pulling back 
the Fallschirmjäger found it necessary to shoot five civilians in Olmen who had the 
‘temerity’ to watch them.713 All of 559 pulled back at the same time. At the end of 
the day 559 reported that it had twelve Sturmgeschütze and three Jagdpanther 
operational.714 Because all of FJR 6 and 559 had to use the Dessel bridge the troops 
did not arrive in the area between Postel and Luijksgestel until the early morning of 
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13 September. Then 1. Fallschirm Armee assigned them to Kampfgruppe Von 
Hoffmann.715  
A second major shift that took place that Tuesday was the handing over by 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps of the sector north of Antwerp to LXVII. Armeekorps (General 
der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer), the first corps of the 15. Armee which had escaped 
being trapped agains at the Belgian North sea coast.716 This was only possible 
because the German commanders had correctly deduced that the Allied effort was 
shifting away from Antwerp. For the first time in a week they felt comfortable 
enough to leave that sector in the hands of weak divisions, the 711. Infanterie-
Division and the 346. Infanterie-Division. Reinhard earlier that day had got a phone 
call from Generalmajor Sievers (719. I.D.) about a Belgian informer reporting that 
the British would no longer attack north out of Antwerp, but would instead try to 
outflank the defences there by an advance through Geel and Turnhout.717 Reinhard 
immediately phoned Student and told him that he agreed with this new 
assessment.718 Student likewise concurred and promised Reinhard a battalion for the 
Turnhout sector. He also granted Reinhard’s request to start moving Flak away from 
north of Antwerp to Turnhout. The new boundary between the two armies ran from 
Schoten via St.-Lenaarts to Breda. This meant that Reinhard could now concentrate 
on a much narrower sector and with a much better chance of holding it.  
Attacking the bridgehead 
The withdrawal behind the Maas-Scheldt Canal meant that from 13 September FJR 6  
and 559 were now available as well to attack the British bridgehead. The bulk of Von 
der Heydte’s regiment had arrived near Postel in the early morning.719 He set up his 
headquarters in Luijksgestel where Major Helmut Kerutt (I/FJR 18) also had a 
command post. Obviously British observers had spotted the coming and going 
because a British salvo hit it just as Von der Heydte was visiting.720 With an elegant 
leap the latter disappeared through the window which had just been blown out while 
Kerutt’s adjudant, Leutnant Heinz Volz, sheltered under the table. Meanwhile the 
phone kept ringing and ringing. Eventually, during a brief fire pause Volz managed to 
pick it up. It was Schacht who explained in no uncertain terms that he was not used 
to being kept waiting so long, at least without knowing the situation.  
That day the three companies of 559, or rather what was left of them, were again 
split up. All ten operational Sturmgeschütze of 2. and 3./559 , commanded by 
Oberleutnant Edmund Haile, together with most of FJR 6 (I, II and IV) came under 
the command of 1. Fallschirmarmee and were to join Kampfgruppe Walther.721 The 
four operational Jagdpanther of 1./559 were ordered to Hapert to become a reserve 
unit for LXXXVIII. Armeekorps.722 They would remain there for two days. On 15 
September they were ordered to move on to Turnhout and assemble there. Then 1. 
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Kompanie was told to stay in touch with Kampfgruppe Chill and Grenadier-Regiment 
743 and continually monitor the situation in the sectors covered by them.723 
Meanwhile, the other seven Jagdpanther plus six Sturmgeschütze were still in 
workshops.724 
 
All the preparations for the attack had robbed Chill of the core of his Kampfgruppe. 
Apart from his ‘own’ troops from the 84. and 85. Infanterie-Division, 150 officers and 
2,027 other ranks, he also retained Grenadier-Regiment 723, II./FJR 6 and 
Kampfgruppe Dreyer. 725 But he was partly compensated for his losses. He was 
assigned II./FJR 18 under Oberstleutnant Stephan, the second of Oberst Helmuth 
von Hoffmann’s battalions.726 It was first ordered to Arendonk to cover the left flank 
of Kampfgruppe Chill.727There it was to make contact with its neighbour, FJR 6, with 
whom a wire connection had already been established because Chill and Von der 
Heydte had agreed that keeping in close touch was essential.728 Chill also got II./SS-
Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland, which had been north of Antwerp until 
two days before. 
 
The attack by Kampfgruppe Walther supported by six Sturmgeschütze of 559 went in 
early on 14 September. It failed miserably. Later in the afternoon the Irish Guards 
launched a counterattack and regained most of the lost ground, throwing the 
Fallschirmjäger out of their old trenches. Nevertheless, it was decided that the Irish 
Guards would abandon the woods and fall back to positions a little closer to the road. 
By six p.m. the affair was over. The attack, the big effort by Kampfgruppe Walther to 
take the bridge, had failed. Von der Heydte’s men had done their utmost, fighting 
their way forward as far as the middle of De Kolonie, until it became clear that there 
was no way they could get through to their real objective, the bridge. They had 
suffered huge losses, about 60 men had been killed and no fewer than 114 were 
taken prisoner.729 This meant that the two companies of I./FJR 6, originally about 
250 strong, had lost nearly 80% of their complement.730 As a result 1. and 2. 
Kompanie were amalgamated.731 Afterwards, Von der Heydte blamed the failure on 
the lack of artillery support which is confirmed by Allied sources.732 It soon became 
clear that this was due to what can only be described as a very major blunder.  
At 09.40 hours, when the attack was already underway, Major Berlin from 1. 
Fallschirmarmee phoned to ask why there was no artillery support.733 It was 
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supposed to have been given by a battery of Chill’s artillery, named Artillerie Gruppe 
Ackermann after the Kommandeur of II./AR 185, which now consisted of the twelve 
guns of 17./ and 18./SS-Artillerie Ersatz und Ausbildungsregiment plus four 8,8 cm 
guns from 4./leichte Flak-Abteilung 925.734 It soon transpired that nobody from 
Kampfgruppe Walther had bothered to pass this message on to Hauptmann 
Ackermann himself. He certainly was not aware of any such request. An hour later 
Berlin rang LXXXVIII. Armeekorps again to stress the need for artillery support as 
their own guns, the Frundsberg battery, had run out of ammunition.735 Chill’s Ia, 
Oberstleutnant Schuster, said  that in that case he would like to know how many 
batteries were required exactly and he pointed out that a position change might 
weaken the left flank of Kampfgruppe Chill. He also asked where the forward 
observer (V.B.) was to report. When all these questions were put to Berlin, he said 
that he would consult Student and get back to Chill. Nothing more was heard of the 
matter. By that time it was a moot point anyway as the two parties were locked in 
close combat and artillery support had become pointless. After this major debacle, 
there was nothing left for Walther but to go over to the defence. The two days 
following the attack, 15 and 16 September, were spent in relative quiet. There was 
the occasional mortaring and shelling, mainly airbursts, with the usual lack of results, 
and the odd exchange of machine-gun fire. The bridgehead was there to stay. The 
Allied units were getting ready for the big day, Sunday 17 September. 
 
Planning 
One of the major operations of the Second World War was Market Garden. It is 
regularly, but erroneously, referred to as the Battle of Arnhem. That it is much more 
has already been made clear in lots of books, but exactly how much more will 
become evident in this chapter, as well as the crucial role that schwere Heeres 
Panzerjägerabteilung 559 and Kampfgruppe Chill would play. When dealing with 
Market Garden, the focus will be on what happened in the areas where 559 and Chill 
were involved, that is south of the river Maas, basically the province of North 
Brabant, the operational area of the US 101st Airborne Division. Brief references will 
be made to what happened north of there, at Nijmegen and Arnhem, in order not to 
lose sight of the overall picture. First the origins of this ambitious project need to be 
described. 
To understand that we need to turn to the operational and strategic levels. On 4 
September, the day that Antwerp was captured, General Eisenhower, outlined his 
strategy in directive FWD13765 in which he stated that ‘the mission of Northern 
Group of Armies (…) is to secure Antwerp, breach the Siegfried Line covering the 
Ruhr and seize the Ruhr”.736 At the same time General Bradley’s US Twelfth Army 
Group was “to occupy the Siegfried line covering the Saar and then to seize 
Frankfurt”.737 This principle of advancing along as wide a front as possible soon came 
to be known as the ‘broad front policy’. Montgomery favoured a different approach, 
that of one powerful push to the Rhine. This was known as the ‘narrow thrust 
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policy’.738 That it was his Twenty-First Army Group that would carry out the main 
attack on Germany, went without saying for the Field-Marshal. But Eisenhower was 
not convinced. Also because he did not want to favour Montgomery’s armies over the 
others for political reasons he issued the abovementioned order.739 In it Montgomery 
was asked to undertake three tasks at the same time, in the belief that the German 
army in the west was on the verge of collapse. An impossible task, as time would 
show.  
Montgomery basically had two choices after capturing Antwerp, clear the Scheldt 
estuary with the added bonus of destroying 15. Armee, or pursue the more glorious 
and potentially rewarding course of pushing on the Rhine with the prospect of 
entering Germany before winter set in. Montgomery opted for the latter and XXX 
Corps was ordered to advance along two basic routes, via Tilburg to Zaltbommel and 
via Eindhoven to Nijmegen and Arnhem.740 To assist the ground forces and secure 
bridgeheads Montgomery asked First Allied Airborne Army (Lieutenant-General Lewis 
H. Brereton) to set up an operation in which the 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 
Parachute Brigade were employed. This, however, was not the first plan involving 
airborne troops. Since early June no fewer than twenty-five operations had been 
proposed. This made perfect sense, because the First Allied Airborne Army was an 
‘army in waiting’, literally. Since the end of August, when all the airborne divisions 
were back in the U.K. the troops had either been recuperating (US 82nd and 101st 
Airborne Division and 6th Airborne Division) or waiting for their first assignment (1st 
Airborne Division and Polish Brigade). Clearly such a well-trained, top-quality force 
needed to be used. That is why planners at SHAEF constantly came up with new 
plans.741 The operation proposed on 3 September was called Comet. The idea was to 
secure crossings of the Waal at Nijmegen and the Rhine at Arnhem using the 1st 
Airborne, the Polish Brigade and the 52nd (Lowland) Division. The operation was to 
take place on 6 or 7 September. The plans took longer to draw up than envisaged 
and they were not ready until the 7th. A storm warning then postponed its execution 
until the following day. Meanwhile it became clear that German resistance was 
stiffening. It was the day that the struggle for Hechtel began and the bridgeheads 
south of Geel had not yet joined. Montgomery felt that Comet was too optimistic an 
option. His forces were clearly not strong enough for what they had to do. The broad 
front strategy did not work, Montgomery felt. It was time to try and convince 
Eisenhower to follow a different route.  
A new plan 
On the morning of 10 September Montgomery and Eisenhower had a meeting. In a 
letter to Eisenhower dated three days before Montgomery again complained about 
the failing logistical situation. If only all resources were reallocated they would be 
adequate “to get  one thrust to Berlin”.742 He would now try to get Eisenhower to see 
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things his way. The meeting took place at Melsbroek airfield near Brussels. As 
Eisenhower had wrenched his right knee it was in a cast. Eisenhower was in a litter 
and so they met in Eisenhower’s aircraft, a converted North American B-25 Mitchell 
bomber.743 In far from parliamentary language Montgomery told Eisenhower what he 
thought of his decisions as Supreme Commander so far. At one point Eisenhower put 
his hands on Montgomery’s knee and said, “Steady, Monty! You can’t speak to me 
like that. I’m your boss.”744 Montgomery apologized but kept on repeating his 
arguments for a single thrust towards the Rhine. Eisenhower would not relent. He 
believed in his broad front policy, but he did agree that Montgomery could launch a 
new airborne operation, in fact a kind of enlarged version of Comet. He refused to 
halt all other operations and when the meeting ended Montgomery had not gotten 
what he wanted. Three days later, however, Eisenhower relented and he agreed to 
immobilise US divisions to provide the necessary motor transport, but stressed that 
this measure was only ‘temporary’, to enable Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group 
to cross the Rhine.745 Montgomery felt that he had won the argument, at least for 
now, and D Day for the new airborne operation, code name Market, was Sunday 17 
September. The planning could now begin in earnest for what was to evolve into 
operation Market Garden. The broad outlines were laid down in directive M 525. The 
general aim was ‘to destroy all enemy west of the general line ZWOLLE - DEVENTER 
– CLEVE – VENLO – MAASTRICHT [capitals in original], with a view to advancing 
eastwards and occupying the Ruhr.’746 To achieve this Second Army would secure 
crossings over the rivers Meuse and Rhine, establish itself astride the IJssel from 
where it was to be directed at the area of Münster and then cut off the Ruhr area 
from the northeast. Meanwhile the US Twelfth Army Group was to capture Bonn and 
Cologne and encircle the Ruhr from the south. Interestingly Montgomery still did not 
recognize the full extent of the German recovery as he directed First Canadian Army, 
after having secured the opening of Antwerp, it was to ‘operate northwards on the 
general axis BREDA – UTRECHT – AMSTERDAM [capitals in original].’747 The aim was 
the destruction of the German troops west of that line and the opening up of the 
port of Rotterdam. It is clear that Montgomery still hoped to attack the Ruhr area 
before autumn set in and also that he was still seriously underestimating German 
resistance.  
For the new airborne operation, Comet was extended by adding the two US airborne 
divisions, 82nd and 101st, to the equation.748 The operation acquired a double name 
because the new plan called for two separate, but related elements. Three airborne 
divisions were to seize vital crossings (Market) and lay out a kind of carpet over 
which Second Army would advance to beyond the Rhine at Arnhem (Garden). There 
it would establish itself on the high ground between Arnhem and the Zuiderzee. In 
detail this meant that the 1st Airborne under Major-General Roy Urquhart, would 
secure the Rhine bridge at Arnhem, the 82nd under Brigadier-General James M. 
Gavin would do the same for the bridges over the Waal at Nijmegen and the Maas at 
                                        
743 Adams, The Battle for Western Europe, 125. 
744 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, London 1952, 489. 
745 Ellis, Victory II, 23. 
746 M 525, 14.09.44. 
747 Ibid. 
748 6th Airborne Division would need until December to recover from the Normandy campaign. 
 167 
Grave, while the 101st under Major General Maxwell D. Taylor would have to capture 
no fewer than four bridges, at Veghel, St.-Oedenrode, Son and Eindhoven. At the 
same time XXX Corps would thrust north out of the Neerpelt bridgehead, the Guards 
Division leading the way, followed by the 43rd (Wessex) and the 50th 
(Northumbrian) Divisions. Meanwhile XII Corps would secure the left flank of the 
advance with the 53rd (Welsh), 15th (Scottish) and 7th Armoured Divisions, and VIII 
Corps would do to the same on the right with the 3rd Division and the 11th 
Armoured Division. Unlike in Normandy the airborne landings would take place by 
day this time. It was a difficult decision for Brereton because obviously the planes 
and gliders would now be more exposed to Flak and enemy fighters.749 This was 
outweighed, however, by the fact that a daylight operation should provide a better 
drop pattern. In Normandy troops had been scattered over such a wide area that 
some soldiers had never found their parent unit at all. Assured of a comprehensive 
anti-flak program Brereton decided it was worth the risk.  
In the days before the operation Second Army regrouped. For XII Corps this meant 
that while the 15th (Scottish) Division still had its hands full at Ten Aard, the 53rd 
(Welsh) was to move to Lommel to cross the canal there, and the 7th Armoured 
Division shifted further eastward. For VIII Corps the 3rd Division had come up and 
was assembling near Hechtel while the 11th Armoured Division was still in position 
along the Maas-Scheldt Canal northeast of it. The first and most important blow 
would have to be dealt by Horrocks’ XXX Corps. That, too, was getting ready. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3.2, the 231st Brigade of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division had 
taken over the bridgehead at De Kolonie while the Guards were getting ready south 
of the canal. The rest of the 50th was assembling further south while the 43rd 
Division was even further back around Diest. It was clear from the start that the 
ground offensive would not be easy as it would have to use a single road with 
marshy land on both sides. Therefore it relied heavily on artillery assisted by large 
numbers of fighter-bombers of Second Tactical Air Force. Forward air controllers 
would play a crucial role in calling up air support if the advance should get stuck.  
On Saturday 16 September everything was in readiness. That day Horrocks held a 
conference for all division and brigade commanders and staff officers of XXX Corps in 
the cinema in Leopoldsburg.750 The inhabitants must have wondered at the motley 
stream of officers arriving in the sleepy little town. There was no standard uniform 
code and Horrocks himself was dressed in a high-necked woolly with a battle-dress 
top and a camouflaged airborne smock. The atmosphere was casual and cheerful, 
but there were very few questions at the end of the orders and the officers looked 
deep in thought as they left the cinema, especially the Irish Guards. The fact that 
they were leading the advance was, no doubt an honour, but not one to cheer a 
soldier.  
In his directive to Second Army issued on the 14th Montgomery himself had 
emphasized the need for speed when he wrote, ‘The thrust northward to secure the 
river crossings (…) will be rapid and violent without regard to what is happening on 
the flanks.’751 Time would tell if this important instruction would be met. 
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  The German side 
After 10 September more and more troops began to arrive to oppose the Allied 
offensive. Because of the major error made by the Allies not to push ahead north of 
Antwerp and thus cut off 15. Armee on 5 september, Von Zangen’s divisions now 
began to arrive one by one. The first to reach the mainland was the 711. Infanterie-
Division under Generalleutnant Josef Reichert. This extremely weak division was in 
reality no more than a regiment with its four battalions and many soldiers did not 
even have fire-arms. It took up position slightly to the right of and behind the 719. 
I.D. northwest of Antwerp.752 Immediately thereafter the 346. I.D., Generalleutnant 
Erich Diestel, at 75% considerably stronger than the 711. Infanterie-Division, entered 
Brabant.753 It was to take over the right wing of the 719. Infanterie-Division north of 
Antwerp. The new arrivals had come just in time. During the evening of 12 
September Reinhard’s westernmost sector was taken over by units from these two 
divisions and the responsibility for preventing a breakthrough north of Antwerp fell to 
LXVII. Armeekorps, General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer.754 As soon as the relief 
was completed 15. Armee, under General der infanterie Gustav-Adolf von Zangen, 
would be in charge. Thus, precisely as the pressure mounted on his left flank by the 
Allied bridgeheads at Ten Aard, Reinhard could shift units from the 719. I.D. to the 
endangered sector and the divisional artillery was just in time to assist in the battle 
at Ten Aard. Originally Reinhard had suggested another solution. Feeling that reliefs 
took time and that the danger at Antwerp had diminished, he suggested to Student 
that the new divisions from 15. Armee should be sent further east, to Turnhout 
where he still feared a breakthrough.755 But Student was not convinced the danger at 
Antwerp was really over and he stuck to his original decision, 15. Armee would take 
over the area west of the line Antwerp-St.Lenaarts-Tilburg. He did, however, permit 
Reinhard to shift some Flak from Antwerp to Turnhout.  
The next three days saw both successes and failures for the Germans, which have 
already been discussed. The Scottish bridgehead at Ten Aard was successfully 
contained, but the counterattack on De Kolonie bridgehead failed miserably. After 14 
September it seemed as if a new stalemate had been achieved. The British could not 
get out of the bridgeheads, while the Germans could not retake them. On 14 
September Student took an extra precautionary measure which so far has received 
little or no attention in any of the books about of Market Garden. Aware that he 
needed to prevent another unexpected crossing of the next canal line (like the one at 
Neerpelt), Student set up two independent commands, General zur besondere 
Verwendung 1, under Generalmajor R. Gohthsche, the erstwhile town commander of 
Antwerp, and Stab General zur besondere Verwendung 2 under Oberst Von 
Hoffmann, the former Kommandeur of FJR 18.756 Both of them were put in charge of 
a stretch of canal, in Von Hoffmann’s case the Wilhelmina Canal and in Gothsche’s 
case the Zuid-Willemsvaart from Helmond northward. Their assignment was to set 
up a defensive line behind the canals, secure the bridges and create strong points in 
Tilburg, Eindhoven, Helmond and Weert. For this they were assigned only a handful 
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of troops. They received about three companies, including one platoon each from SS-
Unterführerschule Arnheim, and some 7.5 cm Pak.757 They were told to use Dutch 
civilians in the construction of the defences. Their immediate task was to blow up the 
minor bridges and make sure that the others would be protected by Pak, barbed wire 
and mines. It was clear that after the failures at Beringen and Neerpelt Student did 
not want to be taken by surprise a third time. Little did Von Hoffmann and Gohtsche 
know when took up their assignment that they would have only three days to get 
their act together. 
Further south Oberst Walther had the same problem. He had positioned his units as 
best he could since the failed counterattack on the 14th. This meant that 
Kampfgruppe Heinke (III./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19, Hauptsturmführer Dr. 
Karl Segler, II./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 21, Hauptsturmführer Friedrich Richter, 
and the two batteries making up the artillery under Hauptsturmführer Gustav Krause) 
were dug in to the east of De Kolonie, Von der Heydte’s I., III. and IV./FJR 6 to the 
west. Von der Heydte was supported by the remaining (now) seven Sturmgeschütze 
from 2. and 3./559. The penal battalion, 6. Luftwaffe Bewährungs Bataillon zur 
besondere Verwendung, as well as I./FJR 18 (Major Kerutt) covered both sides of the 
road right in the path of any attacker. Kerutt’s antitank platoon under Leutnant 
Vinke, had set up a tank-trap a few kilometres up the road.758 It was cleverly hidden 
in slit trenches with Panzerfäuste and Ofenrohre. Further back, at the Dommel 
bridge, was 14. Kompanie (Hauptmann Brockes) with its nine ex-Russian 7.62 cm 
Pak close to the road. To provide artillery cover Sturmbannführer Krause’s four guns 
and four howitzers were in position near Borkel and Schaft. 
A new fact that came to light while researching this book was that Von der Heydte 
was aware of operation Market Garden, which is not really surprising as ‘There 
cannot have been many troops in XXX Corps in contact with the enemy who have not 
been warned of an impending airborne operation’ as the intelligence report stated on 
14 September.759 Although he did not know the exact size of the assaulting forces, a 
Belgian informant passed through the lines during the night of 14-15 September and 
told him that the Guards Armoured Division and elements of other armoured units 
were concentrating near Neerpelt, ready to move up at short notice. Von der Heydte 
then used this information to obtain support from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559 whose Sturmgeschütze as a result were positioned closer to the road 
to Valkenswaard and Eindhoven.760 There is no information about who else –if 
anyone- he informed. But then higher echelons already expected an attack along this 
axis. In fact as early as 9 September, even before Eisenhower had approved 
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Montgomery’s plan, the German high command had surmized that XXX Corps would 
launch a thrust from Eindhoven to Arnhem.761 
 
The day before Market Garden started, a new boundary was drawn up between 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps and Kampfgruppe Walther.762 The same day a new corps 
headquarters arrived, LXXXVI. Armeekorps, commanded by General der infanterie 
Hans Von Obstfelder. It would take charge of Erdmann’s division and Division zbV 
176. All these changes meant that only the Jagdpanther in 1./schwere Heeres 
Panzerjägerabteilung 559  were now the responsibility of Chill (and Reinhard), while 
Walther (and hence Student) was in control of the Sturmgeschütze in 2. and 3. 
Kompanie.763 Schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559  no longer operated as one 
unit. Once again one of the tenets of armoured operations, keeping the iron fist 
together, was neglected. The Jagdpanther in reserve at Turnhout would not be 
involved in the initial stages, but the Sturmgeschütze who were with Kampfgruppe 
Walther were the only SPs available and they would have to weather the worst of the 
storm.  
Market 
As Sunday 17 September dawned Reinhard got ready for another round of 
inspections. It was a sunny day and the skies were clear. He left his headquarters in 
Moergestel just before nine a.m. and headed straight for Turnhout to meet with 
Dreyer.764 After discussing the situation at Ten Aard he spoke to Schuster, Ia 
Kampfgruppe Chill, and then drove on to visit Feld Ersatz Bataillon 347 in Voorheide 
near the Belgian-Dutch border. After that he proceeded up the road to Eersel, where 
schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559  had its headquarters, to inspect the 
terrain along the new boundary of his Corps. From there Reinhard intended to drive 
back to his headquarters in Moergestel via Wintelre and Oirschot. It was nearly noon 
and Reinhard noticed an increase in Allied air activity.765 Because of this he 
frequently had to stop and park under cover of some trees. After many delays he 
finally arrived in Oirschot just in time to see long streams of C-47’s, a number of 
them towing gliders, passing low overhead. Some were so low that he could see the 
cables connecting the gliders to the planes. Hundreds of planes filled the sky, the 
humming of their engines loud and clear. Reinhard immediately realized the 
significance of what he saw: airborne landings on a major scale. It was also clear to 
him that he needed to get back to his headquarters right away. But there was still 
the danger from the dreaded Jabo’s, the fighter-bombers. There was only one thing 
for it. Reinhard jumped unto the pillion of one of the motorcycles escorting him and 
raced back to Moergestel where messages had been coming in thick and fast since 
two p.m.766  
 
Reinhard phoned Tilburg and ordered Oberst Böhmer, the Kommandeur of SS-
Polizei-Sicherungs-Regiment 3, a collection of policemen aged between 35 and 45, to 
                                        
761 Ultra message HP 242, 15.09.44, quoted in Jeffson, Operation Market-Garden, 71. 
762 KTB 88 AK, 16.09.44, C 226. 
763 Captured documents, Second Army IS 121, 03.10.44. 
764 Full report, KTB 88 AK, 17.09.44, A 317. 
765 This section, Reinhard, 13. 
766 KTB 88 AK, 17.09.44, 14.00 hours, phone call from Schuster at K.Gr.Chill. 
 171 
give him his first battalion which was stationed in one of the local barracks.767 These 
(reserve) policemen had been independent tradesmen or shopkeepers and none had 
been in the police before that time. Since May they had only had rudimentary 
infantry training in between normal police duties and were lightly armed.768 Each 
company had two machine-guns and one 5 cm mortar. Nevertheless, Reinhard 
immediately despatched two companies to the reported landing zone, the Sonse 
Heide north of Eindhoven.769One company was sent to Udenhout where a landing 
was reported. Later this turned out to be false, it was a lonely British Horsa glider 
which had come loose, and the policemen joined the others at Best early in the 
evening. 770 What Reinhard had seen was part of the Allied air armada, consisting of  
1,047 C-47’s, 440 gliders and about 1,200 fighters.771 These had come in along two 
routes, the southerly one (which Reinhard had seen a part of) across the liberated 
part of Belgium to IP (Initial Point) Delos near Beringen, where it turned north to 
drop the US 101st on their designated zones. The northern one ran straight east as 
far as Vught, IP Ellis, where Student had set up his headquarters in a villa (Bergen) 
on 7 September. From there it turned north to drop the US 82nd and 1st Airborne on 
their destinations.  
 
The gamble to make the landings by day paid off. Although planes were hit by light 
and heavy Flak, losses were light. The Flak-Kompanie of 559  commanded by 
Oberfeldwebel Lustnauer, with its SdKfz 7/1 also claimed to have shot down a 
number of WACO gliders.772 In spite of these losses the rest managed to drop most 
of the troops in the designated Landing Zones or Dropzones. However, at the end of 
the day, both the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem and the US 82nd Airborne Division 
at Nijmegen had failed to secure the main prizes, the road bridges over the Rhine 
and Waal.773 The British had a few companies from the 2nd Parachute Battalion 
occupying the northern end of the Arnhem bridge, the Americans had only just sent 
the 1st Battalion of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment to Nijmegen and it would 
not get there until just after midnight. Further south, the 101st had done significantly 
better although they had not secured all their objectives either.774 The Screaming 
Eagles managed to seize the bridges at Veghel and St.-Oedenrode and at Bokt they 
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established a bridgehead across the Wilhelmina Canal, from which they could launch 
the attack on Eindhoven the following day. 
Garden  
Horrocks had taken up position on the flat roof of the same zinc factory south of the 
canal from which the Irish Guards had first studied the bridge only a week earlier.775 
He watched the vast armada on its way north. His feelings about the operation were 
decidedly mixed. On the one hand he was worried because he knew it was going to 
be a tough fight. On the other he was confident of its success. Like most Allied 
commanders Horrocks was still feeling the euphoria that had characterized the 
preceding weeks and the sight of the German army in retreat. Still, he was anxious. 
He knew that the terrain, marshy and flat and with numerous waterways, would 
make a speedy advance tricky at best. Still, the idea of failure never entered his 
head.  At two p.m. sharp the artillery barrage began. More than three hundred guns, 
ten field regiments, three medium regiments and one heavy regiment, opened fire 
on pre-arranged targets. Exactly thirty-two minutes later the barrage shifted to a line 
360 metres in front of the main line and extending 900 metres either side of the 
road. The road itself was not targeted to avoid cratering, which might impede the 
advance. Three minutes later it was Zero Hour, 14.35 hours, and the barrage began 
to creep forward at 180 metres a minute. It was time for the Irish Guards Group to 
advance.  
The march column consisted of four groups. Leading the advance was No.3 
Squadron, without infantry.776 It was followed by No.1 Squadron with No.1 Company 
(the infantry riding on top of the Shermans), No.2 Squadron carrying No.4 Company 
and finally No.2 Company in lorries. Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Joe’ Vandeleur and his 
headquarters party would travel right in the middle. Lieutenant Keith Heathcote had 
the dubious honour of commanding the lead tank. At 14.35 hours exactly he shouted 
‘Driver –Advance’ and operation Garden began. Overhead the first patrol of 
Typhoons was arriving, waiting for further instructions. The fighter-bombers had 
rocketed targets earlier in the day, they had then been grounded whilst the airborne 
landings took place. Now they returned in the form of ‘cab ranks’, circling lazily 
overhead ready to give support when called upon. Heathcote and the rest of No.3 
Squadron followed the creeping barrage as closely as they could. The clouds of dust 
made it hard to see the actual shell bursts and Heathcote several times got too close 
as he was nearing the German lines. Right before the attack began Oberst Walther 
had ordered Kerutt who was visiting him at his headquarters in Valkenswaard  to 
despatch one company to Valkenswaard.777 The barrage made it impossible for the 
Fallschirmjäger to obey the order and they could only cling to the soil praying that 
the ordeal would soon end. The barrage also raged further back across the positions 
of Brockes’ 14. Kompanie. Hauptmann Brockes himself was fatally wounded in the 
head by shrapnel and all of his ex-Russian Pak were knocked out without having 
fired a shot, the result of their being positioned so close to the road. Meanwhile the 
Irish Guards kept advancing, followed by the infantry of the 2nd Devons and the 
tanks of the 15th/19th Hussars on either side of the road.  
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For the first ten minutes everything went well. Then the leading Shermans passed 
the tank trap set up by Leutnant Vinke and his anti-tank platoon.778 They allowed the 
first tanks to pass them by before they arose from their well-hidden trenches and 
opened fire on the Shermans with Panzerfäuste and Ofenrohre. Within a space of 
two minutes nine tanks had been knocked out, the last three of No.3 Squadron in the 
lead and the first six of No.1 Squadron following it. The leading half of No.3 
Squadron careered on until Major M. O’Cock, the CO of No.1 Squadron, was informed 
that they had “lost their tail”, which brought them to a halt. Even before they came 
to a complete standstill the infantry riding the tanks along were off and into the 
ditches while the Shermans began to spray the hedges and woods with their 
Brownings and guns. Outraged at the ambush the Irish Guards gave the Germans a 
rough treatment that afternoon. As soon as the advance came to a standstill, 
Vandeleur called in the RAF Typhoons. The air attack was impressive and 
devastating. Each Typhoon carried eight rocket projectiles (RP) which hissed towards 
their targets. Down the planes screamed, guided by eleven VCP’s (Visual Control 
Posts). All in all 91 ‘Tiffies’ made nineteen attacks, firing a total of 427 rocket 
projectiles.779 The attacks were made in an area from de Kolonie as far as 
Valkenswaard and along both sides of the road. Only one Typhoon was hit by Flak 
and had to make a forced landing. The tanks laid down yellow smoke to indicate 
their own positions and red for the enemy ones. Although the Typhoons in most 
cases reported that they could not observe the results of their attacks, these still had 
the desired effect and demoralised Fallschirmjäger from I./FJR 18 left their trenches, 
most of them trembling with shock.  
 
The Irish Guards also got involved with schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559. 
The Sturmgeschütze, together with a few companies of Von der Heydte’s men, held 
the left (west side) of the road. Leaving it in order to bypass the German positions 
ahead, Lance-Sergeant Bertie Cowan spotted a Sturmgeschütz against a farm, the 
Odiliahoeve. He knocked it out with one shot, drove up and ‘persuaded’ the crew to 
climb on to the back of his Firefly and point out their comrades’ position. In this way 
559 lost at least two Sturmgeschütze, possibly three.780 Von der Heydte and FJR 6 
were pushed back, well away from the main road. 
 
The Irish Guards resumed the advance at 16.30 hours after a bulldozer had shoved 
aside some of the wrecks. This time there was no trouble and an hour later No.3 
Squadron reached the Dommel bridge, passing the wreckage of Brockes’ guns which 
should have stopped them. The squadron now took up defensive positions while the 
other two groups passed through. This reshuffle took considerable time and it was 
already getting dark by the time No.2 Squadron and No.4 Company approached 
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Valkenswaard. The only light came from three of four big fires. The roads were 
strewn with debris, but at 20.05 hours Major E.G. Tyler’s Squadron reached the 
northern exit of the town.781 Then something happened which has been a source of 
controversy ever since: at ten p.m. Brigadier Gwatkin gave the order to halt for the 
night and the infantry set up an all-round defence.782  
 
Gwatkin’s order to halt in Valkenswaard, showing an apparent lack of urgency, has 
puzzled historians ever since. Several explanations have been given. The most logical 
and reasonable one seems to be that the Guards had reached their D-Day objective 
for Phase I as described in the divisional order. Moreover the order also clearly 
stated that they would pause on the line Veldhoven-Aalst-Heeze until ordered 
forward by Horrocks, to establish contact with the 101st in Eindhoven.783 So basically 
the Guards did exactly as they had been instructed to albeit a few miles south of the 
objective. The lack of a sense of urgency can also be explained by the fact that the 
Guards themselves thought that they were ‘more or less through and (…) expected 
the battle will loosen up tomorrow.‘784 Suggestions, made long after the controversy 
had begun, that the Guards knew when they halted in Valkenswaard that the Son 
bridge was blown and therefore should have carried on, are refuted by the records. 
Just after midnight Second Army noted that ‘There is NO [capitals in original] news  
of the airborne troops as they are using a different cipher to 30 Corps...’785 Moreover, 
it was pitch black by the time the order came so continuing along a single road with 
armour against unknown opposition was a certain recipe for disaster. As it was the 
Guards would make up for any time lost during the next stage of their advance. 
The Germans  
When operation Market Garden began, Oberleutnant Franz Kopka, officially still the 
acting Kommandeur of 559, was recuperating in Coudewater near ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 
a psychiatric institution cum hospital used as a Kriegslazarett (military hospital) for 
the last three days.786 He was woken up by his driver, Obergefreiter Rudi Nägele. It 
was then that Kopka heard the droning of the Allied air armada passing overhead. 
He quickly grasped what was happening. Kopka discharged himself and took over 
command of his Abteilung back at the command post in Eersel. Next Kopka 
consulted Walther, who had pulled back to Leende after the loss of Valkenswaard. 
Kopka ordered the three Sturmgeschütze that were left to reinforce the next line of 
resistance at Aalst, a few miles north of Valkenswaard. During the night he set up a 
new headquarters near Aalst. As yet Kopka could not use his two operational 
Jagdpanther which were still in Korps reserve at Turnhout to block a potential 
advance from the Ten Aard bridgehead.787  
                                        
781 Second Army Intel Log, 17.09.44, serial 52. 
782 Bennett, A magnificent disaster, 100. 
783 Guards Division, War Diary, Divisional Order 12, 4. 
784 Second Army Intel Log, 18.09.44, serial 3. 
785 Ibid. 
786 This section, Kopka, Missbraucht und Gebeutelt, 323. Re: the Kriegslazarett which was under 
Generalstabartzt Neumüller, Ad Hermens, Rosmalen in de Vuurlinie, Rosmalen 1994, 19-20. 
787 KTB 88 AK, 17.09.44, Tagesmeldung. 
 175 
Meanwhile the bulk of Von der Heydte’s regiment, still without its II. Batallion, was 
largely unhurt by the breakthrough.788 As mentioned above, only IV./FJR 6 nearest 
De Kolonie, got caught up in the whirlwind and about a hundred Fallschirmjäger 
were taken prisoner. Von der Heydte lost touch with Walther, and decided to pull 
back his left wing to a wood (Maay) about a hundred metres from the road. In vain 
he then tried to establish contact with friendly units to the north, the direction of 
Eindhoven.789 It was clear that a huge gap had been torn in the German defences 
and because there was still no communication between the two sides of the breach, 
Student reassigned Von der Heydte to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. Reinhard in turn 
straight away put FJR 6 back under Chill’s command.790 
The second day 
Operation Garden was not just restricted to XXX Corps advancing along a single 
highway to Nijmegen und ultimately Arnhem. In fact, the whole of Second Army was 
to be employed in this ambitious plan. Both VIII Corps and XII Corps were to 
advance alongside XXX Corps. In detail this meant that VIII Corps was to secure the 
right flank while XII Corps was to carry out the same task on the left. On the right 
VIII Corps was commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor, the general 
who, as commander of the Western Desert Force, in 1941 had won the first 
spectacular victory for the British Army of the Second World War. He was later taken 
prisoner by Rommel’s men, but escaped after more than two years of captivity. Were 
it not for his long absence this able soldier instead of Montgomery might have risen 
to the highest command.791 His counterpart in XII Corps was Lieutenant-General Sir 
Neil Ritchie who was considered an able and cool-headed officer by his superiors.792 
Although in 1941 he had suffered a major defeat as commanding officer of the 
famous Eighth Army and had been relieved of his command, he had turned out to be 
a competent Corps Commander since D-Day. Nevertheless, both commanders had 
their work cut out for them as they needed to keep pace with XXX Corps in the 
middle. The problem was that the main roads ran lateral to the direction of attack, 
plus they did not even have a decent bridgehead from which to start their 
operations. For VIII Corps establishing a bridgehead was going to be a major 
headache anyway as most of its divisions were still assembling or on their way. 
Nevertheless, the 3rd Division was ordered to cross the Maas-Scheldt Canal on D+1 
(18 September) in the vicinity of Lille St.Hubert. The starting point for XII Corps was 
to have been the bridgehead at Ten Aard, but as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Germans had effectively sealed that off. Ritchie thereupon decided to try and 
establish a new bridgehead closer to the main advance. He ordered the 53rd (Welsh) 
Division to cross north of Lommel on D-Day (17 September). If Von der Heydte’s 
men thought they could spend the night in relative peace, they had a big surprise 
coming to them. 
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The attack by the 53rd Division under began at eleven p.m.793 A barrage by seven 
Field Regiments, two Medium Regiments and mortars hit the positions of the 
Fallschirmjäger.794 Brigadier G.B. Sugden, commanding the 158th Brigade, decided to 
send two battalions across on either side of the demolished bridge north of Lommel. 
After the bridgehead was sufficiently deep the divisional engineers were to construct 
a Class 9 and a Class 40 bridge. The night was dark and it was pouring with rain as 
the first boats crossed half an hour after the artillery had opened fire. The 1st East 
Lancashire Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel G.W.P.N. Burden operated on the left, 
the 7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF) under Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.T.B. Dickson on 
the right. The East Lancs were soon across. This was sheer luck and due to the 
German troop dispositions opposite them. The wood to the west of the Lommel-
Luijksgestel road was occupied by Fallschirmjäger from Oberstleutnant Stephan 
(II./FJR 18) while troops from von der Heydte’s 5./FJR 6 were in the wood east of 
the road.795 By a fluke the East Lancs landed unobserved, then skirted around the 
positions of II./FJR 18 and took their objective, north of the wood by 03.30 hours. 
However, the 7th RWF did not fare so well. They landed in full view of Von der 
Heydte’s men and were unable to expand their bridgehead which was only two 
hundred metres deep. As a consequence, on the right flank a raft was soon in 
operation, but on the left one all movement came to a standstill. Still, that was the 
extent of the success for the East Lancs. Because Stephan’s men were still in the 
wood, it proved impossible to construct a proper bridge. Every time the engineers 
started work they came under fire and it took repeated calls to Brigade before the 
East Lancs finally cleared the wood at 13.30 hours and removed thirty-six 
Fallschirmjäger from slit-trenches less than three hundred metres from the canal. 
Around the same time the right flank of the bridgehead was also enlarged after the 
1/5th Welch under Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. Gibson had crossed over and a raft was 
in operation there as well. Gibson himself was seriously wounded and subsequently 
died. Bridge construction could now begin and in the evening of 18 September XII 
Corps finally had a bridgehead from which to launch its supporting operation. 
 
Von der Heydte, who now saw his right flank threatened as well as his left one near 
the road, ordered his troops to pull back. As mentioned above Von der Heydte was 
once more part of Kampfgruppe Chill.796 Reinhard had only just issued orders that 
Von der Heydte was to maintain his current positions as long as possible when he 
learned of the withdrawal. Reinhard was livid with rage. Von der Heydte was reputed 
to have pulled back his troops as far as Bladel, but that turned out to be only a 
rumour. Nevertheless he instructed Chill to take a firm grip on the regiment. It was 
to be clear that Von der Heydte was not permitted to order a withdrawal by himself. 
In his defence Chill said that he was not aware of this as he had only just been given 
FJR 6 back.797 Von der Heydte himself complained about the lack of artillery support 
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and urgently requested new Panzerfäuste and heavy machine-guns. His companies, 
he said, were now down to an average of forty men.798 
Best and Eindhoven 
There was also some positive news for Reinhard. That Monday he was informed of 
the arrival of two divisions from 15. Armee that were assigned to LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps. Just after being told about the new bridgehead by Von der Heydte, he 
learned that he was to receive the 59. and 711. Infanterie-Division.799 Reinhard 
intended to send the 59. I.D. to the area Boxtel-Tilburg and the 711. I.D. ‘probably’ 
to Eindhoven and environs. Early on the 18th the plans changed. Reinhard got a 
phone call from 1. Fallschirmarmee informing him that Student had assigned LXXXVI. 
Armeekorps (Von Obstfelder) the 107. Panzerbrigade. The new plan was for Von 
Obstfelder’s troops to attack via Eindhoven and block the advance of XXX Corps, 
while the 59. I.D. would attack the American Paratroopers on the Sonse Heide. The 
two attacks were to meet near Son. Meanwhile at Best German plans had gone 
awry.800 The Kampfgruppe under Oberstleutnant Berthold Rink (GR 723) was 
supposed to occupy the DZ and LZ on the Sonse Heide, but it never got the chance 
to start the attack, mainly because the Americans were also on the move. When it 
became clear the previous evening that H Company was stuck at Best, Colonel 
Michaelis (502nd) decided to send the rest of the 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant-
Colonel Robert G. Cole to join them. At first light the battalion did manage to make 
contact with H Company. However, the attack by Kampfgruppe Rink, now including 
FEB 347 and I./GR 723 (originally the Korps reserve), collided with the move west of 
the 3rd Battalion and the result was that both became stuck. Only from Best itself 
had German troops managed to advance about one kilometre.801 In the ensuing fight 
Cole was killed and in a twist of irony his opposite number, Oberstleutnant  Rink, was 
seriously wounded. Rink was found by the Americans and eventually ended up in a 
military hospital in Brussels where he died of his wounds nearly two months later.802 
He was succeeded by Oberstleutnant Lenz.803 The latter was obviously a lesser man 
than his predecessor and soon Reinhard learned that Lenz considered pulling his 
troops back. He told him off in no uncertain terms informing him that he would be 
court-martialled if he ever seriously considered retreat. From the next day his 
Kampfgruppe would come under the 59. Infanterie-Division whose attack he was to 
support, so there was no more room for independent actions.804 The rest of the day 
the balance kept shifting to and fro, but eventually the Americans reached the 
Eindhoven-Boxtel road and set up a road block there. The American attempt to get 
to the Best bridge had become futile anyway as the bridge was blown at 13.10 hours 
on Student’s personal orders.805 
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The same day Eindhoven was captured by the American paratroopers after a stiff 
fight with a small detachment from Kampfgruppe Köppel.806  Further south XXX 
Corps had more problems overcoming the German resistance. Three Sturmgeschütze 
from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 supported by another Flak group of 
the same Kampfgruppe Köppel, managed to hold up the Guards’ advance throughout 
the day.807  It was not until the Germans finally gave up at the end of the afternoon 
that the advance was resumed and entered Eindhoven amid the cheers of Dutchmen 
and Americans. Meanwhile after almost a fortnight in action, on 18 September 
schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 was reduced to just four fighting vehicles, 
one, single operational Sturmgeschütz  and three operational Jagdpanther, north of 
the Ten Aard bridgehead.808 
New worries 
At the end of Monday 18th General Reinhard began to be increasingly worried about 
his left flank. Because Von der Heydte had pulled back his troops and had taken up 
positions from the Maas-Scheldt Canal up to Hapert, a huge gap had opened up from 
Hapert northwards, as far as Best. In desperation Reinhard looked around, realising 
there were no units to spare for the moment. He had already assigned the 59. 
Infanterie-Division to attack the American Paratroopers at Son and the next 
reinforcement, the 245. Infanterie-Division was only now on its way to Tilburg. It 
would take at least three days to arrive. Gambling that the Allied advance north of 
Antwerp had stopped for the moment he decided once again to use the 719. 
Infanterie-Division, to create reserves. Initially he assigned FEB 1719 to Von der 
Heydte to plug the gap.809 However, sometime during the afternoon he changed his 
mind. He decided to insert a whole new Kampfgruppe instead.810 Reinhard put 
Oberst Zuber, originally Arko 119,811 in command of a combined infantry force made 
up of III./743 and FEB 1719.812 The new battle group was initially assigned to 
Chill.813 Kampfgruppe Zuber which comprised of about 700 men, four field guns and 
some 7.5 cm Pak guns was to plug the twenty kilometre gap. An impossible task if 
ever there was any and Zuber realised that he could only stall for time. Around 
midnight the bulk of the Kampfgruppe assembled in Hilvarenbeek. Soon they were 
on their way to set up a defensive line anchored on the string of villages between 
Hapert and Eindhoven. Still, Reinhard remained anxious. As he himself put it  
‘Sicherungsfront von Hapert bis Best, Abschnitt Zuber, ist so dünn, dass sie mehr 
eine Beobachtungs- als eine Verteidigungsfront darstellt. Auf eine Breite von 19 km 
konnten nur 2 Btle. eingesetzt werden.’814 That evening Reinhard was not optimistic 
of a positive outcome anyway because, as he pointed out to 1. Fallschirmarmee, 
several of his units, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 and Grenadier-Regiment 723 among 
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them, had suffered huge losses over the last fortnight.815 It was, once again, a race 
for time, this time between Kampfgruppe Zuber and the 53rd (Welsh) Division.  
Counterattacks 
While Reinhard fretted about the front west of Eindhoven, he also realized on 19 
September that the decisive attack could and should fall at the American Landing 
Zone near Son. He had high hopes for this counterattack. Moreover, the fact that the 
American Paratroopers there were to be attacked from two sides, Poppe’s 59. I.D. 
from the west and the 107. Panzerbrigade under Major Berndt-Joachim Freiherr von 
Maltzahn from the east, meant that there was a real chance of success. Poppe’s 
division was the strongest infantry division within 15. Armee and it boasted five 
infantry battalions, each about four hundred strong, one Füsilier-Bataillon of 150 
strong and a Feld Ersatz Bataillon with 450 men, which meant it had at least 2,600 
infantry.816 In addition the division had fifteen light and six heavy howitzers plus ten 
7.5 cm Pak guns. The German attack had become all the more urgent as that very 
morning the Guards had completed the Bailey bridge across the Wilhelmina Canal at 
Son. At 06.15 hours the first vehicles crossed and soon the Household Cavalry were 
on their way to the 82nd Airborne Division. During the day most of the Guards 
Division reached Nijmegen. However, there they were stuck because the Americans 
had failed to seize a bridge over the river Waal. Further south the 101st received the 
first of two tank battalions, the 15th/19th Hussars commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.D. Taylor. The second one, the 44th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) under Lieutenant-
Colonel G.C. Hopkinson would not arrive until the early evening of the 19th. Both 
would play crucial roles in the fight for the Corridor, the road between the Belgian 
border and Nijmegen. 
 
Aware of the urgency Poppe had launched the attack as soon as he could. At seven 
a.m. his troops established contact with Kampfgruppe Lenz at Best and started their 
attack in the direction of Son.817 It became an unmitigated disaster. The 502nd 
Parachute Infantry Regiment counterattacked and by the end of the day Poppe’s 
division had been beaten. Total German casualties that day were a staggering 600 
which meant that Poppe had lost at least a quarter of his infantry.818 In view of these 
figures Kampfgruppe Lenz and the 59. I.D. had no option but to go over to the 
defensive. The armoured attack from the other side of the Corridor also failed 
completely.819  After setting off from Venlo railway station it took Von Maltzahn’s 
brigade most of the 19th to close on the Wilhelmina Canal near Son. Then a hastily 
summoned sixpounder gun of the 101st Airborne managed to knock out the leading 
Panther. After this Von Maltzahn ordered his tanks back to Nederwetten. 
The flanks move up 
While the fight for the Corridor was heating up, the same happened with the two 
flanking operations. On the left XII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Neil Ritchie) had 
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not been very successful initially. After the crossing in the evening of the 17th, the 
bridgehead established by the 53rd (Welsh) Division north of Lommel remained small 
throughout the following day. It was not until the early morning of the 19th that the 
53rd Division finally managed to break free. Von der Heydte pulled his units back to 
a line roughly from Postel to Hapert widening the gap north of the bridgehead which 
was exactly what Reinhard had feared and which was why he had sent Kampfgruppe 
Zuber there. But worse was to come. At three p.m. bad news reached Chill.820 His 
headquarters had received a garbled radio message from Stephan’s 5. Kompanie that 
the enemy had broken through. The word ‘surrender’ was mentioned. Later it 
became clear that 7. Kompanie was also in serious trouble. It was said to have been 
‘crushed’ (‘überrrant’). But that is not what happened. In fact Stephan’s battalion 
(II./FJR 18) had not been crushed at all, it was on the run. Soon the armoured cars 
of  the 53rd Recce Regiment were racing ahead. They made spectacular progress 
and early in the afternoon even reached the outskirts of Bladel at a hamlet with the 
curious name Egypte, some twenty kilometres from the Maas-Scheldt Canal.821 Even 
though FJR 6 made a strong stand and prevented the 4th Welch from advancing 
further west, other British units proceeded almost unopposed and reached Hapert, 
Duizel and Steensel. Reinhard’s greatest fear, the collapse of his left flank, was about 
to come true. He was livid with rage, but Chill had already taken a grip and restored 
the situation. He assigned the remnants of II./FJR 18 to Von der Heydte who 
distributed the men among the companies of III./FJR 6 and demoted Oberstleutnant 
Stephan for incompetence and assigned him to command a bridge guard.822 Also, 
Kampfgruppe Zuber arrived in the nick of time. During the night it occupied a line 
from Bladel to Wintelre where it managed to block the advance of the 4th Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers on 20 September. Meanwhile the 1st Ox and Bucks reached 
Veldhoven and were poised to strike north which would mean that the split south of 
the Wilhelmina Canal between the German units on either side of the Corridor would 
be complete and irreparable. Reinhard still did not rule out a complete collapse of the 
front here and he seriously wondered how long the extremely thin line of 
strongpoints set up by Zuber would manage to hold.823 
 
East of the Corridor VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor) also finally 
saw action.824 During the early morning the 3rd Division established a small 
bridgehead over the Maas-Scheldt Canal despite fierce opposition from the remainder 
of Kampfgruppe Heinke. A bridge was completed, but the infantry was held up. 
O’Connor now ordered the 11th Armoured Division to move the 2nd Fife and Forfar 
Yeomanry Group across the bridge used by the Guards and then swing east towards 
Achel to outflank the German defences along the canal. Because of the enormous 
flow of traffic along the Corridor this was easier said than done and the group was 
not clear of the bridge until 17.30 hours. In the meantime the 3rd Division had 
widened its bridgehead. Fighting continued throughout the night and by dawn on 20 
September the leading troops reached the line Achel-Hamont. Another bridge had 
been built across the canal meanwhile and now the 11th Armoured Division could 
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finally be committed as per original plan. This was the breakthrough O’Connor had 
been waiting for and the advance of the mixed groups of the 11th Armoured Division 
encountered only negligible opposition as the 29th Armoured Brigade Group pushed 
north as far as Heeze and Someren, which was strongly defended, while the 159th 
Brigade Group reached Soerendonk and Hamont. The net result was that the 107. 
Panzerbrigade now had to begin looking over its shoulder even while it was engaged 
in fierce combat with British tanks while attacking the Corridor. 
 
Because of the failure of the attacks both by the 59. Infanterie-Division and the 107. 
Panzerbrigade and because the British XII and VIII Corps began to push ever further 
north on 20 September all German attempts to eliminate the Americans from the 
Landing Zone near Son now had to be abandoned. The focus of the battle for the 
Corridor shifted further northwards and for the next week Veghel, Schijndel and 
Eerde would become household names for both sides. Once more, Kampfgruppe Chill 
and schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559  would be called upon to fulfil an 
important role. 
The fifth day 
As dawn broke on Thursday 21 September the prospects for operation Market 
Garden looked increasingly bleak. After two days’ hard fighting the Guards and the 
US 82nd Airborne Division had finally cleared most of Nijmegen. The day before 
Paratroopers had crossed the Waal and established a small bridgehead on the north 
bank. At seven p.m. Sergeant Peter Robinson leading a troop of four Shermans from 
No.1 Squadron 2nd Grenadier Guards rushed across the road bridge in the gathering 
dusk. In a spectacular coup they took the bridge linking up with American 
Paratroopers about a kilometre north of the bridge even though Robinson’s Firefly 
and another Sherman were hit by accurate 8.8 cm fire. Some Paratroopers were so 
glad to see the British tanks they even kissed them. Later the small troop was joined 
by another Sherman, commanded by No.1 Squadron’s second-in-command, Captain 
Lord Peter Carrington. Two companies of infantry from the 3rd Irish Guards were 
also rushed across, but as it was now completely dark the tanks decided to halt for 
the night. This decision has been another source of controversy ever since. It was 
started by the CO of 82nd Airborne Division, Major-General Jim Gavin, who insisted 
that the Guards should have pushed on to Arnhem. How unrealistic it was to expect 
a troop of five tanks and some infantry to push on in the dead of night over land 
which was virtually impassable for tanks even under more favourable circumstances 
can be judged from what happened the following days.  
 
At the farthest end, in Arnhem, the British 1st Airborne Division clung on to the 
bridge for dear life, in fact, the only building still in British hands at the end of the 
20th was the 1st Brigade headquarters. Just before dawn on the 21st at five a.m. 
British resistance at the bridge ended. The gallant airborne soldiers had held on for 
more than three days, well over the forty-eight hours that had been in their original 
orders.825 It was up to XXX Corps to make one last, determined effort to get through 
to the bulk of  the 1st Airborne, which was now concentrated in a perimeter at 
Oosterbeek, about three kilometres from Arnhem. That was not going to be easy. 
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Horrocks realised he was fighting three battles at the same time, trying to reach the 
Airbornes at Oosterbeek, preventing the Germans from closing in on Nijmegen and, 
last but not least, keeping open his tenuous supply line.826 The Germans, too, 
realised the importance of cutting this road, which by then had various names. It 
was Club Route for XXX Corps, Hell’s Highway for the Americans and the Corridor for 
Second Army. Now that VIII Corps was closing on the Zuid-Willemsvaart, forcing the 
107. Panzerbrigade to pull back through Helmond, and XII Corps seemed to be about 
to break out west, threatening the German forces at Ten Aard from the rear, the only 
realistic chance for a German attack lay further north. The question was where and 
with which troops? New plans were being made that Thursday, on both sides. 
American plans 
The American Airbornes, in particular, had not been idle.827 General Taylor (101st 
Airborne) and his regimental commanders, were not content to await events 
alongside the road waiting for the Germans to attack them. Instead, they decided to 
find and destroy the German forces threatening Hell’s Highway. Colonel John H. 
Michaelis of the 502nd Regiment was the first to strike. Now that his regiment was 
complete his three battalions were to attack the German forces around the key 
village of St.-Oedenrode. General Taylor had assigned C Squadron 44th Royal Tank 
Regiment (RTR) to assist him in this job. Michaelis sent the sixteen Shermans to the 
3rd Battalion (Major John Stopka) which was to establish three outposts to the west 
of the village. The American attacks met with mixed success. The first two positions 
were occupied, but close to number 3 infantry supported by a 7.5 cm Pak gun beat 
off all attempts to advance. This area around St.-Oedenrode was held by Hauptmann 
Ewald’s men who felt the full brunt of the Anglo-American attack.828 When night fell 
the attackers were still a hundred metres from their goal. The 1st Battalion 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick F. Cassidy) was even less successful, although it should 
be emphasised that it had an almost impossible task, to attack in three different 
directions, to Olland, Schijndel and Koevering. Only the latter advance, up Hell’s 
Highway, went without a hitch. The other two, both supported by two Shermans 
from the 44th RTR, soon ran into serious trouble. Back in Veghel, Colonel Howard R. 
Johnson (501st Regiment) had much more ambitious ideas about tackling the 
Germans.  
 
What Johnson envisaged was an operation like the encirclement conducted by his 1st 
Battalion the day before, only on a somewhat grander scale.829 From members of the 
Dutch underground and the 3rd Battalion at Eerde, he learned that German troops 
were assembling near Schijndel. Suspecting an attack on Hell’s Highway Johnson 
decided to lay a trap for the enemy. He told Lieutenant-Colonel Harry W.O. Kinnard 
(1st Battalion) to advance on Schijndel from Heeswijk, where he had won a 
spectacular victory the day before. Meanwhile Lieutenant-Colonel Julian J. Ewell (3rd 
Battalion)was to attack towards Schijndel from Eerde. When he learned of this plan 
General Taylor decided to up the ante even further. Instead of just two battalions, he 
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decided to involve two regiments. He expanded Johnson’s original plan by ordering 
Michaelis’ 502nd to attack Schijndel from its positions north of St.-Oedenrode to be 
the ‘dustpan’ which would hopefully catch the Germans being pushed back by 
Johnson’s ‘broom’ from Schijndel. The operation was to start early the following 
morning (22 September). However, just as they got back to their headquarters, Ewell 
and Kinnard received calls from Johnson ordering them to initiate the attack right 
away. A night attack over unknown ground did not really make much sense and 
Ewell was so angry that he was ready to quit.830 But orders were orders and as night 
fell American Paratroopers moved out. Taylor hoped they might achieve another, 
bigger Cannae. 
German plans 
That same day Reinhard continued to be worried about the gap created by the 
advance of XII Corps and he personally oversaw the relief of Kampfgruppe Zuber by 
the 245. Infanterie-Division.831 This division, commanded by Generalleutnant Erwin 
Sander, was the fourth from 15. Armee to reach the mainland safely. On 20 
September it was only just arriving in Tilburg. The division was weakened, since it 
had to give up units and the men were exhausted as they had been on the run, 
fighting rearguard actions, for almost three weeks. In addition they had travelled for 
250 kilometres, most of it on foot. Any attack was therefore bound to end in a 
disaster. Still, their morale was still good and the division should be able to handle a 
purely defensive task provided it was given sufficient time to organise, and provided 
it received support from armoured units in the shape of Sturmgeschütze.832 However, 
the main question for the moment was, would the division get there in time?  It was 
a tense time for Reinhard. Throughout the day he received the most alarming 
messages about the progress of  the 53rd (Welsh) Division. But just as the Welsh 
appeared to breaking through Zuber’s screen, the first elements of the 245. I.D. 
arrived in the nick of time. Sander had the divisional headquarters set up in 
Hilvarenbeek. The troops were in time, but only just. On the left Grenadier-Regiment 
936  blocked the advance at Middelbeers, although it could not prevent the 1st Ox 
and Bucks (15th Division) from reaching the Wihelminakanaal opposite Oirschot thus 
completing the screen west of the Corridor. On the right Grenadier-Regiment 937 did 
the same at Netersel.833 For the time being Reinhard could breathe a sigh of relief. 
But to hold the front –there was still a gap between GR 937  and Von der Heydte’s 
FJR 6- more serious measures were needed. As it happened his superiors had been 
thinking along the same lines that day.  
 
One glance at the map made it clear to Generalfeldmarschall Model, that the bridge 
at Veghel offered the best opportunity to cut the Allied supply route. Since the start 
of Market Garden the front had gradually widened until it had roughly assumed the 
shape of a wine glass upside down. Veghel was the point where the stem and the 
cup met. Here the Allied Corridor narrowed to the width of one road as far as the 
river Maas. At a meeting with Student and Oberst Eichert-Wiersdorff, Reinhard’s 
                                        
830 To this day the reason for this decision is not clear. Johnson was killed on 4 October 1944 before 
anyone could ask him why he had moved the attack forward. 
831 KTB 88 AK, 21.09.44, 08.00 hours. 
832 Von Hobe, 33-4. 
833 Second Army Intel Log, 21.09.44, serial 63 and 22.09.44, serial 33. 
 184 
Chief of staff, Model issued an order accordingly.834 The attack from both directions 
was aimed at cutting the lifeline to Nijmegen and beyond, more specifically the group 
attacking from the west was to seize the Veghel bridge and then blow it up. This 
mission was assigned to the 59. Infanterie-Division. The rearguard of  the 59. I.D., 
including GR 1035, arrived in the meantime. What was left of the regiment was 
commanded by Major Huber who had taken over from Oberst Schroeder. He was put 
in charge of the attacking group, now called Kampfgruppe Huber.835 Since 
Generalleutnant  Poppe’s division took a mauling at Best and Hauptmann Ewald’s 
battalion seemed to be getting nowhere in Schijndel, Major Hans Jungwirth’s 
Fallschirmjäger were ordered from ‘s-Hertogenbosch to assist the 59. I.D.836 
Jungwirth’s battalion was quite formidable as it numbered no fewer than 952 men, 
most of them from the Fallschirm Ersatz Bataillon at Aschersleben.837 
 
In addition the Jagdpanther of 559 were to be involved. Once again they were to be 
deployed in a role for which they were not really designed. At 18.30 hours Reinhard 
ordered Chill to send the three operational Jagdpanther via Tilburg to the southeast 
of Vught for the planned attack of 22 September.838 Later 559 reported back that it 
had four operational Jagdpanther.839 The order prompted the acting Kommandeur of 
1. Kompanie, Oberleutnant Seitz, to send in an urgent request to LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps that day.840 He informed Reinhard that his company with the forward 
workshop and a small staff had been deployed at the Ten Aard bridgehead with four 
operational Jagdpanther while five others were in workshops near Zutphen. He asked 
to be reunited with the rest of 559 both for tactical and technical reasons. Seitz 
pointed out that the Belgian-Dutch terrain with its limited visibility was completely 
unsuitable for the heavy Jagdpanther unless they could operate alongside the more 
mobile Sturmgeschütze. The Jagdpanther could protect the lighter vehicles from 
enemy armour while the Sturmgeschütze could provide flank cover. Technically it 
also made sense, Seitz argued, because the forward workshop could only carry out 
minor repairs. Effectively this meant that most of the Jagdpanther which were in 
repair might never make it back to the front because of Allied air superiority. Finally 
Seitz said he was out of touch with headquarters which had moved back to Well, a 
village on the Maas, almost one hundred kilometres to the east of Turnhout. Seitz 
certainly had a point and 559 would indeed be reunited, just not in the way he had 
requested.  
Since the start of operation Market Garden the remnants of schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 had been scattered to the four winds. For a couple of 
days it seemed as if the unit was gone. Heeresgruppe B reported that ‘Jagd-Panther-
Abt. 559, (…) scheinbar Fallsch.AOK 1 entglitten ist und mit Masse in Wesel steht.’841 
Thereupon the Heeresgruppe decided to order it in reserve. However, it was soon 
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discovered that this only applied to the two Sturmgeschütz Kompanien which were in 
Germany and that the Jagdpanther were still with LXXXVIII. Armeekorps west of the 
Corridor. One measure which Oberst Eichert-Wiersdorff took right away was to order 
the major workshops in Zutphen to move closer to the front and set up shop in 
Baarle-Nassau. They were to take the Jagdpanther and Sturmgeschütze which were 
under repair along with them and report to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. Around this time 
Kopka went to fetch orders from Heeresgruppe B (Generalfeldmarschall Model) in 
Garath Castle near Düsseldorf.842 There he learned that 559 would be assigned to 
15. Armee (Von Zangen) who had his headquarters in Dordrecht. Before seeing Von 
Zangen in Dordrecht Kopka and his staff company travelled back to De Bilt, near 
Utrecht, where some of the workshops had been located since the unit had arrived in 
the Netherlands on 2 September. 
 
As Kampfgruppe Huber began to assemble south of Schijndel and in Wijbosch, the 
four Jagdpanther were clattering along the darkening roads towards their new 
assembly point at Vught, a distance of well over forty kilometres.843 After they 
arrived there they moved on to their starting positions. From what happened later it 
is clear that two must then have gone as far as Wijbosch, between Schijndel and 
Eerde, villages held by the Americans since midnight, while the other pair went on 
and joined the rest of Huber’s group in the area around Olland, a few kilometres 
further west. In the same order Model also allowed LXXXVIII. Armeekorps to pull 
back behind the Antwerp-Turnhout as far as Voorheide in order to free forces. As 
related earlier Eichert-Wiersdorff initially objected, but eventually was overruled. 
Following this meeting Eichert-Wiersdorff drove to Poppe’s headquarters to discuss 
the impending attack there. He was told that the 107. Panzerbrigade would start 
from Gemert at seven a.m. and expected to be in Erp two hours later. From there it 
would attack towards the bridge at Veghel.844 Hopes were high because the 
operation had a reasonable chance of success. The reported strength of 
Kampfgruppe Huber was three battalions. It was supported by two batteries sFH and 
one 2 cm battery plus the Jagdpanther. On the east side of the Zuid Willemsvaart 
Kampfgruppe Walther was a formidable force indeed. It could boast the 107. 
Panzerbrigade, one battalion of Grenadier-Regiment 16, one Artillerie-Abteilung with 
three batteries, one Flak-Abteilung and Kampfgruppe Heinke. The attack from 
Schijndel and surroundings was to start the following morning, 22 September, at 
06.30 hours.845 The Germans were, naturally, unaware of the plans of their 
opponents. In fact, the Americans had already started their own attack. Soon the 
two operations would clash in a spectacular way. 
Clashes 
It was a dark, moonless night as Kinnard’s 1st Battalion 501st marched from  
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Heeswijk to Schijndel.846 Without any serious opposition the Paratroopers reached 
Schijndel shortly after midnight. The Americans dispersed and by 01.50 hours the 
village was secured. Kinnard also got in touch with the head of the local 
underground, an energetic and enterprising priest, curate Fred Woestenburg. 
Kinnard asked Woestenburg to assemble his men. After an hour Kinnard had the first 
information about the German positions in and around Schijndel. While most of his 
men were catching a quick nap Kinnard had a word with Woestenburg. He asked the 
priest to make sure that the people in Schijndel stay indoors the following day. 
“Pretend we are not welcome,” Kinnard said. He knew that the liberation of Schijndel 
was only temporary and he also knew that the Germans might take revenge if there 
were any celebrations. Woestenburg passed the message on and there were no 
reprisals later on.847 
  
Meanwhile Ewell and the 3rd Battalion 501st had made less progress. Starting from 
Eerde the battalion had turned left and followed the railway so that in the darkness 
they would go in the right direction. However, this brought them close to part of 
Kampfgruppe Huber in Wijbosch and as a result Ewell’s men were constantly fired 
upon from positions near the railway. A few Paratroopers lost touch with the main 
force and fell into German hands. When dawn broke on 22 September Ewell’s 
battalion finally closed in on Schijndel from the south. His men took up positions 
north of the railway waiting for the British tanks to arrive. These, B Squadron 44th 
RTR had spent the night in Eerde as Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson did not want to 
risk losing tanks in the darkness. At 08.30 hours B Squadron joined Kinnard’s men in 
Schijndel.  
The American advance had split Major Huber’s group in two, seriously weakening the 
attack force in one swift move. Still, Generalleutnant Poppe decided that the attack 
should go ahead as planned. The battalion and a half in Wijbosch, isolated east of 
Schijndel, would simply have to operate on their own and try to reach the bridge 
through Eerde. The other, western, half of Kampfgruppe Huber would have to make 
a U-turn and clear Schijndel first.848 Now that Kampfgruppe Huber was split in two by 
the American attack at Schijndel, the western half, mainly the bulk of Grenadier-
Regiment 1035 plus Jungwirth’s battalion was engaged south of Schijndel where it 
incurred heavy losses and robbed Huber of his flank protection.849 Hence only the 
eastern half could undertake the assigned mission.850 It was supported by two 
Jagdpanther from 1./559.851 To make matters worse, the Kommandeur of the 
Kampfgruppe, Major Huber himself, was unable to get through to this group and 
command was assumed by Hauptmann Mania, the Kommandeur of I./Grenadier-
Regiment 1036.852 Approaching Eerde from the north and the west the Grenadiere 
reached the village around noon. The only Allies in Eerde were two armoured cars 
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from the Dragoon Guards and a platoon of Paratroopers. This tiny force could not 
stop the Germans. At two p.m. Mania’s group crossed the road and now came within 
sight of the bridge. So far they had been lucky, but then things began to go wrong 
for the small Kampfgruppe.  
Aware that something was brewing, two Anti-Aircraft Regiments on the way to 
Nijmegen had momentarily halted at Veghel bridge to let infantry pass. They now 
joined in the defence of both bridge and town in response to the attack by 
Kampfgruppe Walther. The 123rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (LAA) was already 
across the bridge and became embroiled in the fighting at Veghel itself during the 
afternoon.853 Its 40 mm Bofors guns were set up in various positions as Anti-Tank 
guns. The gunners contributed to holding the key village, but the 123rd LAA incurred 
serious losses, testimony to the nature of the heavy fighting.854 Six tractors were 
shot up by the Panther  tanks prowling around the village and one group of the 
408th Battery had to spend the night holed up in a house in Veghel, literally holding 
their breath at times, surrounded as they were by Germans.  
On the other side of the bridge the 165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment 
(HAA) had become involved in the struggle against Mania’s little band.855 Their 3.7 
inch guns almost matched the performance of the German 88’s and around noon a 
number of them were set up on the western approach to the bridge, both as anti-
tank guns and as artillery. They fired intermittent airbursts over suspected German 
positions, wreaking havoc among Mania’s infantry. The Jagdpanther and the 3.7 inch 
guns exchanged a few shots and the Jagdpanther pulled back. Meanwhile the tanks 
from B and C Squadrons 44th RTR entered Eerde accompanied by gunners from all 
three Batteries (198, 275 and 317) moving alongside them and acting as infantry. 
Although communications left much to be desired between the tanks and the 
gunners (165th HAA unit did have proper infantry radio equipment) the operation 
was successful in that nearly one hundred Germans were taken prisoner. The tanks 
of the 44th RTR found the rest of Eerde empty as Mania’s Kampfgruppe had moved 
on and two Shermans of C Squadron were on their way back to Veghel. They were 
spotted by Mania’s men who were now being threatened from the rear. Mania 
decided to abandon the attempt to get through to the bridge and instead cross the 
road. This was an unfortunate decision as precisely at that moment two battalions 
from the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment moved up the road from St.-Oedenrode. At 
four p.m. the American infantry broke through to the bridge and took about seventy 
prisoners. The few survivors of Mania’s group were now between a rock and a very 
hard place. They fled further south to the hamlet of Zijtaart and hid until it got dark. 
During the night Mania and a number of his men managed to get back to their own 
lines. The two Jagdpanther of 559 had also pulled back to safety. On the way they 
got into a firefight with Shermans from C Squadron 44th RTR at Eerde. One 
Jagdpanther was reputedly knocked out and the other withdrew across the heath 
towards Schijndel around five p.m. Although it was hit from some distance by the 
Shermans it got away by hiding behind some trees.856  
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All in all Poppe had lost at least another battalion. On top of that one of his 
engineers (wrongly) claimed that the Veghel bridge was a concrete construction 
which meant that it would take at least five hours to prepare it for demolition. Poppe 
was deeply frustrated and blamed Kampfgruppe Walther for the failure of the attack. 
The available evidence suggests otherwise. After interrogating prisoners-of-war Allied 
officers made some interesting observations about the two attacking groups. They 
noted about the SS-men in Kampfgruppe Walther: ‘morale good to excellent’. About 
Poppe’s men at Schijndel, however, they wrote ‘Opposition generally much feebler. 
Chaps trying to get home.’857 This was no surprise in view of the fact that one third 
of the men serving in the 59. Infanterie-Division were Volksdeutsche (non-native 
Germans living outside the Reich) among them no fewer than six hundred Poles.858 
Still one can understand Poppe’s frustration. The attack had come so close to 
success. Only two kilometres had separated the two Kampfgruppen. Because they 
were not in direct communication they had had no idea where the other was and this 
had prevented them from linking up. What Poppe did not know was that 
Kampfgruppe Walther had run into problems of its own. These were connected to 
the advance of VIII Corps. 
While Veghel was the focal point of the fighting that day the two Corps on the flanks 
had not been idle either. The previous night VIII Corps had thrown a bridge over the 
Zuid-Willemsvaart at Asten. On 22 September they enlarged the bridgehead in spite 
of attempts by elements from Kampfgruppe Heinke and (later) the 7. 
Fallschirmjäger-division to stop them. This meant that Walther now had to look over 
his shoulders while attacking Veghel; in other words he was running out of time and 
fast. In contrast, west of the Corridor it was clearly noticable to XII Corps that the 
enemy defence had stiffened. The arrival of the 245. Infanterie-Division made itself 
felt and the advance of the 53rd (Welsh) Division slowed down considerably that 
day. Bladel and Bijsterveld were occupied, but at Middelbeers and Reusel the 
Grenadiere would not budge an inch. Further north the advance also ground to a halt 
as the 15th (Scottish) Division tried to take Best. The 2nd Glasgow Highlanders 
stormed the village in vain. Kampfgruppe Lenz met all attempts with murderous fire 
and only D Company in the centre reached its objective, the church and the 
monastery. Lieutenant-Colonel P.U. Campbell realised that further progress was 
impossible and he ordered his companies to consolidate. As the battle at Ten Aard 
was now over the rest of the Scottish division would soon join them.   
Counterattack 
Not only was Kampfgruppe Walther about to be threatened from the rear by the 
advance of VIII Corps, cutting Hell’s Highway meant that there would undoubtedly 
be counterattacks from the direction of Nijmegen. With a sinking heart Horrocks 
(XXX Corps) realised on 22 September that any chance of success for Market Garden 
was fast slipping through his fingers. He learned of the German breakthrough just as 
contact had been made with the 1st Airborne Division at Oosterbeek. He understood 
that there was really no option but to order the 32nd Guards Brigade to make a U-
turn and head back down the road.859 The order went out at four p.m. Executing it 
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took some time as the brigade had to travel all the way back from the Nijmegen area 
where they had been in support of the US 82nd Airborne Division. Still the 2nd 
Grenadier Guards made contact with American Paratroopers in Uden only two hours 
later. Soon after the 5th Coldstream Guards arrived. The village was now packed 
with stranded Allied vehicles and vaguely resembled a railway station full of forlorn 
passengers.  
 
Early in the morning of 23 September Oberst Walther visited the command post of 
107. Panzerbrigade and ordered Von Maltzahn to make one more effort to break the 
defences at Veghel.860 In pouring rain attacks from two directions, Erp and 
Mariaheide, converged on Veghel. Soon the Brigade lost four Panther tanks. During 
this action both the Kommandeur of Panzer-Abteilung 2107, Major Hans-Albrecht von 
Plüskow, and of Panzergrenadier-Bataillon 2107, Hauptmann Kurt Wildt, were killed. 
It was a huge blow to Von Maltzahn’s unit and testimony to the ferocity of the 
fighting. Helped by the Shermans of B Squadron 44th RTR the 501st managed to 
beat off all attacks and by ten a.m. things had quieted down. General Taylor decided 
it was now time to counterattack. A lot of time was wasted trying to come up with a 
plan that in the end turned out to be too ingenious for its own good. The idea was 
that the Coldstream Guards would advance south, on Volkel, to cover the flank of the 
Grenadiers attacking down the road towards Veghel. General Taylor, rightly or 
wrongly, felt that the British took too long to implement their plan and his scheme of 
outflanking Kampfgruppe Walther came to nothing. Communication with the British 
troops was poor, the attack towards Uden started too late and the German forces 
south of Veghel turned out to be too strong. Still, at 15.20 hours Grenadier Guards 
and American Paratroopers met just outside Veghel. The important lifeline was open 
again, but twenty-five precious hours had been lost. For Walther it meant the end of 
the attacks on Hell’s Highway. While the fighting for Veghel raged he saw his biggest 
fear come true: VIII Corps broke out of the bridgehead at Asten. Although 
Kampfgruppe Heinke resisted fiercely the 11th Armoured Division turned out to be 
too strong for the SS-men and slowly but surely they were pushed back. The British 
advance was converging on Deurne, a key road centre. This seriously threatened the 
rear of Kampfgruppe Walther and that night it pulled back from Erp to Gemert. It 
was the end of Walther’s involvement in the battle for Hell’s Highway.  
A new plan 
At the end of 22 September Reinhard’s Ia, Oberst Eichert-Wiersdorff, was called time 
and again by Major Berlin at 1. Fallschirmarmee, inquiring after the progress of the 
attack on the bridge at Veghel.861 Eichert-Wiersdorff was unable to make Berlin 
understand the futility of going on with the attack and the latter simply kept 
repeating that the orders had to be carried out. Then Eichert-Wiersdorff asked to be 
put through to his counterpart. Finally, at 22.15 hours Oberst Reinhard, Student’s 
Chief-of-Staff, came on the phone. After listening to Eichert-Wiersdorff’s arguments 
Reinhard promised to put the issue to Student. Just before midnight Fallschirmarmee 
called back. Both Student and Model told LXXXVIII. Armeekorps to obey the orders 
they had given. The troops involved were to dig in. They would be provided with 
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new ammunition on the 23rd and they would have to resume the attack on the 
bridge the following day. General Reinhard was exasperated. He demanded to speak 
to Student himself. Once again he explained why the 59. I.D. could not carry on with 
the attack. Still Student would not relent. When Reinhard told him that there was a 
yawning gap between the 59. I.D. and ‘s-Hertogenbosch Student reiterated that the 
Kampfkommandant there, Oberst Dewald, had at least 1,500 men, among them an 
outstanding battalion commanded by Major Ernst Bloch. The discussion continued for 
a while, but in the end Reinhard failed to change Student’s mind.  
 
Clearly news of Reinhard’s protests had been passed on towards Heeresgruppe B, 
because very early the following morning, Reinhard received another phone call from 
Major Berlin. He informed the General that Model himself had made the two 
Kommandierende Generale, i.e. Reinhard and Von Obstfelder, personally responsible 
for the attack on Veghel and the Allied lifeline.862 An hour later Reinhard was on his 
way to Poppe at his headquarters in Boxtel to find out what exactly had happened 
the day before.863 Hearing Poppe’s description of the events and the losses he had 
incurred, confirmed Reinhard’s suspicion that the 59. I.D. was no longer in a position 
to carry out any further attacks. Reinhard simply had to find another solution to his 
problem. He then had a brainwave: why not assign the mission to Kampfgruppe 
Chill? Because of the withdrawal behind the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal Chill’s troops 
were now more or less available. The Jagdpanther of 1./559 and Chill were once 
again to be reunited. Reinhard also decided to use the experienced Fallschirm-
Bataillon Bloch. This was to send two of its four companies to St.Michielsgestel, just 
north of Schijndel, right away.864 After returning to Poppe’s headquarters Reinhard 
contacted Student and told him of his decision. Student agreed that it was the best 
plan under the circumstances. Reinhard then got in touch with Chill and told him of 
the new mission. Just before noon Chill arrived in Boxtel and plans were drawn up.  
 
While the bulk of Von der Heydte’s men now moved to Schijndel to get ready for the 
attack on the Allied lifeline, his II. Batallion stayed behind. Hauptmann Mager’s men 
were to help the 245. Infanterie-Division (Generalleutnant Erwin Sander). Although 
the division had arrived just in time to take over from Kampfgruppe Zuber to prevent 
a total collapse, LXXXVIII. Armeekorps was not out of the woods yet. Reinhard was 
still seriously worried about a breakthrough in the direction of Tilburg. Although the 
front was considerably shortened after the withdrawal behind the Antwerp-Turnhout 
Canal the move of Kampfgruppe Chill to Schijndel meant that there were no reserves 
left. This Reinhard felt, was too risky. Hence he assigned II./FJR 6 to Sander’s 
division.865 Soon the battalion would be involved in one of the bloodiest battles in its 
history. 
 
When it moved from the area north of Turnhout, via Tilburg and Vught to its new 
forming up point, Kampfgruppe Chill had swollen to a sizeable force.866 Apart from 
the Jagdpanther of 1./559 it controlled all of FJR 6 (apart from II. Bataillon), I./FJR 2 
                                        
862 KTB 88 AK, 23.09.44, 07.20 hours. 
863 This section, KTB 88 AK, 23.09.44, A 424. 
864 KTB Dewald, 23.09.44, 12.05 hours. 
865 KTB 88 AK, 23.09.44, Lagebeurteilung. 
866 KTB 88 AK, 24.09.44, B 311. 
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(Finzel), I./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring plus 
one battalion of its own troops (mainly Grenadier-Regimente 1053 and 1054) under 
Hauptmann Ohler,867 the Kommandeur of II./GR 1053.868 The Kampfgruppe could 
now boast six battalions with no less than 3,480 infantry.869 In addition it had quite a 
bit of artillery, in fact no fewer than four batteries with a total of fifteen 10,5 cm 
Haubitze, four batteries with the same number of 8,8 cm Flak guns plus nineteen 2 
cm guns.870 Henced there was a chance that Chill might succeed where Poppe had 
failed, especially since there was more good news. Recce parties sent out by the 59. 
I.D. had discovered that their opponents had pulled back from Schijndel, in fact 
Fallschirm-Bataillon Jungwirth and some units of GR 1035 were already back inside 
the village. As darkness fell the various units from Kampfgruppe Chill settled down 
for the night or were still arriving. Chill himself initially set up his headquarters in St.-
Michielsgestel, five kilometres north of Schijndel. Later he would move to Schijndel 
itself. The following day would be crucial for both sides. Chill had divided his 
command into two separate Kampfgruppen. Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte was in 
charge of his own three battalions of FJR 6 and Oberstleutnant Dreyer commanded 
the other three (I./FJR 2, I./F.Pz.Ers.und Ausb.Regt.HG and Btl. Ohler). That day a 
new Kampfgruppe Dreyer was born, quite different from the one before. The 
remnants of the two Flieger Regimente 51 and 53, who had fought so gallantly under 
his command at Geel were now assigned to the 719. Infanterie-Division.  
 
The attack was to start around nine a.m. the following morning. Although 
preparations were necessarily made in haste, the order Poppe gave his troops for 24 
September underlines the seriousness of the attempt.871 While Chill’s men undertook 
the main attack from the line St.-Oedenrode-Schijndel to block the bridges at Veghel 
Poppe’s division was to provide continous reconnaissance and it was to cover the 
right flank with Kampfgruppe Huber. The main task of this group, led by Major 
Huber, the acting Kommandeur of Grenadier-Regiment 1035, was to contain the 
enemy which would no doubt try to counterattack.872 To maintain contact with Chill a 
group of fifty men with two 4,7 cm Pak auf Renault R 35 (f) would follow the left 
flank of Huber.873 Another thirty infantry would be held in reserve and assigned to 
Huber if necessary. In addition four 2 cm Flak auf Sfl and a group of combat 
engineers armed with anti-tank mines would also be subordinated to Huber. It was 
                                        
867 Second Army Intelligence Log, 30.09.44, serial 23. 
868 First Cdn Army IR PoW 85 ID, 14.10.44. 
869 Broken down: I./FJR 6: 662, III./FJR 6: 549, IV./FJR 6: 613, I./H.Gö: 579, I./FHR 2: 554 and Btl. 
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872 On Huber: War Diary 7th Armoured Division, Intel Sum 105. 
873 They were the only two left from Panzerjäger-Kompanie 304 which had set off from Calais with 
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and one had stranded in a minefield. First Cdn Army, Interrogation PoW Artillery Army Units, 
29.09.44. 
 192 
hoped that this concentration of troops should do the trick. While preparations were 
going on other changes had taken place. 
Change of command 
The discussion about the attack on Veghel was the last one Reinhard had with 
Student, because from noon 23 September Reinhard’s Corps was no longer under 1. 
Fallschirmarmee. Instead 15. Armee from now on commanded LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps. Now that the Allied breakthrough was solidifying it made more sense to 
use the Corridor as a natural division. Student’s Fallschirmarmee would control the 
area to the east, and Von Zangen the area to the west. The latter was also in 
command of LXVII. Armeekorps (General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer), 
responsible for the front north of Antwerp as far as Merksem while Reinhard’s Corps 
was responsible for the sector east of there. Since Reinhard obviously had too much 
on his plate now and since the front of the 719. I.D. (Generalleutnant Sievers) did 
not appear to be threatened, Siever’s division was assigned to Sponheimer’s corps 
the following day.  
 
The new Oberbefehlshaber, General der Infanterie Gustav-Adolf von Zangen, was 
not at all like Student. British interrogators after the war wrote, “His square-jawed, 
blue-eyed, rather handsome face has the dull and stolid quality of those usually 
engaged in the business of maintaining law and order.”874 They hit the nail on the 
head. After having served as an officer in the First World War, Von Zangen like many 
other officers had joined the police where he stayed until 1935. He reached a 
position of considerable authority but with the expansion of the Wehrmacht following 
Hitler’s rise to power, he rejoined the armed forces as a lieutenant-colonel. Rising 
through the ranks he gained his Ritterkreuz on 15 January 1942 as Kommandeur of 
the 17. Infanterie-Division fighting in Russia. In spite of this, his former opponents 
who described him as a typical policeman, did not consider him a first rate officer, 
but contributed his high position to both the shortage of officers and his loyalty to 
the Führer. Be that as it may, the new superior to whom Kampfgruppe Chill and 559 
were now assigned would make skilful use of them. 
 
Probably around this time Oberleutnant Franz Kopka must have met Von Zangen.875 
After learning that schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559 had been assigned 15. 
Armee he travelled to De Bilt. From there he drove to Dordrecht and reported to 
Oberst Georg Metzke, Ia 15. Armee, who right away got in touch with 
Generalleutnant Hoffmann, Von Zangen’s Chief-of-staff. The latter expected Kopka to 
tell him how many Jagdpanther would be available for the attack. Over dinner with 
Von Zangen they discussed the various possibilities of transporting the heavy 
Jagdpanther to the front without too much wear and tear. According to Kopka Von 
Zangen offered him the trailers that were used for V-2 rockets. Either Kopka’s 
memory failed him or Von Zangen had never seen such a trailer before, because this 
suggestion was of little practical use. There was no way in which these so-called 
Meilerwagen could ever carry a 46-ton Jagdpanther, even if the trailers had been 
available.  
                                        
874 Quote and details, Special Interrogation Report, 1. 
875 This section, Kopka, Missbraucht und Gebeutelt, 151-2. 
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The final attempt 
On Sunday 24 September operation Market Garden was like a ship dead in the water, 
only the captain still hoping to make port. As Lieutenant-General Horrocks (XXX 
Corps) climbed to the top of Valburg church, it promised to be another typically 
Dutch autumn day, sunny and not too cold (14º C) but with the occasional 
shower.876 Horrocks took a look across the river Neder Rijn (as the Rhine is known 
here) to the shrinking bridgehead still occupied by the 1st Airborne Division.877 He 
was determined to make one final effort to get across the Rhine. He felt that it 
should be possible to put at least one battalion of the 43rd (Wessex) Division across 
and possibly, if things went well, even cross further west to carry out a left hook and 
attack the German forces from the rear. After having issued orders he drove back to 
St.-Oedenrode (still firmly in Allied hands) to meet Dempsey. Dempsey agreed with 
Horrocks that the so-called left hook should be staged quickly, otherwise the 
Airbornes were to be withdrawn.  
 
Looking back Horrocks’ optimism was as unrealistic as the pessimism that prevailed 
on the German side.878 That day Generalfeldmarschall Model, OB Heeresgruppe B, 
reported to the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) that the situation for 15. 
Armee and 1. Fallschirmarmee was deteriorating rapidly every day as they were 
being threatened in the rear by the enemy who had broken out at Veghel.879 He also 
worried about the slow pace with which 15. Armee was pouring troops into the 
province of North Brabant. Two days earlier he had grabbed the phone when his 
Chief-of-Staff, General Hans Krebs, informed him of this. He had urged both the 245. 
and the 712. Infanterie-Division to strengthen his north flank and he had shouted, 
‘Macht mir den linken Flügel stark!’880 Now Model, supported by OB West, Von 
Rundstedt, even went so far as to suggest a gradual withdrawal behind the Maas 
and Waal. Hitler did not agree with Model’s pessimistic assessment and he ordered 
the two armies to hold their present positions and plug the gap at Veghel through a 
concentric attack thus allowing the destruction of the Allied forces north of there.881 
That was exactly what Kampfgruppe Chill was trying to do that day. 
 
The attack was to begin as early as possible.882 At eight a.m. Reinhard joined Chill in 
his new headquarters in Schijndel.883 He also saw Dreyer and Von der Heydte. The 
plan was for Dreyer to make a wide hook via Eerde, his left flank (Bataillon Ohler) 
attacking north of the Zuid Willemsvaart, while Von der Heydte’s group would 
advance in a parallel direction further west. Fallschirm-Bataillon Jungwirth, still under 
control of Poppe’s 59. I.D., would follow closely on their heels to cover the right 
flank. The four Jagdpanther from 1./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 were 
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right in the middle, between I./FJR 2 (Finzel) and I./FJR 6.884 They were to be held 
back until a breakthrough was achieved. Once again, as at Beringen and Geel, 
schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559  was asked to do what it had not been set 
up for: act as tanks.  
 
As most of the troops were exhausted, they had been on the move since the day 
before, the attack began later than envisaged. Not until nine a.m. did the first troops 
set off from Schijndel (Von der Heydte) and Wijbosch (Dreyer). The attack went well 
the first half hour, but then the leading troops of both I./FJR 2 and I./FJR 6 closed in 
on the village of Eerde. Here all three battalions of Colonel Johnson’s 501st had dug 
in the previous day, after leaving Schijndel. As the morning fog lifted the American 
outposts along the railway line and among the sand dunes spotted figures 
approaching from the north. Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell’s 3rd Battalion, securely behind 
the railway line, quite easily managed to stop I./FJR 2  and the rest of Kampfgruppe 
Dreyer that followed in their wake. However, to their left, where the bulk of I./FJR 6 
attacked, the situation soon became more precarious. The official history of the 
101st states that, “the appearance of the 6th Parachute Regiment on the Division 
front caused elation rather than dismay,” remembering how they had virtually wiped 
out I./FJR 6 near Carentan in Normandy.885 Still, it seems unlikely a feeling of 
euphoria was the first thing on the Paratroopers’ minds as they fought for their lives 
in Eerde against their old adversaries. As the outposts ran back to alert the rest of 
the 1st Battalion, shells began to crash down in the village. After a while mortars 
joined in and for a while the situation was so confusing that it took Lieutenant-
Colonel Kinnard twenty minutes before he had a clear idea that a large German force 
was advancing on Eerde through the sand dunes. Kinnard alerted Johnson who 
immediately despatched A Squadron 44th RTR from Veghel to Eerde. The first tanks 
arrived at 10.05 hours. When Colonel Johnson came out of his headquarters in a 
farm near Eerde to brief the British liaison officer, a shell exploded close by. Johnson 
was hit by fragments and wounded. Kinnard took over. He realized that the dunes 
were the key and he decided to launch a counterattack there.  
 
It was now eleven a.m. and pressure on the 1st Battalion and the tankers kept 
increasing. Within six minutes three Shermans were hit, two in the village of Eerde 
and one further north at the railway crossing, killing two of the tank commanders, 
Lieutenants Hooper and Gilbert. Most likely they were hit by the Jagdpanther of 
1./schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559 which were in position near Eerde 
railway station around that time.886 Also around the same time it became clear to 
Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte, that the attack had bogged down. His III. Batallion 
was stuck in the middle of the heath between Schijndel and St.-Oedenrode and his I. 
Batallion was not getting anywhere either at Eerde. Around noon Von der Heydte, 
who had joined III./FJR 6 to see for himself, ordered his men to dig in, just as 
Kinnard was getting ready to counterattack. The American move started at 12.15 
hours. Although the Fallschirmjäger initially put up a serious fight, the Americans 
managed to slowly push I./FJR 6 away and regain the sand dunes. Around 15.30  
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hours the area was completely in American hands. Johnson’s regiment was about to 
continue the advance beyond the railway and retake Wijbosch when they got 
alarming news. About two hundred German infantry accompanied by four ‘tanks’ had 
been sighted west of the sand dunes.  
Success at last 
As mentioned above, Fallschirm-Bataillon Jungwirth was only supposed to cover the 
right flank of the attack on Veghel bridge. However, the American success in 
defending Eerde, meant that the centre of gravity began to shift. Instead of Dreyer, 
who was stuck north of the railway, or Von der Heydte, who was being pushed out 
of the sand dunes, Jungwirth was now the only one left who might still actually reach 
Hell’s Highway. So the four Jagdpanther were assigned to him. We do not know by 
whom, probably Chill under whose command they were, or exactly when, but just 
before four p.m. they were observed moving south along the heath south of the 
railway line.887 The one commanded by Oberleutnant Seitz, call sign 02, must have 
lagged behind and lost its way, because it ended up opposite Kinnard’s battalion in 
the sand dunes where it caused heavy losses among A Company. As he wanted to 
get a closer look at the American positions Seitz opened the hatch and stuck out his 
head. While peering through his binoculars he was hit by an American sniper and 
killed instantly. The Jagdpanther turned around and went back to the German lines. 
Once there it assisted the Fallschirmjäger by shelling the American positions in 
Eerde.888  
 
In the meantime the other three Jagdpanther rumbled on. It was now four p.m. and 
the group began to approach the road, the Allied Centre Line (CL). As soon as the 
Paratroopers of the 502nd in St.-Oedenrode observed the German party they 
sounded the alarm. Colonel Michaelis immediately despatched C and H Companies 
towards Koevering to intercept them. They were too late and arrived seconds after 
the Germans. Slipping away from the Paratroopers the Fallschirmjäger arrived at the 
road northeast of Koevering where they spotted a British convoy and shot up all the 
lorries. The two American companies counterattacked, but were repulsed. It was 
almost an hour later when the lead party, about forty Fallschirmjäger and two 
Jagdpanther, crossed the road.889 Soon more groups followed, the third Jagdpanther 
among them. Once again, the crucial artery had been severed.  
 
The news created a sense of panic among the Allied commanders and without delay 
C Squadron 44th RTR sent one troop down the road to deal with ‘an SP (…) which 
was now shooting up ‘B’ vehicles…’890 The Shermans went full throttle across Veghel 
bridge and just ten minutes later arrived at Logtenburg, a stretch of wood where the 
Germans were just digging. As the three Shermans rounded the corner they were 
suddenly confronted by an unexpected adversary, a Jagdpanther. Within minutes all 
three Shermans had been knocked out. They were reported as ‘brewed up’, but this 
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was in fact not the case. 891 Two Shermans were still operational as the Allies would 
find out the following day. 
 
The last Allied counterattack of the day was also launched from St.-Oedenrode. This 
time the 52nd Reconnaissance Regiment RAC (Recce) under Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.B.A. Hankey, took the lead.892 This was done, because, unlike other recce 
battalions, it had a squadron of tanks. The attack started at 18.15 hours, but as it 
was getting dark the attack soon bogged down. Around seven p.m. after having 
advanced about two hundred metres and losing one tank the 52nd Recce decided to 
call it a day. The situation was too confused to continue.893 As soon as it was really 
dark, more and more Fallschirmjäger, most of them from 9. and 10./FJR 6, crossed 
the road and joined the group around Logtenburg.894 Altogether around two hundred 
men established themselves in the woods astride and south of the Allied Centre Line. 
It is also clear that at least one, but probably more Panzerjäger from Panzerjäger-
Kompanie 304 joined in as well.895 Finally two or three 8.8 cm Flak guns reinforced 
the Kampfgruppe under Major Huber.896 How the guns reached the wood at 
Logtenburg is not recorded, probably they were towed there by halftracks, although 
we do not know for sure since after the battle no such vehicles were found, so they 
must have returned after dropping off the Flak. Kampfgruppe Huber’s mission was 
twofold, to block the Allied centre line and to try reach the Veghel bridges.897 The 
first part was difficult enough, with his tiny force, virtually in the middle of Allied 
territory, the second one was a mission impossible from the start. Still, neither 
Huber, nor any of his superiors had any choice in the matter as Hitler himself insisted 
on another attack. His aim: ‘die Lücke an den inneren Flügeln der 15. Armee und der 
1. Fallschirm-Armee bei Vechel durch konzentrischen Angriff zu schliessen und damit 
die Voraussetzung für die Vernichtung des Feindes nördlich der Maas zu schaffen.’898  
 
That same, fateful day, the remaining divisions of XXX and XII Corps were also finally 
brought forward. After the bloody battle for Geel the 50th (Northumbrian) Division 
had had almost a fortnight’s rest and recuperation.899 Only the 69th Brigade had 
been in action so far, assisting the Guards at Uden. On the 24th the two other 
brigades also moved up, the 151st concentrated south of St.-Oedenrode while the 
231st went as far as Veghel, just before the German force cut the road. Divisional 
headquarters were moved to a hamlet, east of St.-Oedenrode, Vechelse Hut, where 
it had an important guest that night, XXX Corps commander, a very frustrated 
Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks. After the conference with Dempsey (Second 
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Army) Horrocks had gotten into his car to drive back to his headquarters north of 
Nijmegen, only to find the road cut again. Because of the confused situation in the 
dark, he had no option but spend the night with the 50th Division. Following the 50th 
was the 7th Armoured Division, the famous Desert Rats, commanded by Major-
General G.L. Verney. The division was on its way from Eindhoven just as 
Kampfgruppe Huber cut the road. Most of its units would soon be involved in the 
battle for Hell’s Highway.  
The end 
The German success in blocking the artery to Nijmegen and beyond was the final 
straw that broke the camel’s back for operation Market Garden. On Monday 25 
September General Dempsey (Second Army) decided to withdraw the 1st Airborne 
Division from the bridgehead that night. Their position was no longer tenable. 
Montgomery agreed and at 09.30 hours he confirmed Dempsey’s decision. Finally 
Horrocks was told. He had spent the night at 50th Division headquarters. Early in the 
morning, with the help of a carrier platoon from the 9th Durham Light Infantry he 
made a wide detour of the German blocking position.900 Later that morning he was 
back at his headquarters north of Nijmegen. The atmosphere was gloomy. The 4th 
Dorsets who had crossed the Rhine the previous night  had suffered such casualties 
that they were unable to reinforce the bridgehead. There was nothing left to do for 
Horrocks but oversee the withdrawal. Further south, however, the fighting still raged 
on. 
  
Kampfgruppe Huber had to attack on its own on the 24th since Kampfgruppe 
Walther on the other side of the Zuid-Willemsvaart had been forced to pull back. The 
advance of VIII Corps (O’Connor) had proceeded so rapidly that by the time Chill’s 
men reached Koevering, Walther’s group had already left Erp, south of Veghel, and 
moved further southeast to protect their rear. Because it was also being threatened 
from Veghel (and Volkel) by the 231st Brigade of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, 
Walther was authorised to pull back even further in a northeasterly direction. There 
he was to form a semicircle covering the all important Maas bridge at Venlo. This 
withdrawal had to be completed on the 25 September. O’Connor’s corps had done 
pretty well overall, but on the other side of the Corridor it was a very different story. 
There Ritchie’s XII  Corps was in serious trouble.901 The attack by the 53rd (Welsh) 
Division against the 245. Infanterie-Division, supported by Von der Heydte’s FJR 6, 
which had caused Reinhard so many headaches earlier on, had completely bogged 
down. Also, at Best, Kampfgruppe Lenz, the improvised battle group formed around 
I./SS-Polizei-Sicherungs-Regiment 3 and I./GR 723 still clung on for dear life. The job 
of taking the village should have been a piece of cake, first for the American 
Paratroopers then for the 15th (Scottish) Division, but it had turned into a nightmare. 
Best had become a sponge soaking up the blood of the units involved and even on 
25 September the Scots remained stuck just outside the village. Again Scottish losses 
were appaling and gains were negligible. But the eyes of the Allied commanders 
were focused elsewhere. The one overriding priority was to clear the Allied Centre 
Line. And it would turn out to be a tough job, even though the enemy was just a 
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small Kampfgruppe, not the ‘considerable forces astride the road’ as Montgomery 
claimed after the war.902 
The second day 
While it was still dark both sides prepared for battle. There was no need for fancy 
plans. Huber’s mission was simple: block the road and take Veghel bridge by 
attacking through Eerde, while Poppe’s 59. I.D. covered the right flank by attacking 
St.-Oedenrode. For the Allies the task was not very complicated either, it was ‘to get 
the road open again’.903 From the southwest units of the 7th Armoured Division, i.e. 
the 1/7th Queens Royal Regiment and the 5th Dragoon Guards, together with two 
companies from the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment would advance north. At the 
same time the 506th, supported by the Shermans of B Squadron 44th RTR would 
advance from the northeast. This force of five battalions plus, roughly equivalent to 
5,000 men, should be enough to remove the blockade by a few German companies, 
at least in theory. 
 
In the pouring rain German and Allied soldiers got ready for combat. The Germans 
were the first to set off. At seven a.m. two hundred infantry (among them two 
companies from Fallschirm Batallion Bloch) supported by five SPs (probably Pak of 
59. I.D.) crossed the railway line south of Schijndel. 904 The diversionary attack on 
St.-Oedenrode had begun. The force managed to reach the Damianen College 
halfway on the road between Schijndel and St.-Oedenrode, just like three days 
before, but that was the extent of their success. The 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars 
and the 1/5th Queen’s of the 7th Armoured Division, drove Von der Heydte and 
Jungwirth’s men from the heath.905 Efforts by Kampfgruppe Chill to drive the 501st 
from Eerde also failed miserably. It was a rock upon which every wave of attackers 
broke. Hence the main German success that day was claimed by Kampfgruppe Huber 
in the wood near Koevering.  
 
The Anglo-American attack from St.-Oedenrode began at 07.30 hours. But C 
Company of the 1/7th Queen’s and A and B Companies of the 502nd, supported by a 
few Cromwells of 5th Dragoon Guards failed to make much progress. In fact, they 
managed to clear only a few hundred metres before they were stopped outside 
Koevering.906 As the southern attack force did not manage to make much progress 
the pressure was now on the 506th (Colonel Robert F. Sink) coming from Veghel.907 
The 1st Battalion (Major James L. LaPrade) was to advance on the right (northern) 
side of the road, the 3rd (Major Oliver M. Horton) on the left while the 2nd 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. Strayer) was held back to exploit a breakthrough.The 
                                        
902 Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic, London 1946, 146. 
903 Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, 371. 
904 War Diary 44th RTR, 25.09.44, 07.20 hours; the SPs were no doubt converted French types since 
s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt. 559 did not have any operational Sturmgeschütze on the 25th (cf. Chapter 10). 
905 They also captured fifteen Fallschirmjäger. Feldwebel Lemke, in charge of the party, was an 
experienced parachutist of nine years’ service, who had fought in Crete, Sicily, Cassino and Leningrad. 
But even he admitted the futility of the struggle when he saw the materiel the Allies had and he 
concluded that the war would not last for much longer. 7th Armoured Division, IS 105. 
906 Foster, History of the Queen’s Royal Regiment Volume VIII 1924-1948, Aldershot 1953, 393, War 
Diary 50th (N) Division, 25.09.44, 17.00 hours. 
907 This section, Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, 371-2. 
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3rd was to be supported by B Squadron 44th RTR (Major Hales). The plan was for 
the combined group first to advance south along a sandy track, away from the main 
road, and then turn sharply once they were level with Logtenburg and sweep 
northwest to link up with the 501st.908 The attack started at 08.30 hours and initially 
it went fairly well. LaPrade’s 1st battalion slowly advanced down the main road while 
Horton’s 3rd battalion walked down some sandy lanes, the Shermans of No.2 and 
No.4 Troops of the 44th RTR in support. As this force was getting closer and closer 
to the wood at Logtenburg small arms fire rapidly increased in volume. The advance 
began to slow down. At about 11.30 hours the leading Shermans of No.4 Troop were 
fired on by one of the Jagdpanther of 1./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 
on the  southern edge of the wood. The first tank brewed up, killing three crew 
members. Two more Jagdpanther were spotted and No.4 Troop was effectively 
pinned down. A foot reconnaissance was made which confirmed that it would be 
impossible for the American Paratroopers to cross the road either, owing to the large 
amount of small arms fire which the Germans could send directly up the main 
road.909  
 
This forced Colonel Sink to come up with another plan. He decided to try a repeat of 
the attack which had led to the capture of Eindhoven a week earlier. Strayer’s 2nd 
Battalion was to proceed down the same sandy track as 3rd Battalion. However, 
instead of turning right when they were level with Logtenburg, they would proceed 
another kilometre along it before turning west. Hopefully they could outflank the 
German position in this way. The attack was to be supported by No.5 Troop of  the 
44th RTR. Without wasting time Strayer’s battalion set off. Once they had reached 
the hamlet of Hoogebiezen the Paratroopers turned right. It was now 12.30 hours.910 
All the time the Americans were subjected to withering small arms fire. Still, 
determined as ever, the Paratroopers entered the woods to clear them. The three 
British tanks drove on in search of targets. Sergeant Newman’s tank, moving to the 
left of the wood, turned a corner and found itself facing a Jagdpanther. The gunner 
immediately fired and scored a direct hit, but with absolutely no effect. The gunner 
of the Jagdpanther responded just as quickly and the 88 shell penetrated the co-
driver’s seat. Still, the driver managed to reverse the tank back into cover only to 
receive two more direct penetrations in the turret. The Sherman caught fire and 
three crew members, Sergeant Newman among them, were killed while the other 
two were wounded. The other two tanks, trying to help, faced some steep dunes 
which they could just climb, but once at the top they found that they could not 
depress their guns sufficiently to engage the Germans and so they remained where 
they were. 
 
The use of two captured Shermans by the Germans added considerably to the 
confused nature of the fighting that day. Time and again English and American 
soldiers held their fire because they thought that they were dealing with friendly 
tanks. But at the end of the day at least one of the captured Shermans was returned 
                                        
908 War Diary 44th RTR, 25.09.44, 08.15 hours. 
909 Ibid, 11.30 hours. The Jagdpanther are alternately referred to as Panther, Tiger or simply SP. 
910 The following section: ibid, 12.35. 
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to its rightful owners.911 The day continued to be confusing and it was not until 18.30 
hours that some Shermans of 5th Dragoon Guards and a carrier patrol of the 1/7th 
Queen’s finally made contact with Paratroopers of the 2nd Battalion 506th at 
Koeveringse Molen.912 A quarter of an hour earlier Colonel Sink’s Paratroopers had 
also crossed the road and made contact with their comrades of the 501st near 
Eerde.913 The noose had been drawn and Kampfgruppe Huber was now completely 
surrounded. 
Back again 
All of this meant that although they were still blocking Hell’s Highway, Kampfgruppe 
Huber and the three Jagdpanther of 1./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559  
at De Koevering were now cut off.914 It must have been extremely frustrating for 
Huber to have had the same experience twice within three days. At five p.m. 
Reinhard phoned Von Zangen to inform him of the latest developments. He said that 
Huber was now isolated and could only hold on for a limited period of time since his 
troops could no longer be provided with ammunition. Von Zangen told Reinhard that 
if it turned out to be impossible to hold the present line, Huber was to be pulled back 
to the northwest but only after a proper defensive position had been prepared there. 
In spite of this setback, Chill was still under orders to take first the railway and then 
the road bridge at Veghel.915 The order was a pipe dream, of course, as the nearest 
unit, Batallion Ohler, was still one hundred metres away from the railway and 
completely stuck.916 Reinhard realised this when he visited both Chill and Poppe after 
his phone call to Von Zangen. Both divisional commanders convinced Reinhard that 
at least two companies were needed to re-establish contact with Huber. Since the 
fighting had been pretty intense that day Chill and Poppe had incurred serious losses, 
a total of no fewer than 107 casualties.917 With no reserves left, the only thing 
Reinhard could do was pull the plug. He ordered Huber to withdraw during the 
night.918 At the same time he warned Chill and Poppe that after these troops had 
rejoined them, any further withdrawal was strictly forbidden. Chill, meanwhile, was 
reminded that he was still to try and reach the bridge and blow it up.919   
 
In the darkness of the early hours of 26 September Kampfgruppe Huber finally 
withdrew towards Wijbosch. It was an extremely tricky manoeuvre, surrounded as it 
was on all sides by enemy units. But Huber’s men successfully extricated themselves. 
The 88 Flak guns were towed back by the three Jagdpanther of 559 from the 
blocking positions around Koevering.920 One of the Panzerjäger, 4,7 cm Pak (f) auf 
Renault R 35(f) of Panzerjäger-Kompanie 304 had to be left behind and caused a 
                                        
911 This incident, Donald R.  Burgett, The Road to Arnhem, a screaming eagle in Holland, Novato 
1999, 96-7. 
912 Second Army, Intelligence Log 25.09.44, serial 66. 
913 War Diary 44th RTR, 25.09.44, 17.00 and 18.15 hours. 
914 KTB 88 AK, 25.09.44, 16.10 hours and A 464. 
915 KTB 88 AK, 25.09.44, 17.00 hours. 
916 KTB 88 AK, 25.09.44, A 461. 
917 KTB 88 AK, 25.09.44, A 462; broken down: 5 killed, 92 wounded and 10 missing. 
918 KTB 88 AK, 25.09.44, 17.20 hours. 
919 KTB 88 AK, 25.09.44, A 466. 
920 KTB 88 AK, 26.09.44, A 473. 
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brief halt to the Allied mopping up operation.921 Around ten a.m. all the German 
troops reached the  assembly area in Wijbosch, southeast of Schijndel. The idea was 
for them to turn around, attack southwards and take up a new defensive line halfway 
between Schijndel and St.-Oedenrode.922 However, the British acted first. A 
combined tank-infantry group of the 8th Hussars and the 1/5th Queen’s managed to 
advance a few kilometres towards Schijndel. The attack which began at one p.m. 
caused a bit of a panic because it hit the boundary of Poppe’s 59. I.D. and 
Kampfgruppe Chill. This meant that Fallschirm-Bataillon Jungwirth caught the full 
brunt of the attack which only came to a halt a few hundred metres south of the 
railway line. Immediately the other two companies of Fallschirm-Bataillon Bloch were 
ordered to Schijndel by Chill.923 Contact between Jungwirth and Von der Heydte had 
to be re-established.  
 
The Jagdpanther of 559, which were still officially with the 59 I.D. that morning, 
could not help out as they were not operational temporarily.924 To add to their misery 
Kampfgruppe Huber and the Jagdpanther of 559 found themselves under attack by 
RAF Typhoons during the afternoon.925 Eight Typhoons from 182 Squadron bore 
down on the village of Wijbosch, where the Kampfgruppe was concentrated, 
destroying part of the village including the church, with their rocket projectiles. 
Miraculously, only one German vehicle was hit. Meanwhile 247 Squadron, also with 
eight Typhoons, strafed the area between Olland and St-Oedenrode.926 Because of 
the British attack FJR 6, still on the heath west of Eerde, was in danger of being 
outflanked and received permission to pull back. But Reinhard added a warning, 
instructing his commanders to be careful. ‘Es kommt darauf an, dass die 
Bewegungen unter straffer Führung in der Dämmerung und in der Nacht so 
durchgeführt werden, dass die Truppe in der Hand der Führer bleibt und 
Absetzbewegungen vom Feinde nicht bemerkt werden.’ 927 Eventually 1./559 with its 
three Jagdpanther, pulled back to the hamlet of Heikant, ten kilometres west of 
Schijndel, as part of the reserve of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps.928 
 
Meanwhile the 5th Dragoon Guards, the 1/7th Queen’s and the 2nd/506th continued 
to follow the main body of FJR 6 back north. It was a slow and tedious job during 
which Von der Heydte’s men had to be pushed back every step of the way. Not until 
dusk was the area north of Hell’s Highway finally cleared of Germans. Still, even after 
Kampfgruppe Huber had left their blocking position at Koevering the Allied Centre 
Line could not be used right away. The Fallschirmjäger had left behind many mines 
which needed to be lifted and it was not until 14.30 hours that the 5th Dragoon 
Guards finally reported back the opening of the road.929 The heaviest fighting was 
                                        
921 War Diary 44th RTR, 26.09.44, early morning report. 
922 KTB 88 AK, 26.09.44, 08.12 hours. 
923 KTB Dewald, 26.09.44, 15.40 hours. 
924 KTB 88 AK, 26.09.44, 12.35 hours. 
925 Second TAF, Daily Log, 26.09.44, 1600 hours. 
926 One Typhoon was lost and the pilot, Flight Sergeant Barwise, became a PoW only four hours after 
he had joined the squadron. C. Shores and C. Thomas, 2nd Tactical Air Force, Volume two, Breakout 
to Bodenplatte, July 1944 to January 1945, Crowborough 2005, 305. 
927 KTB 88 AK, 26.09.44, 18.00 hours. 
928 KTB 88 AK, 27.09.44, 16.00 hours and 28.09.44, 10.50 hours. 
929 Second Army, Intelligence Log, 26.09.44, serial 45. 
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now over although the British tried to push back the Germans closer to Schijndel, but 
fierce resistance by Fallschirm-Bataillon Jungwirth supported by at least six 88 guns 
prevented the 8th Hussars and the 1/5th Queen’s from advancing further along the 
road from St.-Oedenrode.930 The main line of resistance would stay for the next 
month roughly where it now was, partly south of and partly along the railway line 
running to Veghel. This line was only achieved after Kampfgruppe Dreyer (Chill’s left 
wing) had closed up on the railway between Wijbosch and the Zuid-Willemsvaart on 
27 September. In the process the two remaining battalions of Fallschirm Panzer 
Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring suffered badly. The acting 
Kommandeur of I. Bataillon, Hauptmann Westphal, was taken prisoner while his 
counterpart of III. Bataillon, Major Werner Krahmer, was killed.931 Westphal was 
succeeded by Hauptmann Pauls, a former company commander in the 85. I.D.932 
This meant that Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann 
Göring, which had fought their opponents at Hechtel and Ten Aard so successfully, 
was virtually annihilated after only two weeks in combat. It was the price of slowing 
down the advance of an enemy force far superior in numbers and it is a good 
illustration of the attrition inflicted on the Wehrmacht at this stage of the war. 
  
Kampfgruppe Huber had put up a magnificent performance. They had blocked the 
Allied main artery for forty-four hours. This was no mean feat for such a tiny force. It 
is clear that the support by the three Jagdpanther of schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559 was a key ingredient to this success. As a reward for this Oberleutnant 
Franz Kopka as acting Kommandeur was awarded the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold three 
months later.933 For once, 559 was able to operate exactly as it had been designed, 
i.e. support friendly infantry against enemy armour. The position at Koevering and 
Logtenburg was ideal for this. Although the small wood was potentially a mouse trap, 
which it eventually became, it provided the ideal position from which to cover the 
open terrain surrounding it. The British armour was restricted to the few sandy roads 
which could easily be covered by the Jagdpanther. Together with the two captured 
Shermans which provided just enough confusion it enabled the small group to hold 
out for so long. But it was the final gasp on this battle front. In clearing the Centre 
Line and driving the Germans back to Schijndel, the Screaming Eagles had fought 
their last battle along Hell’s Highway, which had more than lived up to its nickname. 
From now on the Corridor, to use the British name, was no longer under direct threat 
from German attacks. One of the reasons was that the German commanders 
correctly surmised that the main threat had now shifted elsewhere, against the town 
of ‘s-Hertogenbosch.934 That would soon be the next focal point for Reinhard to keep 
an eye on. 
 
 
                                        
930 War Diary 7th Armoured Division, 26.09.44, Wireless Log, 14.08 hours. 
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Post Market Garden 
While the struggle for Koevering was still raging a new unit came under the 
command of  LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. On Sunday 24 September Generalleutnant 
Friedrich Neumann, commanding the 712. Infanterie-Division, had arrived at Korps 
headquarters to report to Reinhard.935 The same day Von Zangen ordered the 
division to go to ‘s-Hertogenbosch, which he considered the ‘wichtigsten Eckpfeiler 
des grossen Brueckenkopfes suedlich der Maas,’ adding ‘Er musste daher bis zum 
aeussersten gehalten und stark gestuetzt werden…’936 Even then Von Zangen was 
already worried that an attack across this town, the provincial capital, would cut off 
his whole 15. Armee. Ordered to counterattack east, without proper preparation or 
support, the 712. I.D. suffered badly and had to be content to hold the line just 
outside Nuland. Then activities gradually ground to a halt in a semi-arc east of  ‘s-
Hertogenbosch. For the next three weeks the front would remain static here, too. 
Market Garden was definitely over. The result was a long, thumb-like stretch of 
territory leading nowhere. 
Conclusion 
Although he was probably the only one, Montgomery himself did not really consider 
Market Garden a total failure. Montgomery thought that the operation had been 
‘ninety per cent successful’.937 An interesting conclusion, which he explained by 
pointing out that the Allies now had crossings over four major water obstacles. Still 
Montgomery conceded that the operation had at least partly failed. He saw two 
principal reasons for this, one was the weather, the other was the ‘surprising’ 
concentration of forces the Germans had managed to put together. 938 Many books 
have been (and are still being) written about both aspects, but a general discussion 
of the merits and demerits of Market Garden and to what extent it failed is beyond 
the scope of this study. However, Kampfgruppe Chill, certainly did play a crucial part 
in the ultimate failure and this needs to be examined. The author of a recent book 
about Market Garden has a strong case when he claims that during World War Two 
airborne operations on the whole were not very successful.939 The reasons for this: 
they were expensive, they were often characterized by high casualties and mission 
failure, or only partial success, and successive airlifts proved to be very problematic 
to set up.940 Hence, Market Garden had only a slim chance of succeeding, but only if 
‘the airborne coud be promptly relieved by conventional ground forces’.941 The 
problem was that the ground troops had to rely on a single road initially. A widening 
of the flanks by VIII and XII Corps should have alleviated the situation gradually, but  
these operations failed in their objective and for a week one road, the Corridor, Hell’s 
Highway, was all that led to Nijmegen and beyond. It is the contention of this author 
therefore that the attacks on this one artery, starting on the second day when the 
59. Infanterie-Division and the 107. Panzerbrigade tried to make contact at Son were 
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crucial to the failure of the operation.942 Both attacks were unsuccessful, but they 
forced the Allies to divert considerable resources to deal with them. After two days 
the attacks moved further north, to the bridge at Veghel, but again the two attacking 
parties did not manage to establish contact. It was then that Reinhard turned to 
Kampfgruppe Chill to try and cut the Allied line of communication. This attack was 
successful and for forty-four hours all contact between the base and the head of the 
operation was severed. Operation Market Garden was already dead in the water by 
that time, but this counterattack dashed all hopes either Horrocks or Montgomery 
may have had and effectively helped finish off the operation. By first seeking the 
weak spot in the Allied defences and then quickly setting up an all-round defence in 
a location ideally suited for that, Major Huber had managed to keep the Allies 
occupied for nearly two days before slipping away and pulling back to safety. It was 
the first time the Kampfgruppe was called upon to act as an Eingreifsreserve, but it 
would not be the last. 
 
Following this nerve wracking period the Kampfgruppe dug in along a frontline 
running from Schijndel to the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal opposite Dinther, following the 
canal for five kilometres and then, on the other side of the canal, covering a stretch 
around Berlicum.943 To the left (north) in front of ‘s-Hertogenbosch was the 712. 
Infanterie-Division, to the right (west), as far as Oirschot, was the 59. Infanterie-
Division. Here, for over three weeks the front remained static, but Chill’s battle group 
would only be allowed a week there, since further west a new crisis had developed in 
the meantime. 
 
3.5. Goirle (27 September – 10 October 1944) 
 
“My real task was to move quickly from one trouble spot to the next. Student called me his 
Feuerwehr, or Fire Brigade. For me it was a good assignment. I had only to attack – and I 
got everything I wished. If I said, I can’t attack, without this and this, the next day I got it. 
To attack is more interesting and it is not so difficult as to defend.” 944 
 
Allowing 15. Armee to escape cost the Allies dearly in the end. Not only was Von 
Zangen’s army able to intervene in operation Market Garden, it also meant an 
extended and extremely bloody autumn campaign for Montgomery’s Twenty-First 
Army Group. While Montgomery’s ambitious operation was first unfolding and then 
slowly grinding to a halt, north of Antwerp the Germans still held the original line 
along the Albert Canal at the end of September. That was about to change and 
Kampfgruppe Chill and schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 would find 
themselves once more in the thick of the fighting. 
A temporary lull 
At the end of September the Allied struggle to expand the Corridor was beginning to 
slow down. The Allied effort to seize ‘s-Hertogenbosch had failed as a result of the 
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stubborn defence put up by Kampfgruppe Chill and Neumann’s 712. Infanterie-
Division. It was at this point that the size of the Kampfgruppe reached an all time 
high despite the losses it had occurred. During this brief lull in the fighting Chill 
commanded an impressive array of troops.945 On 29 September, in addition to the 
only battalion that was left of the 85. Infanterie-Division, Batallion Ohler (composed 
of infantry from 1053. and 1054. Grenadier-Regiment), he had no fewer than eleven 
other battalions under his command: I. and III./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und 
Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring, I., III. and IV./Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 
(Von der Heydte), I./Fallschirmjäger Regiment 2 (Finzel) plus five Fallschirm Lehr 
und Ausbildungs Bataillone (Bloch, Gramse, Wittstock, Weller and Hanke). More 
infantry came from what was left of Flieger Regiment 53 (Einheit Jürgens), various 
border guard and airfield companies (Einheit Koch and Einheit Rötscher). In addition 
Chill had three anti-tank companies, two equipped with light Flak 946 and he 
commanded eight batteries with twelve 10.5 cm leFH 18, two 15.5 cm sFH 18 and 
fifteen 8.8 cm Flak guns. This meant that with the addition of staff, mine clearing 
and engineer units Chill commanded 10,800 men.947 Effectively his improvised 
Kampfgruppe was now the size of an inflated Wehrmacht type 1944 division, 
although the latter had less infantry (seven battalions instead of twelve), but more 
artillery (forty-eight pieces instead of twenty-nine).948 Soon the armoured vehicles of 
schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559 would be added. However, that unit was 
the Cinderella of this impressive array of troops.  
 
On the very day that Kampfgruppe Chill was at its strongest, 559 was at its weakest, 
in fact as a fighting force it was temporarily out of the game altogether. After being 
continuously in combat for three weeks it had suffered horrendous losses. All in all 
eight Jagdpanther and twenty Sturmgeschütze had been lost through enemy action. 
Others were out of action because of mechanical failure. At the end of September all 
that was left of 1. Kompanie were the three Jagdpanther with 15. Armee, which 
would not be operational until the first week of October, plus six Jagdpanther in 
workshops for short-term repairs. On 29 September the three that were still with 
Chill were ordered to Breda, where there were some major workshops.949 All 2. and 
3./559 had left were eight Sturmgeschütze, none of them operational, but every 
single one in short-term repair. The unit was also short eighty-one men.950 This 
meant that the Abteilung was in no state to be deployed at the front. Moreover it 
was still geographically split up and its units were over a hundred kilometres apart. 
While 2. and 3. Kompanie were near Wesel on the Rhine, 1. Kompanie was in 
Breda.951 At first, on 27 September, Heeresgruppe B ordered all of 559 to move to 
Zutphen, to be rebuilt as reserve for the army group itself, but two days later it 
changed its mind. The Abteilung was assigned priority status, ‘bevorzugter 
Instandesetzung’952 and was told to link up with Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 which 
                                        
945 KTB 88 AK, 03.10.44, C 256. 
946 Namely 1./185, 3. (Fla)/Pz.Jg.Abt.170 and 3. (Fla)/Pz.Jg.Abt.344. 
947 KTB 88 AK, 03.10.44, C 255. 
948 Harrison, 236-7. 
949 KTB 88 AK, 29.09.44, 19.15 hours. 
950 KTB H Gr B 29.09.44, Ia 7969/44. 
951 KTB OB West, 27.09.44, 10.05 hours. 
952 KTB H Gr B, 29.09.44, Ia 7982/44. 
 206 
only a week before had been battling it out with the British Airbornes at Arnhem and 
Oosterbeek.953 This Brigade, a somewhat euphemistic name for seven 
Sturmgeschütze and three Sturmhaubitze, really no more than one Kompanie, was 
commanded by Major Kurt Kühme. It had fought on the Eastern Front until February 
1944 and was then sent to Denmark during the summer to be refitted. It was on its 
way to Aachen when, like the 107. Panzerbrigade, it was diverted because of 
operation Market Garden, in this case to Arnhem. There its arrival had tipped the 
scales in favour of the German defenders. After the ferocious fighting there the 
Brigade had only four serviceable vehicles left.954 Now, on 28 September, 
Heeresgruppe B ordered 1. Fallschirmarmee to hand over Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 
to 15. Armee.955 Eventually, partly because of the distance and the perceived threat 
from Allied fighter-bombers, it would take a couple of days before 280  joined Von 
Zangen’s army. Originally it was to cover the left flank at ‘s-Hertogenbosch, but with 
the new Canadian threat developing it was to go to the area north of Antwerp (see 
below) and so it unloaded at the railway station in Breda.956  
 
 
In the meantime 559 was to prepare at least one Kompanie of twelve 
Sturmgeschütze  and one Kompanie of Jagdpanther for action.957 To do this new 
vehicles were needed to make up for the losses. This was organised by 
Panzerstützpunkt Nord. It assigned 559 ten brand new Jagdpanther on the 27th. 
However, it is clear that they never arrived with 559 for some reason, because the 
total number of Jagdpanther continued to dwindle steadily throughout October and 
November. As for the Sturmgeschütze, three days earlier, seventeen new ones had 
been assigned to Sturmgeschützbrigade 280.958 Now that 559 was to link up with 
280 that was changed, too. On 4 October Heeresgruppe B reported that 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 would receive only four new Sturmgeschütze, (giving it a 
total of fifteen SPs for the time being) and that the remaining twelve were to go to 
559.959 That day 559 also had three operational Jagdpanther and five operational 
Sturmgeschütze plus six Jagdpanther and four Sturmgeschütze in workshops. Even 
after it received the twelve new SPs it would still only have about two-thirds of the 
number of vehicles with which it went into action. In view of the Allied build-up, this 
did not bode well for the forthcoming battles. 
   
                                        
953 Details about actions 280: Marcel Zwarts, German Armored Units at Arnhem, September 1944, 
Hong Kong 2001, 26. In addition: CO was Major Kühme, Adjudant was Leutnant Meining, CO 1. Zug 
Hauptmann Woerner, 2. Zug Leutnant Larisch, 3. Zug Leutnant Baender (First Canadian Army, IS 102, 
10.10.44). 
954 First Cdn Army, IR PoW Miscellaneous Artillery Units, 8.10.44. 
955 KTB OB West, 28.09.44, 01.50 hours. 
956 KTB OB West, 29.09.44, 23.00 hours. 
957 KTB H Gr B, 29.09.44, Ia 7982/44. 
958 On 24. September 1944 Heereszeugamt Krugau despatched 17 StuG III to the Westfront. They 
were really intended for H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 280. Gen.d.Pz.Tr. West reported that they arrived in 
Düren on 26 September, were accepted by Pz.Stützpunkt Nord and then transferred to 
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 280. (Via Martin Block).  
959 KTB H Gr B, 04.10.44, Ia 8154/44. It is unclear where the one missing StuG went. 
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On 28 September Kopka as acting commander of schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559 wrote an after-action report.960 The first part, devoted to an analysis 
of what had gone wrong at Beringen, has already been discussed (Chapter 3.1). But 
Kopka also looked at the broader picture and he put his finger on the sore spot when 
he wrote that ‘there were always large problems in freeing the armoured forces from 
the infantry in order to engage other enemy concentrations. The infantry 
commander’s strong concern for his unit’s security resulted in him always holding the 
armoured force back even if they were not located in the correct location 
(Schwerpunkt). Since this is backed by the higher command, it leads to a scattering 
of our armoured force with the result that success is not achieved and our own 
losses are unnecessarily high.’961 If one remembers the actions described above, at 
Beringen, but more particularly at Geel, Lommel and Joe’s Bridge, Kopka certainly 
appears to have a point here. He also pointed out another aspect of the relentless 
battles. The 1. Kompanie with its Jagdpanther had been kept in action for far too 
long, Kopka felt and ‘the Panther-Kompanie, which must absolutely be serviced after 
driving 250 kilometres, drove a stretch of over 600 kilometres without any 
maintenance halts (…) resulting in decreased unit combat capability.’  He also made 
a number of recommendations. ‘First, concentrated employment of the entire 
Abteilung under the direction of its own commander. Second, subordination of 
infantry units in the Abteilung sector or close coordination with them. Third, actions 
of the schwere Panzerjäger and infantry must be aligned with the tactics of the 
Panzerjäger and not the reverse. The entire operation must be built on this principle. 
Fourth, after every action, immediately pull the Panzerjäger out and create a mobile 
reserve behind the assigned sector.’ All these recommendations were in line with the 
official guidelines for the Jagdpanther and were examples of good practice as well as 
common sense. Whether they would be followed under the circumstances remained 
very much to be seen. Anyway, the time for reflection was abruptly cut short as 
further west, near Antwerp, another storm was brewing and once again 
Kampfgruppe Chill was asked to play a crucial role. The origins of the Allied attack go 
back to the instructions Montgomery issued on 14 September. 
The Canadians arrive 
As mentioned earlier, the front north of Antwerp was no longer the responsibility of 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. On 12 September General der Infanterie Hans Reinhard 
handed the sector over to LXVII. Armeekorps (General der Infanterie Otto 
Sponheimer), the first corps of the 15. Armee which escaped being trapped against 
the Belgian Northsea coast.962 Sponheimer, Chill’s erstwhile divisional commander, 
cut a less imposing figure than Reinhard. British interrogators wrote that ‘As a 
personality General Otto Sponheimer is most unimpressive. Short and very thin, with 
a small, gentle face, made more paternal by a tiny moustache and white hair, 
General Sponheimer looks and talks like a village school teacher…’963 The transfer of 
Sponheimer’s Corps was only possible because the German commanders had 
correctly deduced that for the moment the Allied effort was shifting away from 
                                        
960 Jentz, Jagdpanther, 86-7. Unfortunately Jentz could not locate the original document or remember 
where he had it from and so far the author has been unable to find it either. 
961 Ibid. 
962 KTB 88 AK, 12.09.44, C 220. 
963 Special Interrogation Report Sponheimer, 1. 
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Antwerp. For the first time in a week they felt comfortable enough to leave that 
sector in the hands of just two divisions, one very weak, the 711. Infanterie-Division 
(Generalleutnant Josef Reichert), and one of average strength, the 346. Infanterie-
Division (Generalleutnant Erich Diestel).964 Von Zangen was not too sure that these 
divisions were strong enough to ward off any serious attacks. He knew that the 346 
I.D. which had four infantry battalions was the more reliable of the two. Moreover, in 
addition to its own two regiments (GR 857 and GR 858) it also controlled Grenadier-
Regiment 1018 (from the 70. I.D.). Its leadership was solid, but it lacked anti-tank 
weapons. He feared more for the 711. I.D. with its three infantry battalions which he 
described as ‘abgekaempft, geringe Kopfstaerke, nicht gefestigte Kampfmoral.´965 
Diestel’s division dug in near the Beveland isthmus as far away from the enemy as 
possible. The 711. I.D. was responsible for the sector from Lillo, a few kilometres 
west of Antwerp, to Merksem. There it linked up with the 719. I.D., for the time 
being still under LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. Then Operation Market Garden was 
launched and on the Allied side, too, new divisions began to arrive. After the 11th 
Armoured had left Antwerp the 53rd (Welsh) Division took over during 8 and 9 
September. One week later, between 16 and 19 September, the Canadian 2nd 
Infantry Division in turn took over from the 53rd. First Canadian Army under 
Lieutenant-General Henry Crerar had arrived. He put his II Corps under Lieutenant-
General Guy Simonds in charge of the front near Antwerp.966 All these changes had 
to do with decisions at the highest level. 
 
While Second Army was fully occupied preparing for Operation Market Garden, 
Montgomery outlined the goal for First Canadian Army when he wrote, “the whole 
energies of the Army will be directed towards operations designed to enable full use 
to be made of the port of ANTWERP [capitals in original].’967 The problem was that 
the Canadian Army which commanded only five divisions had more than enough on 
its plate at the time the order was issued. In addition to Antwerp it was also involved 
in the capture of various Channel ports as well as chasing 15. Armee which by then 
had reached the relative security of the Leopold Canal and was in what came to be 
known as the Breskens pocket. The two northernmost divisions, the 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division and the 1st Polish Armoured Division, in fact soon became bogged 
down in that struggle. The problem was that Crerar’s other divisions were still heavily 
engaged at the various Channel ports. His 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had to 
finish the capture of Boulogne and Calais and the 49th (West Riding) Division had 
only just taken Le Havre -together with the 51st (Highland) Division- and was badly 
in need of a few days’ rest and refitting, while the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
was still besieging Dunkirk. Montgomery decided to relieve the Canadians of the task 
of capturing Dunkirk and Crerar ordered the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 
commanded by Major-General Charles Foulkes, to pull up their stakes and take over 
in Antwerp.968 The first Canadians arrived in Antwerp on 16 September and within 
three days the whole division had settled in and outside the port. For the next few 
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days the Canadians were engaged in what they referred to as a ‘Streetcar War’ 
where war was literally just a tramcar ride away from the fleshpots of the town.969 
The name also reflected a somewhat surreal situation where Belgians who lived in 
Merksem took the tram as far as the Albert Canal, got off, crossed the canal on foot 
and resumed their journey in a tram on the other side.970 But this surreal war would 
soon turn into a very real one. A week later Crerar ordered I Corps under Lieutenant-
General John Crocker to take over the sector east of Antwerp with the 49th (West 
Riding) Division. On the 26th Crocker also assumed temporary command of the 2nd 
Canadian Division.971 
One bridgehead 
Now that the whole of his 2nd Division was deployed at Antwerp, Foulkes decided to 
try and establish a bridgehead over the Albert Canal, soon followed by another one 
of the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. If the plan succeeded the division would be in an 
excellent position to outflank the German defences north of Antwerp.972 The first 
step was a crossing in the early hours of 22 September by the 5th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade. Brigadier W.J. ‘Bill’ Megill ordered the Black Watch to send in a patrol in the 
area of Wijneghem, five kilometres east of Merksem.973 Although this was not hugely 
successful and even led to the sacking of the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Mitchell, 
it was followed by the Calgary Highlanders crossing via a damaged lock gate. By six 
a.m. three companies were across, partly obscured by ground fog which made it 
difficult for the opposing side, II./Grenadier-Regiment 743 under Major Otto 
Neubauer, to use their artillery. By the end of the morning the bridgehead had been 
expanded considerably in spite of German efforts to drive the Calgary Highlanders 
back. In the attempt Neubauer was killed and the regimental commander, Oberst 
Bosselmann, took over himself.974 During the afternoon German mortar and shellfire 
ceased to the amazement of the Canadians and the engineers proceeded to 
construct a bridge which was ready by seven p.m. In spite of suffering serious 
losses, fifteen dead and thirty-four wounded, the Calgarians had successfully 
completed their mission.975 A few hours later the next battalion, Le Régiment de 
Maisonneuve, moved across. The reason for the sudden German silence lay, of 
course, in the decision made earlier on the 21st to pull back behind the Antwerp-
Turnhout Canal, among others to free Kampfgruppe Chill for the attack on the 
Corridor. As the artillery needed to be in position the following morning it had 
already left by noon which is why the Canadians could build the bridge undisturbed. 
The big question was whether they could pull off this trick a second time at the next 
canal. 
 
Saturday 23 September was dismal and wet. A steady drizzle poured down all day as 
the Régiment de Maisonneuve (Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bibeau) exploited the 
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bridgehead and found the Germans gone. Soon the Maissies were joined in the area, 
just abandoned by the719. Infanterie-Division, by the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
and, on their right, by the 49th (West Riding) Division. This division, commanded by 
Major-General E.H. Barker, had come up from France where a week earlier it had 
liberated Le Havre together with the 51st (Highland) division. The 49th crossed at 
Herentals and by the end of the day had liberated Turnhout. First contact with the 
retreating enemy was at 20.30 hours when patrols from Kampfgruppe Buchholz 
clashed with troops of the 4th Lincolnshire Regiment two kilometres north of 
Oostmalle.976 Buchholz’ unit was composed of Luftwaffe and naval personnel, border 
security troops and even two so-called Magen Kompanien i.e. soldiers suffering from 
stomach complaints. This was one of the hodgepodge of units of which the 719. I.D. 
was composed by now. After having given up Grenadier-Regiment 723, first to Chill 
and then to Poppe, and II./GR 743 to 245. I.D., the division, commanded by 
Generalleutnant Karl Sievers, only had three battalions left of its original units, I. and 
III./GR 743 plus FEB 1719. No wonder that the719. Infanterie-Division was described 
as a ‘pawn shop’.977 In compensation it had been assigned scores of companies, but 
unfortunately all of them consisted of poorly trained Luftwaffe, navy and security 
personnel.978 The only other reliable unit attached was II./SS-Landstorm Nederland. 
It very much remained to be seen whether this weak and improvised force would be 
able to stop the Allied advance. Reinhard was ordered to hand over the 719. I.D. to 
LXVII. Armeekorps (General Sponheimer) so it was no longer his problem. But he 
certainly believed the division could hold the line and he did not expect an attack on 
this front.979 He was in for a rude awakening. 
And another 
On 24 September two attempts were made to cross the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. 
The first one was undertaken by two battalions of the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
under Brigadier J.G. Gauvreau.980 Foulkes had stressed the need for speed and the 
two battalions went across at the same time, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal (Major J.M.P. 
Sauvé) to the right of the blown bridge at Lochtenberg (these days part of the town 
of Sint-Job-in-‘t-Goor), the South Saskatchewan Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel V. 
Stott) on the right. This sector was defended by Grenadier-Regiment 857 of the 346. 
I.D. The attack began early in the morning and the Fusiliers managed to reach the 
crossroads where they dug in. The South Saskatchewans, however, found 
themselves unable to cross the canal because of heavy small-arms fire. This changed 
after the artillery laid down a barrage at one p.m. Within an hour the South 
Saskatchewans crossed closer to the bridge and went into Lochtenberg. However, by 
then the Germans had begun to infiltrate the Fusiliers’ positions. At five p.m. 
Generalleutnant Diestel sent in his Panzerjäger-Abteilung 346 (Hauptmann Von 
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Obstfelder) and the Canadians were attacked by at least twelve light 
Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731(f) Renault tanks and about two hundred Grenadiere. 
Since the bridgehead was still too small no anti-tank guns could be brought across 
and the Fusiliers were slowly driven back towards the canal. At seven p.m. Foulkes 
and Gauvreau agreed to order the troops to withdraw. The failure to cross had cost 
the brigade 113 casualties, two thirds suffered by the Fusiliers. It was a sign of 
things to come. 
 
Further east, the British were more successful.981 The previous day the 49th Division 
had found, unsurprisingly, all the major bridges across the canal blown. Originally 
Major-General E.H. Barker had wanted the 146th Infantry Brigade to force a crossing 
in the area of the main bridge from Oostmalle to Rijkevorsel. However, a 
reconnaissance found that Lock 7 near a brickworks offered a better bridging site 
since the gap here was only thirty feet instead of one hundred. So the plan was 
changed and the 4th Lincolnshire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel F.P. Barclay) crossed 
at two a.m. in driving rain during a dark night. Rain covered the attack and two 
hours later three companies had taken up positions in a horseshoe defence around 
the lock. At 03.30 hours the engineers were told that they could start building a Class 
40 bridge which opened for traffic at six a.m. on 25 September. It was called Plum. 
During the building the engineers were not disturbed, but as soon as they had 
finished the Germans opened up with shells and mortars. But by then it was too late. 
The CO of the 146th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier J.F. Walker, ordered the 1/4th King’s 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel T.W.A. Harrison-Topham) to seize 
Rijkevorsel, two kilometres north of the canal.982 The leading companies were soon 
in the village square, but then German resistance stiffened and they became stuck. 
Throughout the day Kampfgruppe Buchholz tried to dislodge the 1/4th KOYLI, but 
they were unsuccessful. Although at times they were about to overrun the village 
and even took a complete section prisoner, they were pushed back every time. An 88 
scored a hit on the village church in which the 1/4th KOYLI had an observation post 
and all in all it was a day of fluctuating fortunes. In the end it was the 1/4th KOYLI 
that emerged victorious, taking no fewer than 134 Germans prisoner. Moreover, the 
bridgehead had been widened and the Hallamshire Batallion York and Lancaster 
Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel T. Hart Dyke) had come up on their right in order to 
advance east to Merksplas. The Hallams soon found that they were unable to break 
out from Rijkevorsel itself, so they went back to the brickworks and made a detour to 
the main road to try and move east from that position.983 As night fell they were 
joined by 1/4th KOYLI whose positions in Rijkevorsel had been taken over by the 2nd 
Essex Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel G.G. Elliott).  
Countermeasures 
Monday 25 September was not a particularly good day for LXVII. Armeekorps. Not 
only was Rijkevorsel captured by the British, it was also the very day that 
Generalleutnant Sievers, commanding the 719. Infanterie-Division, reported in sick. 
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His successor, General Felix Schwalbe, would not arrive until that evening. This could 
explain why the counterattacks were not coordinated properly and achieved so little. 
General Sponheimer was now in dire straits and he had to come up with something, 
and soon. As his Korps did not have any reserves he decided to order the 711. 
Infanterie-Division to plug the gap that was threatenening to open up.984 Von Zangen 
concurred with this decision. At noon Sponheimer called Generalleutnant Josef 
Reichert and ordered him to leave his current positions, load his division into trucks 
and take over the Rijkevorsel sector right away. Although his division was weak, 
Reinhard had full confidence in Reichert whom he considered a ‘Frische, bewegliche, 
positive eingestellte Persönlichkeit. Gerader, anständiger Character. Einsatzbereit und 
tapfer’.985 Kampfgruppe Buchholz would come under his command. He was told to 
leave one of his two regiments behind. Grenadier-Regiment 744 (Major Hoffmann) 
would have to hold the line northwest of Antwerp on its own. Moreover, Reichert was 
to counterattack the same night without any delay. Reichert ordered Grenadier-
Regiment 731 (Oberst Von Limburg-Hetlingen) to attack from Gammel the following 
morning and try and push the British out of Rijkevorsel.  
 
The attack which went in without any proper preparation or reconnaissance, 
amazingly, met with some degree of success and one of the battalions, III./GR 731, 
under Hauptmann Liessmann, even managed to get into Rijkevorsel itself. However, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott called in help from the Sherbrooke Fusiliers (Canadian 27th 
Armoured Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon) which had come under 
command of the British division the previous day.986 A and B Squadrons were in 
support. The armour tipped the balance in favour of the 2nd Essex and only one 
Sherman tank was lost to a Panzerfaust. The following day saw a repeat 
performance and at the end of 27 September the bridgehead was still there. After a 
four-day slogging match around the bridgehead the 49th (West Riding) Division had 
taken 1,119 prisoners, most of them from Kampfgruppe Buchholz.987 The British and 
Canadians were amazed at the multitude of units the soldiers came from and 
commented on their ages. Eleven men from Landesschützenbataillon 484 were found 
to be between 40 and 47 years old.988 Still the British and Canadian top commanders 
knew from experience that the fighting would only get tougher as the enemy tried to 
prevent them from breaking out at any price since this would eventually threaten the 
German units west of the Corridor. Reichert suddenly noticed that a new threat was 
developing elsewhere. While he was focused on his own division’s counterattacks 
towards Rijkevorsel, which were successful in so far that they prevented Barker’s 
division from breaking out to the northwest, he had neglected his left (east) flank. 
There British soldiers and Canadian tanks managed to cross the Blakheide area and 
get as far as Dépot de Mendicite which was the responsibility of the 719. I.D., now 
under Schwalbe.  Once again the 719. I.D. was in serious danger. 
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This advance meant that it was now useless for Reichert to try and push the Allies 
out of Rijkevorsel. He ordered his division to go over to the defence and it would 
remain undisturbed by and large in their positions for almost a month. The next day 
the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel F.W.A. Butterworth) doubled 
back towards the canal from Rijkevorsel to expand the bridgehead, thus enabling the 
engineers to construct a second Bailey bridge after clearing the wreckage of the old 
bridge.989 The battle now shifted away from Rijkevorsel and once again this had to 
do with decisions at the highest level. 
New plans 
After the failure of operation Market Garden Field-Marshal Montgomery needed to 
rethink his strategy. On 27 September he formulated his new plans in directive M 
527. In it he stated that Second Army’s main task was to ’operate strongly with all 
available strength from the general area Gennep-Nijmegen against the N.W. corner 
of the Ruhr.’990 As in the earlier directive First Canadian Army was to secure the use 
of Antwerp, but it was assigned an extra mission. I Corps, under Lieutenant-General 
John Crocker, was to ‘thrust strongly northwards on the general axis Tilburg-
Hertogenbosch and so free Second Army from its present commitment of a long 
flank facing west’.991 Montgomery added, ‘This thrust should be on a comparatively 
narrow front and it is important it should reach Hertogenbosch as early as 
possible.’992 This new directive shows that Montgomery still hoped to enter Germany 
before winter set in. Getting over the Rhine remained his first priority. It also shows 
that he still did not appreciate the importance of Antwerp. Although he paid lip 
service to freeing the docks he failed to understand that First Canadian Army could 
never do the job on its own, particularly not now that he had assigned it an extra 
mission. Moreover, it sent I Corps off at a tangent, making operations more difficult 
than they already were. This is a clear case where means and operational goals were 
not geared to one another. This unfortunate decision on Montgomery’s part would 
soon come back to haunt him. 
 
Montgomery’s intentions were translated in the orders issued by Lieutenant-General 
Guy Simonds who was acting commander since  Crerar had been on sick leave since 
27 September. Simonds ordered I Corps to ‘thrust North Eastwards on 
Hertogenbosch’ while at the same time ‘direct 2 Cdn Inf Div to clear the area North 
of Antwerp and close the Eastern end of the Zuid Beveland isthmus…’993 This went 
against the basic military tenet of concentrating one’s forces, but there was little 
Simonds could do about it given Montgomery’s orders. In addition his II Canadian 
Corps had to clear the Breskens pocket and tackle the problem of Walcheren. In 
accordance with Simonds’ instructions the operations of I Corps developed in two 
different directions after 27 September. First the fighting on the right flank, the 
Tilburg-‘s-Hertogenbosch operation, will be described before turning back to the left 
flank, the Woensdrecht operation. This makes sense for two reasons. First of all this 
is the chronological order in which Kampfgruppe Chill and schwere Heeres 
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Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 were to become engaged in both operations. In addition, 
the climax of the fighting at Woensdrecht followed immediately after the conclusion 
of the fighting near Tilburg. But not only on the Allied side were new plans being 
drawn up. 
 
The bridgehead at Rijkevorsel was a major headache for Von Zangen.994 His 15. 
Armee was now under pressure in three different places at the same time 
(Rijkevorsel, Reusel and ‘s-Hertogenbosch) and he had absolutely no reserves to 
plug any gap that might occur. He therefore asked Heeresgruppe B 
(Generalfeldmarschall Model) for reinforcements. He was promised the 256. 
Volksgrenadier-Division, although the exact date of deployment was not yet known, 
for at present the division was still assembling in Königsbrück near Dresden.995 It 
would be on its way to the Netherlands as soon as possible, but for the moment it 
was of no use to Von Zangen. His biggest nightmare was a two pronged attack from 
the east across ‘s-Hertogenbosch and from the south which would catch his army in 
the middle. The only way to prevent being caught south of the Maas, Von Zangen 
felt, was a timely withdrawal. He asked for permission, but was expressly forbidden 
even to explore this scenario. Instead Model urged Von Zangen to try and attack east 
from ‘s-Hertogenbosch and re-establish contact with 1. Fallschirmarmee! Von Zangen 
pointed out that not only could his army never influence the battle east of ‘s-
Hertogenbosch in any way with its weak divisions, fit only for defensive tasks, 
eventually it would crumble under the weight of the Allied onslaught which was 
inevitably heading his way. He asked Model if he could at least start preparing a 
withdrawal ‘unter Aufrechterhaltung des Abwehrkampfes s. der Maas’[underlined in 
the original].996 However, that request was also turned down. But Von Zangen was 
no fool and preparations went ahead in secret and he had officers make contact with 
the Kriegsmarine.997 He also realized that the next few days might be crucial for the 
future of 15. Armee and he must have watched with apprehension as a truly 
multinational force got ready to attack Grenadier-Regiment 743 in Merksplas. In an 
attempt to bolster the defences, 20. Flakbrigade was ordered to sent ten 8.8 cm Flak 
guns from Heeres Flak-Abteilung 291, currently in position on the Beveland isthmus, 
to Breda forthwith.998 It was hoped that they would arrive in time. 
Breakout 
On 28 September about half of the 1st Polish Armoured Division began to cross the 
Antwerp-Turnhout Canal at Rijkevorsel and squeezed in next to the 49th (West 
Riding) Division which was already there.999 The Polish Division, made up of Polish 
expats, had arrived in Normandy between 20 July and 5 August and first saw action 
three days later.1000 It had been engaged in several extremely bloody battles, most 
notably around Chambois which was the very point where German units tried to 
escape from the Normandy pocket. There it had fought, among others, Chill and his 
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85. Infanterie-Division and, as mentioned in Chapter 2.4, it was fighting the Poles 
that had earned Hauptmann Von Hütz his Ritterkreuz.1001 The divisional commander 
was Major-General Stanislaw Maczek who had fought the Germans before, both in 
Poland in 1939 and in France in 1940. He was a charismatic and well-loved leader 
and the Poles fought ferociously under his command. His division had just captured 
Terneuzen and was now ready for its next task. Like other divisional commanders 
Maczek had begun to appreciate the value of mixed tank-infantry groups. He 
therefore assembled a task force composed of the 3rd Infantry Brigade (Colonel F. 
Skibiński) minus the 8th Battalion, but reinforced with the Cromwell tanks of the 
recce regiment, 10 Pulk Strzelów Konnyck (PSK or Regiment of Mounted Rifles) 
under Major J. Wasilewski, plus the Shermans of the 24th Ulanów (Lancers) under 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Kański. This combined tank-infantry force should be strong 
enough to break the German crust. The plan was to split up the task force and 
advance on Merksplas over two axes, the northern one commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Z. Szydłowski, the CO of the 9th Rifles, the southern one by Lieutenant-
Colonel K. Complak, the CO of the 1st Podhalanski Rifles. In the middle would be two 
British infantry battalions, the 1st Leicestershire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. 
Sandars) and the Hallamshire Batallion (Lieutenant-Colonel T. Hart-Dyke), supported 
by 49th Recce and B Squadron The Sherbrooke Fusiliers.1002 
 
The attack began at 10.30 hours on 29 September and soon 10 PSK led the way to 
the next village, Merksplas. However, before getting there they hit the enemy who 
were ensconced in the Dépot de Mendicite with infantry and anti-tank guns.1003 The 
Poles lost one tank and soon the armour was stuck. The Dépot, then, as today, was 
a combined prison and mental institution. It not ony looked like, but was actually as 
strong as a fortress and a deep moat surrounded the complex. There was no way 
around it as the road to Merksplas ran through the Dépot de Mendicite. It was no job 
for armour on their own and two British infantry battalions were assigned to assault 
the mini-fortress.1004 They were to be supported by B Squadron The Sherbrooke 
Fusiliers. The troops went to their Forming Up Points at four a.m. Two hours later 
the attack began. The ten companies of Kampfgruppe Stein were the usual mixed 
bag of Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS-troops.1005 Still they put up a stiff fight and it 
took the two British battalions all day to crack the tough nut that the Dépot de 
Mendicite presented. How tough the battle was can be judged from the fact that the 
leading company of the 1st Leicesters was nearly wiped out. Also, it was during the 
battle for the Dépot that Corporal J.W. Harper won his Victoria Cross, unfortunately 
as is so often the case, posthumously. Harper led his platoon over the wall of the 
institution by covering his men single-handedly. At the end of the day the fortress 
was occupied. British losses had been substantial, the three battalions involved 
having suffered 117 casualties altogether. In return they took 157 prisoners and 
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killed 49, mostly from Grenadier-Regiment 743.1006 After the capture right away the 
Polish task force proceeded past the Dépot de Mendicite on to Merksplas. The 
following day, 30 September, they took the village. Just north of Merksplas the Poles 
captured all three batteries of II./AR 1719.1007 The nine 15.5 cm K414 (f) guns 
carried the Polish eagle on their barrels which meant that they must have been 
captured during the Polish campaign.1008 The following day their first time owners 
turned the guns 180 degrees and the guns once more fired on German troops. In all 
the Poles took 409 prisoners in two days in addition to the 200 taken by the 49th 
(West Riding) Division.1009 It was a serious blow to the 719. Infanterie-Division. 
 
General Schwalbe’s division (719. I.D.) was in real trouble now as its right flank had 
been torn wide open. Von Zangen realized that his whole army might be cut off by a 
swift advance towards ‘s-Hertogenbosch. He also feared that once the gap had 
widened LXVII. Armeekorps might become completely isolated north of Antwerp. So, 
the gap had to be plugged. The centre simply had to hold together or his army was 
doomed.1010 The only reserves Von Zangen had there were what was left of I./SS-
Polizei Sicherungs Regiment 3 who had finally been pulled out of their old 
battleground at Best, and II./FJR 6 which had just been told to assemble and get 
some rest in Helvoirt after having retaken Reusel.1011 For obvious reasons Von 
Zangen decided on the Fallschirmjäger, although they were exhausted after the 
intense fight for Reusel. But Hauptmann Mager’s troops were granted no respite. 
That evening they were told to assemble post-haste and to travel to Baarle-Nassau in 
lorries and report forthwith to the headquarters of the 719. I.D.1012 Not surprisingly, 
Von Zangen’s analysis of the situation was shared by his opposite number, 
Lieutenant-General Crocker, whose comment on the most likely German response 
was that, “Again the alternatives of the encirclement or withdrawal are beginning to 
loom up, and if withdrawal it is to be, then the threat [on] ‘s Hertogenbosch is likely 
to be the most severly [sic] contested since it would have to be the pivot for the 
whole manoeuvre”.1013 This was a remarkably astute analysis, which, in fact, almost 
predicted what was going to happen south of the river Maas next. 
Crossing the border 
During the early hours of 1 October the village of Zondereigen, close to the Dutch 
border, was a hive of activity. Lorry after lorry arrived to drop off Hauptmann 
Mager’s Fallschirmjäger. The SPs of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1719, eight ex-French 
Lorraine Marder I anti-tank guns (official designation: 7,5cm Pak 40/1 auf GW 
Lorraine Schlepper(f), Sd Kfz 135) as well as 8,8 cm Flak guns from Heeres Flak-
Abteilung 291 just arriving, would provide the necessary back-up for the defence. 
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The Polish attack began in thick fog and on the right the mixed task force, which had 
crossed the canal the afternoon before, became stuck at the railway crossing on the 
Dutch border at Noordbosch, due north of Turnhout. The mixed group on the left 
had just as difficult a time against II./FJR 6 in Zondereigen. It took them all day to 
capture the village. The arrival of the Fallschirmjäger had certainly slowed down the 
Polish advance, but it was unclear whether that was enough to halt it altogether. An 
attack to retake Zondereigen was ordered for the following morning. 
 
The Poles had their own concerns now that the attack was slowing down. In an 
attempt to break the deadlock Maczek ordered the brigade to try a left hook the 
following morning. The whole of the divisional artillery would be in support.1014 The 
attack by the 3rd Infantry Brigade which began at eight a.m. on 2 October rapidly 
turned into a nightmare. The 24th Ułanow, for example, lost one Sherman after 
another and soon No.1 Squadron was reduced to just one operational tank. The 
deadliest fire came from the 8.8 cm Flak guns of Heeres Flak-Abteilung 291. The 
guns fired from such a great distance (the 88 had a maximum range of 12,000 
meters)1015 that the Poles could neither hear nor observe the flashes when they were 
being fired on.1016 At one p.m. the Poles called in air strikes just as the German 
counterattack was starting. The Poles halted for the moment to allow Second Tactical 
Air Force to do its work.1017 Early in the afternoon sixteen Typhoons from 164 and 
183 Squadrons (123 Wing) arrived over the target area. They fired a total of 126  
projectiles.1018 Gradually German mortars and artillery fell silent as rockets screamed 
down and more and more positions were hit. The counterattack slowly petered out. 
Meanwhile the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade on the right only got as far as the 
railway station and the customs house near Noord-Bosvenheide. In fact, German 
resistance by II./FJR 6, Grenadier-Regiment 743 and what was left of Kampfgruppe 
Stein was so fierce that the Poles commented that it was ‘worth [sic] of 
admiration’.1019 Still, admirable or not, when night fell the resistance was finally 
broken and the Shermans crossed the border into the Netherlands. The Polish 
division now regrouped for the next stage, the attack on Baarle-Nassau. Further to 
the right, the 49th (West Riding) Division also halted for the moment until a Bailey 
bridge was finished at the main road bridge to Tilburg, north of Turnhout. This job 
was completed just before noon and the first companies of the 11th Royal Scots 
Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel D.A.D. Eykyn) were soon across and established a 
bridgehead without opposition.1020 
 
On Tuesday 3 October the attack by the Polish division started at 08.30 hours. From 
two sides the Poles approached the twin villages of Baarle-Nassau and Baarle-
Hertog. On the left the 3rd Infantry Brigade slowly advanced on the centre of Baarle-
Nassau. On the right the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade (Colonel T. Majewski) first 
took Schaluinen, then turned right and proceeded in a northeasterly direction 
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towards the eastern edge of Baarle-Hertog. Three Polish Cromwell tanks slugged it 
out for a while with an SP which had taken up position near the railway line at 
blockhouse 25, just south of Baarle, probably one of the Marder I from Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 1719.1021 The first Cromwell was hit, the second pulled back and the third 
rammed the Marder because of a misunderstanding between the driver and the 
commander of the Cromwell. The two opponents then started firing at each other 
from zero range, but the German gunner, probably still –literally- shaken by the 
crash missed three times and the Marder was brewed up by the Polish gunner.1022 
The advance continued and the Polish troops entered Baarle in pouring rain. It took 
some time to drive off the last German defenders from Kampfgruppe Müller. This 
unit , named after Sturmbannführer G. Müller, was another mixed bag formed of his 
own II./SS-Landstorm Nederland plus Flieger-Regiment 53, II./GR 743, III./GR 743 
and II./FJR 6.1023 Still, at 19.15 hours the Poles had captured the two villages.1024 
Meanwhile the 146th Infantry Brigade of the British 49th (West Riding) Division 
crossed the canal north of Turnhout and took Ravels and Weelde.  
Response 
Although the 719. I.D. had done everything in its power to stem the advance of the 
Polish and British divisions, the Allied advance slowly but surely widened the gap 
between LXXXVIII. (Reinhard) and LXVII. Armeekorps (Sponheimer). This meant 
that the 245. Infanterie-Division (still southeast of Tilburg) was now increasingly 
being threatened from the rear. There was nothing else to do but order it to pull 
back to a new frontline just north of Hilvarenbeek, screening Tilburg.1025 At the same 
time it was to give up one battalion (I./GR 937) to form the new Korps reserve.1026 
This move was executed during the early hours of 3 October. To Generalleutnant 
Sander’s immense relief the 53rd (Welsh) Division did not immediately follow their 
movements so that cohesion could be maintained among his units.1027 The Allied 
advance also meant that the danger for 15. Armee was still acute. That evening 
Reinhard was called by Oberst Metzke, Ia at 15. Armee.1028 He ordered Reinhard to 
create an immediate reserve by pulling Kampfgruppe Chill out of the line near 
Schijndel, starting that very night. The Kampfgruppe was to assemble southeast of 
‘s-Hertogenbosch ‘zu anderweitiger Verwendung’ so that 15. Armee could send it to 
block the threat developing south of Tilburg if necessary.1029 Chill was told to leave 
Fallschirm-Bataillone Bloch and Gramse behind near Schijndel.1030 The two battalions 
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were to be united under Major Jungwirth.1031 The decision to take Kampfgruppe Chill 
out of what until now had been considered one of the key sectors was a calculated 
gamble on Von Zangen’s part. Should the Allies put more pressure on ‘s-
Hertogenbosch the troops there could at least pull back to the next canal line 
whereas a successful attack through Tilburg would mean that his left flank, i.e. the 
whole of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, would be caught in a ‘bag’. But it was still a gamble, 
calculated or not, and the next few days would be of crucial importance for 15. 
Armee. 
 
During 4 October tension began to mount at 15. Armee headquarters in Dordrecht as 
the Allies continued their slow, but seemingly unstoppable, advance in the direction 
of Tilburg. The Poles received reports about a German force assembling in a wood 
(Goordonk) northwest of them and there was clearly still a strong German presence 
in a triangular wood (Het Oud Heiveld) to the east of Baarle-Nassau which had to be 
taken care of.1032 Attempts by the 3rd Infantry Brigade to advance further northeast 
were met by another Marder I firing the occasional shell from behind a farmhouse 
along the road to Ulicoten. Shermans were sent to deal with this nuisance and they 
succeeded in knocking out the SP. This duel also had another effect. The alarm was 
sounded at 711. Infanterie-Division. Reichert had zero reserves left after the fighting 
in Rijkevorsel to deal with this perceived threat to his right flank. In sheer 
desperation he sent the divisional brass band to the front-line near Ulicoten.1033 A 
group of just one officer and twenty-six other ranks, armed with rifles and 
Panzerfäuste, had to deal with the Polish armour.1034 Reichert must have been 
enormously relieved when the Polish attack halted a few kilometres away from his 
right flank. Meanwhile part of the 49th (West Riding) Division also moved up. On the 
left of the Polish Division the 147th Infantry Brigade was holding the line opposite 
the 711. I.D., while on the right the 146th Infantry Brigade was ordered to capture 
Poppel two kilometres south of the Dutch-Belgian border. The brigade was supported 
by the armoured cars of the 49th Recce and the Sherman tanks of A and B Squadron 
of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers (Canadian 27th Armoured Regiment).1035 At the end of 
the afternoon both the Hallams and 1/4th KOYLI took the village of Poppel, three 
kilometres from the border and only nine kilometres from Tilburg.1036 The slow pace 
of the advance worried Crocker (I Corps). An attack towards Tilburg was still on the 
agenda, but the lack of speed meant a rethinking of the route there. He ordered the 
1st Polish Armoured Division to advance through Alphen the following day while the 
49th (West Riding) Division would attack from Poppel. Depending on the results, the 
Poles were to swing either northeast, towards Tilburg, or northwest towards 
Gilze.1037 In the event, neither would happen. By now, Von Zangen was determined 
to block the Allied threat to his army, whatever the cost. 
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It was obvious to Von Zangen that the time had come to take serious action if he 
was to prevent the two Allied divisions from steamrolling Schwalbe’s division. At 
16.45 hours Reinhard received another phone call from Oberst Metzke at 15. Armee, 
telling him to expect an order concerning Kampfgruppe Chill within the next two to 
three hours. In fact Reinhard did not have to wait that long. Half an hour later Von 
Zangen’s Chief-of-Staff, Generalleutnant Hofmann called to inform Reinhard that the 
Kampfgruppe was to join LXVII. Armeekorps to be deployed south of Tilburg.1038 This 
town was to be held at all costs. Orders came from the very top. 
Generalfeldmarschall Von Rundstedt, OB West, ordered 15. Armee to hold the line 
Antwerpen-Tilburg ‘s-Hertogenbosch with every possible means.1039 During the rest 
of the night and the following morning frantic phone calls were made by both 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps and 15. Armee to inquire after the relief near Schijndel, a 
clear sign of the nervousness at the higher levels.1040 In fact Von Zangen himself 
phoned early the next morning to complain that only two battalions were on the 
move. Von Zangen feared that if this process continued they would be committed 
piecemeal (‘verzettelter Einsatz’). He complained about Reinhard’s caution and 
insisted that he should take the risk, because the counterattack by Kampfgruppe Chill 
was also in the interest of his Korps.1041 Another measure Von Zangen had taken 
meanwhile was to order the new reserve, I./GR 937 under Major Stadelbauer, to 
move to Goirle and form a backstop behind the right flank of the 245. I.D.1042 He 
hoped this would suffice. 
The fire brigade arrives 
On 5 October at nine a.m. the 4th Lincolns resumed their advance towards Tilburg, 
supported by A Squadron The Sherbrooke Fusiliers. The last Germans were pushed 
out of Poppel and the tanks clattered along the cobbled road to Goirle. The tanks 
dealt with some 2 cm Flak guns which had knocked out two armoured cars the 
previous night, before the leading units arrived at the bridge over the Lei river one 
kilometre south of Goirle. Then they ran into more serious trouble. Alarmed by news 
of the advance Reinhard sent in I./GR 937 to restore the situation. Its mission was 
both to screen the assembly of Kampfgruppe Chill and to secure the right flank of the 
245. I.D.1043 Stadelbauer’s battalion assembled on the Breeheese Heide and at 14.30 
hours began their attack in a south-westerly direction.1044 The attack got under way, 
but it was slow going and it was not until 20.20 hours that the battalion reached its 
goal, kilometre marker 9, just north of the border.1045 It was clear that Kampfgruppe 
Chill had arrived in the nick of time. Its orders for the following day were “Lage 
Ostfluegel des Korps durch Stoss auf Poppel zu bereinigen u. unter tiefer Staffelung 
rechts Luecke Nordostw. Baarle-Nassau zu schlieszen.”1046 The Kampfgruppe was not 
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alone, because once more schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 joined the ‘fire 
brigade’, or at least part of it did.  
 
The following morning 15. Armee ordered 559 to join up with Schnelle Abteilung 
505, in order to support the counterattack by the 719. I.D. north of Alphen. Schnelle 
Abteilung 505 was originally an independent battalion of cyclists, but during the long 
retreat from France it had suffered serious losses and the Kommandeur, Major Fürst 
Rupprecht Eberhard von Urbach (who claimed to be related to King George V) had 
been taken prisoner. In early September the remnants of the unit were assigned to 
the 245. Infanterie-Division.1047 It merged with Aufklärungs Abteilung 245, the 
reconnaissance battalion of the 245. I.D. under Hauptmann Ott.1048 On 1 October it 
became part of the new reserve for LXXXVIII. Armeekorps near Goirle.1049 The two 
Sturmgeschütz companies of 559 , which had now returned from Germany were to 
join Chill at Goirle.1050 The Allies reported the arrival of fifteen ‘tanks’ driving through 
Riel on their way to Baarle.1051 This probably referred to the total number of tracked 
vehicles of schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 which travelled from the workshops in 
Breda that morning. Since it is known that six Sturmgeschütze and one Jagdpanther 
arrived north of Terover in the early afternoon to assist the 719. I.D., it appears that 
Kopka’s combined 2. and 3. Kompanie on 5 October consisted of another eight 
Sturmgeschütze, which took up position south of Goirle to help Kampfgruppe 
Chill.1052 The solitary Jagdpanther was commanded by Leutnant Heinrich Koch, 
Führer of 3. Zug.1053  
 
Kopka himself established his headquarters in the vicarage at Goirle, alongside Chill, 
to whom he was again assigned.1054 The Abteilung was now a mere shadow of the 
once mighty unit it had been only a month earlier. But at least from now on all the 
vehicles would operate together, so in that sense the requests made by Seitz on 22 
September and by Kopka six days later were finally granted. The Sturmgeschütze of 
559 at Goirle soon clashed with the Canadian tanks advancing towards them. For 
once the SPs could do what they were best at. They formed a semi-circle and waited, 
heavily camouflaged, for the Canadian armour to approach.1055 The tactic was 
successful and Kopka’s Sturmgeschütze knocked out four or five of the Sherbrooke 
Fusilier’s Shermans (one may have been hit by a 5 cm Pak) and the advance was 
momentarily halted.1056 Being out on a limb, so far ahead of the rest of the division, 
the 4th Lincolns and the Canadian tanks supporting them, pulled back to a more 
secure position in the woods straddling the Dutch-Belgian border. After they had 
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withdrawn the Germans blew up the bridge over the river Lei.1057 The first attempt to 
reach Tilburg had failed. But had the Poles to the left fared any better that day? 
 
Once again Colonel Majewski’s 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade took the lead. Maczek 
ordered it to take Alphen, five kilometres north of Baarle-Nassau. Meanwhile the 3rd 
Infantry Brigade would clear the woods south of the village.1058The attack began at 
eleven a.m. but soon ran into trouble.1059 After half an hour the two leading 
battalions, the 9th Rifles and the 2nd Armoured, reached the hamlets of Nachtegaal 
and De Roos. Here they hit the main line of resistance. Well-hidden Fallschirmjäger 
from II./FJR 6 and Pak fired on the Shermans. Eventually the RAF was called in again 
and between eleven a.m. and one p.m. eighteen Spitfires from 308 and 317 
Squadrons (131 Wing) screamed down on Alphen and surroundings dropping a total 
of twenty-eight 250 and twenty-one 500 pound bombs while sixteen Typhoons from 
257 and 266 Squadrons (146 Wing) fired a total of 107 rocket projectiles on 
suspected German positions.1060 The left group, 24th Ułanow in the lead, in the 
meantime reached Terover and just beyond that the open terrain of the Rechte 
Heide. In short order the battalion lost another three Shermans. They blamed the 
losses on Pak, but the tanks were probably hit by the seven Sturmgeschütze from 
schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, which had earlier taken up position two 
kilometres north of there, at Oudelandse Hoef .1061 In return 24th Ułanow claimed to 
have knocked out two of the SPs.1062 Whoever was to blame for the Polish losses, at 
four p.m. the attack had become completely bogged down and the RAF was called in 
for a second time. A quarter of an hour later sixteen Typhoons from 123 Wing left 
their basis at Merville in Northern France.1063 However, weather conditions rapidly 
deteriorated as the planes neared the front line and the four Typhoons from 164 
Squadron were unable to find their target area in time. The other fighter-bombers, 
eight from 183 Squadron and four from 198 Squadron, did reach the area and fired a 
total of 62 rocket projectiles, four aircraft having to abort at the last minute because 
of a ground haze coming up.1064 This intervention had the desired effect and the 
Shermans of the 2nd Armoured got moving again, infantry from the 9th Rifles 
Battalion riding along on top of the tanks. As dusk fell the leading tanks finally 
entered Alphen. The Polish division had reached its goal for the day, although it had 
incurred heavy losses on the way there. The bravery displayed by Hauptmann Rolf 
Mager’s Fallschirmjäger was certainly recognised by their superiors and II./FJR 6 was 
recommended by 15. Armee for the skilful way in which it had handled the tank 
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attacks.1065 In addition Mager, who had led from the front, was awarded the 
Ritterkreuz on 31 October for his part in preventing a breakthrough to Tilburg.1066 
 
The fierce resistance which had slowed down the Allied advance had an additional 
effect. The delay, coupled with the fact that from Alphen to Rijkevorsel he now only 
had a lightly covered fifteen-mile left flank, caused Lieutenant-General Crocker (I 
Corps) to reconsider his original plan. On top of that, on 4 October Montgomery had 
issued a new directive to cover the regrouping of his forces for the operations 
outlined in the direction ordered on the 27th (see above).1067 A short halt was 
therefore inevitable and both the 1st Polish Armoured and the 49th (West Riding) 
Divisions were told to remain on the present line for 6 October.1068 But simply 
holding the line was not what the German commanders had in mind. 
Counterattack 
In the early morning of 6 October the British frontline practically ran along the 
Dutch-Belgian border north of Poppel.1069 To the left, the Hallams were in Aerle, to 
the right 4th Lincolns had dug in south and north of the customs building. In 
between and slightly ahead was C Squadron 49th Recce Regiment. In line with 
Crocker’s orders to halt the advance and regroup, the only activity planned that day 
was for the Hallams and the 4th Lincolns to take over the forward positions from 
49th Recce. The Hallams under Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor Hart-Dyke would send 
troops to the hamlet of Nieuwkerk (basically no more than a cluster of farms), while 
the 4th Lincolns under Lieutenant-Colonel F.P. Barclay, were to take over the Recce’s 
position along the Goirle road about four hundred metres ahead of them. After C 
Company had taken over in Nieuwkerk, Hart-Dyke inspected the area. He decided to 
take no risks and ordered B Company to join C Company that afternoon. This should 
be enough, he hoped. The Germans soon forced him to act. The first signs of an 
impending German attack was the shelling which started at 10.30 hours and was 
kept up throughout the morning. Around noon it was clear that serious trouble was 
brewing, just as Barclay ordered his carrier platoon to move up the road to begin the 
relief. Because of the increased machine-gun fire up ahead he decided to send C 
Company instead. 
 
As the British battalions were relieving the Recce squadron, Kampfgruppe Chill was 
getting ready for the big counterattack in the woods and heath north of the 
border.1070 Chill had ordered Von der Heydte with I. and III./FJR 6 to attack along 
and east of the Goirle-Poppel road and for two of Dreyer’s battalions, I./ Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring (commanded by Major 
Horst Pohl (Füsilier-Batailon 85) since the previous Kommandeur had been taken 
prisoner on 27 September) and Bataillon Ohler, to attack west of the road, while his 
third battalion, I./FJR 2 (Finzel), was kept in reserve. Reinhard himself, visiting the 
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 224 
forward troops, urged Major Stadelbauer (I./GR 937) to assist the attack from Gorp 
should Von der Heydte become stuck. The attack began at two p.m. It came along 
the road and across the Braacken heath. It first struck the 4th Lincolns. The artillery 
fire should have alerted the British troops but still at least two hundred 
Fallschirmjäger managed to crawl across the heath unseen and straight away the 
British troops near the road were in trouble. This was not all their fault and was 
partly due to the alacrity with which the Recce Squadron moved out from this 
position just as C Company 4th Lincolns were relieving them.1071 This, no doubt, 
encouraged Von der Heydte’s men to redouble their effort, thinking that the British 
troops were about to withdraw. The effect was that C Company came under 
increasing pressure. Then followed the first ‘white flag incident’.   
 
A group of Fallschirmjäger indicated that they would like to surrender. Two of their 
comrades were wounded. A corporal with some stretcher bearers went forward to 
investigate, but he arrived at the same time as a German NCO with some men who 
had also witnessed the incident. They shook hands, had a friendly conversation and 
the NCO told the corporal and his escort that they were ‘English Chentlemen’. 
However, they were not allowed to take back the potential POWs and he had to 
leave the two stretchers behind. As he was outnumbered and outgunned the 
Corporal could only comply and return to his own lines empty-handed and furious. A 
second white flag followed soon after. In this case the white flag was simply a ruse 
by the Fallschirmjäger to infiltrate between two platoons. The ruse worked and 
No.15 Platoon became completely isolated, but eventually two-and-a-half sections 
(out of three) made it back. The situation became more and more threatening. 
Sturmgeschütze were reported further up the road, although none showed up, and 
at 15.50 hours B Squadron plus one troop C Squadron the Sherbrooke Fusiliers were 
ordered to assist the 4th Lincolns.1072 The Sherman tanks arrived just in time to 
break up the second attack by FJR 6 which went in at 17.30 hours. Together with the 
divisional artillery this meant that the German attack ended as dusk approached and 
C Company received permission to pull back through their old lines while the tanks 
went back to harbour at the road junction south of Maerle for the night.1073 A 
Company was now out in front. While beating off the attack some Fallschirmjäger fell 
into British hands and it became clear to them that most of their problems had been 
caused by I./FJR 6 led by Hauptmann Peiser.1074 
 
The Hallams in Nieuwkerk were also in trouble by now. The Germans had infiltrated 
between the Hallams and the Lincolns, helped by the terrain, which Hart-Dyke 
described as ‘jungle like in the thickness of the trees and shrubbery.’1075This meant 
that the detachment in Nieuwkerk were now unprotected on their right. Snipers and 
mortar fire made life in the hamlet increasingly uncomfortable and by the end of the 
afternoon C Company had suffered 23 casualties. Hart-Dyke called for a DF task 
which eased the situation, but only temporarily. The hayrick in the centre of the 
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village started burning as a result of sniping and the carriers and three six-pounder 
anti-tank guns had to be moved under heavy fire. Throughout the afternoon Second 
Tactical Air Force tried to intervene on the battlefield, but on all three occasions 
Typhoons from 257 and 266 Squadrons (146 Wing) and from 609 Squadron (123 
Wing) were unable to do so because there was no red smoke to indicate the enemy 
locations. At the end of the afternoon Spitfires from 66 and 127 Squadrons (132 
Wing) dropped twenty-four 500-pound bombs on the woods west of Nieuwkerk.1076 
As dusk fell the shelling abated, a sure sign that German patrols were out. Hart-Dyke 
considered he should do no less and what followed was a confused night with patrols 
from both sides sometimes moving along the same ditch, but in opposite 
directions.1077  
The second day  
The fighting continued throughout the night and into 7 October as FJR 6 tried to 
push the British troops back even further.1078 For A Company 4th Lincolns, who were 
now at the tip of the line it was a true nightmare. The men were tired, they had had 
no sleep for two nights now, and noises could be heard from the woods around 
them. Fallschirmjäger continued to infiltrate and in the darkness it was impossible to 
tell who was who. As the Lincolns’ after action report said, the noises ‘were enough 
to strain the nerves of all but the coolest head.’1079 At 04.30 hours the proverbial 
balloon went up. Fallschirmjäger  popped up everywhere and soon the three 
platoons of A Company were being forced back. As a result a six-pounder and a 
seventeen-pounder anti-tank gun were left behind. The crew of the smaller gun had 
managed to remove the breech plate, but the seventeen-pounder was still fully 
intact. A counterattack by C Company an hour later was blocked by Von der Heydte’s 
men. Fearing that his opponents might turn the seventeen-pounder gun on them, 
the A Company commander had it knocked out with a PIAT bomb. As soon as it got 
light the cavalry arrived and the old positions of A Company were recaptured by 
eight a.m. Half an hour later the German attack began to falter and the 
Fallschirmjäger in front of the 4th Lincolns started to dig in. Now that the German 
positions had been located deadly mortar and artillery fire (273rd Battery) was 
unleashed on FJR 6. 1080 Throughout the day screaming could be heard and 
ambulances were seen carrying off the wounded. In fact, one of these ambulances 
strayed too close to the Allied lines, but was still allowed to depart in one of those all 
too rare cases of decency that sometimes occur on a battlefield.1081 Around the same 
time the Hallams were coming under increasing pressure in Nieuwkerk. 
 
While the 4th Lincolns were being attacked in the early hours, the Hallams in 
Nieuwkerk were subjected to barrage after barrage. Kampfgruppe Chill made a 
renewed attempt to reach Poppel. This time Artillerie Gruppe Übel (I./AR 347) with 
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its ex-French 15.5 cm guns was to be in support. From its positions near Moergestel 
it was to change direction so that it could cover the new target area.1082 An earlier 
German attack at seven a.m., from the east, had been easily beaten off, but the next 
one could not be halted so easily. The attack, by Kampfgruppe Dreyer supported by 
the Jagdpanther of 1./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, started at 08.30 
hours and came in from the northwest. For some reason Leutnant Koch’s 
Jagdpanther was in the lead.1083 An hour before this second attack went in Hart-Dyke 
had sent out a call for help to the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. The RAF also spotted the 
‘Tiger’ approaching Nieuwkerk and four Typhoons from 609 Squadron roared down 
and fired their guns and a total of 31 rocket projectiles. Through the smoke they 
could not observe the result, which was nil anyway.1084 Brigadier J.F. Walker (146th 
Infantry Brigade) told the Canadians to send one troop of tanks to Nieuwkerk 
straightaway and the other three to Aerle where the rest of the Hallams were still in 
position. Hart-Dyke also requested DF fire as C Company reported enemy 
approaching from the west, but the advance could not be stopped and German 
troops entered the hamlet. They got behind a standing patrol on the bridge, crossed 
the stream, fired some light machine-guns into the trees and generally made the 
situation of C Company most uncomfortable if not critical. Then a Sturmgeschütz and 
a Jagdpanther approached. The Jagdpanther stopped at the tiny crossroads next to 
the bridge across the Poppelse Leij, no more than a stream really, within a few 
metres of C Company headquarters.  
 
Disaster was looming for the Hallams, but then fate intervened in the form of two 
Canadian Shermans that rounded the corner of the sandy road that very moment. 
However, a Jagdpanther was a tall order even for two Shermans. But then fate 
intervened a second time. Spotting the first Sherman the Jagdpanther rushed to the 
attack. The Sherman backed off the road at high speed firing as it went. The 
Jagdpanther carried on. However, there was a six-pounder anti-tank gun next to a 
building at the crossroads. It had been left there because the crew thought that it 
was faulty. It certainly was not, because when the Jagdpanther pulled up right in 
front of it Sergeant W. Newton fired at the SP from nine metres. The shell hit and 
stopped it. The Jagdpanther apparently tried to turn in order to fire back but the 
barrel hit a tree and Sergeant Newton put four more rounds into it from point blank 
range, upon which it caught fire. The crew, some of them badly burned, bailed out 
and were taken prisoner, except for the commander, Leutnant Koch. He was rescued 
by the accompanying Fallschirmjäger and taken back to a dressing post. From there 
he went to a military hospital in Utrecht where he died the following day.1085  
 
One of the crew reported to the Hallams that there were four more ‘tanks’ in the 
woods north of Nieuwkerk and soon the area was plastered by medium guns.1086 
Knocking out the Jagdpanther meant that the Fallschirmjäger following it, stopped in 
their tracks. An immediate counterattack, supported by the Canadian tanks soon 
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restored the situation. Still, the position was far too exposed and Hart-Dyke was told 
that he could pull back the two companies to rejoin the rest of the battalion in Aerle. 
The withdrawal was effected around noon. The Hallams in Aerle had also been under 
some threat. At least two Sturmgeschütze reared their heads to the northwest and 
some infantry popped up. But DF tasks were put down by the British artillery and no 
attack materialised. The Sturmgeschütze drove off unharmed, no doubt to rejoin the 
rest of 559 further north. One carrier, One Dingo scout car and one Sherman had to 
be left behind in Nieuwkerk and fell into German hands. The following day they were 
proudly displayed to the people of Tilburg.1087 The Dingo was kept by Oberleutnant 
Franz Kopka to be used by 559, the carrier went to Chill while the Sherman was 
passed on to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps.1088 
 
Von Zangen could be content. The attack by Kampfgruppe Chill had not yet reached 
Poppel, but it had achieved its primary goal, to plug the gap between LXVII. and 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. The success for the time being effectively neutralized the 
threat to the inner flank of 15. Armee.1089 Von Zangen now hoped that this success 
could be exploited by pushing the Allied forces back across the Belgian border. In his 
own analysis Chill was less sanguine.1090 He pointed out that the British artillery in 
particular posed a major problem. That day at least 10,000 shells had been fired on 
his sector (his Ia, Oberstleutnant Schuster, estimated the number to be 8,000).1091 If 
there was to be any chance of success for a continued attack on Poppel, he wrote, 
he needed Panzerjäger and more ammunition for his artillery. Little could he know 
that the next day events elsewhere would make his request redundant. The same 
day on which one Allied advance was blocked by 15. Armee, another one, sixty 
kilometres further west, was about to materialize. A month after the capture of 
Antwerp the Allies were finally approaching the Beveland isthmus. More of that in the 
next chapter. 
On the move again 
On Sunday 8 October there was a reshuffling of forces. On the Allied side both the 
1st Polish Armoured and the 49th (West Riding) Divisions stayed put. The two 
battalions which had been in continuous action for five days were taken out of the 
line. The Hallams in Aerle were relieved by the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment and 
the 4th Lincolns along the border swapped places with the 1/4th KOYLI. The attack 
which was originally planned for the following day was postponed indefinitely i.e. 
until I Corps had decided on the next step.1092 A bigger move was made by their 
opposite number. About to launch another attack Chill received a phone call early 
that morning that must have sounded very familiar.1093 He was told by 15. Armee 
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that he and his men were desperately needed at Hoogerheide. There an Allied 
breakthrough towards Woensdrecht was imminent and LXVII. Armeekorps was 
unable to block it with the forces at its disposal. The previous evening General 
Sponheimer had called 15. Armee asking for help and Von Zangen had promised to 
send his ‘fire brigade’. Obviously he could not take the whole Kampfgruppe out of 
the line right away, but something needed to be done and fast. Hence Von Zangen 
ordered Chill to pull only half of his Kampfgruppe out. Von der Heydte and his 
battalions plus I./FJR 2 were to go to Hoogerheide while Chill himself with the 
remaining two battalions would stay at Goirle. Their sector was to be taken over by 
Grenadier-Regiment 935, without any further delay.1094 The whole manoeuvre was to 
be covered by the Sturmgeschütze of 559.1095 Again Von Zangen was forced to take 
a calculated risk. 
 
Because of this unexpected turn of events the idea of an attack towards Poppel was 
abandoned. The whole day was a repeat of three days before and Chill must have 
suffered from a sense of déjà-vu as once again the frantic phone calls inquiring after 
the relief came in.1096 Still Reinhard was immensely relieved when the Allied drive on 
Tilburg did not materialise. Another change was that Kampfgruppe Chill south of 
Tilburg once more reverted to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. This made sense as Chill now 
needed to work closely together with Sander’s 245. Infanterie-Division, one of 
Reinhard’s two divisions. Early the following morning the relief was completed and 
Von der Heydte’s men were on their way to their new battleground.1097 As a result, 
on 9 October the front north of Poppel and Alphen was largely quiet. In fact it was so 
quiet that Reinhard himself used the opportunity to inspect the forward positions of 
both Bataillon Pohl (I./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann 
Göring) and Bataillon Ohler, north of Nieuwkerk during the morning.1098 Since 
Kampfgruppe Chill had had to give up no fewer than five battalions and to avoid 
breaking up the regiment that day Chill got tactical command over Grenadier-
Regiment 935. At the same time the whole of schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 
559 was taken away from Kampfgruppe Chill and ordered to place itself at the 
disposal of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps. The Abteilung was to take up position west of 
Tilburg.1099 It was told that it should be able to move quickly at all times. In view of 
the situation at Hoogerheide and nearby Woensdrecht this could be any minute. As it 
turned out, Kampfgruppe Chill and schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 would 
only get two days’ rest. 
 
The following day General Reinhard wrote a glowing report to Von Zangen 
recommending that Chill receive mention in a special despatch at the end of one of 
the daily war reports issued by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the so-
called Wehrmachtsberichte.1100 His arguments were that through Chill’s actions on 5 
September he had personally prevented the enemy from continuing his advance. 
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Also, during the following weeks his unit had been put into action in many crucial 
places and had delayed the advance of enemy units which far outnumbered him. It 
was thanks to Chill, Reinhard felt, that the enemy had not reached Eindhoven in 
early September.1101 Reinhard’s wish would soon be granted. Just over a week later, 
on 18 October, the whole of Germany heard his name when Chill was personally 
mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht. The report said that, ‘Generalleutnant Chill, 
Kommandeur der 85. Infanteriedivision, hat östlich Antwerpen mit einer Anzahl aus 
eigenem Entschluss zusammengeraffter kleinerer Verbände den Engländern den 
Stoss auf den Albert-Kanal verwehrt und in den darauffolgenden schweren Kämpfen 
mit diesem Verband den vielfach überlegenen Feind immer wieder 
zurückgeschlagen’.1102 Kampfgruppe Chill had indeed acted as a ‘fire brigade’ on 
more than occasion. But the job was far from over. By the time the German 
Rundfunk broadcast the report, Chill had just finished dealing with another 
potentially lethal Allied penetration at Woensdrecht. 
Conclusion 
Chill’s battlegroup had triumphed once more. It had done so by first making 
maximum use of the potential offered by the Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther 
(which could knock out the average Sherman from a distance of 1,371 and 1,829 
metres repectively1103) to deal with the Allied armour, and then by counterattacking 
together with the infantry. As before (Geel and Schijndel) the infantry 
counterattacked and infiltrated the enemy lines, supported by armour, looking for the 
weak spots before an effective defensive system could be in place, then cutting off 
parties of Allied soldiers, forcing the rest to pull back. Not only did the Kampfgruppe 
block the advance towards Tilburg (and eventually ‘s-Hertogenbosch) and plug the 
gap between LXVII. and LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, but it even stood poised to capture 
Poppel and push back the Allies even further when the plans were interrupted by 15. 
Armee which needed their ‘fire brigade’ to halt another potentially disastrous Allied 
advance at Woensdrecht. 
 
By its prompt actions south of Tilburg Kampfgruppe Chill blocked the Canadian 
advance in the general direction of ‘s-Hertogenbosch. This advance would have 
caught the bulk of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps in a bag and as a result should have 
enabled Second Army to ignore its left flank (as Montgomery had planned) and break 
out from the Nijmegen area to ‘operate against the N.W. corner of the Ruhr.’1104 
Chill’s successful defence prevented this scenario from unfolding and it again vitiated 
Montgomery’s ambitions to continue the operations into the industrial heart of the 
Reich and hence had far reaching consequences. But it was not before the 
Kampfgruppe inflicted another bloody defeat on the Canadian troops under his 
command that Montgomery finally woke up to the realities of the autumn campaign. 
 
 
 
                                        
1101 Ibid. 
1102 Die Wehrmachtsberichte, Band 3, 297. 
1103 John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944, London 2004, 126. 
1104 M 527, 27.09.44, TNA WO106/4356. 
 230 
3.6 Woensdrecht (24 September – 19 October 1944) 
 
“… the monumental task of attacking these strongpoints on a one-man front, dyke by 
wretched dyke, without respite. This was bad enough, but when it had to be done in cold, 
driving rain, through ankle-deep mud, with little hope of a change of dry clothes or a warm 
place to sleep, not knowing from one moment to the next if you would be dead or alive, it 
was a new form of hell. This was polder warfare.”1105 
“Do you know what it’s like? Of course you don’t. You have never slept in a hole in the 
ground which you have dug while someone tried to kill you. It is an open grave – and yet 
graves don’t fill up with water.”1106 
 
The next battlefield for Kampfgruppe Chill would be the scene of the some of the 
bloodiest fighting for any Allied troops during the autumn campaign of 1944. The 
struggle to take Woensdrecht and surroundings was the indirect result of 
Montgomery’s failure to order the 11th Armoured Division to carry on north of 
Antwerp after the town had been captured on 4 September. It was the Canadians 
who were to pay the price for this error. The story begins at Rijkevorsel where the 
49th (West Riding) Division had established a bridgehead on 25 September (see 
3.5). 
The initial stage 
After Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds had taken over First Canadian Army from 
Lieutenant-General Henry Crerar because the latter was on sick leave, he called for a 
conference on 29 September. He made it clear to the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
that he wanted a bridgehead over the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal before the meeting 
convened. A second failure, after the Lochtenberg operation (see previous chapter) 
was not an option as far as he was concerned.1107 Now that Simonds, a favourite of 
Montgomery’s, had moved up there were other changes in command. His place as II 
Corps Commander was taken by Major-General Charles Foulkes, who in turn was 
replaced at the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division by Brigadier R.H. Keefler. Hence it 
now fell to Keefler to come up with a successful plan for a crossing. In view of the 
earlier failed attack at Lochtenberg, Keefler decided on a two-pronged affair.1108 He 
sent his 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier W.J. Megill) to Rijkevorsel where it 
would use the same bridgehead from which the Poles and the 49th Division had hit 
north and east. Megill’s Brigade was told to turn sharply to the left after crossing the 
Antwerp-Turnhout Canal and advance alongside the canal until it reached a point 
near Lochtenberg. While the Germans had their hands full warding off the 5th 
Brigade, the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J.G. Gauvreau) would cross 
successfully it was hoped this time. The two brigades would link up establishing the 
bridgehead Simonds wanted. But, as always, plans are one thing, the actual 
execution another.1109 
                                        
1105 Whitaker and Whitaker, Tug of War, 250. 
1106 Whitaker and Whitaker, Tug of War, 306. 
1107 Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 124. 
1108 Next section, unless otherwise specified, Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 124-133. 
1109 Next paragraphs about advance to Woensdrecht, unless otherwise specified, Johan van Doorn, 
Slag om Woensdrecht, bevrijding van de Zuidwesthoek, Willemstad 1995, 25-33, and Zuehlke, Terrible 
Victory, 124-154 and 171-188. 
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Early on 28 September, another cold and wet day, the lead battalion of the 5th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, Le Régiment de Maissoneuve (under Lieutenant-Colonel 
J. Bibeau), crossed the bridge at Rijkevorsel. To prevent a repeat of the disaster that 
befell the Fusiliers Mont-Royal at Lochtenberg, the Maissies were supported by A 
Squadron the Fort Garry Horse (one of the three regiments in the 2nd Armoured 
Brigade) and a troop of armoured cars from the recce unit, the 14th Canadian 
Hussars. The CO of the Fort Garry Horse, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Mackay Wilson, 
was unhappy about the battle plan which had the armour in the lead, and his 
misgivings turned out to be justified. A few hundred yards from Oostbrecht an 8.8 
cm Flak gun opened up and the lead Sherman was immediately disabled. The 
infantry lagged behind and were unable to help out. Soon other Pak guns joined in 
and at the end of the day only eight tanks were still operational although the 
Maissies did manage to drive the German defenders out of the village. Since 
Oostbrecht was on the boundary between two divisions, some were from Grenadier-
Regimente 857 and 858 of the 346. Infanterie-Division, others were from Grenadier-
Regiment 731 , the left wing of the 711. Infanterie-Division. For once there had 
clearly been none of the usual rivalry about who was responsible. By now it was dark 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Ritchie did not like to attack what was apparently a 
strongly held position, but Brigadier Megill nevertheless insisted that the Black Watch 
carry out the plan and seize the next village, St.-Lenaarts. This was defended by the 
346. Infanterie-Division although some units of the 711. I.D. remained involved in 
some houses on the northern edge. The Black Watch would be supported by B 
Squadron Fort Garry Horse. It was midnight before the attack got underway. 
 
Again German resistance was fierce and again farmhouse after farmhouse had to be 
cleared in the chaos so typical of night actions. The Canadians slowly advanced on 
the village centre. At one point 3./Grenadier-Regiment 858 counterattacked, 
supported by two Renault  SPs (4,7 cm Pak (t) auf Pz.Kpfw.35R (f)), most likely from 
Panzerjäger-Kompanie 346, and one platoon from B Company even found itself 
surrounded.1110 However, during the attack Leutnant Schwarzelt’s men ran out of MG 
ammunition and a renewed Canadian effort broke the encirclement. The tables were 
definitely turned and in the end seventy-four Germans surrendered. In fact 
Schwarzelt’s company, originally 110 strong, had been wiped out. By mid-morning on 
29 September the Canadians were in control of most of St.-Lenaarts.1111 The battle 
for the village had been bloody. At the end of the day about eighty Germans and 
twelve Black Watch had lost their lives while many Grenadiere had been taken 
prisoner.1112 In addition forty-three Canadian soldiers had been wounded. At noon 
Brigadier Megill decided to push his third battalion, the Calgary Highlanders, through 
to exploit, but not as far as Brecht, which had been the plan at first. In view of the 
stiff German resistance he was wary of pushing the Calgarians out too far. Moreover 
the original plan, to link up with the 6th Brigade further west, was out of the window 
                                        
1110 First Cdn Army, IS 96, 04.10.44. Details on 3./858: First Cdn Army IR PoW Misc. Commands and 
Units, 03.10.44. 
1111 The capture of the village was not reported until 17.00 hours (Second Army Intel Log, 29.09.44, 
serial 29). 
1112 Wally Schoofs, De Slag om Brecht 1940-1945, Brecht 2005, 150 and 327-331, gives 49, Van 
Doorn (PAJVD) has found between 30-40 DOW (died of wounds) who need to be added to this. 
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because that same day the South Saskatchewans had been unable to cross at 
Lochtenberg. The Calgarians were now to seize another stretch of canal about two 
kilometres west so that the engineers could construct a bridge there which the 6th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade could use instead to join the advance.  
 
The operation started late on the 29 September and lasted throughout the night. The 
Germans broke off the action early the following morning and pulled back closer to 
Brecht. In fact the 346. Infanterie-Division had little option in view of the high 
number of casualties. Generalleutnant Diestel was now in dire straits. If the Canadian 
attacks continued at this pace his division could be annihilated within a few days. 
Von Zangen had no real reserves and eventually he decided that the 70. Infanterie-
Division under Generalleutnant Wilhelm Daser, which was assigned to hold 
Walcheren, was to come to the rescue.1113 The ‘Magendivision’ (Stomach Division) 
had received this nickname as 85% of its soldiers suffered from stomach ailments, 
sometimes caused by wounds from other fronts. The men were attached to this 
division until they were reclassified as fit for more active duties and thus the turnover 
was nearly a thousand in three months. Hence there was little group cohesion and 
morale was very low.1114 But it was all Von Zangen had. The division was to give up 
one of its three regiments. Diestel decided to assign Grenadier-Regiment 1018 
commanded by Major Hiller a sector in between his own two regiments.1115 Thus it 
ended up in the area around Maria-ter-Heide, where it would catch the brunt of the 
Canadian attack. The first soldiers began to arrive north of Antwerp on 29 
September. They would arrive too late to stop the first stage of the Canadian 
breakout. 
Breakout 
On 1 October the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade kept pushing west to expand the 
bridgehead.1116 Initially the Calgarians were in the lead. They started their attack in 
darkness and heavy rain. Once the start line was secured, after some squabbling, the 
Black Watch took over at eight a.m.  After a short, but bloody fight, they managed to 
push the German defenders (I./ and II./Grenadier-Regiment 857, I./GR 858 plus 
II./GR 743) out of Brecht around noon. After that the third battalion, the Cameron 
Highlanders, took over. They managed to expand the bridgehead up to a point close 
to Lochtenberg. The way was now clear for the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade to 
follow, push through and link up with the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade which was 
to come out of Antwerp the following day. All in all 135 Germans were taken prisoner 
that day.1117 For the Canadians this boded well for the next stage. The Germans 
were in deep trouble.  In a desperate attempt to stem the Canadian advance Diestel 
decided to take a risk. He pulled back three newly arrived companies (2., 3. and 
6./Grenadier-regiment 1018) from their current positions around Brasschaat and 
formed them into an ad-hoc battalion. This improvised unit under Hauptmann Feil 
                                        
1113 Von Zangen, 25 and Rehm, 32. 
1114 Special Interrogation report of Leutnant Obermeit, TNA WO 208/1199. 
1115 According to a PoW who served in 1018, Hauptmann Theobald was the Kommandeur (TNA WO 
208/3608, SIR 1319). 
1116 This section, unless otherwise specified, Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 139-154. 
1117 War Diary 2nd Cdn inf Div, message 01.10.44, 24.00 hours. 
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was to seal the gap now developing along the anti-tank ditch running from 
Lochtenberg to Maria-ter-Heide.1118  
 
The first goal of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier F. Cabeldu) on 2 
October was Merksem, the Antwerp suburb which had been the scene of the first 
action of schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 about a month before and 
which had eluded the 11th Armoured Division then. The weather improved slightly 
and once again Second Tactical Air Force helped out on a massive scale.1119 During 
the early morning twelve Spitfires of 127 Squadron (131 Wing) swooped down on 
German guns north of Antwerp and half of the bombs fell within the target area. For 
good measure gun positions were also strafed. The Spitfires all returned safely to 
Lille/Nord just before ten a.m. After refuelling they took off again together with five 
other squadrons and the combined might of fifty-seven Spitfires plastered a wide 
area from north of Antwerp as far north as Brecht.1120 In fact 332 Squadron flew two 
additional missions. A total of seventy-nine 500-pounders were dropped on buildings, 
guns and known ammunition dumps. Finally, at the end of the afternoon all forty-
eight Spitfires of the four squadrons in 145 Wing attacked woods north-east of 
Antwerp dropping another forty-six 500-pounders on suspected targets.1121   
  
In spite of all the fireworks, Cabeldu opted for caution and he decided on an attack 
from two different directions. He ordered the Royal Regiment of Canada (Lieutenant-
Colonel R.M. Lendrum) supported by Belgian volunteers to go in first, across the 
Albert Canal, while the Essex Scottish (Lieutenant-Colonel J. Pangman) would come 
in from the west. The Royals’ canal crossing went surprisingly well, because it went 
undetected and it was not until the Belgian volunteers, all 150 from the Antwerp 
resistance and led by ‘Colonel Harry’ (Eugene Colson), went across that the German 
defenders woke up.1122 The Belgians suffered horrendous losses, eleven men were 
killed and thirteen were wounded, but still the Canadians managed to form a 
bridgehead although smaller than originally intended. The Royals went ahead and 
they soon reached the town centre. Here a sharp counterattack developed, but it 
was broken up by the Canadian artillery. The attack by the Essex Scottish had also 
gone off to an auspicious start, although Groenendaal Castle looked like it might be a 
tough nut to crack. Amazingly the defenders left it as soon as the Essex attacked. At 
the end of the day the Canadian advance ended just north of the town at the anti-
tank ditch. All in all Grenadier-Regiment 1018 had been pushed out of Merksem 
before it could really dig in there. Forty-three of their number were taken prisoner (in 
addition to a score of Belgian SS-men).1123 Worse was to come for the Grenadiere.  
 
Just as the Grenadiere tried to take up position between Grenadier-Regiment 857  
and 858 the Canadian advance was gaining momentum. That same day, as planned, 
                                        
1118 Captured order in War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, IS 14, 22.10.44. 
1119 Details actions 2 TAF, Daily Log 02.10.44. 
1120 131 Wing: 302 and 317 Squadrons, 132 Wing: 127, 332 and 349 Squadrons and 135 Wing: 222 
Squadron. 
1121 Namely 74, 329, 340 and 341 Squadrons. 
1122 Stappaerts, Kolonel Harry, 149-157. 
1123 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Intel log, 03.10.44, 03.30 hours. Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 146, 
gives forty-four. 
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the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade broke out of the bridgehead and headed towards 
their comrades breaking out of Antwerp. The South Saskatchewan Regiment 
(Lieutenant-Colonel V. Stott) supported by B Squadron the Fort Garry Horse 
advanced alongside the canal, while the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of 
Canada (Lieutenant-Colonel E.P. Thompson) and C Squadron the Fort Garry Horse 
proceeded northwest towards Maria-ter-Heide. Hauptmann Feil’s improvised battalion 
fought back as well as they could, but the Germans were seriously outnumbered and 
it remained to be seen how much they could do. The dense woods helped to delay 
the advance, but at the end of the day the South Saskatchewans took their 
objective, Lochtenberg. There they came across the bodies of their comrades who 
had fallen in the failed crossing eight days before (see Chapter 3.5). The Camerons, 
however, failed to reach their objective for the day. Both poor tank-infantry 
cooperation on their part and fierce resistance by Feil’s men meant that Thompson 
was forced to reorganise for the following day. 
  
On Tuesday 3 October the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade continued their advance. 
The Camerons met with hardly any resistance this time and Kamp de Brasschaat and 
Maria-ter-Heide were occupied by 12.30 hours. The South Saskatchewans were also 
quite successful and they advanced another three kilometres and liberated the town 
of Brasschaat to the usual scenes of cheering civilians. Again Grenadier-Regiment 
1018 bore the brunt of the attack and this time 121 were taken prisoner.1124 
Meanwhile the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade had its hands full taking the heavily 
defended marshalling yards at Oorderen. This job fell to the Royal Hamilton Light 
Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel D. Whitaker). Using a feint as well as a creeping barrage 
Whitaker managed to get one company behind the Germans and at 06.30 hours the 
marshalling yards were taken. The last Germans at Merksem were driven off and 
Colson’s group of resistance fighters was finally relieved, not until after another five 
had been killed. They had fought bravely alongside the Allies for one month since the 
capture of Antwerp and they had suffered hugely in the process.1125  
 
Canadian patrols found that the next town, Eekeren, was still firmly held by German 
troops and that as was far as Cabeldu’s 4th Brigade got that day. As the two 
Canadian brigades were now just three kilometres from each other, the Germans in 
between, in particular a small group of Germans inside Fort de Schooten, risked 
being trapped. The Canadians had no idea how many Germans were inside the old 
fortress and they decided to take no chances.1126 It was thought that maybe the 
group was amenable to propaganda using loudspeakers. The script was prepared, 
but due to technical difficulties the idea could not be carried out. Unbeknownst to the 
Canadians about half of the German defenders used this lull to slip out during the 
night. The following morning a company from the Calgarians entered the fort to take 
the rest, thirty-four, prisoner.1127 It was then found that the whole group, 
Kampfgruppe Wittenberg (Hauptmann Wittenberg), had been composed of a mere 
sixty to seventy men from Grenadier-Regiment 1056 (89. Infanterie-Division).1128   
                                        
1124 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Intel Log, 04.10.44, 02.00 hours. 
1125 Stappaerts, Kolonel Harry, 200-203 . 
1126 Story Fort de Schooten. War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, 03. and 04.10.44. 
1127 War Diary 2nd Cdn inf Div, G Intel Log, 03.10.44, 17.20 hours. 
1128 First Cdn Army, IS 95, 03.10.44. 
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Plain sailing 
Bolstered by this success the Allies were fooled into thinking that the breakthrough 
towards the Beveland isthmus was finally about to happen. The intelligence officers 
felt that the losses inflicted on the Germans meant that ‘enemy resistance on the 
Northern shore of the Scheldt may not after all be as prolonged or as stubborn as 
expected…’1129 In other words, hopefully it would be plain sailing from now on. 
The loss of the canal line meant that General Von Zangen (15. Armee) now had no 
natural features to fall back on. So retreat was the only option. From Antwerp 
northwards until north of the Dutch border, where there was an area of higher 
ground the so-called ‘Brabant Wal’, it was all flat polder land which offered little 
opportunity for defence. Another reason to pull them back was that Von Zangen 
wanted to prevent his troops from being trapped.1130 His biggest headache was still 
the attack towards Tilburg since that could tear open his whole defensive line. Von 
Zangen could only look for Kampfgruppe Chill to stop this impending disaster. 
Coupled with the serious losses incurred by the 346. Infanterie-Division and the fact 
that there were no other reserves he again asked Heeresgruppe B for permission to 
prepare to pull back his army behind the river Meuse. Again permission was refused. 
Von Zangen therefore decided on a gradual withdrawal north. 
 
On 4 October, a bright and cool day, the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades 
finally formed a continuous front north of Antwerp. It was a day of steady progress 
as the Canadian troops followed the German withdrawal closely. The ultimate goal 
for Cabeldu’s 4th Brigade was Woensdrecht, the key to the Beveland isthmus. Things 
finally seemed to be going well that sunny day as the Essex Scottish (4th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade) took Eekeren and then Stabroek with its vital bridge across the 
Opstalbeek. That same day the Fusiliers Mont Royal (6th Canadian Infantry Brigade) 
occupied Capellen. All in all another 268 Germans were taken prisoner.1131 The 
Division’s intelligence officers correctly deduced that the enemy was ‘fighting a 
delaying action to cover (…) limited withdrawal towards new line…’1132   
 
The following day saw the continuation of the Canadian advance. The Essex Scottish 
proceeded northeast for another five kilometres until they came upon the Dutch 
border at the village of Putte. There German resistance stiffened and Canadian losses 
soon began to mount. The lead company (B) was down to just forty men when it 
reached the central square. The defenders, largely from 5. and 7. Kompanie 
Landesschützbatallion 484, had only that morning arrived from Merksplas to bolster 
Grenadier-Regiment 858. No sooner had the Essex taken Putte than a counterattack 
began which could be beaten off after some fierce fighting. Meanwhile, to the left of 
the Essex, the Royal Regiment of Canada had struck out in a more northerly 
direction, towards Berendrecht, B Squadron 14th Canadian Hussars leading the way. 
There around twenty-eight Grenadiere from 5. and 8./Grenadier-Regiment 744 
surrendered to the Daimler armoured cars without putting up much of a fight.1133 
                                        
1129 Second Army, IS 121, 03.10.44. 
1130 This section, Von Zangen, 31-2. 
1131 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Intel Log, 04.10.44, 02.00 hours. 
1132 Ibid.  
1133 Zuehlke (Terrible Victory, 176) gives a hundred, but the G Intel Log for 5 October (23.00 hours) 
gives 28. 
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During that night’s briefing Cabeldu told his battalion commanders that the brigade 
would advance on the axis Ossendrecht – Calfven and that the next stop was to be 
Hoogerheide while the ultimate goal was Korteven. If that was captured the road 
between the Zuid Beveland peninsula and Bergen op Zoom would be completely cut 
off, isolating the island of Walcheren and all the German troops there. The attack 
was to start the following morning. 
 
Diestel’s 346. Infanterie-Division was now in a real trouble, losing a company or 
more every day and the lack of armour and mobile anti-tank guns made itself felt. In 
an effort to remedy this Generalfeldmarschall Model, Oberbefehslhaber 
Heeresgruppe B, on the same day announced that 15. Armee was to be reinforced 
by Sturmgeschützbrigade 667 (in addition to Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 and the 
eight Sturmgeschütze from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559), 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 and the 256. Volksgrenadier-Division. These units were 
expected to arrive on the 10th (667) or the 12th (244 and the 256 V.G.D.).1134 But 
that was still a few days away and for the time being 559 had its hands full south of 
Tilburg. At least Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 was available so all of its operational 
Sturmgeschütze were sent on their way to Hoogerheide that very day from the 
station at Breda where they unloaded.1135 Every day the Allied advance was held up 
was a day that denied the vital port of Antwerp to the Allies. At a conference with 
Eisenhower and Montgomery that day the British Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field-
Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, reached the conclusion that ‘access to Antwerp must be 
captured with the least possible delay’.1136 It was a clear sign that a storm was 
brewing at the highest levels, just beyond the horizon for the moment, but one 
which would have momentous consequences for the current campaign.  
The advance continues 
Friday 6 October was a continuation of the previous two days. The Royal Hamilton 
Light Infantry (Rileys) started off from Putte and crossed the border into the 
Netherlands expecting a stiff fight. But they discovered a vulnerable spot in the 
network of enemy rearguards and advance elements slipped through to just east of 
Ossendrecht.1137 Lieutenant-Colonel D. Whitaker hoped to overtake the Germans 
before they could set up a new defensive line and he ordered A Company to mount 
the Shermans of A Squadron the Fort Garry Horse so they could move faster. His 
hope was dashed when the group came across an extensive roadblock after only 
three kilometres. Eventually the obstacle was overcome and the Rileys got as far as 
Het Puts Molentje en Jagersrust, the latter place, an inn, only a few kilometres from 
Hoogerheide and Woensdrecht. That same day the Royals on the left advanced on 
Ossendrecht which they hoped to take by entering it from two different directions. 
However, this time the German defenders failed to be impressed by the armoured 
                                        
1134 KTB H.Gr.B,  Nr. 8222/44, 05.10.44 and 8441/44, 10.10.44. 
1135 Not as is incorrectly reported in various books, Sturmgeschützbrigade 255. This mistake stems 
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1136 Alanbrooke, 601. 
1137 First Cdn Army IS 98, 06.11.44. 
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cars of the 14th Canadian Hussars and a concealed Renault SP (4,7 cm Pak (t) auf 
Pz.Kpfw.35R (f))  opened fire on them. The defence of Ossendrecht had been 
assigned to Major Friedrich Oesterheld of the 346. Infanterie-Division who was in 
charge of the usual motley crew from this division and from Grenadier-Regiment 743 
(719. I.D.) as well as Bataillon Nick from Grenadier-Regiment 744 (711. I.D.), 
Kampfgruppe Lammert (or Lambert) with 6. and 1./GR 861  plus units from the 
Kriegsmarine.1138 Diestel hoped that he would be able to put a stop to the Canadian 
force bearing down on Ossendrecht, but all they could do was slow them down. 
Accurate artillery fire knocked out the Renault and broke a German counterattack. 
Oesterheld himself was mortally wounded (he died the following day) and at the end 
of the day the Royals were in full possession of Ossendrecht. About fifty Germans 
lost their lives. Unbeknownst to the Canadians, the lead Shermans had gotten to 
within a few metres of the headquarters of Grenadier-Regiment 744.1139The scene 
was now set for the final all-out assault on Hoogerheide, Korteven and the Beveland 
isthmus. That job was assigned to the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade. After five days 
it was to go the final stretch to Woensdrecht. Once they possessed that village the 
Canadians would in effect have severed the link between Walcheren, Zuid-Beveland 
and the mainland. Somewhat optimistically the divisional war diarist noted ‘There are 
definite indications of enemy withdrawal in the direction of Bergen op Zoom.’1140  
 
While it was heading for the Woensdrecht area the right flank of the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division was getting more and more extended. There were simply no Allied 
units available to plug the potential gap. This development was, of course, a direct 
result of Montgomery’s focus on the Rhine (see Chapter 3.5) and the resulting orders 
to I Corps which led to two divergent lines of attack, a sin against basic military 
principles. As the 49th and the Polish 1st Armoured Divisions still had more than 
enough on their plates in the struggle south of Tilburg, there were basically no 
troops to fill the gap which was beginning to open up between the two main lines of 
attack. Both to draw defenders away from Woensdrecht and to prevent the Germans 
from exploiting this gap Brigadier Keefler, the acting divisional commander, ordered 
the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade to attack towards Kalmthout. This task fell to the 
Fusiliers Mont Royal (still at Capellen) plus four troops from the Fort Garry Horse, a 
squadron from the 14th Canadian Hussars and some supporting units. Their attack 
would start the following morning at ten a.m.1141 
 
Meanwhile Von Zangen had his own worries. Both the OKW and Model pointed out 
the operational necessity of defending the area on the general line Antwerp – Tilburg 
– ‘s-Hertogenbosch, stating that it was ‘bis zum Äussersten zu halten.’1142  But how? 
Von Zangen was becoming ever more anxious about the way the situation was 
developing for the 346. I.D. and he was running out of troops. Eventually he decided 
to send Sturmbataillon AOK 15, also known as Sturmbataillon Armee Waffenschule 
                                        
1138 This section, Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 30. Data Germans: 2 Cdn Corps, IS 69, 17.10.44. Re 
Lambert: First Cdn Army IR PoW 347 ID, 10. and 18.10.44. 
1139 Rehm, 38-9. 
1140 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, 06.10.44. 
1141 War Diary 6th Cdn Inf Bde, 06.120.44. 
1142 KBT H Gr B, 8244/44, 06.10.44. 
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15.1143 This unit, which was not really intended for front-line duty, was originally 
formed in Essen, Belgium, in September 1943. It was made up of a headquarters 
company, three rifle companies (1.-3.) and one heavy company (4.) armed with 
mortars and 2 cm Flak. In addition the battalion had four horse drawn 10.5 cm LfH 
18 (m) field guns.1144 The battalion was sent to Soissons in February 1944 to serve 
as a demonstration unit at the 15. Armee Waffenschule.  Except for 1. Kompanie, 
which was left at Dordrecht to guard the army headquarters, the Sturmbataillon, 
about two hundred infantry plus guns, led by Hauptmann Hühne,1145 was sent to 
Hoogerheide where it arrived during the afternoon of 7 October.1146  
Blocked 
On 7 October, another rainy day, a clear indication that autumn had finally come, the 
5th Canadian Infantry Brigade started what it hoped would be the last push to 
Woensdrecht. The Calgary Highlanders and le Régiment de Maissoneuve took the 
lead while the Black Watch were held in reserve. The Calgarians started from 
Ossendrecht, supported by five tanks from C Squadron the Fort Garry Horse. First 
stop was Hoogerheide, next and final stop was Woensdrecht. As the name implies 
(‘hoger’ means higher) Hoogerheide dominates the surrounding countryside. It was 
built on a sandy ridge twenty-two metres above the flat polders surrounding it. It 
was higher, too, than Woensdrecht. In fact, the pinnacle of  St.Joseph’s, the Roman 
Catholic church tower in Woensdrecht was on the same level as the floor of Our 
Lady’s Ascension in Hoogerheide. Clearly the latter village was the key to a 
successful advance on Woensdrecht.  
 
Initially the advance went off to a fine start.1147 Progress was good as the Calgarians 
moved north through the woods east of the road. Things began to heat up as the 
leading platoon emerged from the woods. Stiff resistance had to be overcome, but 
helped by the Shermans from the Fort Garry Horse the Calgarians soon entered the 
southern part of Hoogerheide. From four p.m. the first prisoners began to pour in. 
They were mainly from Sturmbataillon AOK 15 . The Calgarians’ war diary described 
the surprise of the Canadians when they saw their new opponents, ‘Contrary to what 
we had expected, they were not all old, sickly men, but rather young, fairly well-built 
men. (…) some of them spoke English and informed us that it was the first battle for 
many of them.‘1148 Eventually sixty-two would be taken prisoner. The main reason for 
this high number is that the German soldiers had been told to attack, which they 
‘thought rather a poor idea’ since they only had rifles and the Canadians had armour. 
Hence they were only too willing to surrender.1149 Still, their appeareance stalled the 
Canadians’ advance and fighting became more and more chaotic as night fell. At one 
                                        
1143 There is confusion as to who was its Kommandeur. Dritter Befehl  FJR 6 (10.10.44) suggests that 
it was Major Ebsen, but the Canadian sources (see following note) insist it was Hauptmann Huehne. 
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1147 This section, unless otherwise specified, Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 180-4. 
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point the commander in one of the Shermans thought he could see a Panther 
rumbling towards him.1150 In the darkness the Sherman slugged it out with the 
German ‘tank’. The Canadian gunner managed to set the opponent ablaze although 
the Sherman had received a round through its final drive, disabling it. The chaos in 
Hoogerheide went on for a long time, but when the fighting died down the 
Calgarians were in possession of the all-important crossroads. The Maissies on their 
right had not been so successful. Their attack along the Putte-Hoogerheide road 
from early on had become bogged down at a roadblock which could not be 
circumvented because of anti-tank ditches next to the road and it was not overcome 
until the German defenders pulled out to avoid being trapped at the end of the 
afternoon. The Maissies captured sixty-three prisoners, but they had only covered a 
mile that day.1151 
 
The diversionary attack to secure the extended right flank on 7 October failed 
miserably. The ill-conceived attack soon got stuck at a roadblock and the Fusiliers 
barely made it past the starting line. At five p.m. Brigadier Gauvreau decided to call 
off the ‘show’.1152 He decided to put more weight behind the attack. The Fusiliers 
would now be supported by two squadrons of tanks instead of a few troops. The 
whole force was to be called Saint. The goal was now even more ambitious: 
Saintforce was to capture Achterbroek (just east of Kalmthout) and from there carry 
out a circular sweep taking it as far as Wuustwezel and back again). The object was 
to create confusion and give the Germans the impression that they were ‘completely 
surrounded by tanks’.1153 The same day there was a change of command and control 
over the operations north of Antwerp also fell to II Canadian Corps. The new 
boundary with I Corps ran from Achterbroek to Essen.1154  
 
Despite the limited success the Canadians had that day LXVII. Armeekorps was 
clearly in serious trouble. As the Chief of staff, Oberst Elmar Warning put it, ‘Die 
Lage entwickelte sich immer bedrohlicher. Reserven, um eine weiteres 
Feindvorgehen zu verhindern, standen nicht mehr zur Verfuegung. Das 
Generalkommando musste sich mit der Bitte um unverzuegliche Hilfe an die Armee 
wenden.’1155 Von Zangen looked around and he realised that the only thing he could 
do was call in his trusty old ‘fire brigade’, Kampfgruppe Chill.1156 The tragedy was 
that they would have to bail Sponheimer’s corps out in the middle of a potentially 
successful attack of their own towards Poppel (previous chapter). However, beggars 
cannot be choosers and as Von Zangen put it, ‘Es kommt jetzt darauf an, dass die 
Landverbindung nach Walcheren moeglichst lange in eigener Hand bleibt.’1157 Von 
der Heydte was highly surprised when he received the order, ‘I realized the urgency 
of the mission: it was the first time in the whole war I had been ordered to break off 
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a successful attack mid-battle’.1158 For the moment all that the 346. Infanterie-
Division could do was to try and delay the Canadian advance until the Fallschirmjäger 
arrived. 
New arrivals 
On 8 October Saintforce moved towards Kalmthout. However, visibility was down to 
thirty-five to forty metres. In the dense fog an 8.8 cm Flak gun opened up fire and 
the attack ground to a halt.1159 Once the fog lifted the tanks could locate and break 
enemy resistance and around two p.m. the lead elements reached Kalmthout. Next 
they came across a new obstacle at a bridge which was not overcome until five p.m. 
Opposition was stiffening and it was clear that the idea of a circular sweep would 
have to wait another day. Then Keefler received a message that spelled the end of 
Saintforce. The Fusiliers were to consolidate at Kalmthout, but the Sherman tanks 
were urgently needed at Hoogerheide. There, serious trouble was brewing.  
 
The operation to capture Hoogerheide had started off well and by mid-morning the 
Calgary Highlanders had cleared most of the village. The Maissies to their right had 
also caught up by then. Now that Hoogerheide was firmly in Canadian hands it was 
time for the third battalion of the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the Black Watch, to 
pass through on their way to Korteven and the brickworks there.1160 They would 
bypass Woensdrecht and cut the route into the Beveland isthmus. Battalion 
commander Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Ritchie told his officers that conditions were 
not very good and it soon became clear that this was an understatement as even the 
start line had not been secured. His companies, supported by a troop of Shermans 
from the Fort Garry Horse, had to fight their way forward just to get there. D 
Company managed to advance as far as Zandfort just a kilometre from where they 
had started. They dug in around the crossroads. Further attempts to oust on failed in 
the face of enemy mortars, machine-guns and artillery shells and D Company was 
forced to pull back to their start line. The fierce resistance was a last ditch attempt to 
stem the Canadian advance by the usual motley of troops from the 346. Infanterie-
Division including Sturmbataillon Armee Oberkommando 15.1161 It seemed as if the 
day would end in a stalemate. Early in the evening, however, German soldiers 
wearing different uniforms and with a different type of helmet appeared on the 
scene. Small groups of Fallschirmjäger began to infiltrate the lines of all three 
battalions in and around Hoogerheide. Kampfgruppe Chill had arrived on the scene. 
The attackers became the defenders. 
 
As related at the end of Chapter 3.5, half of Kampfgruppe Chill had begun to move 
to the west of Brabant early that Sunday morning. Leaving Oberst Dreyer back with 
just two battalions, Batallion Pohl (I./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-
Regiment Hermann Göring) and Batallion Ohler, to cover the line, the other five 
battalions under Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte moved west. Their sector was taken 
over by II./Grenadier-Regiment 935 and I./Füsilier Batallion 937, which were 
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temporarily assigned to Chill.1162 A long column of lorries and buses drove from 
Tilburg through Breda to Bergen op Zoom six kilometres north of Korteven where 
they were unloaded. First to arrive on the scene was the Kampfgruppe’s reserve unit, 
Batallion Finzel (I./Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2), followed by III./ Fallschirmjäger-
Regiment 6, then parts of I./FJR 6.1163 While loading up it was found that I./FJR 6 
did not have 280 men as had been reported earlier, but 530, so that out of the blue 
extra lorries needed to be found somewhere to take the other 250 men to Bergen op 
Zoom. It all took a very long time and in fact the last soldiers did not reach their 
destination until the morning of 9 October.1164  
 
The arrival of this large group of Fallschirmjäger, their number was estimated by the 
Allies at 2,000 (which was quite accurate), did not go unnoticed. Civilians (probably 
resistance fighters from the Albrecht Group who specialized in reporting on German 
units) managed to cross the lines and informed the Calgary Highlanders of the new 
German force which together with eight ‘tanks’, clearly the five Sturmgeschütze III 
and two or three Sturmhaubitzen 42G of Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 under Major 
Kühme, was moving into Bergen op Zoom that morning.1165 This number means that 
on that date 280 had only seven vehicles in repair. The Calgarians passed the news 
on to higher echelons with a request to act on this information. Later that day further 
reports came in about the whole German group moving south to the woods just 
north of Mattemburg.1166 It was in this beautiful country house, nicknamed the ‘white 
house’,  that Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte established his headquarters. It was an 
ideal location. On the estate was a brickyard which offered an excellent observation 
post. Later he remembered, ‘I would make my customary evening stroll and could 
walk just a thousand metres away, to the houses over at the top end of the ridge 
overlooking Woensdrecht.’1167 Less ideal was the discovery, after one of his men had 
inadvertently stepped on a mine and died, that the area immediately south of 
Mattemburg was strewn with thousands of mines of all types, both Teller and anti-
personnel Schuh Minen. Von der Heydte had not been provided with a map and had 
to call upon the 719. Infanterie-Division to provide him with one as the mines had all 
been laid during the summer by 2./Pi 719.1168 The problem was soon solved, but 
precious time was lost while Von der Heydte decided to explore the battlefield for 
himself. While his companies were getting ready for the counterattack, Von der 
Heydte, who liked to lead from the front, decided to go on a recce trip. As he did not 
have a clear idea where the enemy was and did not trust official reports Von der 
Heydte decided to see for himself.1169 He left Mattemburg in his VW Kübelwagen.1170 
                                        
1162 KTB 88 AK, 08.10.44, C 270 and KTB 88 AK,  09.10.44, 10.07 hours. 
1163 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Intel Log, 11.10.44, 15.30 hours and KTB 88 AK, 07.10.44, B 366. 
At some point IV./FJR 6, the heavy battalion, must also have arrived, because they too were involved 
in the fighting. 
1164 KTB 88 AK, 09.10.44, 07.30 hours. 
1165 War Diary Calgary Highlanders 08.10.44 and 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Ops Log, 08.10.44, serial 778. 
1166 Ibid, serial 779, 15.45 hours. 
1167 Whitaker and Whitaker, Tug of War, 185. 
1168 Von der Heydte, Muss ich sterben, 169 and Minefield Clearance Certificate (archive CID 
Netherlands Army). The mines were all cleared at the end of August 1945 
1169 This incident Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 41. 
 242 
While in Hoogerheide  he was nearly captured by the Canadians. However, he got 
away safely and personally oversaw the attack on Hoogerheide. It was set for six the 
following morning. That afternoon a battery of six 10.5 cm Feldhaubitze from 
Artillerie-regiment 70 also arrived to provide the necessary artillery support for the 
coming attack.1171  
 
Worried about the development north of Hoogerheide the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division at 17.15 hours sent out a call to Second Tactical Air Force for Typhoons to 
attack immediately and without prior tactical reconnaissance as it would soon be too 
dark.1172 For once the request was granted. This was not an automatic thing as the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division had to take the backseat to their comrades of  the 
3rd Division (who had just started Operation Switchback) as far as air support was 
concerned.1173 In an attempt to disrupt Kampfgruppe Von der Heydte’s preparations 
at 18.30 hours eight Typhoons of 257 Squadron (146 wing) swooped down. In spite 
of intense Flak fire they pressed home until almost zero feet and fired a total of fifty-
four rocket projectiles on to the target area.1174 They could not observe the results in 
the dense woods and the gathering dusk. The Flak hit one of the planes and 22-year 
old W/O J.R. Powell was killed when his plane dove into the ground not far from Von 
der Heydte’s headquarters.1175 The results, however, were better than expected. The 
attack not only inflicted damage and casualties but line communications were 
disrupted to such a degree that the various units found themselves unable to 
coordinate their attacks properly afterwards. (Five days later, when POWs revealed 
this information, Keefler would express his thanks to the RAF for their 
contribution.)1176  
 
Nevertheless, the danger for the Canadians was far from over. The Fallschirmjäger 
approaching Hoogerheide that evening were well armed. On average each company 
had nine MG 42’s and a similar number of Panzerschreck.1177 It was a formidable 
force indeed, as the three Canadian battalions in Hoogerheide, all of them seriously 
understrength by then, would soon find out. The Calgarians, were in the western half 
of Hoogerheide while the Black Watch were in the eastern half. To their right Le 
Régiment de Maissoneuve held a line from the airfield in a south-easterly direction 
covering the road to Putte. Prior to the attack the Fallschirmjäger began to probe the 
Canadian lines. Something else they did was to clear the civilians out of Woensdrecht 
and Hoogerheide, as they (rightly) feared that some of them might pass on 
intelligence to the Canadians. The civilians ended up in Bergen op Zoom. The 
measure, though not taken for humanitarian reasons, nevertheless in the end saved 
many Dutch lives. 
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The first attack on Hoogerheide 
As the night wore on the pin prick attacks kept coming. The Black Watch beat them 
off, inflicting serious casualties on the attackers, but the Fallschirmjäger did not give 
up. The CO of the Calgarians, Lieutenant-Colonel D. MacLaughlan became 
increasingly worried. First he asked for tank support, then he looked for assistance 
from the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade. He was told that neither would be coming. 
He would have to make do with what he had. The Calgarians braced themselves. 
They could clearly hear Germans digging in, talking, shouting, even the clanking of 
tracked vehicles and the sound of engines was audible.1178 After an extremely fretful 
night the German force finally struck Hoogerheide in earnest. It was six a.m. on 
Monday 9 October. It was clear that the Calgarians were in for a hard time.1179 Even 
before the main blow was struck A Company, at the vital crossroads, was in serious 
trouble and it was not until the CO, Major Del Kearns, called in artillery fire that the 
German attackers were driven off. Nevertheless the company found itself still unable 
to reorganise thanks to the confusion. Amazingly, they still managed to take some 
prisoners among the Fallschirmjäger. Later that morning Kearns was wounded and 
had to be evacuated. Eventually the company, now led by Lieutenant Munro, had to 
pull back to the southernmost house of the Raadhuisstraat, near the church.  
 
Other companies began to suffer too from the mortaring and infiltrations. Because 
the focus was on the left of the Calgary positions D Company in particular came 
under a lot of pressure and only beat off the attackers by putting up a determined 
stand and its CO, Major Bruce MacKenzie, also became a casualty and had to be sent 
to the rear. Only B Company, not under direct attack, scored a minor success. Their 
CO, Major Ellis, ordered No.11 platoon together with a troop from C Squadron the 
Fort Garry Horse to clean out a small wood southwest of Hoogerheide where some 
Fallschirmjäger had established an Observation Point. The attack was highly 
successful. The Shermans put intense fire on the wood for ten minutes after which 
the Calgarians went in and found the OP. They returned with thirty-four prisoners. 
But the attacks on Hoogerheide did not diminish in intensity, nor did the hail of fire 
that rained down on the village. 
  
Things got decidedly worse for the Canadians when a couple of Sturmgeschütze of 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 poked their armoured snouts into the streets of 
Hoogerheide. One actually ended up in the middle of the positions of the Black 
Watch. So far Lieutenant-Colonel Ritchie’s battalion had been spared the worst of it. 
Now disaster seemed to strike as the SP rolled down the street towards C Company. 
Because of the proximity of their own troops the Canadian artillery could not 
intervene. Neither could the Shermans of the Fort Garry Horse because the built-up 
area made them too vulnerable. At that moment a Canadian soldier inched his PIAT 
over the window sill of an upstairs window and fired a bomb, which immediately put 
the Sturmgeschütze out of action.1180  
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At the end of the day casualties were rapidly mounting, for both sides. Among the 
dead that day were nineteen Calgarians, four Black Watch plus eighteen Germans, 
from Fallschirmjägerregiment 6 and Sturmbataillon Armee Oberkommando 15. 1181 
Coupled with the fact that the number of fatalities was higher than that of the 
wounded is testimony to the ferocity of the fighting in this small village.1182 The 
armour had suffered too and C Squadron the Fort Garry Horse was down to just nine 
Shermans, half of their normal strength. Unfortunately for the men on the ground, 
this was not the end of the bloodletting in this small ’corner of a foreign field’, in fact, 
it was merely the beginning. Because of weather conditions, and to their own 
annoyance, Second Tactical Air Force was unable to help out; the only mission flown 
in support of the army was an attack on two observation points on Zuid-Beveland.1183 
The night of 9-10 October was a repeat of the previous one. Again the Calgarians in 
particular could hear movements all around them as well as the rattle of tracks and 
again they got very little sleep. It was not until five a.m. that things began to quiet 
down for a while.1184  
 
During the night there was an O group at the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
headquarters in a farm near Ossendrecht. The farm was really too small for a 
brigade headquarters and the war diarist complained that ‘the Ops-Int room is more 
like Grand Central Sta[tion] on a Sunday night…’.1185 In addition, the proximity of six 
regiments, three field artillery and three anti-aircraft, which were constantly firing 
either singly or together, created so much noise that it was hard to concentrate on 
what Keefler, the divisional commander, was saying. However, his message was loud 
and clear. He told his subordinates that he wanted the battalions to attack again. 
Megill explained to Keefler that this was absolutely impossible in view of what had 
gone on that day and Keefler eventually relented. He agreed that there was to be no 
further attack for the next forty-eight hours. Moreover, it was to be carried out by 
the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade on 11 October while the 5th would go into 
reserve. Keefler did insist, however, that the Calgarians retake the vital crossroads at 
Hoogerheide. 
Stalemate 
Lieutenant-Colonel MacLauchlan, whose nerves were completely frayed by this time, 
ordered D Company (Captain Bob Porter) to try and fulfil this mission impossible.1186 
But there was no way the company could pull it off under the prevailing 
circumstances. Incredibly Porter’s men managed to push Von der Heydte’s 
Fallschirmjäger slowly back up the Raadhuisstraat in Hoogerheide. They reached the 
Antwerpsestraatweg at 07.30 hours which was halfway. That was as far as they 
would get. Fighting became so intense then that sometimes it was not just the 
houses, but rooms within houses that were contested. ‘Im Haus Nr. 19 sind Kanadier 
in die Küche eingedrungen – Schlafzimmer ist noch in unserem Besitz,’ said a report 
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sent to Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte.1187 The Canadians could not reach their 
objective. Enemy snipers were still very active and a high-velocity gun, possibly an 
88 or a Sturmgeschütz, controlled the crossroads. The Black Watch meanwhile 
reported that they had reached the crossroads. This was clearly a mistake and the 
CO of A Squadron the Fort Garry Horse said that ’no infantryman could have crossed 
that street alive’.1188 Back at brigade headquarters the long afternoon dragged on, 
but in the end Brigadier Megill realised that D Company was never going to make it 
to the crossroads and it was allowed to pull back. After this had been decided Major 
Ross Ellis took over command of the Calgarians from MacLauchlan who went on a 
much needed leave. Second Tactical Air Force did not enter the fray that day, both 
because the weather still was not too good, but also because the majority of the 105 
sorties that were flown were aimed at assisting operation Switchback (clearing the 
Breskens pocket south of the Scheldt) which had just started.1189 
 
The fighting in Hoogerheide slowly died down as darkness fell on 10 October. Both 
sides began to dig in. The men were utterly exhausted because of the intense and 
confused fighting. Again casualties were high, the Black Watch alone suffered eighty-
one casualties in two days at Hoogerheide. Most of the village itself was reduced to 
rubble, over 400 houses were destroyed and another 235 damaged. Hardly a house 
was untouched by the fighting. Fortunately for the inhabitants they had been 
evacuated by the Germans and so in the end very few civilians lost their lives in the 
fighting. Von der Heydte rearranged his troops. He ordered Finzel with I./FJR 2 to 
take over the line between III./FJR 6 north of Hoogerheide and Kampfgruppe Ebsen 
(i.e. Sturmbataillon AOK 15) at Eiland, just west of Huijbergen.1190 Meanwhile the 
Fallschirmjäger of I./FJR 6 were desperately needed elsewhere. The German line at 
Woensdrecht was now being threatened from the west as well. A new battalion 
joined the fray around the two key villages. The Royal Regiment of Canada 
(Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Lendrum) was trying to cut the connection to the Beveland 
isthmus by advancing through the polders southwest of Hoogerheide.1191  
The ishtmus 
On Saturday 7 October the Royals reorganised after clearing Ossendrecht which 
resulted in the capture of thirty POWs from Grenadier-Regiment 1018 (70. 
Infanterie-Division) and almost every battalion of the 346. infanterie-Division. 
Lendrum decided to explore west. This was never going to be an easy assignment as 
the Germans had flooded the polders west of Ossendrecht and his men could only 
use the one available higher road which any German unit might easily cover. But, 
fortune favours the bold and the march out of Ossendrecht in the early morning of 8 
October started off well. D Company (Major Tim Beatty) followed by A Company did 
not meet any resistance initially. It was not until 13.45 hours that Beatty’s company 
stumbled on the first enemy unit in the Nieuw Hinkelenoord Polder. It was a group of 
thirty soldiers with a 2 cm Flak gun (probably from Grenadier-Regiment 1020). After 
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a brief burst from the Royals the Germans quickly pulled back. The Royals continued 
their advance until eight p.m. when D Company reached a point about three 
kilometres from the railway which they could see in the distance. There they dug in 
with A Company a few kilometres behind them. The railway and the road running 
beside it formed the link between the Brabant mainland and Zuid-Beveland and 
Walcheren. It looked as if it was finally to be severed. But the easy part was over for 
the Canadians. As they paused reinforcements arrived on the other side in the form 
of one Sturmgeschütz from Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 and infantry from 
Füsilierbataillon 70.  
 
The new German troops made their presence felt the following day and 9 October 
was a day of frustration for Beatty and his men. He, too, received reinforcements in 
the form of four 3.7 inch guns of 1st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Marines, 
part of the Antwerp air defence system. Initially the airbursts fired by the AA guns 
did not seem to make much impression on the enemy, but later in the day they 
became useful when the Germans, from various units of the 70. Infanterie-Division, 
counterattacked. This was successfully beaten off, but when the Royals wanted to 
take a group of fifty Germans prisoner it turned out to be a trap and the Royals had 
to move back quickly under cover of smoke. At the end of the day D Company had 
moved a bit further west and captured the sluice gate in the Völcker Polder taking a 
number of prisoners from 27. Pionier Bataillon.1192 But the Canadians were no closer 
to the railway than the day before. On 10 October it was the turn of C Company 
(Major E. Ryall) to try and push through, their intermediate goal being the Hoofdweg 
in the Damespolder, a few hundred metres from the railway. After an opening 
barrage the attack went in at 14.17 hours. Two platoons marched along parallel 
roads in a northeasterly direction. Within an hour C Company reached its goal and 
they even captured a 7.5 cm Pak 40 and its crew in the process. Ryall’s company 
was now within firing range of the road and the railway. Alarm bells went off at the 
headquarters of LXVII. Armeekorps when the news reached them. Something had to 
be done and quickly. 
 
As there were no reserves the only option was to send two companies from 
Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 who had just been fighting in Hoogerheide for two days. 
Von der Heydte decided to send Leutnant Erich Hosp’s 1. Kompanie and Leutnant 
Carl Werner ‘Charly’ Wiegand’s 16. Kompanie. The latter was the regiment’s 
Aufklärungs (recce) Kompanie. Hosp and his men were to block the road into 
Woensdrecht and Wiegand was to proceed further west and counterattack from the 
railway embankment. His band of fifty men was to be supported by two 
Sturmgeschütze from 280.1193 It was now five p.m. However, the Royals spotted 
them and a hail of shells rained down on the Fallschirmjäger as they were 
assembling. Ryall also asked for anti-tank weapons which arrived in due course. 
These fired at the Sturmgeschütze and managed to knock one out with a 7.5 cm Pak 
gun which the Canadians had captured earlier. The other SP tried to get away but as 
a result got stuck in the mud and became immobilised.1194 The German attack 
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faltered. Meanwhile B Company (Major T.F. Whitley) moved further north and was 
now just a hundred metres from the railway. They were prevented from getting any 
closer by Wiegand’s men. The road remained in German hands, but Canadian 
artillery prevented normal traffic from using it. It seemed success was at last within 
reach for the Royals. All that was needed was to actually close the neck. Lendrum 
ordered A Company to accomplish this task the following day. The attack was to be 
launched from the so-called five roads position. 
 
The attack by A Company started at 15.30 hours on 11 October after what should 
have been a devastating barrage. However, as soon as the leading platoons crossed 
the road ready to charge up the embankment the Fallschirmjäger who had come 
through relatively unharmed in their foxholes on the reverse slope of the dyke, 
opened fire and inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking Canadians. During the 
night further reinforcements from FJR 6 had arrived which made the German line 
virtually impenetrable. Mortars joined in and the Fallschirmjäger even 
counterattacked. The nut proved too hard to crack for the Royals especially as the 
few roads in the polders were in full view of the Germans along the railway 
embankment. The flat polders had been turned into killing zones. A Company had no 
option but to fall back and withdraw through C Company. Further west Wiegand’s 
men attacked B and C Companies using flamethrowers, but the Canadians would not 
be driven off. The Canadian attempt to seize the railway had failed. After well over a 
month there was still a link between the mainland and Walcheren, even though it 
was a tenuous one. Canadian divisional headquarters staff were a bit premature 
therefore when they concluded that ‘they had managed a goodly force across both 
road and railway’.1195 The result, as at Hoogerheide, was a stalemate and the night 
passed relatively quietly as both sides sank down, completely exhausted. Further 
east, major changes had taken place in the meantime. 
Moving troops 
As night fell on 10 October Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 had only four operational 
Sturmgeschütze left.1196 Now that the Fallschirmjäger were also needed to block the 
Canadian advance up the Beveland isthmus FJR 6 was like butter spread too thin. 
Von Zangen realized that the rest of Kampfgruppe Chill had to join them quickly 
although he was aware that this meant of course that there was now an increased 
risk of a breakthrough at Tilburg, which had only just been prevented. It was only a 
matter of time before the front here collapsed.1197 But he felt that there was no other 
option. His opponents agreed with his analysis that the Beveland isthmus was the 
‘keystone’ for 15. Armee and that losing it meant ‘the beginning of the end of the 
battle for Antwerp’.1198 So, for the third time in a fortnight Chill had to execute the 
tricky manoeuvre of extricating his own troops while waiting for the relief to take 
over, all without the enemy being aware of what was going on. It must have 
sounded depressingly familiar to him as he got the phone call from 15. Armee that 
evening to speed things up. The Canadians correctly assessed their enemy’s 
                                        
1195 First Canadian Army, IS 103, 11.10.44. 
1196 Second Army Intel Log, 10.10.44, serial 28. 
1197 Von Zangen, 40. 
1198 First Canadian Army, IS 105, 13.10.44. 
 248 
weaknesses and strengths when Lieutenant-Colonel P.E.R. Wright, GSO I (chief 
intelligence officer) at First Canadian Army, wrote about 15. Armee ‘This has meant 
that reinforcement of a threatened sector can only be achieved by withdrawing 
troops from a quiet part of the front’.1199 In view of the Allies’ correct assessment of 
the German problems one is left to wonder why the Allies did not use this intelligence 
to exert more pressure at Tilburg and renew the drive there. After the war Oberst 
Warning complained that this moving around of troops was a result of the fact that 
LXVII. Armeekorps no longer had the freedom to carry out a ‘beweglichen 
Verteidigung’, because higher command’s (i.e. the OKW and Hitler) insistence to halt 
the enemy whatever the cost.1200  
 
Wednesday 11 October was a day on which both sides were reorganising in order to 
be ready for battle again. Chill was told that his troops needed to leave the area 
south of Tilburg before eight p.m. if the weather was bad, if the weather was good 
(meaning a greater risk of fighter-bombers spotting them) he was given two extra 
hours to do the job. The last units were to arrive in Bergen op Zoom no later than 
the following morning. The sector now held by Chill, or more accurately the two 
battalions commanded by Oberstleutnant Dreyer, was to be taken over by  
Grenadier-Regiment 935 under Major Stadelbauer (245. Infanterie-Division). At the 
same time Chill received the welcome news that schwere Heeres 
Panzerjägerabteilung 559  which had only just been put under LXXXVIII. Armeekorps 
as a mobile reserve, was once more assigned to him.1201 To make up for the loss of 
this valuable unit Reinhard was promised that his Armeekorps would receive one of 
the two Sturmgeschützbrigaden (244 and 667) that were on their way from the 
Reich and Denmark at that moment and were expected to arrive within a few 
days.1202  
 
Only that morning schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 arrived in Udenhout, a 
village northeast of Tilburg. The five (or six) Sturmgeschütze and (one or) two 
Jagdpanther startled the inhabitants who were afraid that their village was going to 
find itself in the middle of a ferocious battle.1203 But the crew members assured the 
civilians that they had nothing to worry about, as they had just been told that they 
were leaving for Bergen op Zoom that afternoon. And anyway, they added, their 
machines broke down about every other day.1204 Little did the men of Kopka’s unit 
know that they were on their way to one of the bloodiest engagements in this 
campaign. The Abteilung was the only unit that left the Tilburg area on time. The 
others were delayed which caused a lot of anxiety higher up. 
 
                                        
1199 First Canadian Army, IS 102, 10.10.44. 
1200 Warning, 24. 
1201 KTB 88 AK, 11.10.44, C 276. 
1202 As it turned out he got one, but only for a few days and both would eventually go to Sponheimer’s 
LXVII. Armeekorps. 
1203 I arrive at this figure as the diary of Kees van Iersel (Over d’n oorlog, 198) mentions seven tanks 
(‘huge monsters’) entering the village (and leaving at 6 p.m.) and as KTB 88 AK mentions five to six 
Sturmgeschütze (11.10.44, 16.55 hours). A PoW from 7./1053 GR (1st Cdn Army IR PoW 85. I.D. 
16.10.44) remembered seeing four StugS and six ‘Panthers’ which is not confirmed by another source. 
The number of Jagdpanther is obviously far too high. 
1204 Over d’n oorlog, 198. 
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When the new chief-of-staff of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps, Oberstleutnant Karl-Heinz von 
Prittwitz und Gaffron, phoned Chill at five p.m. to express his concern that the relief 
was taking much too long.1205 Transport was waiting in Goirle, where were the 
troops? Chill was completely unruffled. It had nothing to do with him as it was all 
Sander’s responsibility, he retorted. Sander had promised him that the relief would 
take place in time and it was not his fault that the 245. I.D. would not meet its 
obligation. Prittwitz agreed that there were always problems with the 245. I.D.1206 
Chill had learned from his new masters at LXVII. Armeekorps that he was to be 
ready no later than four a.m. the following day so that he could attack at six. If there 
were more delays he would never be able to meet this deadline, he added. Ten 
minutes after this conversation a missing battalion was found and as darkness began 
to fall all of Chill’s troops were on their way west. The first to leave (after 559) was 
Bataillon Ohler, followed by I./ Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment 
Hermann Göring. Besides these two battalions Chill also took along two extra 
companies. That morning Generalleutnant Rudolf Hofmann, chief-of-staff 15. Armee, 
had ordered Reinhard to send along another battalion of at least two strong 
companies. It was an impossible request for Reinhard as his forces were spread too 
thin already. In the end he decided to order Poppe’s 59. Infanterie-Division to 
release two companies. When Poppe suggested he could send 91 rested men instead 
he was told that was not an option. Eventually Poppe decided to take two companies 
away from Kampfgruppe Jungwirth (one from Bataillon Bloch one from Bataillon 
Gramse, together two officers and 160 men). The new group was to be commanded 
by Hauptmann Balzereit.1207 Earlier Balzereit had been engaged in the fighting at 
Eerde and Koevering where his unit had suffered huge losses.1208 
 
The Dutch resistance spotted schwere Heeres Panzerjägerabteilung 559 on its way to 
Bergen op Zoom and it reported twenty ‘heavy tanks’ moving from Breda to 
Roosendaal between midnight and early morning.1209 In the early hours of 12 
October the Kampfgruppe, now three battalions strong, arrived in the woods around 
Huijbergen which were defended by gemischte Flak-Abteilung 252 and MG Bataillon 
14.1210 Chill set up his headquarters in Rouwmoershoeve, a redemptorist convent 
school in a wood just west of Essen. He was to stay there for almost a week.1211 Chill 
planned to attack the Canadian precisely where they had feared the Germans might 
                                        
1205 This section, KTB 88 AK, 11.10.44, A 640. Prittwitz had taken over from Eichert on 30 September. 
1206 See also next chapter. 
1207 Precis of KTB Bloch, I Corps, IS 94, 02.11.44. Their presence would puzzle Canadian intelligence 
officers later on when a few of the men were taken prisoner and they wondered whether the men 
really belonged to the unit or the company carried the name Bloch ‘for deliberate confusion’ (War 
Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Intel Log, 15.10.44, 01.00 hours). The two companies were commanded by 
Leutnant Mittenmeyer and Leutnant Skau (SIR 13.10.44, First Cdn Army, PAJVD). 
1208 Fallschirmjäger-Suchdienst, Suchliste 1/1968, 3 (via Peter Vandermissen). 
1209 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Log, 13.10.44, 24.00 hours, and War Diary 4th Can Armd Div, IS 21, 
17.10.44. 
1210 Rehm, 55, and Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 51. 252 gem. Flak Abt was at Ostend for a lot of the 
war. In October it was probably under 20. Flak Brigade which was under 16. Flak Division. The 
Kommandeur of 14 MG Btl was first Hauptmann Hildebrand and then Leutnant Wiedenberg (First Cdn 
Army IR PoW Misc. Commands and Units, 11.09.44). 
1211 L. Vercammen, Eiland in het Groen, beknopte historiek Rouwmoershoeve klooster – college, Essen 
1986, 32. 
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strike for the last few days, along their extended right flank. But, by the time Chill 
arrived his opponent, Keefler, had made some changes, too. 
  
That day the Black Watch and the Calgary Highlanders left Hoogerheide and the 
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish took over.1212 The 4th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade was now in command of the entire sector and Keefler had assigned 
both Le Régiment de Maissoneuve and The South Saskatchewan Regiment to 
Brigadier Cabeldu. The Maissies were at Ossendrecht  and the South Saskatchewans 
(Lieutenant-Colonel V. Stott) were committed east of Hoogerheide, exactly where 
Chill was planning to attack. But the Kampfgruppe had not yet arrived when the 
South Saskatchewans started their own attack at three p.m. on the 11th. The 
Canadians therefore only faced a motley crew from the 346. Infanterie-Division, the 
bulk of which was formed by Grenadier-Regiment 858 under Hauptmann Scheue, but 
which also included gemischte Flak-Abteilung 252 and MG Bataillon 14.1213 The goal 
of the South Saskatchwans was to advance up the Abdijlaan until somewhere 
halfway. In this way they would provide flank protection for the rest of the Brigade in 
Hoogerheide. After a barrage on Huijbergen the attack went in as scheduled, met no 
resistance and pretty soon B Company (Major F. Lee) had reached its objective. Stott 
then decided to explore further and eventually the South Saskatchewans advanced 
along the main road to Huijbergen until they arrived at a crossroads about a 
kilometre from the village itself where they came under heavy machine-gun fire.1214 
This wooded area dotted with farmhouses was called Eiland (Island). It was to be 
the scene of some extremely bitter fighting during the next three days. 
Chill attacks 
When dawn broke on 12 October the leading platoon of the South Saskwatchewans 
at the crossroads came in for a nasty surprise.1215 Crawling along a ditch intending to 
occupy three houses near the crossroads they came under fire from a machine-gun, 
but this was quickly neutralised. Then Germans appeared shouting ‘Kamerad! 
Kamerad!’ The moment Canadian soldiers exposed themselves they were fired on by 
one of the 2 cm Flak guns of gem. Flak-Abteilung 252. The Saskatchewan platoon at 
once lay down in a ditch, but the shells grazed it, exploding on both sides and 
causing nine casualties. The Canadians crawled back. From then on they had to stay 
put as the Germans sniped and mortared the position throughout the day. It was a 
sign of things to come. Still, Kampfgruppe Chill did not attack, not yet at least.  
 
Chill’s orders were to attack in a westerly direction from south of Huijbergen in the 
Canadians’ flank and from there push on to the Scheldt west of Ossendrecht thus 
cutting off the Canadian troops in Hoogerheide from their supply base. This was 
exactly what the Canadians had feared might happen all along. If the attack was 
successful first Grenadier-Regiment 858 and then Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 and 
                                        
1212 This section, unless otherwise noted, Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 51-6, and Zuehlke, Terrible 
Victory, 292-300. 
1213 Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 51, and 2nd Cdn Corps, Intel Sum 65, 09.10.44. The latter also says 
that I./858 was under Lt. Lehner and II./858 was under Lt. Prehm. 
1214 War Diary South Saskatchewans, 11.10.44. 
1215 This incident, War Diary South Saskatchewans (SSR), 12.10.44. 
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Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 were to follow up.1216 It was an ambitious plan with an 
extremely slim chance of success especially since Chill had little artillery available 
because his own batteries had stayed behind near Tilburg to cover the relief 
there.1217 He could only count on 2./Artillerie-Regiment 170 with its three leichte 
(10.5 cm) and three schwere (15 cm) Feldhaubitze.1218 Moreover, the area around 
Eiland was extremely difficult fighting terrain. It was marshy in places, provided lots 
of cover for defenders and was also very undulating. It took Chill most of the 12th 
just to organize things. This is not surprising if we bear in mind that he and his staff 
were now suddenly responsible for the whole sector west of Huijbergen as far as the 
Beveland isthmus. The new divisional boundary with the 346. Infanterie-Division ran 
from Putte via Vossenberg (two kilometres northwest of Kalmthout) to Essen. Thus, 
not only the counterattack, but the whole of the defence of this crucial area required 
his attention. It is no wonder that preparations for the attack took so long. Rather, it 
is amazing that it went in at all at the end of the same afternoon.  
 
The first sign that something was about to happen was when A Company of the 
South Saskatchewans (Major Ken Williams), who were on the Staartse Heide heath, 
north of a lake called Grote Meer, at 15.45 hours reported that they saw a ‘tank’ in 
the woods and that fifteen enemy soldiers attempted to infiltrate their lines.1219Just 
over two hours later they called in again. They now had the ‘tank’ firing HE shells at 
point blank range into their OP there while they were also attacked by two sections 
of infantry.1220 In fact it was two Sturmgeschütze from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559 that were trying to break through the Canadian lines. The South 
Saskatchewans managed to drive them off.1221 The two Sturmgeschütze were right 
behind one another. The commander of the lead one was hit and the vehicle 
stopped. Accidentally the driver hit reverse and the second Sturmgeschütz slammed 
into the first one. The crew jumped out and ran back. Later they returned, covered 
by a group of Fallschirmjäger, to retrieve the SPs. Amazingly the engine of the first 
vehicle was still running. Two 19-ton Famo Sd Kfz 9/1 schwere Zugkraftwagen 
halftracks then came up to recover both Sturmgeschütze. They were ready for action 
two days later. This was not the end of the fighting that day, however. 
  
The houses in which B Company South Saskatchewans had taken up position at the 
crossroads were attacked at 22.30 hours by a force of about thirty-five to forty 
men.1222 The first inkling B Company had of the attack was when grenades were 
thrown through the windows. The South Saskatchwans, after the initial shock wore 
off, managed to hold on and beat off the attack with just a few casualties. While the 
attack was taking place Major Lee sent an SOS to C Company to send two platoons 
to assist them. However C Company itself now came under attack by heavy machine-
                                        
1216 Rehm, 50. 
1217 Warning 27. 
1218 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Intel Log, 15.10.44, 01.00 hours. 
1219 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Ops Log, 12.10.44, Serial 1186. 
1220 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Ops Log, 12.10.44, Serial 1198. Oddly enough neither attack is 
mentioned in the War Diary of the SSR. 
1221 This section, Kopka, Missbraucht und Gebeutelt, 158-9. 
1222 This section, War Diary SSR 12 and 13.10.44. 
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guns, mortars and 2 cm Flak. Eventually D Company sent a platoon and by three 
a.m. peace more or less returned.  
Black Friday 
In the early morning of Friday 13 October the war diarist of the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division noted drily, ‘all front quiet except definite attempt to penetrate S 
SASK R posn…’.1223 Unfortunately for the Canadians it was to be the proverbial quiet 
before the storm. Throughout the day the front did, indeed seem quiet and during 
the afternoon the South Saskatchewans received permission from the 4th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade to pull B Company back from its exposed position at seven p.m. 
Before that manoeuvre could take place, however, Kampfgruppe Chill put in their 
third attack. It went in at five p.m. and again schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 
559 joined the fray. 
  
Lieutenant-Colonel Stott received an SOS from A Company who were again attacked 
by ‘tanks’ and infantry.1224 A Company held their position and beat off the enemy. At 
the same time a Jagdpanther, probably commanded by Unteroffizier Günter Runge, 
appeared on the right flank of A Company, drove on another kilometre and then 
proceeded to demolish the South Saskatchewans Command Post west of the 
Abdijlaan (Vluchtheuvel these days). After receiving five direct hits and several near 
misses Lieutenant-Colonel Stott had had enough. He called in a smoke screen which 
was apparently interpreted by Runge as signs of an impending Canadian attack. He 
fired off a few more random shots and then drove back. Even so the Command Post 
was moved back a few hundred metres to Jagersrust where the Abdijlaan and the 
Putseweg met. Runge’s Jagdpanther then suffered a cable burning through so he 
could no longer use the electrical aiming system, the Achilles heel of this tank 
hunter. It needed to be hauled back all the way to workshops in Roosendaal.1225 
Runge was wounded and out of action for the next few weeks while his vehicle was 
taken to the Abteilung workshops back in De Bilt, near Utrecht, by Leutnant Redlich 
whose responsibility that was. The same day Hauptmann Finzel (I./FJR 2) was also 
seriously wounded. His place was taken over temporarily by Hauptmann Bauer.1226 
 
The fourth attempt to push back the Canadians by Kampfgruppe Chill was made at 
seven p.m. that day when B and A Companies of the South Saskatchewans were 
again attacked by infantry with a high percentage of automatic weapons.1227 Three 
Sturmgeschütze drove along the road to Huijbergen from west to east firing on B 
Company. One was engaged and hit and all of the crew were killed.1228 It was the 
largest loss of life that 559 had suffered in forty-eight hours so far. Still the battle 
raged on. Kampfgruppe Chill managed to surround A Company and cut it off from 
                                        
1223 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div G Log, 13.10.44, 01.30 hours. 
1224 This section, War Diary SSR and Kopka, Missbraucht und Gebeutelt, 159. 
1225 Kopka has Runge’s Jagdpanther attacked by fighter-bombers in Roosendaal, however, there is no 
evidence for this in 2 TAF daily log. 
1226 First Cdn Army IR Battle Groups, 14.10.44. I Corps IS 86, 25.10.44 and First Cdn Army IR PoW 2 
Para Div, 27.10.44 name him as Oberleutnant Bauer.  
1227 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Log, 14.10.44, 01.15 hours. 
1228 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Ops Log, 13.10.44, Serial 1301. Amazingly this is not recorded in the 
War Diary of the SSR either. Oddly this is not mentioned by Kopka. Losses confirmed, PAJVD. 
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the rest of the battalion. The commanding officer, Major Williams was taken prisoner 
on his way back from battalion headquarters. Sergeant-Major Don Allan took over 
temporary command. All through the night A Company kept as quiet as the 
proverbial church mice in order not to alert the enemy, mainly from I./Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring. Stott drew up plans to 
liberate A Company. The action was to start the following morning. 
 
Further west things had gone even worse for the Canadian troops. The day before, 
12 October, the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Megill) had drawn up plans for the 
final attack on the embankment, starting from the positions west of Woensdrecht.1229 
The Black Watch were to seize intersections on the northern side of the railway 
embankment. The operation, code-name Angus, was to start on 13 October at 06.15 
hours. Lieutenant-Colonel Ritchie was unhappy about it. His battalion had suffered 
serious losses in the fighting in Hoogerheide and should have been given time to 
recuperate. Lieutenant-Colonel Denis Whitaker of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, 
who were to support this operation by an attack out of Hoogerheide, was not best 
pleased either. He persuaded Brigadier Cabeldu to give him one day’s reprieve. 
However, Brigadier Megill was not to be persuaded and the Black Watch would be 
going in, whether they were ready or not. The results were almost predictable 
especially as the brigade staff had misjudged the capability of the German troops. 
Ritchie later said, ‘We were misinformed; we had no idea the Germans would be so 
good. We really were up against the crème de la crème’.1230 It was a tragedy waiting 
to happen. 
 
Things went wrong almost from the word go. C Company was late so that the effect 
of the preceding barrage was lost. Nevertheless, they got as far as the first objective 
but then got stuck at the dyke. As this was about six metres high Von der Heydte’s 
Fallschirmjäger on top could lob grenades at will and with deadly effect. B Company 
tried to follow, but both companies lost their commanders in the first fifteen minutes. 
The fighting was savage, but there were also moments of chivalry and German 
stretcher-bearers carried away the Canadian wounded. (A temporary truce requested 
by the Black Watch was reported to 15. Armee.1231) Even an air raid around noon 
could not break the deadlock.1232 Ten Typhoons from 197 Squadron (146 Wing) 
dropped twenty 500-pounder bombs and eleven Spitfires from 74 Squadron (145 
Wing) dropped eleven on other suspected positions.1233 It was all to no avail. Ritchie 
ordered both companies back while trying to come up with a new plan. An O Group 
was held at three p.m. and Ritchie decided to use A Company and a section of three 
Wasps (flame-throwing carriers) to gain the first objective and D and B Company 
would follow. C Company, which now consisted of just fifteen men, would provide 
covering fire. The attack went in two hours later. D Company, furthest to the west, 
took its objective suffering heavy casualties and B Company got as far as the bend in 
the dyke. A Company was slaughtered as it pushed forward and only nine men came 
back. In these circumstances Ritchie had just one option: to pull his battalion back. 
                                        
1229 This section, Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 57-8, War Diary RHC Black Watch, Account by Lt. Shea. 
1230 Whitaker and Whitaker, Tug of War, 175. 
1231 KTB 88 AK, 13.10.44, C 284. 
1232 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, Ops Log, 13.10.44, serial 1167. 
1233 Second TAF, daily log, 13.10.44. 
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At the end of the day the Black Watch had lost all of their company commanders, a 
sad record in the number of men killed in one day. In all they had suffered 183 
casualties of which 58 were fatal, higher than the usual ratio. It was a bloodbath 
reminiscent of the worst fighting during World War One. The day would enter 
Canadian military history as ‘Black Friday’. The reasons for the disaster that day were 
threefold: determined German resistance, great natural defences and the poor 
quality of the reinforcements. As Major-General Chris Vokes told Defense Minister 
J.L. Ralston when the latter visited Europe, ‘Trained men have a seventy-five per 
cent chance of survival. Untrained men none.’1234 It was to be an ever growing 
problem for the Canadians in Europe and one which would never be properly 
solved.1235 Nevertheless, there was to be no let up and the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division was to going to give it one more try the following day. 
Once more into the breach 
Keefler decided on one further effort on 14 October. In order to achieve this the 
division again regrouped. The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade took over the left sector 
in the isthmus area still held by the Royals (who were now relieved by the Calgary 
Highlanders) and the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade moved into the right sector to 
prepare for an attack on Woensdrecht itself. However, the South Saskatchewans 
(also under the 4th Brigade) still had a mission to fulfil. After an introductory barrage 
they counterattacked across the Staartse Heide at eleven a.m. in order to rescue A 
Company who had spent the night surrounded by the Fallschirmjäger of I./Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring.1236 Assisted by C 
Company of the Essex Scottish (who had moved in to the left of the South 
Saskwatchewans) and two troops from A Squadron the Fort Garry Horse the attack 
was a resounding success. The position of A Company was reached and it was then 
pulled out. In all seventy POWs were taken in the early afternoon.1237 Fifty of them 
were from Bataillon Bloch, which effectively meant that this company was  
annihilated.1238 A pleasant surprise for Lieutenant-Colonel Stott was the sudden 
appearance of Major Williams, A Company’s commanding officer, who had made his 
escape from the Germans while the Canadian artillery laid down a barrage. The 
German counterfire was intense too and many of the shells fell on the houses in 
which Stott had established his headquarters and for a while he believed he was 
facing certain death. After surviving the barrage Stott moved his HQ and expressed 
the hope that he would never again get a command post as hot as this one. 
 
Even though the South Saskatchewans had now restored the situation, Chill was not 
going to take things lying down. At the end of the afternoon he decided on one more 
push. The fifth and final attack by Kampfgruppe Chill across the heath began at five 
p.m. as it had done the day before, possibly because they had just seen the 
company of the Essex  pull out and move back. Again it was A Company of the South 
                                        
1234 Whitaker and Whitaker, Tug of War, 228. Vokes took over from Foster on 1 December 1944. 
1235 For an in-depth description of this tragedy, Whitaker and Whitaker, Tug of War, Chapter 10, 212-
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1236 This section, War Diary SSR, 14.10.44. 
1237 The War Diary of SSR gives the number as 106 which seems way too high as the total number for 
the division that day was 96 (Intel Log 15.10.44, 01.00 hours). 
1238 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Log, 14.10.44, 18.00 hours. 
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Saskatchewans that got the worst of it. North of Grote Meer four Sturmgeschütze 
from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559  and about a hundred infantry 
closed in on the Canadian lines. A few Sturmgeschütze got to within forty metres of 
A Company’s  positions and plastered them with HE fired from point blank range. The 
attack completely disorganised A Company and Major Williams ordered his men to 
withdraw which they managed successfully, at least up to a point. Casualties were 
light, considering the circumstances, fifteen men were wounded and eight were 
missing. The attack gradually petered out and as night fell the Royals took over while 
the South Saskatchwans moved north to new positions east of Hoogerheide, to 
provide flank cover for the Rileys inside the village. This was not quite the end of the 
battle around Grote Meer, however. Kampfgruppe Chill still held the old A Company 
position north of the lake and somewhat belatedly at 20.30 hours a Mike Target was 
fired on it, followed by an Uncle Target half an hour later.1239 This meant that first 
7th Canadian Medium Regiment (sixteen 5.5 inch howitzers) fired, followed half an 
hour later by all the guns of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. So at nine p.m. all 
three Field Regiments were concentrated on this single target. The effect of seventy-
two 25-pounders firing at once was devastating. D Company reported hearing 
numerous groans and the South Saskatchewans concluded that ‘the arty had done a 
good job’.1240 It was the end of Chill’s attempts to attack and drive back the 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division. From now on the focus was on maintaining a solid 
defence line from Zuid-Beveland to Essen. 
 
Fortunately for schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559  they were gone by the 
time the hail of shells rained down on the unfortunate Fallschirmjäger. Now that 
Kampfgruppe Chill switched from attack to defence all of 559 (three Jagdpanther and 
four Sturmgeschütze) left the battlefield that same night. The Abteilung was brought 
together in the area of Zundert in reserve. It was the last time the unit fought 
alongside the Kampfgruppe. Near Zundert the Abteilung would provide a sort of 
backstop for the 245. Infanterie-Division which was to take over there once the 256. 
Volksgrenadier-Division took over their sector around Tilburg during the next few 
days. At the same time the newly arriving Sturmgeschützbrigade 667 was to join 15. 
Armee as army reserve near Rijen.1241 General Von Zangen realised the hopelessness 
of the situation his army was in. Shifting forces all the time was not a proper solution 
and all the reinforcements did was to buy him extra time to delay the inevitable. 
Once again he asked OB West for permission to start moving units behind the river 
Maas and once again permission was refused.1242 Von Zangen was only able to 
switch forces anyway because I Corps had wound down all of its operations south of 
Tilburg as it had too few troops on the ground. That was soon to change. His 
opponents accurately guessed von Zangen’s problems’. Back at Second Army the 
G.S. I wrote  ‘He is constantly contending against the risk of being embagged and 
the danger is accentuated on the present occasion when the enemy has put most of 
his available reserves into the place furthest from the way out.’1243 The analysis was 
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spot on, but for the moment Von Zangen had no choice but to put his reserves near 
Woensdrecht, particularly as the Canadians were just about to renew their drive 
there. 
One final push 
The Canadians spent Sunday 15 October preparing for the attack on Woensdrecht. 
This time the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry wanted to leave nothing to chance. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Whitaker was extremely thorough and he and his company 
commanders even flew over the lines in a light Auster OP plane to observe the 
battlefield for themselves. The Rileys would start the following morning from a line 
running from the Braakseweg to Onderstal. Their goals were Woensdrecht and 
Nederheide and height 19.7 from which the surroundings could be dominated.  As 
part of the preparations there was also an air attack on Von der Heydte’s 
headquarters in Mattemburg. During the morning eleven Spitfires of 127 Squadron 
(132 Wing) took off from Grimbergen (north of Brussels). The weather was fine and 
they soon spotted the ‘white house’ in the woods. Undeterred by the Flak fire they 
peeled off one by one and screamed towards the target. Each Spitfire dropped a 
500-pounder bomb some of which hit the house. The Flak managed to damage one 
Spitfire and shoot down another, killing the pilot,  F/O G.W. Davies.1244 Von der 
Heydte and his staff were not hurt. The air attack was a clear indication that 
something was brewing and the last civilians left in Woensdrecht were evacuated by 
the Germans and sent to Bergen op Zoom.  
 
That day Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 was officially assigned to the 346. Infanterie-
Division which was now responsible for an eight-kilometre sector between Essen to 
Achtmaal.1245 However, before it could be moved east it had to come to the 
assistance of Von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger one more time. At 02.30 hours Von 
der Heydte was woken up.1246 Forward observers sent word that something unusual 
was going on. Von der Heydte decided to see for himself. His intention was to assess 
the situation and if an attack was impending he would withdraw his men to the pre-
arranged line of resistance. It was a tactic that Von der Heydte had used before. 
When he had to defend a certain line he always had a second line prepared that the 
Fallschirmjäger could fall back on. The idea was for the attackers to spend their 
energy clearing this vacuum after which they could be ejected in a counterattack. It 
was a tactic that had worked before, so hopefully it would do the trick again. But he 
received a shock as he arrived. The Canadians had already begun their attack, it was 
03.30 hours.1247 
Street fighting 
The Rileys were supported by the Shermans of B Squadron the Fort Garry Horse. The 
attack was preceded by a massive barrage of no fewer than the divisional artillery 
(three Field Regiments) pus three Medium Regiments (7th Canadian, 84th and 
121st), 115th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, one troop of an Anti-Tank Regiment and 
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one troop of Light Anti-Arcraft Artillery. In all some 150 guns laid down a hailstorm of 
steel on Woensdrecht and Nederheide. Not surprisingly, in view of the barrage, after 
the Rileys left the starting line initial progress was good and by 05.15 hours the first 
prisoners came in. While advancing up the streets of Woensdrecht about seventy 
German soldiers surrendered. Seeing the attack unfold Von der Heydte had given the 
order to retreat to those of his men that he could find. It appeared that he had 
located all of them and his Fallschirmjäger had pulled back to the second line of 
defence. This explains why nearly all of the POWs were from 743. Grenadier-
regiment and I./Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2 (Finzel).1248 By mid-morning the 
Canadians seemed to be running out of steam. This was what Von der Heydte had 
been waiting for and at ten a.m. Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 counterattacked.1249  
 
Major H.L. Hegelheimer, commanding A Company, from his headquarters in the 
Doelstraat was the first to spot the camouflaged figures approaching. He saw a 
Sturmgeschütz and thirty infantry moving towards him down the Doelstraat from the 
east.1250 The SP fired at the house and blew it to smithereens. As Hegelheimer’s 
platoons were dispersed he could not get through to them right away which meant 
that he was temporarily out of control. Within half an hour A Company was reported 
to be overrun and had to be pulled back behind C Company which was mopping up 
in Nederheide. The fighting was ferocious. Wiegand and his men of 16. Kompanie 
had to resort to their bayonets to get the last Rileys out as their ammunition was 
virtually spent. As they moved from A to C Company the Fallschirmjäger used the 
weapons they had taken from captured and fallen Canadians.1251 They took about 
thirty Canadians prisoner and some Rileys panicked. Lieutenant-Colonel Whitaker and 
his staff had to pull their side arms and halt a few soldiers that were on the run. 
Hegelheimer informed Major Joe Pigott of C Company that his HQ had just been 
blown to pieces by an enemy SP. In fact there were three Sturmgeschütze heading 
towards Nederheide and Woensdrecht.1252 When Major Pigott looked out of the 
window he also saw a Sturmgeschütz and infantry in front of him.1253 The SP fired 
and demolished C Company’s HQ. Pigott’s position was desperate and had only one 
option left, to call for artillery support. He ordered his men to get down in their slit 
trenches and then requested a so-called Victor Target, meaning that he asked for all 
of II Corps guns to fire on his own position. It was a concentration seldom duplicated 
in World War Two. About fifty tons of high explosives screamed down and the 
barrage had the desired result. It slaughtered the Fallschirmjäger who were out in 
the open and were either killed instantly or pulled back wounded. Amazingly only 
one Riley in C Company was wounded. Another effect was that the Sturmgeschütz 
pulled back about 250 metres. Pigott, now wounded, personally directed an anti-tank 
gun forward into a position from which it was able to destroy the SP.  
 
Casualties in C Company were very severe and in the end Pigott had only twenty 
able men left. But he managed to rally them, moving from one platoon to another 
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under constant fire, and they stayed put and drove off the German attackers with 
Brengun and rifle fire. Pigott was to receive the DSO for his actions that day. 
Leutnant Wiegand pulled back to the Doelstraat with his Fallschirmjäger, of which 
there were only nineteen left. On the edge of Woensdrecht village D Company under 
Major E.L. Froggett was doing alright until the Germans counterattacked.1254 The 
Germans attacked in two columns, Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte personally led the 
right hand one while the one on the left was carried out by 3. Kompanie (Leutnant 
Helmut Müller).1255 One Canadian platoon was completely wiped out by the ferocious 
attack. Other platoons came under so much pressure that Froggett had no option but 
to fall back a few hundred metres. The Fallschirmjäger retook their old positions and 
leapt into their old foxholes. Most of Woensdrecht was once again firmly in German 
hands. Fortunately for the Rileys, B Company of the Essex Scottish arrived in the nick 
of time and took up position to the right of D Company. This prevented a complete 
withdrawal and enabled the Rileys to hang on the edge of Woensdrecht.  
 
In the afternoon the Second Tactical Air Force tried to help break the deadlock. The 
Royal Air Force put in its biggest appearance since 2 October on the front of the 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division. All four squadrons of 132 Wing (66, 127, 331 and 332) 
took off from Grimbergen. A total of 46 Spitfires dropped the same number of 500-
pound bombs in the Target Area, Nederheide and the Doelstraat. They observed hits 
on what they suspected was a command post in the copse in the northeast 
corner.1256 It had little impact on the fighting although at 18.20 hours Whitaker 
reported the situation near Woensdrecht finally under control.1257 However, that 
message was a bit premature, for what followed was another restless night with 
Fallschirmjäger infiltrating D Company’s position followed by a more serious attack at 
02.15 hours.1258  
Stalemate 
The following day, 17 October, the struggle continued and around noon 
Fallschirmjäger were still resisting around the Doelstraat and the Steenstraat.1259 
Another thirteen German soldiers were captured, nearly half from Sturmbataillon 
Armee Oberkommando 15 and only one from FJR 6.1260 Apart from continuous 
attempts to infiltrate the Canadian lines the fighting gradually began to die down at 
the end of the day. After Black Friday the Rileys now had their own Black Monday. 
The Rileys had managed to advance about five hundred metres at a cost of 167 
casualties of whom 21 had been fatal.1261 German losses had not been light either 
with thirty-five killed.1262 Amazingly, in view of their losses, Whitaker’s battalion were 
told to hold on to their positions for another five days in spite of constant sniping, 
mortaring and shelling. They were finally relieved by the Queen’s Own Cameron 
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Highlanders of Canada late on Saturday 21 October. There were no more attacks for 
the time being. Both sides were completely exhausted by the ferocious fighting that 
had lasted for over a week. This state of utter exhaustion is reflected in the war diary 
of the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade where the diarist, somewhat 
uncharacteristically, noted ‘We are getting fed up here having been in this area for 
nearly a month now. Cannot understand why they do NOT put more tps in the area 
and finish the job once and for all instead of playing about shifting first one Bn and 
then another.’1263 If the diarist had known what lay ahead he would no doubt have 
been even more scathing in his comment. 
Reinforcements 
The Canadian operations north of Antwerp had ended in a stalemate. They were on 
the edge of Woensdrecht and the Beveland isthmus, but the Germans still held these 
key positions. In the middle of October the German side was badly in need of 
reinforcements. Two examples to illustrate this point. Finzel’s first company for 
example (1./FJR 2) led by Leutnant Ackermann, which had arrived on 6 September 
with a hundred and fifty men had just fifty left.1264 Likewise Sturmbataillon AOK 15 
on 16 October only had sixty-nine men left out of an original two hundred.1265 Von 
Zangen actually received some reinforcement on the day the Rileys tried to capture 
Woensdrecht and Nederheide. On 16 October, six days later than promised, two 
armoured units finally arrived. The liaison officer of Sturmgeschützbrigade 667, 
Hauptman Rübbig, reported on behalf of his commanding officer, Major Ludwig 
Knüpling, to LXXXVIII. Armeekorps in Herpt on the river Maas, where it had set up 
its new headquarters the day before.1266This Brigade had a full complement of 
nineteen Sturmgeschütze III and twelve Sturmhaubitzen 42G, a welcome addition 
indeed. Meanwhile 3./Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 under Hauptmann Friedrich Jaschke 
arrived with LXVII. Armeekorps in Breda with seven Sturmgeschütze III and three 
Sturmhaubitzen.1267 It had taken the Brigade a long time to travel after it had been 
ordered to the Western front almost three weeks earlier on 29 September.1268 Four 
days later the other two Kompanien of 244 arrived with another mix of thirty-one 
Sturmgeschütze and Sturmhaubitze. They unloaded in Dordrecht.1269 Both Knüpling 
and Jaschke were experienced commanders and veterans from the Eastern Front. 
Knüpling had assumed command of his Brigade on 15 August and was rated by his 
superiors because he had shown himself to be an ‘überlegter, taktisch gut geschulter 
Führer und Kommandeur seiner Sturmgeschützbrigade.’1270 Jaschke, who had 
commanded his brigade since 5 August was rated equally highly. About him it was 
said, ‘Vor dem Feind zeigte er sich als schneidiger Draufgänger, der durch den 
rücksichtslosen Einsatz seiner Person seinen Untergebenen stets Vorbild war und 
schwungvoll mitriss.’ 1271 Both units would play key roles in the battles to come. 
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At the end of the same day the vehicles of 2./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 
559 that had been in short-term repair finally joined the rest of the Abteilung which 
had now arrived in the Zundert – Essen area to rest and refit.1272 The next day Chill 
abandoned Rouwmoershoeve convent headquarters and moved to Mattenburg.1273 
Also on 17 October Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 moved further west to Rosendaal to 
form the new mobile component for Kampfgruppe Chill now that Kopka’s Abteilung 
and Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 were gone.1274  
Conclusion 
The intervention of first half and then all of Kampfgruppe Chill at Woensdrecht and 
Hoogerheide had been a close call. Had Von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger together 
with Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 arrived even a day later, the Canadians would have 
taken the heights near Woensdrecht, entered the Beveland isthmus and isolated 70. 
Infanterie-Division even earlier, advancing the operations to clear the north banks of 
the Scheldt by two to three weeks. The Germans managed to prevent this by 
recapturing part of Hoogerheide and taking up excellent defensive positions behind 
the railway line running to Beveland and Walcheren. On 12 October the rest of the 
Kampfgruppe joined Von der Heydte’s men and Chill immediately organized a 
counterattack across the Staartse Heide on the right flank of the Canadians aimed at 
cutting off their troops in Hoogerheide. The attacks (five in all) failed, mainly because 
of the Canadians’ resilience, the poor terrain and because Chill lacked artillery, which 
had stayed behind near Tilburg. Chill then ordered his men to switch to the defence 
and effectively roped off the Canadian advance. A point of criticism raised by 
professor Terry Copp, one of Canada’s leading historians on the campaign, needs to 
be addressed here.  
 
Copp feels that instead of tackling Hoogerheide and Woensdrecht head on, 
Kampfgruppe Von der Heydte should have tried to outflank the Canadian defences 
and attack the weak, extended right flank of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
southeast of there.1275 Although this sounds perfectly reasonable, there are a few 
objections to this. First of all Von der Heydte with just three battalions simply did not 
have enough soldiers both to block the Canadian advance from Hoogerheide and 
attempt a flanking attack. It was either the one or the other. Starting from the 
woods north of Woensdrecht blocking the direct route was the most logical choice. 
Moreover, the Staartse Heide which was marshy, hilly and wooded, did not favour a 
flanking attack from the east as the rest of Kampfgruppe Chill found out when they 
tried an attack on the vulnerable Canadian right flank a few days later. In view of the 
terrain the attack was necessarily funnelled north of the Grote Meer and hence 
relatively easy to block. Also, Kampfgruppe Von der Heydte was not nearly mobile 
enough to circle around the Staartse Heide and use the other obvious choice, the 
road from Essen via Kalmthout to Kapellen. Finally, the flanking attack by the Royals 
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through the polders west of Woensdrecht required Von der Heydte to send a 
battalion there as well, which meant that he had even less room for manoeuvre. 
Fancy tactics were alright if possible, but under the prevailing circumstances Von der 
Heydte could have done little else. What is more, he and the rest of Kampfgruppe 
Chill did succeed in halting the Canadian advance short of their objective, which is 
what counted in the end. In the final analysis of the battle for Woensdrecht it is clear 
that the terrain had favoured the defenders, that Kampfgruppe Chill had arrived in 
the nick of time, had fought tenaciously, and that the equally brave Canadian troops 
had been too few and far between to break the iron German grip on Woensdrecht 
and surroundings. 
 
After having done the same as at Goirle, Kampfgruppe Chill once again was able to 
block an attack thus effecting the planned course of the operations. By preventing 
the Canadians from seizing the heights near Woensdrecht and isolating the German 
troops on Walcheren, Chill ultimately forced Montgomery to reconsider his whole 
operational plan which since early September had been focused on one thing and 
one thing alone: to attack the Ruhr area and isolate it from the rest of Germany. The 
repeated failures of his plans, for which Kampfgruppe Chill bore a direct 
responsibility, opened his eyes to the new reality on the battlefield. The frustrations 
about the continued delay to open Antwerp also, finally, made it clear to Eisenhower 
and others that Montgomery had been on the wrong track for some time and that 
the time had come to remind him of his priorities. Montgomery was not immediately 
convinced, however, and for a while the issue remained unresolved, but on 15 
October things finally came to a head and the Field-Marshal was rudely woken up 
and finally forced to abandon his earlier battle plans. 
 
3.7. Western Brabant (20 October – 9 November 1944) 
 
‘Diese wurden stets a[n] Brennpunkt d[er] Kämpfe eingesetzt u[nd] nach Erfüllung ihrer 
Aufgabe wieder als K[orps] od[er] Armeeres[serve] herausgezogen. Sie waren d[ie] 
‘Feuerwehr’.’1276 
 
‘Der Einsatz der Sturmgeschütze im Rahmen der Nachtruppe ist zweckmässig. Ihr Einsatz 
gibt der Truppe grossen Auftrieb und Sicherheitsgefühl.’1277  
 
 
The failures of British and Canadian forces at Goirle and Woensdrecht to achieve a 
breakthrough made it clear that post Operation Market Garden the Allied strategy 
was definitely on the wrong track. Pushing 15. Armee back towards the river Maas 
and away from Antwerp was taking far too long. East of the Corridor meanwhile the 
fighting during the same period had been equally bloody and protacted. There VIII 
Corps (Lieutenant-General O’Connor) had had the same frustrating experience of 
failing to push a determined enemy out of well-prepared positions. Starting on 22 
September for a whole month this Corps, consisting of the 3rd Division and the 11th 
Armoured Division, three crack units, reinforced with the American 7th Armored 
Division had in vain tried to drive the Germans behind the river Maas. LXXXVI. 
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Armeekorps (General Hans von Obstfelder), the core of which was still formed by 
Kampfgruppe Walther, successfully stalled the Allied advance resulting in ferocious 
fighting at Overloon, a tiny village on the northern edge of the Peel marshes. 
Montgomery’s strategy of Second Army advancing into Germany while First Canadian 
Army was developing operations to free the use of the port of Antwerp had patently 
failed. At this rate it would take forever before Allied forces reached the Maas. It was 
becoming rapidly clear that something needed to be done, and soon. Even 
Montgomery himself admitted as much immediately after the war when he wrote 
about this stage of the campaign, ‘Great successes had been achieved, but we had 
nowhere been strong enough to secure decisive results quickly’.1278 In his memoirs, 
which were published twelve years later, he was even franker, ‘I must admit a bad 
mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches 
to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the 
Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.’1279 The 
breakthrough in Montgomery’s thinking came on 16 October, the same day that the 
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry tried to take Woensdrecht and failed. Montgomery 
issued a new directive that day. What had preceded this change of heart and his 
post-war insight? 
Rethinking strategy 
It all started eleven days earlier, on 5 October, when Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had a meeting with General Eisenhower, 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and all the Army Group 
commanders at Versailles.1280 Afterwards he noted in his diary ‘I feel that Monty’s 
strategy for once is at fault, instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought 
to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place’.1281 At that stage Montgomery 
himself had no idea he was on the wrong track and he was still holding on to the 
operational directive that he had issued on 27 September (M 527). Three days later 
he had a meeting with Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley (Twelfth Army Group) and 
Lieutenant-General Courtney H. Hodges (First Army) to discuss the command 
arrangements. General George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff, was also 
present. Afterwards Montgomery asked if he could see him in private. Montgomery 
then complained about Eisenhower’s way of running the operations, he was too far 
from the front, he had to control too much at the same time, his strategy was wrong. 
He did not have a good word to say about his superior and his conclusion was that 
the Allies had gotten themselves into a real mess. He wanted one, unified land 
command. There is no record of what Marshall said (very little according to 
Montgomery in his Memoirs) or thought, but he must have been flabbergasted. Apart 
from the fact that it was not very gentlemanly to criticise Eisenhower behind his 
back. Still, Montgomery persisted and two days later he wrote a letter to Lieutenant-
General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief-of-Staff. Just a day earlier 
Montgomery had issued a new directive in which he insisted that First Canadian Army 
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finally resolve the Antwerp affair while Second British Army drive the enemy back 
towards the river Maas south of Nijmegen (M 528). In other words, he was still 
trying to achieve two objectives at the same time. That same day, 9 October, 
Eisenhower sent Montgomery a telegram in which he underlined the importance of 
Antwerp as a supply base, particularly now that heavy autumn gales had wrecked 
most of the installations back at Cherbourg. Still the penny would not drop. 
 
The change in Montgomery’s thinking did not come until Eisenhower read the letter 
he had sent him through Bedell Smith on the 10th. In this letter Montgomery 
repeated the criticism he had vented to Marshall and in no uncertain words he 
blamed Eisenhower for being too far away and for not getting a firmer grip on things 
as Supreme Commander. The relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery, 
often a troubled one, especially since Eisenhower had taken over as land 
commander, had reached a new low. This time Eisenhower had had enough. He sent 
Montgomery a reply on 15 October that was equally plain and left no room for doubt. 
He emphasised two points. He dismissed Montgomery’s complaint about his not 
keeping enough ‘battle grip’ by pointing out that ‘This is no longer a Normandy 
beachhead!’ He also made it quite clear that Montgomery was to focus all his 
attention and energy on freeing the port of Antwerp which he felt was ‘the real issue 
now at hand’. He even promised him reinforcements in the form of the 104th US 
Infantry Division.  
  
Montgomery was finally forced to face the facts. On the same day Eisenhower wrote 
to him he cabled Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that ‘it does seem 
enemy is endeavouring to delay us all he can in Antwerp area’.1282 The following day 
he replied to Eisenhower’s letter and promised that he would stop griping about the 
subject of command and that he would give ‘Antwerp top priority in all operations in 
21 Army Group and all energies and efforts will be now devoted towards opening up 
that place’. Montgomery was as good as his word and that same day he issued a 
new directive to Twenty-First Army Group. In hindsight it is easy to see that 
Montgomery had been in a kind of post-Normandy euphoria for too long. He was too 
much focused on forcing an entry into Germany and had not yet woken up to the 
new realities on the battlefield. Still, it would not be right to put all of the blame on 
Montgomery’s shoulders as Eisenhower let the time pass until 9 October before 
giving any indication that he was dissatisfied. Even stranger is the fact that the Royal 
Navy did not insist more strenuously except for Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay who had 
pointed out as early as 3 September how important Antwerp was as a supply port. 
The truth of the matter is that neither Eisenhower, nor Montgomery, nor any of the 
other naval authorities had sounded the alarm bell. Montgomery’s new directive was 
to put all this right. Since it determined the operations for the next three weeks it is 
worth looking at it in some detail. 
Battle plans 
In directive M 532 Montgomery described the new operational goals and how 
Twenty-First Army Group was to achieve them.1283 The opening two paragraphs 
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revealed that the message from Eisenhower had finally come across. They stated 
that ‘the free use of the port of Antwerp is vital to the Allied cause’ and that 
‘operations designed to open the port will therefore be given complete priority’. That 
these instructions this time paid more than mere lip service became clear from 
paragraph 3 where, after acknowledging the Canadian efforts, he wrote that ‘The 
whole of the available offensive power of Second Army will now be brought to bear 
also.’ This meant that while First Canadian Army continued to focus on freeing the 
port of Antwerp by taking the banks of the Scheldt, concerning Second Army ‘The 
whole available offensive power of the Army will be employed in a strong thrust 
westwards on the general axis Hertogenbosch-Breda, with the right flank on the 
Meuse.’ First Canadian Army was to head for Bergen op Zoom and Roosendaal while 
Second Army pushed westward from a line between ‘s-Hertogenbosch and Best. As a 
final point Montgomery wanted to impress on his two Army commanders, Simonds 
and Dempsey, a sense of urgency. The attack was to start no later than 20 October. 
The operations, he wrote, ‘must be begun at the earliest moment; they must be 
pressed with the greatest energy and determination; and we must accept heavy 
casualties to get quick success.’ Time would tell if his commanders and those who 
had to do the actual bloody work had gotten the message. To do the job there was 
to be some reorganisation and there would be some reinforcements as well. So who 
were involved? 
  
The two operations, which in effect would enable the attack on Beveland and drive 
15. Armee behind the river Maas or, even better from the Allied perspective, encircle 
it south of that river, were to be carried out by I Corps (Lieutenant-General John 
Crocker) and XII Corps (Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie).1284 I Corps code-named its 
operation ‘Suitcase’ while XII Corps called it –quite appropriately in view of the 
season- ‘Pheasant’. For Suitcase Crocker had the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, 
arriving to the right of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division at Hoogerheide, thus 
finally removing the danger to the extended right flank (see previous chapter), the 
49th (West Riding) Division around St.Lenaarts and the 1st Polish Armoured Division 
which had taken over from the 49th south of Tilburg. In addition Crocker had two 
independent armoured units, the 34th Tank Brigade and the 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Brigade. Finally he would receive an as yet untried unit, the 104th U.S. Infantry 
Division (Timberwolves). Unfortunately for Crocker this division was expected to 
arrive after Suitcase had already begun. This made Crocker’s corps a truly 
international force with Englishmen, Canadians, Poles and Americans fighting 
alongside each other. Being on the left or outer flank the 4th Canadian Armoured 
and 49th Divisions were to strike the first blows. For XII Corps Ritchie had four 
divisions under his command, among them two of the most famous divisions in the 
British army, the 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats) and the 51st (Highland) 
Division, plus the 15th (Scottish) and 53rd (Welsh) Divisions as well as the Dutch 
Prinses Irene Brigade. His corps was also supported by independent armoured units, 
the 4th and 33rd Armoured Brigades and the 6th Guards Tank Brigade. All in all the 
two corps had nine divisions (the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was involved in the 
initial stages), one infantry brigade and five armoured brigades to carry out 
Montgomery’s operational directive. It was an impressive force, equal to twelve 
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divisions, that should be able to fulfil the mission. But no Allied commander, in view 
of the recent battles, can have been under any illusion it would be a walk-over, even 
if they outnumbered the German forces facing them.  
The German position 
Interestingly, while the leading Allied commanders became aware of Antwerp rather 
late in the game, the Germans, had realised the importance of the Belgian port as 
early as 4 September, the day it was captured. Hence the fanaticism with which 15. 
Armee had defended its bridgehead position south of the river Maas ever since. Still, 
there was to be some reorganisation there, too, and Von Zangen would also 
welcome reinforcements. On 16 October, the day Montgomery issued his new 
directive, von Zangen had two corps under his command with a total of six weak 
divisions and one Kampfgruppe. Sponheimer’s LXVII. Armeekorps controlled 
Kampfgruppe Chill, the 346. Infanterie-Division, the 711. Infanterie-Division and the 
719. Infanterie-Division, while Reinhard and LXXVIII. Armeekorps could boast the 
245. Infanterie-Division, the 59. Infanterie-Division, and the 712. Infanterie-Division. 
Basically these were the same weak divisions that had been delaying the Allied 
advance since the conclusion of operation Market Garden at the end of September.  
 
On the eve of the new Allied offensive the German divisions on average had a 
strength of 6,452 men.1285 The Allied divisions on the other hand officially numbered 
18,347 and 14,964 each for infantry and armoured divisions respectively.1286 
However, we need to take into account that the infantry in particular had suffered 
serious losses since D-Day that had not been completely replaced. In fact, as 
mentioned above, the Canadian and British armies had a serious man power 
problem. There are no definitive figures, but it seems reasonable to assume –in view 
of what is recorded in the war diaries for example- that in the middle of October 
most infantry battalions were down to 60-70% of their nominal strength. Discounting 
Corps and Army troops on both sides this means that the Allied force could field at 
least 125,000 men against 52,000 Germans, a ratio of 1:2.4. Where artillery was 
concerned the Germans were definitely worse off. On average the German divisions 
had about 20 artillery pieces each and each Corps could muster another 30. This 
meant that all of 15. Armee had about 200 guns on 20 October. The Allied Field, 
Medium and Heavy Regiments together (divisional artillery plus Corps artillery) had 
1,028 guns, a ratio of 1:5.1287  As for armour the situation was even worse for the 
Germans and resembled conditions on the Eastern Front. By the middle of October 
three Sturmgeschützbrigaden had reinforced 15. Armee but, except for 667, these 
were not up to full strength and it remained to be seen whether the total number of 
about sixty plus Sturmgeschütze and the occasional two or three operational 
Jagdpanther were strong enough to withstand the Allied onslaught that was coming. 
The Allied forces opposing them had roughly 1,600 tanks between them, a 
staggering disparity of  1:25 in favour of the attacker. The difference in air support 
(or in the case of the Germans, the lack thereof) is not even worth mentioning. So, 
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even though the terrain favoured the defender since it included a number of 
waterways, the Allied offensive could only have one outcome. The one remaining 
question for the German commanders was: when would it happen? Von Zangen’s 
tactics therefore were basically the same they had been since the middle of 
September, to save his army. The only way to do that was by pulling it back behind 
the river Maas, and beyond that, the river Waal. As mentioned before, as early as 21 
September he had begun to look into the possibility of a withdrawal behind the Maas 
and Waal.1288   
 
The first real preparations started on 7 October at a meeting between Oberst 
Lehnert, the Pionier-Führer of 15. Armee, and the chief naval officer, Admiral in den 
Niederlanden Gustav Kleikamp.1289 The meeting was conducted in a somewhat 
acrimonious atmosphere. Lehnert emphasised that the army did not have enough 
personnel to carry out the withdrawal behind the two rivers and he required 117 
captains, 105 sailors and 122 engineers. Kleikamp took the opportunity to point out 
that had 15. Armee not used some of his sailors as infantry to plug gaps in the 
frontline, a task for which they were neither trained nor equipped, some of these 
could now be used to man the ships! In addition the navy also lacked sufficient 
qualified personnel because all over the Netherlands sailors had been enlisted by the 
army and the SS. (He quoted the example of 150 trained sailors who had been 
involved in the fighting at Arnhem and had still not been returned.) Moreover, he 
added, ferrying units across rivers was basically the task of 15. Armee itself. After 
having thus cut Lehnert down to size, Kleikamp grudgingly agreed that, of course, 
the navy would help out in an emergency, provided he received clear, written 
requests. Three days later Kleikamp made good on his promise. He ordered 300 
sailors coming from the Reich to be available for the new task. He also instructed 
Korvetten Kapitän August Hermann Becker, Flotillenchef Flussräumflotille in 
Amsterdam, to supervize the operation.1290  
 
Becker took up his task energetically and efficiently. On 13 October he had his first 
meeting with Lehnert and two days later he had set up seven different sectors each 
with its own commanding officer.1291 The army, for its part, on the same day ordered 
Arko 119 with its headquarters to supervise the traffic to and from the ferries.1292 
Protection of the sites was to be provided by Flakregiment 100 (mot) with no fewer 
than eighteen mixed batteries of 8.8, 3.7 and 2 cm guns.1293 Thus, when operations 
Rebound and Pheasant burst upon 15. Armee, everything was in readiness to bring 
the troops back in safety behind the two major rivers quickly. In view of the 
achievement when his army had to be ferried across the Westerscheldt well over a 
month before, Von Zangen knew that he could rely on the navy to deliver. The other 
good news for him was that the promised reinforcement, the 256. Volksgrenadier-
Division was finally about to arrive. It was the last serious reinforcement Von Zangen 
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would receive south of the rivers. Even though Von Rundstedt himself requested 
more the Führer turned it down. Even his top commanders did not know at the time 
that 15. Armee in the near future would no longer command major forces as these 
were already being assembled in the Reich for the forthcoming offensive in the West, 
the future Ardennes Offensive.1294 
 
On 15 October the first units of the 256. Volksgrenadier-Division finally arrived near 
Goirle to take over from the 245. Infanterie-division which was now moved west to 
take up position in the exposed ‘balcony’ between the 346. and the 711. Infanterie-
Division, by now mere shadows of their former selves. The Kommandeur of the 256. 
V.G.D., Oberst Gerhard Franz, was eager to prove himself, because of an 
unfortunate incident earlier in the war. In August 1942 he had been court-martialled, 
together with his superior officer, General Georg Stumme, and sentenced to two 
years in prison because one of their staff officers had been shot down behind 
Russian lines while carrying top-secret documents concerning ‘Fall Blau’. The 
execution of the sentence was postponed until after the end of the war and so Franz 
was given command of the 256. V.G.D. on 1 September 1944.1295 The British found 
him “eager to learn, of more than average intelligence and with a strong dislike for 
the Nazi-regime.”1296 The phenomenon of the Volksgrenadier-division was another 
invention on the part of the German army to camouflage that it was fighting a losing 
war.1297 They were created in the summer of 1944, at first set up as elite formations 
because they were supposed to be equipped with the latest weapons and because 
administratively they were under the command of the Reichsführer SS Heinrich 
Himmler. In reality these divisions were nowhere near anything like elite formations. 
They were not given enough time to train and weld together, and with a complement 
of 10,070 men they were smaller than the average 1944 German infantry division 
which was supposed to have a complement of 12,352 men. This reduction was 
mainly achieved by assigning each regiment two instead of the regular three 
battalions. Still, apparently the arrival of this new division whetted Reinhard’s 
appetite for action. Three days later (19 October) he ordered Sturmgeschützbrigade 
667 on a recce mission in the direction of Alphen, Poppel and Hilvarenbeek to 
explore the possibility of a counterattack there by the 256. V.G.D.1298 But the 
impending Allied operations prevented this idea from coming to fruition. Moreover, 
his superiors soon had other plans for the Sturmgeschütze. 
Suitcase begins 
On Friday 20 October Operation Suitcase began. The operation was to begin in a 
staggered way i.e. the two ‘outer’ divisions, the 49th and the 4th Canadian 
Armoured, would start first while the ‘inner’ division, the 1st Polish Armoured, pinned 
the German forces opposite down and served as a kind of pivot. Depending on 
developments this division, together with the 104th US, which was still to arrive, 
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would start their own attack northward later. The attacks by the 4th Canadian 
Armoured and the 49th (West Riding) Division towards Roosendaal and Breda were 
launched at the same time. Since 17 October the 49th Division had leapfrogged the 
Polish 1st Armoured Division and their positions south of Tilburg had been taken over 
by the 4th Armoured Brigade who at first did not quite know what to make of playing 
the role of infantry.1299 The offensive went off to a successful start by and large, 
mainly because the Allies had correctly deduced that Von Zangen’s ‘policy of 
transferring appreciable forces across to the Beveland isthmus area has resulted in a 
general weakening of the whole central sector’.1300 The 49th Division, whose own 
operation was called ‘Rebound’, struck a very weak spot indeed. This was discovered 
literally on the eve of the attack. The frontline immediately north of Brecht was 
defended by I./Grenadier-Regiment 858 under Hauptmann Post and no fewer than 
eleven deserters told the British interrogators that the three companies between 
them had only one Panzerschreck each. The area around Wuustwezel was defended 
by I./Grenadier-Regiment 857 under Major Schilling who were hardly better off.1301 
Moreover Sponheimer’s attention was still focused on his right flank, Woensdrecht 
and surroundings. Because of this nearly all of the German artillery was in positions 
from which they could cover this sector, but were out of range to intervene north of 
Brecht.1302 This was another reason why, almost everywhere, the operation went 
according to plan on the first day.1303  
German reaction 
The Allied breakthrough along two major roads out of Antwerp meant that General 
Sponheimer’s LXVII. Armeekorps had the biggest crisis yet on its hands.1304 The 
initial response was to ask 15. Armee for permission to pull back the 711. Infanterie-
Division a few kilometres as it was now in an extremely exposed position. Von 
Zangen forbade this right away and instead ordered Sponheimer to organise a 
counterattack. Fortunately for Sponheimer that very day the first Regiment of the 
245. Infanterie-Division was arriving in the area of Zundert, ready to take up position 
between the 346. and 711. Infanterie-Division. Sponheimer hoped that Grenadier-
Regiment 936 could mount the counterattack and restore the line. There was plenty 
of armour to support such an ambitious scheme. As noted above, four days earlier 
3./Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 and Sturmgeschützbrigade 667 had arrived to reinforce 
15. Armee. Moreover the 346. I.D.  still had Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 under 
command. Finally there was Kopka’s unit, schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 
559, south of Zundert. The big question now was where and how to attack. Here the 
generals had very different ideas.  
 
Generalmajor Walter Steinmüller had swapped places with Diestel as Kommandeur of 
the 346. I.D. just four days earlier (until then he had commanded 331. I.D. which 
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Diestel now commanded).1305 He felt that the Canadian threat to Essen was the more 
dangerous of the two attacks. The main reason was probably that if the advance 
there continued at this pace Kampfgruppe Chill would be cut off. Therefore 
Steinmüller favoured a counterattack from Zundert in the general direction of 
Kalmthout to take the advancing Canadians in the flank. From there, if possible, the 
attacking force could carry on and clear up the situation south of Hoogerheide. 
Steinmüller’s plan obviously did not take into account that there were very few roads 
(metalled or otherwise) in the open heath his men would have to cross. Whatever 
the reason, Steinmüller was overruled by his Kommandierende General, Sponheimer, 
who ordered an attack in a more southerly direction aiming straight for Wuustwezel. 
Once that had been reached the attacking forces were to turn right and head for 
Kalmthout. Moreover, Sponheimer insisted that the attack take place the following 
day with whatever units from the 245. Infanterie-Division had arrived.1306 Von 
Zangen, who in accordance with the German principle of Auftragstaktik did not 
control the details of the counterattack, was not aware of Sponheimer’s decision until 
afterwards. He was scathing in his comment. He felt that ‘Eindrehen im Angriff bei 
Wuustwesel auf Calmpthout war ‘in den Feind hineindisponiert.’ Es trug (…) dem 
Schwerpunkt der feindlichen Angriffsrichtung zu spät Rechnung und musste (…) zum 
Aufreissen des Anschlusses zum linken Nachbarn (711. I.D.) führen.’1307 This 
difference of opinion between Steinmüller and Sponheimer might explain why 
schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 was first sent to Essen and later moved 
back to Zundert because the attack was to begin from there. 1308 
 
While the German force was getting ready their opponents had not been idle either. 
Clarkeforce1309 (Brigadier C.S. Clarke) had only one mission: to punch a hole in the 
German lines and not bother about its flanks or rear. Hence all units remaining in 
and around Wuustwezel had to leave as soon as possible. The troops in the key 
position around Stone Bridge were relieved by the 1st Leicesters (three companies 
only since D Company stayed with Clarkeforce). By ten a.m. the German attack on 
Wuustwezel was well underway and it was A Company on the left (around the 
bridge) and C Company on the right who took the brunt of the attack.1310 The 
defenders did not crumble under the German onslaught and the the intense artillery 
fire forced the Grenadiere to go to ground time and again. The German SPs slugged 
it out with the Churchill tanks of the 147th RAC, both sides losing a few vehicles. The 
fight continued the following day and the end of it 559 and 667 had lost nine 
vehicles while the 147th RAC had lost ten plus a number of carriers and lorries.  It 
had been a short, sharp battle with a (relatively) large number of armoured vehicles 
on a small piece of ground. In human terms it had also been a costly battle. At the 
                                        
1305 Diestel had the more relaxed job as 331 was being reconstituted south of Rotterdam (Van Hilten 
maps 18 and 20). 
1306 Hofmann, 43. 
1307 Comment Von Zangen in Rehm, 58. 
1308 War Diary 4th Can Armd Div, IS 23, 22.10.44. 
1309 A highly mobile force which consisted of one tank battalion, the 107th RAC, the 49th Division 
recce regiment, one troop of Crocodiles of the 1st Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, one infantry company 
(D) from the 1st Leicestershire Regiment, one anti-tank troop (248 Anti-tank Battery) and one 
machine gun company (D) from the 2nd Kensington Regiment and engineers, under the command of 
the CO of the 34th Tank Brigade. 
1310 This section, War Diaries, 49th Inf Div, 147 Brigade, 1st Leicesters and 147 RAC 21.10.44. 
 270 
end of the two-day battle the 1st Leicesters had suffered an appaling 111 casualties 
of whom 24 had been fatal.1311 In total British losses were between sixty and sixty-
five dead while German losses amounted to at least fifty killed.1312 The counterattack 
had failed and all Sponheimer could now do was order the 254. Infanterie-Division 
back and hope that the line would hold. All of schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 
559 pulled back to the Liesbosch convent of the Sisters of Saint Joseph near Breda 
that evening to recuperate. Its strength was down to two Jagdpanther and six 
Sturmgeschütze, not all of them operational.1313 
The next step 
On 22 October operation Suitcase continued on its way northwest.1314 The previous 
evening Lieutenant-General Crocker (I Corps) had urged Major-General Foster (4th 
Canadian Armoured Division) to push on. Crocker knew that the following day 
Second Army would start its offensive, Pheasant. He hoped that Suitcase and 
Pheasant together might spring a trap for 15. Armee south of the river Maas and that 
is why he urged the 4th Canadian Armoured Division to step up its speed. Besides 
having to provide flank protection for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division it had now 
had the added responsibility of applying pressure on the southwest corner of the 
trap. Foster therefore ordered both brigades to carry on their advances during the 
night. Night attacks were always tricky affairs, however, even at the best of times. 
On the other hand, they were usually a surprise to the Germans. This time was no 
different and the gamble paid off. On the left the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade 
pushed north through the woods south of the Dutch-Belgian border and reached the 
vicinity of Essen very quickly. On the right the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade were 
temporarily held up at a bridge over the Wildertse Beek but at 06.15 hours the 
Algonquins entered Essen and overran the town.  
 
The rest of 22 October was spent mopping up. The surprise effect of the night 
attacks was also evident from the large number of prisoners taken during the 
advance. No fewer than 450 were rounded up. Most were the usual suspects, various 
units of the 346.Infanterie-Division, but also reinforcements like I./Grenadier-
regiment 743 and, most surprising to the Canadians, a few from II./Fallschirmjäger-
regiment 6, Mager’s battalion were captured.1315 The success left the troops on the 
ground eager to go on. Little could they know that the next step would be far more 
difficult. Clarkeforce to the right of the Canadians during the same night established 
contact with them and at first light sent patrols out of Nieuwmoer.1316 Progress was 
very slow. Neither Hauptmann Mager’s Fallschirmjäger nor the various 
Sturmgeschütze from Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 were willing to give way and it took 
the force half a day to get to the next village, Vissenhoek. The resistance was fierce 
despite the problems Jaschke’s Brigade now had. The supply situation was so bad 
that at one point three Sturmgeschütze were towed into action to conserve 
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petrol!1317 During the afternoon about a hundred audacious Germans who had been 
bypassed in a wood south of Nieuwmoer decided to take the initiative themselves. 
They captured several soft-skinned vehicles of the 107th RAC and took some 
prisoners. The following day A Squadron 49th Recce was sent to deal with them. 
They cleared the woods and took thirty POWs.1318 
Woensdrecht again 
While it achieved a great success on 22 October, the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division’s advance that day had an even bigger impact further west, at Woensdrecht. 
There the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division had resumed the attack.1319 The plan for 
22 October was simple. Two brigades were to clear the Woensdrecht area. On the 
left the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade would take the isthmus, preparatory to 
beginning operations against Zuid Beveland, and on the right the 6th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade was directed on the old goal of Korteven which had eluded the 
Rileys a week earlier. The attack on Woensdrecht and surroundings went in at seven 
a.m. after a devastating barrage, but it was the old story. As soon as the Canadian 
infantry left the start line they were met by a hail of small-calibre and mortar fire. All 
three battalions of  Gauvreau’s 6th Brigade failed to make any headway and history 
seemed to repeat itself.  
 
On the left the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada were to take 
Woensdrecht and their CO, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Thompson, at twenty-two the 
youngest battalion commander in the Canadian Army, was confident they could 
succeed where the Rileys had failed. He had under his command about 150 Belgian 
volunteers led by ‘Colonel’ Colson, whom we have met earlier at Antwerp.1320 The 
Camerons went off to a good start and took forty prisoners. But then the attack 
stalled and the shell and mortar fire became so intense that the whole battalion, 
except for D Company, had to move back to where it started. Les Fusiliers Mont-
Royal, in the centre, were supposed to take Korteven. They got nowhere near the 
village. Von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger were too well dug in and after a few 
hundred metres the Fusiliers were stuck. At eleven a.m. they had no option but dig 
in and hope for reinforcements. The South Saskatchewans on the right tried to 
advance in country that the war diarist described as ‘ideal for snipers’.1321 They, too, 
only managed to get a few hundred metres before the attack bogged down. At 
around three p.m. Brigadier Gauvreau himself inspected the forward lines. He had to 
admit defeat and concluded that his men could get no further that day. Once again 
Fallschirmjäger-regiment 6 had triumphed and with little loss to themselves at that, 
the biggest loss being that of the Kommandeur of 3. Kompanie, Leutnant Müller, who 
went missing that day.  
 
Meanwhile the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade had fared little better initially. The 
Calgary Highlanders found the going extremely tough and in fact two companies 
advanced straight into the same network of dug-in machine-guns which had nearly 
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annihilated the Black Watch ten days before. In the end the losses were horrendous 
(69 casualties), but A Company did manage to creep to the railway undetected and 
Major W. Lashner, the CO, had his men outflank a German position and in this way 
drove off the Fallschirmjäger, just as night was falling. The Canadians now had a 
toehold on the other side of the railway. But it was to be their right hand neighbours 
who indirectly would finally help break the deadlock at Woensdrecht. 
The next hurdle 
Elated by the success of their night attack and the capture of Essen the 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division was eager to press on against what appeared to be a weakened 
enemy force.1322 Studying the map the divisional commander, Major-General Harry 
Foster, realised that to get to Bergen op Zoom he could either try to force his way 
through the woods or take the road running through the village of Wouwse Plantage. 
Since the latter route made more sense he ordered Brigadier R. Moncel (4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade) to capture the village on the 23rd. The attack was to be 
made in two stages. First the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 
supported by the Canadian Grenadier Guards (22nd CAR), would advance to a point 
right on the Dutch-Belgian border. After that was cleared of Germans, the Lake 
Superiors in their Carriers, supported by the Governor General’s Foot Guards (21st 
CAR), would advance as far as Wouwse Plantage. 
  
The Argylls’ attack with two companies was to start at eight a.m. on 23 October. It 
ran into serious trouble right away, even before it had begun. The Germans had 
obviously spotted the Canadians forming up and they fired a lethal barrage at the 
Argylls. For almost thirty minutes one concentration after another rained down. 
When it finally let up the Argylls quickly got up and moved out. On the way they met 
relatively little resistance, but it still took them more than two hours to reach their 
objective. By that time they had suffered twenty-nine casualties, most of them due 
to the shelling at the start. It was eleven a.m. when the Superiors and the Foot 
Guards took over. The troops they faced were from Kampfgruppe Dreyer, the left 
wing of Kampfgruppe Chill, which only a week earlier had been trying to break 
through to Ossendrecht. It was still composed of Bataillon Ohler, and I./Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring (Bataillon Pohl). The 
infantry were supported by Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 which now finally arrived in 
full, driving down from Roosendaal.1323  
  
The attack was led by A Company of the Superiors and No 1 Squadron of the 
Guards. The Canadian group took the direct route to Wouwse Plantage, a country 
lane known locally as the Mariabaan. Unfortunately for them, this was the most 
logical choice and hence exactly where Dreyer expected them to attack. No wonder 
then that within minutes the leading carrier as well as the first three tanks of the 
Guards were knocked out by Sturmgeschütze lying in ambush. But worse was to 
come. The tank of the Squadron Leader, Major A.G.V. Smith was hit in its idler 
section. Amazingly it could still drive and Smith found shelter behind some 
                                        
1322 This section, War Diaries 4th Cdn Armd Div, 4th Cdn Armd Bde, 21st RAC and Algonquins 
23.10.44. (Summary: Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 93-6.) 
1323 Kriegstagebuch Hans Geng. 
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farmhouses with the two tanks of his headquarters section. Meanwhile the rest of the 
squadron was being slaughtered and one Sherman after another was hit. However, 
the Canadians fought back as well as they could. Sergeant K. Morrison of the 
Superiors scored a direct hit on a Sturmgeschütz with his PIAT and set it on fire. 
Another one was knocked out by Lieutenant E.J. Canavan as it drove on to the road. 
Although his Sherman had also been put out of action (one of his tracks was blown 
off), he had ordered his crew to stay put and keep on firing. He and his crew only 
abandoned their vehicle when the ammunition was spent. The Superiors meanwhile 
agonizingly slowly moved forward taking prisoners on the way until they were about 
a kilometre from their objective.1324 Without tank support that was as far as they 
could go. Major Smith decided to break out and try to help the infantry, but the 
moment the tanks left the farmyard all three were hit by Sturmgeschütze. Two were 
knocked out and again only Smith’s tank survived. At six p.m. he gave the order to 
pull back and as his Sherman limped into regimental headquarters the idler burst into 
flame. No.1 Squadron had lost all of its eleven Shermans to the Sturmgeschütze that 
day. It was another resounding defensive success for Kampfgruppe Chill. The 
Canadian advance on Wouwse Plantage was to be resumed the following day. 
Endgame at Woensdrecht 
In spite of the defensive success, the advance on Wouwse Plantage alarmed General 
Von Zangen greatly. He was all too aware that Kampfgruppe Chill was increasingly in 
danger of being outflanked. He therefore ordered Chill to pull back from 
Woensdrecht and Huijbergen towards Bergen op Zoom, but very slowly and step by 
step.1325 Von der Heydte set up new headquarters in Bergen op Zoom on the 26th 
while Chill moved to Vrederust, an asylum, northwest of that city.1326 The move did 
not go unnoticed and Canadian patrols reported the withdrawal. When the 6th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade resumed the attack the following morning (24 October) 
they noticed that the resistance was clearly ‘softening’.1327 Twelve Fallschirmjäger 
were taken prisoner around eight a.m. They were all newcomers from the Ersatz 
Kompanie of FJR 6.1328 At the end of the day another forty-two Fallschirmjäger had 
become POWs and the Canadians had captured most of Woensdrecht and 
Nederheide.1329  
 
In effect that day 15. Armee gave up on the 70. Infanterie-Division on Walcheren 
and Zuid-Beveland. The daily report of the Wehrmachtführungsstab drily noted that 
‘Der Feind stiess NW Hoogerheide bis zum Damm 3 km NNW Woensdrecht durch 
und unterbrach damit die Landverbindung nach Walcheren.’ 1330 It was a momentous 
event, but one that went largely unnoticed amidst the fighting going on. What should 
have happened on 4 September was finally achieved. The goal which the 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division had been striving for was finally realised after seventeen 
days of slugging it out with a professional and determined enemy who had the 
                                        
1324 War Diary 4th AGRA, Sitrep 23.10.44, 19.00 hours. 
1325 Von Zangen, 45. 
1326 Piet Hoedelmans, Jeeps & Klaprozen, Bergen op Zoom 1990, 66. 
1327 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Log, 24.10.44, 15.30 hours. 
1328 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Log, 23.10.44, 14.30 hours. 
1329 War Diary 2nd Cdn Inf Div, G Log, 25.10.44, 00.35 hours. 
1330 Die geheime Tagesberichte 11, 152. 
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advantage of the terrain. That was evident even that day, because in the end Von 
der Heydte’s men only pulled back two kilometres and Lindonk and Korteven, the 
Canadians’ ultimate goals, were still in German hands at the end of Tuesday 24 
October. Trying to occupy the height of Lindonk saw a repeat of the fighting for 
Hoogerheide and Woensdrecht: the Fallschirmjäger who were dug in held every 
advantage and their machine-guns dominated the lower lying approaches. Time and 
again the Calgarians rushed the height, but the Germans would not abandon this 
position until three days later in connection with a general withdrawal of LXVII. 
Armeekorps. The struggle for Woensdrecht was at last over to become part of 
Canadian military history. It was a name that was synonymous with tremendous 
suffering and would for ever send shivers down the spines of Canadian veterans. 
While operation Suitcase was running its course and Kampfgruppe Chill and 559 
were slugging it out with I Corps, further east XII Corps had started operation 
Pheasant.  
Operation Pheasant begins 
Although 559 was involved, Kampfgruppe Chill was not, so only a summary of 
operation Pheasant is given here. The focal point of the operation was the medieval 
town and provincial capital, ‘s-Hertogenbosch. It was here that the outcome would 
be decided as well as the fate of all German troops south of the river Maas. The 
impending attack on this town was exactly what Reinhard (LXXXVIII. Armeekorps) 
and Von Zangen (15. Armee) had feared all along since the end of September when 
the frontline settled there after operation Market Garden had ground to a halt.1331 
The problems Von Zangen had to solve on the eve of operation Pheasant were 
gigantic. By concentrating on Woensdrecht and surroundings and moving his best 
forces there he had seriously weakened his left flank. On the eve of operation 
Pheasant 15. Armee was weak at ‘s-Hertogenbosch and strong south and east of 
Bergen op Zoom. And his opponents noted drily that ‘It would have been more 
reasonable in reverse, and one is tempted to guess the enemy would have preferred 
it so.’1332 Von Zangen and Reinhard did realize that an energetic Allied attack 
westwards with its right flank on the river Maas might trap the whole of 15. Armee 
south of the river. This had to be prevented at all costs. That is why Von Zangen 
considered ‘s-Hertogenbosch the ‘wichtigsten Eckpfeiler des grossen Brueckenkopfes 
suedlich der Maas. Es musste daher bis zum aeussersten gehalten und stark 
gestuetzt werden…’ 1333 That the outcome of the battle in North Brabant would be 
decided there was abundantly clear to both sides. That is why it became the scene of 
a very tough five-day battle in which schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 
would again be called upon to provide some of the necessary hardware with its SPs. 
The front at ‘s-Hertogenbosch since the end of September had been held by 
Generalleutnant Friedrich Neumann’s 712. Infanterie-Division. In the early morning 
of 22 October, a few hours after the last units of the 245. Infanterie-Division left 
Tilburg, Oberstleutnant Von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Chief-of-staff of LXXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps got a call from the 712. Infanterie-Division informing him of a barrage 
                                        
1331 Reinhard, 19. 
1332 First Cdn Army, IS 117, 25.10.44. 
1333 Boetticher, 52. 
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on ‘s-Hertogenbosch. He wasted no time and immediately called 15. Armee. His 
message was brief, ‘dass es bei uns anscheinend auch losgeht’.1334 
 
Like Suitcase, Pheasant was planned in a staggered way from the outside in.1335 It 
was to be a four-division operation. The first stage on 22 October was for the 53rd 
(Welsh) Division, Major-General R. Ross, and half of the 7th Armoured Division (the 
Desert Rats) under Major-General G.L. Verney to advance on ‘s-Hertogenbosch 
(Operation Alan), the next day the 51st (Highland) Division (Major-General T. 
Rennie) would attack towards St.-Michielsgestel (Operation Colin). Once the 7th 
Armoured had been ‘pinched out’ it would pass through the 51st and strike west 
towards the key village of Loon op Zand (Operation Don). Depending on the 
development of all these attacks, the 15th (Scottish) Division was to clear the 
triangle Boxtel-St.-Oedenrode-Best (Operation Eric).1336 Finally, Lieutenant-General 
Ritchie admonished the divisional commanders that ‘The essence of the all ops must 
be speed.’  It would not be easy to achieve. The problem for the attackers was the 
terrain, flat as a pancake, but crisscrossed with ditches, canals and few metalled 
roads so that there was usually only one avenue of approach.  
 
Still, the first blow seemed to be successful. Although Major-General Ross sent 
up part of his force too late in the day, his division still managed to crack the German 
front open and push the 712. Infanterie-Division back as far as Rosmalen, just 
outside ‘s-Hertogenbosch. The following day a German counterattack failed and the 
53rd Division inched closer to their main prize. South of there on the 23rd the 
Germans suffered an even more serious defeat when the 51st Division cracked open 
the lines of Poppe’s 59. Infantry-Division, captured Schijndel and St.-Michielsgestel 
and established a bridgehead across the Dommel. Help was now urgenty needed to 
prevent a total collapse of LXXXVIII. Armeekorps and schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-
Abteilung 559 was ordered to Vught, where it was expected to arrive sometime 
during the night. Now that the front near ‘s-Hertogenbosch also threatened to 
collapse General Reinhard had to make a difficult decision. Should he send 559 to 
Neumann or to Poppe? In the end he decided to send the Jagdpanther to 
Neumann.1337 Instead Poppe received Panzerjäger-Kompanie 1363 which had just 
arrived on the Western Front with twelve brand new Sd. Kfz. 138/2 Jagdpanzer 38 
(t) Hetzer.1338  
 
The next day the Scots advanced to the next river line only to find all bridges blown 
in their faces while the Welsh Division tried to trap the German troops in ‘s-
Hertogenbosch. Ross had ordered the 1/5th Welch to seize the Dieze bridge at the 
northwestern edge of the town in a coup de main during the night, but the attempt 
                                        
1334 KTB 88 AK, 22.10.44, 06.40 and 06.45 hours. 
1335 This section, War Diary XII Corps, Op Instr No. 17, 20.10.44. 
1336 The letter B was reserved for Operation Bob, which would only take effect if 51st H Div did not 
succeed in which case 15th Sc Div would take over part of Colin. 
1337 KTB 88 AK, 23.10.44, 20.55 hours. 
1338 Mail Martin Block and 51st H Div, IS 272, 26.10.44. On 13.10.44 the unit had left Milau for 
Deventer, Netherlands (KTB H Gr B, 6973/44). The parent unit, 363 VGD had arrived in the 
Netherlands on 01.09.44 and joined 1. Fs. Armee two days later to fight the Allied troops near 
Nijmegen (geheimen Tagesberichten, 86, 92). In KTB 88 AK it is also indicated as 2./Pz.Jg.Abt. 363.  
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failed although a bridgehead was established in the southwest of ‘s-Hertogenbosch. 
Meanwhile the 15th (Scottish) Division had started Operaton Eric, passing through 
Best and Oirschot. That same 24 October also saw a spectacular attack on Von 
Zangen and his staff which has led to a myth persisting to this day in British 
publications.1339 The operational headquarters of 15. Armee in Dordrecht were 
targeted by most of the Typhoons in 146 Wing led by their commanding officer, 
Group Captain Denys ‘Kill ‘Em’ Gillam, himself. In all forty-eight Typhoons left Deurne 
airfield for Merwestein Park.1340 Half of the Group, 193, 197 and 263 Squadrons were 
to attack Flak positions and make a feint attack on the nearby railway bridge, and 
257 and 263 Squadrons would bomb the main target. The attackers found their 
objective, although as usual the three inch rocket projectiles landed over a wide 
area, and there were a fair number of duds. All the Typhoons made it back to base. 
The attack appeared to be a resounding success and local resistance reported that 
two generals and over fifty other officers had been killed, a claim which has been 
repeated in all British histories and many other books since. However, the truth was 
more sobering. It was the civilians in Dordrecht who suffered most, sixty-nine losing 
their lives, and only one German officer and eight other ranks were killed in the 
raid.1341 Moreover, in spite of claims from Second Tactical Air Force to the contrary, 
15. Armee continued to function as before, the only result of the raid being a brief 
interruption of telephone traffic.1342 
Breakthrough 
The following day saw mixed results for XII Corps. The 53rd (Welsh) Division cleared 
most of ‘s-Hertogenbosch while the 51st (Highland) Division found their way forward 
blocked, among others by the Hetzer SPs of Panzerjäger-Kompanie 1363 who had 
set a deadly trap for the 1st Black Watch (Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Hopwood) and the 
supporting Shermans of No.3 Troop (Lieutenant Margetts) of  B Squadron 
Northamptonshire Yeomanry.1343 The 15th (Scottish) Division captured Moergestel 
and closed in on Tilburg. The big breakthrough came on the 26th. That day the 7th 
Armoured Division, passing through the 51st, punched a huge hole in the German 
front, leaving Poppe’s division in tatters, and advanced as far as Udenhout. Poppe 
requested permission to pull back behind the Afwateringskanaal immediately. This 
was denied, but throughout the afternoon there was frantic consultation between 
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps and 15. Armee about some kind of withdrawal. Naturally for 
such a drastic move Armee needed to consult Heeresgruppe B, who in turn had to 
ask OB West and it was not until nine p.m. that Generalleutnant Hoffmann, Chef 15. 
Armee, called Von Prittwitz und Gaffron at LXXXVIII. Armeekorps to say that 
permission for the whole of 15. Armee was granted. Both LXVII. and LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps were to withdraw to Stellung II. Again rearguards were to hold up the 
                                        
1339 E.g. Shores and Thomas, Breakout to Bodenplatte, 344-5.  
1340 Ibid. 
1341 C. Weltevrede, Geschiedenis van het Bombardement op Park Merwestein, oud-Dordrecht, 2004, 
nummer 3, 40-53, gives a good analysis of the (disappointing) results of this raid in his article, Johan 
van Doorn found the definitive casualty figures (PAJVD). 
1342 Shores and Thomas, Breakout to Bodenplatte, 34 for 2 TAF, and Von Zangen, 46-7, for 15. 
Armee. 
1343 For a vivid description of this action: Tout, To Hell with Tanks!, London 1992, 49-53. 
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Allied advance as long as possible.1344 The move went smoothly as it had been 
meticulously prepared beforehand. Nine days earlier all the divisions had been sent 
an extensive plan laying out the stages of withdrawals, timetable, routes etc.1345 That 
night the divisions pulled back to the new front-line running from Bergen op Zoom, 
Roosendaal, Breda, Dongen, Loon op Zand and the Afwateringskanaal to ‘s-
Hertogenbosch. It was the last stop line before a complete withdrawal behind the 
river Maas. 
 
The next two days XII Corps gradually pushed back the shattered German divisions, 
facing stiff opposition in places. To the surprise of German commanders the 53rd 
(Welsh) Division did not attack westward after taking ‘s-Hertogenbosch. There were 
three reasons for this: the terrain in front of Vlijmen, flat polders crisscrossed with 
ditches, was completely unsuitable for an improvised attack and secondly, further 
east the Germans had begun a spoiling attack against VIII Corps which caused some 
alarm at Second Army headquarters and needed to be dealt with. Both the 15th and 
the 53rd would be diverted there as soon as possible. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
it no longer made any sense to advance west, since both the 51st (Highland) and the 
7th Armoured Divisions expected to reach the river Maas any day. The inevitable 
course the battle was now running was also evident to the Germans and Reinhard 
realised that it was time to order the next and final step, the withdrawal behind the 
river Maas. Von Zangen and Von Rundstedt concurred and that evening Reinhard 
gave LXXXVIII. Armeekorps the order to fall back. Then Hitler himself intervened. He 
agreed to the order in principle if enemy pressure left the troops no other choice, 
expecting the troops to hold the new line, but he added a caveat. He ordered 
15.Armee to ‘wenigstens grosse Brückenkopfe südlich der Maas halten.’1346 
Consequently Von Zangen had no choice but tell Poppe’s 59. Infanterie-Division to 
stay behind the relative security of the Afwateringskanaal. 
 
On 30 October patrols of the 51st (Highland) Division reached the river Maas. This 
move was a major event and it had a huge impact on 15. Armee. From then on its 
two constituent Korps no longer fought side by side. While all the headquarters, 
artillery, armour and second line services pulled back behind the rivers Maas and 
Waal, two Jagdpanther of 559 were ordered to stay near Geertruidenberg to assist in 
the defence of the Moerdijk bridge area.1347 This order, to remain south of the river, 
also had something to do with the fact that 15. Armee had a new master, 
Heeresgruppe H under Generaloberst Student. There were two reasons for this 
change.1348  
 
First of all, as early as 12 October, Generalfeldmarschall Von Rundstedt, OB West, 
had indicated that Heeresgruppe B was in charge of too extended a front, 370 
kilometres of sea and 630 kilometres of land.1349 Von Rundstedt argued that a new 
Heeresgruppe should be created and on 27 October this request was granted. The 
                                        
1344 Schramm, Kriegstagebuch 7/I, 411 and KTB 88 AK, 26.10.44, 21.10 hours and 27.10.44, C 299. 
1345 KTB 88 AK, 17 and 18.10.44, C 288a. 
1346 Schramm, Kriegstagebuch 7/I, 411. 
1347 Kopka, Missbraucht und Gebeutelt, 166. 
1348 This section, unless otherwise indicated, De verdediging, 13-5. 
1349 This argument, Schramm, Kriegstagebuch 7/I, 414. 
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new Heeresgruppe H was to be in charge of 15. Armee, 1. Fallschirm-Armee and 
Wehrmachts-Befehlshaber für die Niederlande (WBN), in other words, the whole of 
the Netherlands. Two days later Von Rundstedt was told by the OKW to put Student 
in charge of 15. Armee as well as his own army under the name Armeegruppe 
Student. General Albert Schlemm would take over as commander of 1. Fallschirm-
Armee. On 10 November the Armeegruppe was officially renamed Heeresgruppe H 
and included responsibility for WBN.1350 But a second, equally important, reason was 
that preparations were starting for what would ultimately be the Ardennes offensive 
(operation Wacht am Rhein) and Generalfeldmarschall Model was to be in charge of 
this major offensive. In order to do this he needed to be relieved of some of his 
responsibilities. The assignment given to Heeresgruppe H was to set up 
a‘nachhältender Verteidigung’, a permanent defence, behind the major rivers (Maas, 
Waal and Rhine) in the Netherlands, while maintaining and/or creating as many 
bridgeheads as possible south of them. Basically Student wanted to retain three 
bridgeheads on the left bank of the rivers Rhine and Maas. One was south of 
Arnhem, one west of Venlo and one south of Moerdijk.1351 It is possible that this 
decision was another reason why Kopka and his little band had to stay behind. The 
consequences of this strategy would soon become clear to the troops on the ground, 
including Kampfgruppe Chill. 
 
When operation Pheasant was concluded on 31 October it could be labelled a 
success because it had achieved its main goal, to clear the area south of the Maas. It 
was also a failure, since the Germans still possessed a large bridgehead behind the 
Afwateringskanaal, but especially because LXXXVIII. Armeekorps had been allowed 
to pull back largely intact. Although losses had been horrendous the German 
divisions were ready for a second (in some cases third) life. It had taken Ritchie’s XII 
Corps with all its armour a long time (nine days) to drive a demoralised and 
weakened force back an average distance of about twenty kilometres. The German 
troops had created roadblocks, sown mines and generally made very skilful use of 
the terrain, the waterways in particular. The celerity, the sense of urgency, 
emphasised by Ritchie in the operational plan had often been lacking during the 
advance. Now it is time to see what happened to Kampfgruppe Chill in its battles 
against  I Corps. To do that it is necessary to go back to 24 October when Chill’s 
men were beating back the 4th Canadian Armoured Division at Wouwse Plantage 
and fighting a delaying action against the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division at Lindonk, 
north of Woensdrecht. 
New opponents 
While schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 became involved in the battle at ‘s-
Hertogenbosch, eighty kilometres to the west Kampfgruppe Chill was fighting a new 
opponent, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, a direct result of Operation Suitcase, 
the advance towards Bergen op Zoom and Roosendaal by I Corps. As described 
above, the Operation had gone off to a mixed start on 20 October, followed by a 
sudden breakthrough to Essen, but had slowed down again as the Canadians failed 
                                        
1350 Later 15. Armee would leave the theatre and move to the Roer and 25. Armee (Gen. D. Flieger 
Christiansen) was created in its place. 
1351 Manuscript Van Hilten, 13-4. 
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to take the key village of Wouwse Plantage on 23 October and the Governor 
General’s Foot Guards (21st CAR) along the Mariabaan lost a whole squadron of 
Shermans to the Sturmgeschütze of Sturmgeschützbrigade 280. The following day, 
Tuesday 24 October, was the day that the 53rd (Welsh) Division stood poised to 
enter ‘s-Hertogenbosch and the Highlanders got stuck at the next waterline. That 
same day the Canadians for the second time tried to pry loose the iron grip Chill still 
had on the wooded area northeast of Woensdrecht 
The second attempt 
As dawn broke on 24 October the disposition of Kampfgruppe Chill by and large had 
not changed. His right wing was still under control of Kampfgruppe Von der Heydte 
(I., III., and IV. /Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 and I./Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2, 
Finzel) and his left under Kampfgruppe Dreyer which consisted of Bataillon Ohler  
(Grenadiere from 1053. and 1054. Grenadier-Regiment), Bataillon Pohl (I./ Fallschirm 
Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring) plus Bataillon Bauer 
(possibly the remnants of Flieger-Regimente 51 and 53). Hauptmann Bauer, like 
Ohler, was one of Dreyer’s former battalion commanders and had previously been in 
charge of II./GR 1053.1352 He was wounded at the end of October and replaced by a 
Hauptmann Melchak or Milzak. 1353 Chill could also make use of 
Sturmgeschützbrigaden 667 and 280. The Kampfgruppe was heavily outnumbered, 
especially in armour, but the terrain, heavily wooded, and the extremely wet autumn 
weather, making the ground soggy and impassable thus restricting attacks to the 
roads, both favoured the defence. Because of this the Canadians were unable to 
utilize the fact that they had such a relatively large number of tanks. Moreover, the 
Germans had heavily mined the area with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines as part 
of the so-called Atlantikwall in the area of Bergen op Zoom. Both types would take 
their toll. 
  
The attack by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, supported by two 
troops of the Canadian Grenadier Guards (22nd CAR) and the Scout Platoon of the 
Lake Superiors should have gone in at three a.m. The idea was that the first streaks 
of dawn would find the attackers on the edge of Wouwse Plantage, ready to assault 
when it was light enough. However, as before, things went badly wrong, right from 
the start.1354 The night was pitch black and a cold rain fell, making it difficult for the 
infantry to reach the forming-up positions. The road had been churned up by the 
tanks and the rain, but the soggy ground on either side was also virtually 
impassable. Therefore the lead platoons moved up nearly two hours late, at 04.45 
hours when Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Stewart finally issued the codeword Mabel. A 
devastating barrage by eight Medium, six Field and two Heavy Anti-Aircraft 
Regiments plastered the German positions for fifteen minutes. Soon Stewart’s men 
covered the first 400 metres and it looked as if this time a surprise had been 
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achieved. Then things –again- began to go wrong. All along the line the Germans 
opened fire and the attack bogged down some 600 metres from the village.  
 
The Shermans of the Grenadier Guards were unable to assist. The first tank rumbling 
along the Mariabaan had to stop at the Sturmgeschütz knocked out the previous day. 
In an attempt to bypass it, the Sherman became bogged down in the ditch. At the 
same time many houses were ablaze, because of all the firing going on and the 
attacking force became clearly silhouetted. Three Shermans managed to slither past 
the roadblock, but soon two were knocked out, one by a Sturmgeschütz, another by 
a Panzerfaust. At four p.m. the Argylls tried to cross the open ground one more time, 
but a mortar concentration caused horrific losses and forced the Canadians to the 
ground. Stewart decided his men had had enough. They were exhausted by the 
nightmarish fighting at the start and the constant battering by mortars. He asked for 
and was given permission to pull back. Their place would be taken by two companies 
from the Lincoln and Wellands. This battalion had tried to outflank the German 
positions from the northeast, supported by Shermans of the British Columbia 
Regiment and six Crocodiles of A Squadron Fife and Forfar Yeomanry. It also failed 
to reach its objective. Here it was the Grenadiere from Bataillon Ohler (Kampfgruppe 
Dreyer) who put a spanner in the works.1355  
 
On the way to the wood which held the German position, one troop of the Fifes and 
Forfars flamed it, expecting to subdue the German defenders. What it did, however, 
was start the battle.1356 Heavy mortars and anti-tank fire greeted the attackers. 
Progress was extremely slow. One Crocodile was hit four or five times, but the crew 
remained inside and fought with their turret weapons. Once again the Germans 
discovered that the ‘super heavy’ tanks, as they described the Churchills, were not as 
easy to put out of action as the Shermans which they had nicknamed the ‘Tommy 
cookers’. However, the attack got nowhere and the Lincoln and Wellands withdrew, 
covered by a smoke screen. The crew of the knocked-out tank were brought back, 
but they neglected to destroy it and eventually the Canadian artillery had to do the 
job of blowing it up. The Lincolns were hit hard, suffering nine killed, twenty-four 
wounded and eleven being taken prisoner by Ohler’s men. That day the Argylls also 
suffered appaling losses in the second attempt to take Wouwse Plantage: thirteen 
killed and twenty wounded. There was virtually no air support to help the ground 
troops. That day, besides the spectacular, but useless, raid on 15. Armee 
headquarters in Dordrecht, 84 Group mainly focused on rail interdiction and weather 
recce missions. Only the Spitfires of 131 Wing strafed targets near Roosendaal, but 
that was still some six kilometres from the contested village.1357 The defenders at 
Wouwse Plantage, mostly from Bataillon Pohl (Hermann Göring-Regiment), and some 
of them in battle for the very first time, had managed to hold on to this key position 
for the second day running.1358  
                                        
1355 Second Army Intel Log, 25.10.44, Serial 12. 
1356 Details: R.J.B. Sellar, The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, 1919-1956, Edinburgh 1960, 69-70. 
1357 Second TAF, Daily Log and No. 84 Group IS 75. Oddly, the latter mentions Roosendaal, the former 
Oosterhout as targets for 131 Wing. 
1358 Analysis defenders: First Cdn Army, IS 116, 24.10.44, IS 117, 25.10.44 and 21st Army Group 
Cositintrep 204, 25.10.44. 
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Moving up 
However, the Canadians did score a minor success that day when they occupied 
Huijbergen which had been given up by Chill in order to straighten his lines.1359 At 
13.45 hours the Sherman tanks from C Squadron the South Alberta Regiment found 
the village clear of enemy and Lieutenant-Colonel G. Wotherspoon ordered his whole 
battalion to concentrate in and around the village. One troop seized an intersection 
north of Huijbergen. From there two roads branched off, one going to Bergen op 
Zoom, one to Wouwse Plantage. Excited about the possibility of a rapid advance to 
Bergen op Zoom, Wotherspoon went to Brigade headquarters. Brigadier J. Jefferson 
(10th Canadian Infantry Brigade) liked the idea and he asked Division for permission 
to proceed. But Major-General Harry Foster’s attention was focused on Wouwse 
Plantage and he ordered Jefferson to concentrate on that village instead. 
Wotherspoon was disappointed. Instead of going for the main prize, the South 
Albertas were directed to support the Algonquins who were to close in on Wouwse 
Plantage from the direction of Huijbergen.  
 
Further east the divisions of I Corps troops began to shift positions because of the 
arrival of  new troops. The 104th US Division, nicknamed the Timberwolves, joined I 
Corps that day. They moved in between the 49th (West Riding) and 1st Polish 
Armoured Divisions, finally filling the thinly held line there. The Americans 
concentrated in an area north of Wuustwezel, so hotly contested only a few days 
before. The brand-new division was commanded by Major-General Terry de la Mesa 
Allen, a veteran of the war, but also a somewhat controversial one. ‘Terrible’ Terry 
had performed well when he commanded the 1st Division in North Africa, but 
eventually Bradley had him relieved as he felt that Allen was too little in control of his 
men when they ran amok in rear echelon rest areas. Officially it was said, somewhat 
politely, that Allen mistakenly believed that the interests of the Big Red One were 
identical to those of the whole army.1360 Still, being ‘relieved for cause’, a pejorative 
word in the military for being fired, usually meant the end of a military career. 
However, since Allen had performed so well Eisenhower decided to give him a 
second chance, a rare opportunity. In October 1943 he took over the 104th at its 
training camp in Oregon. Allen once more proved an inspirational leader and he was 
keen to show the 104th would do well. The division trained 30-35 hours a week, 
three to four times what was required. Allen also insisted on training in night fighting 
tactics, correctly believing as it turned out, that there lay the key to success. As a 
result of this reinforcement all of I Corps divisions now began to shift westward and 
the 56th Brigade (49th West Riding Division) took over the responsibility for Essen 
from the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The Canadians could now concentrate on 
Bergen op Zoom while the British division aimed for Roosendaal. Plans were drawn 
up by Major-General Barker for the next stage. This operation, called Thruster, was 
to begin two days later.1361  
 
                                        
1359 This section, unless otherwise indicated, War Diary South Albertas 24.10.44, and Donald E. 
Graves, South Albertas, a Canadian Regiment at War, Toronto 1998, 219-221. 
1360 Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 354. 
1361 War Diary 49th WR Div, 24 & 25.10.44. 
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The only real advance in this sector on 24 October was undertaken by Bobforce, a 
mixed group composed of the 89th Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA), 102nd LAA and 62nd 
Anti-Tank Regiments under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Bob’ Cory of 89th 
LAA.1362 This composite force with its light guns, whose main task since 5 October it 
had been to patrol as infantry and fill the gap between the 49th and 1st Polish 
Armoured Divisions, advanced as far as Hoogstraten which had been abandoned by 
the 711. Infanterie-Division (Generalleutnant Josef Reichert) a day earlier. The 
withdrawal, ordered by LXXVII. Armeekorps and necessary to shorten the frontline, 
had not been noticed by the British troops.1363 Also as a result of this withdrawal, 
Clarkeforce was finally able to take the village of Schanker (southeast of Essen) 
against little opposition, whereas a day earlier it had still been fiercely defended by 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 (Hauptmann Jaschke) and II./FJR 6 (Hauptmann 
Mager).1364  
Success at last 
Wednesday 25 October Wouwse Plantage was to be seized.1365 In fact, Brigadier 
Moncel had issued a deadline to his commanders. He ordered the village to be taken 
by two p.m. This time the German stronghold was to be attacked from three sides. 
The Lake Superiors A and C Companies were to work forward through a brickworks 
on the southern outskirts, while A and B Companies of the Lincoln and Wellands 
were to drive up the main road; their Scout Platoon was to try and outflank the 
German positions to the northeast.  Support was given by the Shermans from the 
Governor General’s Foot Guards (21st CAR) and the 15th Anti-Tank Regiment and 
flame throwing Wasps. The attack went in at eleven a.m. and gradually 
Kampfgruppe Dreyer had to give way to the superior force. Fighting was ferocious 
and some Germans were literally burnt out of their foxholes. Three Sturmgeschütze 
tried to intervene around two p.m. and once more halted the attack along the 
Mariabaan. One Sherman was knocked out, another bogged down and one had a 
jammed turret. For a moment it seemed as if the operation was going to be a repeat 
of the previous two days. But the attacking infantry managed to move around the 
German position.1366 The Lincolns penetrated the village from the southeast and the 
Superiors managed to bypass the brickworks (which were left to two companies of 
the Argylls coming up from Huijbergen). At 15.30 hours the village was finally taken. 
The cost of the three-day battle had been high. The Canadians had suffered 310 
casualties (eighty dead) against at least 170 (seventy dead) for Kampfgruppe 
Dreyer.1367  
 
Meanwhile, to their left, C Squadron of the South Albertas explored along the 
Huijbergschebaan towards Bergen op Zoom.1368 Around noon the Albertas were told 
                                        
1362 I Corps Intel Log, 24.10.44, Serial 153 (which erroneously gives 87th instead of 89th LAA) and 
Hughes, The 49th West Riding, 34. 
1363 Reichert, 26. 
1364 War Diary 49th Div, 24.10.44, I Corps Intel Log, 25.10.44, Serial 218. 
1365 This section, War Diaries Lincs and Wellands, Lake Superiors; Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 96, 
Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 387-8. 
1366 I Corps, Intel Log, 25.10.44, Serial 290. 
1367 Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 96. 
1368 This section, War Diary South Albertas, 25.10.44. 
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by civilians that there were no more Germans in Bergen op Zoom.1369 Wotherspoon 
ordered the squadron to take prisoners to confirm the news.1370 He then sent on the 
support troop to pick up D Company of the Linoln and Wellands in an attempt to 
exploit the seemingly favourable situation, seemingly being the operative word. As 
the infantry were beginning to clear the woods on either side of the road, the three 
troops had already moved on in the direction of Bergen op Zoom. Initially the group 
made excellent progress along the sandy track until they reached a crossroads at 
Heimolen, about four kilometres from Bergen op Zoom. On the way they took a total 
of twenty-six prisoners. Then the atmosphere soured as the squadron came under 
deadly fire from the rear. It was clear to the tankers that they had been ambushed. 
The Fallschirmjäger had let the tanks penetrate their first line of defence and 
proceed some distance  before closing the trap. In the battle that followed the 
Canadians fought for their lives as they tried to extricate themselves from the 
ambush. They knocked out six Panzerfäuste, but lost six Shermans before they 
managed to pull back as far as C Squadron headquarters at Heihoefke, four 
kilometres north of Huijbergen. At the end of the day the war diary noted bitterly ‘if 
the higher command had been quick enough to exploit this initial breakthrough made 
by C Sqn there would have been little difficulty in dislodging the enemy completely 
from this area and pushing on to BERGEN OP ZOOM [capitals in original].’1371 
Whether that is really true in the light of the German resistance, must remain an 
open question.  
 
That same day the Timberwolves had their first real taste of combat. The keyword 
for their operations was ‘speed’. It all began during a meeting at divisional 
headquarters at Hogeheide (near St.Job in ‘t Goor) where both Field-Marshal 
Montgomery (Twenty-First Army Group) and Lieutenant-General Crocker (I Corps) 
emphasised that the Germans should be pursued without delay. As Crocker put it, 
‘The Boche is softening all around, and we don’t want to miss an opportunity.’1372 As 
it was, Allen had already ordered his three regiments (the third was only now 
arriving) to secure a line just beyond the Dutch-Belgian border. Advancing along the 
road from Antwerp to Breda the American troops east of the road hit the boundary 
between the 245. and the 711. Infanterie-Division, which was always a weak spot in 
a defence line. This explains why the American advance went off to a smooth start. 
Except for some exchange of fire there was no serious fighting and the lead troops 
soon reached a point near Wernhoutsebrug. At the end of their first day in combat 
they could be quite content. As one of the soldiers put it, ‘We learned more in one 
day on the Belgium-Holland border than we had in all those months of manoeuvring 
in Oregon and California.’1373 But they were not done yet. In view of the insistence 
on celerity, Allen ordered his troops to continue the advance until they reached an 
imaginary line B, two-and-a-half kilometres further on. The attack started at 22.30 
hours. It was pitch black and the three regiments advanced slowly towards their 
                                        
1369 Division had already learned the same thing during the night (G Log, 25.10.44, 0135 hours, Serial 
3). 
1370 The prisoners were from I./FJR 6 and 14./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment 
Hermann Göring. 4th Cdn Armd Div, G Log, 25.10.44, Serial 101. 
1371 Capitals in original. 
1372 Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 1946, 62. 
1373 Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 60. 
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targets. Many ditches had to be crossed and soon most soldiers were soaking wet. 
German resistance gradually stiffened and the 413th Regiment (the Seagulls) in 
particular drew heavy fire from the Goorkens wood where their opponents, 
Grenadier-Regiment 731 (711. Infanterie-Division) had set up a strongpoint.1374 In 
view of the stubborn German resistance the advance was to continue as soon as it 
got light. Meanwhile the 49th (West Riding) Division was getting ready for operation 
Thruster which would be launched that night. 
Farewell 
That Wednesday there was a major command change on the German side.1375 After 
having set up a new command post north of Bergen op Zoom, Von der Heydte issued 
his last daily order to FJR 6.1376 Two days before, on 23 October, he received a 
telegram with mixed news. It congratulated him on being awarded the Eichenlaub 
zum Ritterkreuz (Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross) on 30 September and at the same 
time informed him that he had to relinquish command of his regiment as he was to 
become the commander of the new Waffenschule (training centre) der 
Fallschirmarmee in Aalten, the Netherlands. His new job was to train young 
Fallschirm-officers. The Regiment lost one of is most experienced commanders at a 
crucial moment. His successor –until the end of the war- was Major Fritz Hencke, 
until then the Kommandeur of the 14. (Flak) Kompanie. Von der Heydte, who had 
been in charge of FJR 6 since it was newly raised in Cologne on 15 January 1944, 
was saddened by the promotion. This was reflected in the last daily order he issued 
to his men.1377 First he emphasised that the award was not just for him, but for the 
achievements of the whole Regiment, first in Normandy and then in the Netherlands. 
He then wrote that ‘Meine Freude über die Auszeichnung mit den Eichenlaub wird 
leider wesentlich beeinträchtigt durch einen Befehl des Fallschirm-Armee-
Oberkommandos, der mich von der Führung des Regiments zu anderer Verwendung 
abberuft.’  Von der Heydte found it hard to be parted from the Regiment which he 
himself had established, trained and led in battle. His period as Kommandeur of the 
Regiment, he added, ‘gehört zu der schönsten meines miltärisches Lebens. Von der 
Heydte ended with a purple passage, entirely in the spirit of the day in which he said 
that, ’Wenn alles zusammenbricht und Welle über Welle über unserem Volk 
zusammen schlägt, dann wird noch ein Fallschirmjäger meines Regiments dem 
Schicksal trotzen und im Sturm und Ungewitter die Fahne hoch über die Fluten 
halten, auf der ein Wort in leuchtenden Buchstaben steht: „Grossdeutschland“- und 
dieses Wort (…) wird er hineinrufen in das Toben des Sturmes…’ After having 
despatched his last message Von der Heydte left for Berlin. Earlier Göring himself  
had awarded him the Oak Leaves. After the award ceremony Göring suggested that 
he ask Hitler for permission to allow FJR 6 to wear a cuff band with the name of the 
Führer himself. Von der Heydte managed to dissuade him from this somewhat inane 
idea which was potentially hazardous to a soldier wearing it when captured. 
However, he gladly accepted Göring’s second suggestion, namely that each and 
every member of FJR 6 receive the Nahkampfspange (Close Combat Badge) in silver. 
                                        
1374 Reichert, 27, Skizze 6, and Von Hobe, Anhang 4. 
1375 This section, Von der Heydte, Muss ich sterben, 171; Griesser, Die Löwen von Carentan, 227-9. 
1376 The new post was in a villa on the road to Halsteren, Villa Bergina, property of the Lijnkamp 
family who moved to a suite in Hotel de Draak, Hoedelmans, Jeeps & Klaprozen, 54. 
1377 PAJVD. 
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It was an honour unique to the Regiment. Back in the Netherlands the 
Fallschirmjäger no doubt had other things on their mind. They were bracing 
themselves as the Canadians prepared to storm their positions once more.  
Thwarted again 
Now that most of Wouwse Plantage was finally in their hands, the 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division could aim for the next major objective, Bergen op Zoom. In fact 
Montgomery himself had emphasised during his visit the day before that the town 
needed to be taken by the 27th, to which Foster could only reply ‘I’ll try’. In view of 
the progress made the day before the expectations were high. After all the Germans 
had lost a key village and the South Albertas had come within a few kilometres of 
Bergen op Zoom. Maybe one more push was all it would take. However, it soon 
became clear that the Fallschirmjäger would need more than a push and that 26 
October would be no different from the preceding two days. In Operational 
Instruction Number 13 Foster’s orders were for the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
to capture Bergen op Zoom while the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade was to protect 
the right flank by occupying Wouwse Hil and the village of Vijfhoek. As one historian 
cynically put it, ‘It all looked good in theory’.1378 The move by the armoured brigade 
to cut the main Bergen op Zoom – Roosendaal highway should not have been a huge 
problem as this was only a few kilometres from Wouwse Plantage, but the flank 
operation got stuck right from the start even though Brigadier Moncel himself 
remained at headquarters to oversee things. The main problem were three anti-tank 
ditches around Wouwse Plantage, the biggest blocking the road to Wouwse Hil. Until 
these were cleared and bridged, the entire armoured fist was forced to stand by. The 
Lake Superiors had reported that morning that it required ‘only a bulldozer to fix’. 
The reality was quite different.1379 Although a section from the 8th Canadian Field 
Squadron worked as fast as they could during the afternoon, in the end the large 
anti-tank ditch and a crater were not filled until eleven p.m. and then only for 
tracked vehicles. Wheeled vehicles would not be able to pass until the following 
morning.1380 In Wouwse Plantage the Shermans of the Canadian Grenadier Guards 
(22nd CAR) assembled for the break-out which was postponed until the following 
morning while the other two tank battalions (21st and 28th CAR) were coming up 
from the south.1381The flanking operation on the right was clearly dead in the water, 
but what about the main attempt by the infantry? 
 
In view of the trap that FJR 6 had sprung on the South Albertas the previous day it 
was clear that the woods needed to be thoroughly cleared first.1382 This job was 
assigned to A and B Companies of the Argylls, supported by A Squadron of the South 
Albertas.1383 The going was extremely slow and booby traps and accurate mortar fire 
                                        
1378 Graves, South Albertas, 223. 
1379 4th Cdn Armd Div, G Log, 26.10.44,  Serial 6. 
1380 Ibid, Serial 61 and War Diary 4th Cden Armd Bde 26.10.44. 
1381 I Corps, G Log, 27.10.44 Serial 304. 
1382 This section based on War Diaries South Albertas, Algonquins, Lincoln and Wellands and Argylls; 
also Graves, South Albertas, 223-7 and Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 407-412. 
1383 Now commanded by Major Stockloser as Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart was to undergo an operation 
Most likely Stewart was also temporarily relieved of command by Brigadier Jefferson for refusing to 
order his exhausted men forward once again (Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 408). 
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from small groups of Fallschirmjäger impeded progress and the job took all day. 
Meanwhile the main effort along the Huijbergse Baan was to be made by C Squadron 
of the South Albertas with C and D Companies of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment. 
Crocodile flamethrowers of the 1st Fife and Forfar Yeomanry would assist. The 
column set off at a steady pace along the road. Hearts began to beat faster as the 
tanks neared the place of the previous day’s ambush, Heimolen. The lead tanks 
under Lieutenant William McLeod drove past that point and everyone breathed a sigh 
of relief when all of a sudden a Panzerfaust round went across the bow of Lieutenant 
McLeod’s tank. He had seen that the missile had been fired from a bunker and 
McLeod immediately signalled the Crocodiles to flame the bunkers, but the British 
misunderstood. They thought he was just cheering them on and bore right past 
McLeod’s troop. After just fifty metres a second Panzerfaust hit the first Crocodile 
and the crew bailed out. The second Crocodile did not need to be told what to do 
and it ‘blasted the hell out  of the bunkers on both sides of the road’. The South 
Albertas pushed on a few hundred metres, but Major D. Curry, the Squadron 
commander decided to call the lead tanks and infantry back and firm up just north of 
Heimolen. But the story was not over yet. At the end of the day an Armoured 
Recovery Vehicle (ARV) together with a Churchill tank came up to try and bring back 
the damaged Crocodile of the 1st Fife and Forfars. The attempt misfired 
spectacularly.1384 The ARV probably struck one of the large demolition charges with 
long-delay igniters that the Fallschirmjäger had planted everywhere and it blew up 
with a loud bang. The explosion must have been heard for kilometres since it ripped 
the thirty-nine ton Churchill ARV apart, killing all three crew members.1385 To make 
matters worse, the Churchill accompanying it was damaged by heavy fire. Still, the 
engineers managed to get the flame gun out of the Crocodile. The road to Bergen op 
Zoom was now littered with knocked-out tanks and other vehicles and from then on 
was known as ‘Hulk Alley’.1386  
 
To the east things had gone even worse for the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The 
clearing of the brickworks by A and C Companies Algonquins took less than two 
hours and at 11:30 hours the job was done. However, B Company, which had struck 
out from Centrum the previous day and dug in at a crossroads two kilometres north 
of there was in dire straits. Supporting it were four Shermans of the South Albertas. 
Instead of advancing towards Zoomvliet, about two kilometres north, the Canadians 
got stuck rightaway. They found that Fallschirmjäger, trained in working 
independently in small groups, had infiltrated the woods all around them and laid 
more mines. D Company (with another troop) trying to reach them from Centrum ran 
into trouble when the lead tank was knocked out by a Panzerfaust. B Company came 
under increasing pressure as soon as it became light when Kampfgruppe Dreyer 
attacked down the road from Zoomvliet supported by Sturmgeschütze, which fired 
on the Canadians from very close range sometimes1387 After two hours a cry for help 
went out to Division, informing that all officers had become casualties, that the FOO 
from the 15th Field Artillery Regiment (Captain Jack Forbes) was now in charge and 
                                        
1384 Details: Sellar, Fife and Forfar, 72. 
1385 PAJVD, two KIA, one DoW the following day. 
1386 Graves, South Albertas, 227. 
1387 I Corps, G Log, 26.10.44, Serial 289 and 4th Cdn Armd Div, G Log, 26.10.44, Serial 22. 
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that two Shermans had already been knocked out.1388 Not much later all four tanks 
were out of action. Forbes calmly directed fire against any Germans he could see, 
even though his own Sherman tank was hit no less than three times. He knew that 
the wireless in the tank was the only link to the outside and therefore to survival. 
Artillery support meant that the defenders could hold the position for the time being, 
but it was clear something needed to be done to help the beleaguered unit. 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Bradburn ordered B Company to withdraw. But even that was 
impossible under the circumstances and eventually the Carrier Platoon of C Company 
advanced across country under a hail of small arms fire. Quickly picking up the 
survivors the platoon dashed back to Wouwse Plantage. 
 
All in all, it had been a most disappointing day for Harry Foster’s division in general 
and for the South Albertas, who had lost no fewer than twelve tanks, in particular. 
Kampfgruppe Chill had once more skilfully used the terrain, effectively blocking the 
Canadian advance from Lindonk to Wouwse Hil. To the Canadians on the ground it 
must have appeared as if the deadlock would never be broken. But, they were in for 
a pleasant surprise the following day. Moreover, for the rest of I Corps things had 
taken a slightly more positive turn.  
Thruster 
For Major-General Barker’s 49th Division, 26 October saw the beginning of operation 
Thruster.1389 It was another typical autumn day with a persistent mist shrouding 
everything. During the opening stage of the operation the 56th Brigade (immediately 
to the right of the Canadians) would take Nispen, whereupon Clarkeforce (now 
consisting only of headquarters of the 34th Tank Brigade, the 49th recce and the 
107th RAC) would exploit to the northwest and cut the Bergen op Zoom – 
Roosendaal road. The operation began with a night attack by the 2nd South Wales 
Borderers who were to seize a wood (Honingsbossen) southwest of Nispen. 
However, the Borderers were unable to flush out the wood they were supposed to 
clear and so the 2nd Essex had to fight their way forward from the start at seven 
a.m. after a thirty-minute barrage.1390 The barrage impressed the Germans who felt 
that their opponent apparently had an endless supply of ammunition.1391 The attack 
by the Essex over open terrain, assisted by B Squadron of 9th RTR and a Troop of 
flame-throwing Crocodiles of C Squadron 1st Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, again 
demonstrated what proper infantry-tank cooperation was capable of and made rapid 
progress. A slight setback was that the crews of the Crocodiles in No.4 Troop 
discovered that only two tanks were capable of flaming because the other two had 
leaks due to mortaring the previous day. Nevertheless, these two helped the Essex 
by covering the attack over the railway using guns as well as flames.1392 After two 
hours the Essex were on their objective, west of Nispen and at 09.30 hours Barker 
launched Clarkeforce.  
 
                                        
1388 4th Cdn Armd Div, G Log, 26.10.44, Serial 32. 
1389 This section, unless otherwise indicated, War Diaries 49th WR Div, 56th Brigade, 34th Tank 
Brigade. 
1390 T.A. Martin, The Essex Regiment 1929-1950, Brentwood 1951, 218. 
1391 Diary Hans Geng. 
1392 Sellar, Fife and Forfar, 72. 
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The combat group steamed ahead along the Bergsebaan, were temporarily held up 
by harassing fire from two Sturmgeschütze (probably from Sturmgeschützbrigade 
667), then proceeded until they came to two blown bridges across a stream 
(Rissestroom) which had been converted into an anti-tank ditch. In fact, it was the 
same ditch that was holding up the Canadian armoured brigade north of Wouwse 
Plantage at its western end. Efforts to expand the base were hampered by fire from 
mortars and Sturmgeschütze and just before three p.m. the 1st Leicesters were 
attached to Clarkeforce to provide the much needed infantry. The Leicesters arrived 
at the end of the afternoon and at eight p.m. Major-General Barker himself came up 
for a conference with Brigadier W.S. Clarke. The orders were unequivocal: the next 
day Clarkeforce was to cross the ditch, proceed to Wouw and cut the Bergen op 
Zoom – Roosendaal road. 
 
While the Essex punched a hole in the German line west of Nispen, the 2nd 
Gloucestershires and C Squadron 9th RTR went into the village itself just before 
noon. At one p.m. they reported the village taken. When the Glosters tried to exit the 
town, however, they found their way to the north blocked by II./FJR 6 (Mager) and 
at least two Sturmgeschütze from Sturmgeschützbrigade 244.1393 Two tanks in C 
Squadron were damaged and the bridge over the Moolenbeek was blown. But this 
was a minor setback and the 49th (West Riding) Division had achieved most of its 
objectives for the first day as well as taking 166 prisoners, most of them from 
various units of the 346. Infanterie-Division, but also from II./Grenadier-Regiment 
937 of the 245. Infanterie-Division.1394 After leaving the Tilburg sector Oberstleutnant 
Nass’ whole Regiment had been sent as a reinforcement to the 346. Infanterie-
Division.1395 Eventually I. and III./GR 937 were designated Corps reserve near 
Roosendaal.1396 The rest of Sander’s division remained south of Breda to face the 
green troops from the States with whom they had their first clash that day.  
 
The Timberwolves resumed their advance towards Zundert early in the morning, but 
found the going somewhat difficult.1397 As on the previous day it was the 413th 
Regiment on the right that had the toughest fighting on its hands. The German 
strongpoint in the Goorkens woods initially resisted all attacks. The battle raged all 
day and light Flak in particular was a problem for the Americans who had to cross 
the open terrain. At six p.m. there was even a counterattack by Grenadier-Regiment 
731 (711. I.D.). But that was the proverbial last gasp and after the counterattack 
was beaten off, the Seagulls captured two 3.7 cm and destroyed three 2 cm Flak 
guns. In this operation the American infantry were supported by the heavy Churchill 
tanks of No.8 Troop 147th RAC. The Americans managed to clear the woods 
although the Germans held out in Maxburg castle. About fifty Grenadiere were taken 
prisoner, but the bulk of the force, about 150 men, escaped north. In the middle the 
414th (Mountaineers) supported by C Squadron 147th RAC struggled on along on 
                                        
1393 First Cdn Army, IS 119, 27.10.44 and I Corps G Log, 26.10.44, Serial 263. 
1394 Plus I./1018 GR and 772 Sich Rgt (34th Tank Bde, Is 40, 27.10.44.) 
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1396 Von Hobe, 46. 
1397 This section, Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 65-6 and War Diary 147th RAC. 
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either side of the main road to Zundert. Progress was slow, but about noon the 
regiment finally reached Line B. To the left the 415th (Old Faithful) also had their 
hands full.  Advancing over open terrain towards Achtmaal they, too, suffered a 
counterattack, in this case by Grenadier-Regiment 935 (245. I.D.). A barrage beat 
the German force off, but American losses were also serious. At the end of the day 
the 104th US Division stood poised to seize Zundert the following day.  
 
To the right of the Americans both Bobforce and the 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Brigade held the line as far as Baarle-Nassau. The village was the responsibility of 
the 1st Polish Armoured Division, which was finally also to resume the offensive.1398 
Major-General Maczek was told by Lieutenant-General Crocker that his division was 
to advance the next day. Crocker ordered Maczek to pin the enemy down in order 
not to allow him to regroup further west where the main attacks were launched. 
Crocker did not really expect much from the Poles who had been recuperating for the 
last three weeks, but were unable to make up for the losses which they had 
incurred.1399 Still, Crocker would be in for a surprise once Maczek’s men got going. In 
spite of the achievements that day Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, G 1 at First Canadian 
Army, warned the divisional commanders not to be overly optimistic. He noted that 
‘Although the position of Fifteenth Army is no better tonight, it is worth remembering 
that 64 Division SOUTH of the SCHELDT has held us at bay for three weeks, and has 
shown that, given proper leadership, and suitable ground, German soldiers can still 
put up a good show’.1400 It was a correct analysis, accurately predicting that the 
advance would not be a walk-over. 
Pull back 
After the speedy advance of the 7th Armoured had punched a huge hole in its main 
line of defence (see above) Reinhard’s LXXXVIII. Armeekorps was in serious trouble. 
General Von Zangen felt that the time had come to pull the whole 15. Armee back to 
Stellung II during the night. For Sponheimer’s LXVII. Armeekorps this meant that it 
had to withdraw to a line running from the southern edge of Bergen op Zoom via 
Roosendaal and Breda to Dongen.1401 At the same time the Korps was to send the 
719. Infanterie-Division to the area of Oosterhout as a reserve. Von Zangen also 
insisted that his two corps maintain contact even though this would make an already 
difficult manoeuvre even more problematic, especially as the boundary was the 
Wilhelminakanaal. A second, equally important, caveat was given.  ‘NACHTRUPPEN 
HALTEN BISHERIGE HKL MINDESTENS BIS NEUE HKL STEHT UND VERZOEGERN 
IMMER WIEDER FRONT MACHEND FEINDVORGEHEN GEGEN NEUE HKL 
MOEGLICHST LANGE, VIEL ZEIT GEWINNEN...’ 1402 This part of the order would be 
followed to the letter by some of Sponheimer’s divisions, but not by all.  
                                        
1398 Bobforce now also had 4 Lincolns under command; 2nd Cdn Arm Bde at this time consisted of 6th 
CAR (Hussars) and 27th CAR (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) since 10th CAR (Fort Garry Horse) still supported 
the 2nd Cdn Inf Div on South Beveland. On the Polish Div: Operational Report by CO 1 Polish armd 
Div. 
1399 Because of a lack of tank crews the armoured units had an average establishment of 2/3 to 3/5 
and the 3rd Infanry Brigade was even worse off. 
1400 First Cdn Army, IS 118, 26.10.44. 
1401 KTB 88 AK, 27.10.44, C 299. 
1402 KTB 88 AK, 27.10.44, C 299. 
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In effect Kampfgruppe Chill was now forced to give up some of the positions for 
which the Canadians had been struggling in vain for the last three weeks, such as 
the key positions north of Woensdrecht. The Kampfgruppe pulled back as far as 
Bergen op Zoom itself, where it set up a new defensive line behind the river Zoom 
which cuts right through the town. Helped by minefields and marshy ground, they 
dug in east of the town, along the railway line to Roosendaal. South of there Chill left 
strong rearguards, often supported by the Sturmgeschütze from 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 280, which meant that, at least in some places, for I Corps 
the next day still would be a continuation of the by now familiar struggle. When 
dawn broke on 27 October it was clear that it was going to be another grey, wet and 
miserable autumn day. The only consolation for the German troops was that this 
meant no air intervention for the third day running. While schwere Heeres 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 got into position to launch their final attack on ‘s-
Hertogenbosch, their comrades in Kampfgruppe Chill shivered in their foxholes, 
wondering how soon the Allied troops would reach them.  
Take the damned place 
The main attack on Bergen op Zoom (which the BBC had already reported liberated 
several times) was to be undertaken by the tanks of the South Albertas and the 
infantry of the Lincoln and Wellands, while the two other infantry battalions, the 
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Algonquins, would clear the rest of the 
woods east of the town.1403 Having no idea of the German strength ahead of him, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wotherspoon decided to order two squadrons to explore towards 
the northwest. A Squadron advanced on the right, accompanied by the Argylls, and C 
Squadron on the left, supported by the Lincoln and Wellands. Not surprisingly, in 
view of the German withdrawal, only slight opposition was met and at noon both 
squadrons had advanced about two kilometres. Nearly two hours later C Squadron 
came across civilians who informed them that the Germans had cleared Bergen op 
Zoom itself. It sounded too good to be true. Wotherspoon decided to pull A 
Squadron over from the right to Nieuw Borgvliet, a village south of the main prize. C 
and D Companies of the Lincoln and Wellands had followed the tanks closely and 
Wotherspoon consulted the CO of the Lincs, Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Cromb, who had 
also set up his headquarters near Heimolen. It was clear that a decision had to be 
made: continue cautiously or take a chance and rush into the town. After debating 
the issue for some time Wotherspoon looked at Cromb and said, ‘Hell, Bill, let’s take 
the damned place.’ Cromb agreed. The die was cast. The infantry mounted the tanks 
and, led by a guide from the Dutch underground, soon reached the central square 
where they were greeted by cheering crowds, somewhat prematurely, as would soon 
become clear. Bergen op Zoom was finally declared clear of enemy at 17.45 hours on 
27 October.1404  
 
But the enemy had not completely abandoned the town yet. They had merely pulled 
back to the north bank of the Zoom, the sixteenth century canal running through the 
                                        
1403 This section, War Diaries, 10th Cdn Inf Bde, 29th CAR, Lincs and Wellands, Graves, South 
Albertas, 227-230. For summaries: Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 100; Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 414-7. 
1404 Second Army, Intel Log, 27.10.44, Serial 73. 
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northern part of the town which was a formidable obstacle to cross, being on 
average thirty metres wide with very steep banks. The Fallschirmjäger there had no 
intention of giving up any too soon, because, like their comrades in ‘s-
Hertogenbosch, they held a pivot in the whole German main line of defence. Behind 
the Zoom were all four companies of III./FJR 6, now commanded by the ubiquitous 
Ritterkreuzträger Hauptmann Leopold Von Hütz, who had been in charge of the 
Kampfgruppe bearing his name which had tried to retake Joe’s Bridge (Chapter 3.4). 
He took over from no less of a firebrand, Oberleutnant Ulmer, who had led the 
daring raid on Beeringen bridge on 9 September and was then taken prisoner (see 
Chapter 3.1).1405 Twenty-six year old Von Hütz must have transferred to the 
Fallschirmjäger at the end of September or in early October. It was an unusual step 
which he took for reasons best known to himself.1406 This veteran soldier would 
prove to be a real nuisance for the Canadians over the next few days. As the first 
Canadian tanks approached the main bridge over the Zoom at the end of the 
afternoon they heard a loud bang as an AP shot creased one of the Shermans. All 
hell then broke loose, a smokescreen was laid and the tanks pulled back. It was clear 
to the Canadian troops in Bergen op Zoom that some stiff fighting was ahead of 
them. On the right flank that struggle was already being fought that day. 
And block the road 
The rearguards of Kampfgruppe Dreyer who had stayed behind in the old main line 
of defence on the 27th in effect prevented the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade from 
gaining its objective, the main road from Bergen op Zoom to Roosendaal in the area 
of Vijfhoek.1407 Early in the day all three armoured regiments closed in on Wouwse 
Plantage, ready for the breakout. On the map they were stacked like a deck of cards, 
starting with the Canadian Grenadier Guards (22nd CAR) who were in the village 
itself, followed by the British Columbia Regiment (28th CAR) south of there, while the 
Governor General’s Foot Guards (21st CAR) were beginning to arrive during the 
day.1408 The operation started fairly well early in the morning as the lead troops, 
No.2 Squadron of the Grenadiers and C Company of the Lake Superiors, set off from 
Wouwse Plantage. The first stage was successful and the column cleared the next 
village, Wouwse Hil, at 07.15 hours.1409 Then B Company of the Superiors came up 
to occupy the village so that the force could continue west for the next objective, 
Westlaar. Even before setting off, the force came under heavy fire from mortars and 
Flak guns. It was clear that they had struck the German rearguard, probably from 
Bataillon Pohl. In addition three Sturmgeschütze (Sturmgeschützbrigade 667) were 
spotted west of the village.1410 Artillery was called down and two Sturmgeschütze 
were reputedly hit.1411 A Troop of the 12th Manitoba Dragoons (18th CAR), under the 
                                        
1405 War Diary 49th (WR) Div, IS 71, 24.10.44. 
1406 His Personalakten does not provide any answers. 
1407 This section, War Diaries, 4th Cdn Armd Bde, 21st, 22nd and 28th CAR and Lake Superiors. 
Summary, Zuelhlke, 416-7. 
1408 Zuehlke (Terrible Victory, 416) has 21st CAR blocking the Bergen op Zoom-Roosendaal road that 
day; this is impossible as they were still assembling south of Wouwse Plantage. The attack north took 
place the following day. 
1409 4th Cdn Armd Div, G Log, 27.10.44, Serial 9. 
1410 Ibid, Serials 18 and 33. 
1411 Ibid, Serial 28 (although, erroneously they were described as ’88 SP’). 
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direct command of I Corps, tried to investigate the suspected SP positions, but 
withdrew after the troop leader was knocked out.1412  
 
It was a sign of things to come, because as the column left Wouwse Hil just after 
midday and headed for Vijfhoek, they were met with heavy AP and small arms fire. 
The attack soon bogged down. After several attempts to break the deadlock, at four 
p.m. Major C.A. Greenleaf of the Headquarters Squadron of the Grenadiers ordered 
No.4 Troop to attack the village from the south via a secondary road. Sergeant W.M. 
Irvine’s Troop was also met with devastating fire, but this assault managed to break 
into the village and half an hour later Westlaar was in Canadian hands. However, 
they were still two kilometres from their goal and German traffic continued to leave 
Bergen op Zoom unimpeded. Brigadier Moncel issued two orders. The Grenadiers 
were told to continue the advance while the British Columbia were to push north and 
consolidate along the Bergen op Zoom - Roosendaal road.  
 
The advance by the British Columbia started straight away, met no resistance and 
was soon in Zoomvliet, which had eluded the Canadians a day before. Half an hour 
after leaving A Squadron, supported by A Company of the Superiors, reached the 
main road, crossed it and firmed up behind the dyke three hundred metres north. 
Soon the rest of the British Columbia tanks arrived in the same area. The road 
Bergen op Zoom – Roosendaal, essential to supply the left wing of Kampfgruppe 
Chill, was finally cut. Meanwhile the Grenadiers and Superiors in Westlaar were 
preparing for their attack which started at midnight. The attack was preceded by an 
artillery barrage and, illuminated by the many fires, the force moved northward. Just 
before dawn on 27 October tanks and infantry rushed forwards, overwhelmed the 
German defences and at four a.m. cleared Vijfhoek. The Grenadiers and the 
Superiors crossed the main road, shot up two Pak guns and a number of lorries and 
then dug in, finally having achieved their goal.1413 Over forty prisoners were taken, 
No.2 Squadron finally got some rest and was relieved by No.1 and 3 Squadrons to 
secure the blocking position. 
Slow going 
The rest of I Corps, unsurprisingly, in view of the German withdrawal, was also fairly 
successful on 27 October. Still, the 49th (West Riding) Division, to the right of the 
Canadians, during the second day of operation Thruster had to fight part of the same 
tough rearguards left behind by Kampfgruppe Dreyer.1414 As day broke the British 
still faced the stream cum anti-tank ditch at two points, southeast of Haink and one 
kilometre east of Wouwse Hil where Clarkeforce was to make the main effort to 
Wouw. But first the ditch needed to be crossed and here the infantry in the form of 
the 1st Leicesters came in. The attack by B Company under Major A.E. Pollard went 
in at 08.15 hours and within twenty minutes had captured the objective, two houses 
on the other side of the ditch. Only then did the German defenders, I./FJR 2 (Finzel),  
wake up and try to drive off the Leicesters. The latter would not budge and sixty-
                                        
1412 Ibid, Serial 34. 
1413 4th Cdn Arm Div, G Log, 28.10.44, Serial 6. 
1414 This section based on War Diaries 49th WR Div, 34th Tk Bde, 1st Leicesters, and 62 A/Tk. 
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eight Fallschirmjäger were taken prisoner.1415 A bulldozer was immediately put to 
work, covered by the Churchills of the 107th RAC and just before noon a crossing 
had been effected. It was then found that the west side was not only higher than the 
east side, but the top was lined with concrete. Two troops, A and B, of the 62 Anti-
tank Regiment equipped with M-10 Achilles were sent for. The seventeen-pounders 
fired at the concrete until it crumbled down and the Churchills could finally cross the 
obstacle.  
 
While part of  the 49th Recce and a composite force with six Achilles M-10s moved to 
Wouwse Hil, which had been taken by the Canadians earlier that day, Clarkeforce 
moved north towards Haink which was reached early in the afternoon. From there 
the Churchills hoped to turn west to Oostlaar. However, Sturmgeschütze 
(Sturmgeschützbrigade 667) restricted all movement on the open ground and three 
Churchills were lost.1416 The M-10s were called up and throughout the afternoon 
engaged the Sturmgeschütze. It was a battle of SP against SP. The result was more 
or less a draw as one Achilles was knocked out and two were bogged down while the 
British SPs themselves hit one of the Sturmgeschütze and forced the others to pull 
back. A Squadron 49th Recce then found that the German defenders had left the 
back door open and they managed to get within a few hundred metres of the village. 
At around the same time the 11th Royal Scots Fusiliers took over from the 1st 
Leicesters who had reverted to the 147th Brigade. The Fusiliers were rushed to 
Wouwse Hil and then followed the Recce Squadron into Oostlaar where at last light 
they were joined by the main force which, by using smoke, had cut west and entered 
the village without too many casualties. Clarkeforce was ready for its final task, to 
capture the village of Wouw on the Bergen op Zoom – Roosendaal road. Also during 
the day the 1st Leicesters cleared the area north of Nispen as far as Tolberg. With 
the main road leading into Roosendaal cut, it seemed that the town itself 
(codename: ‘Toffee’) would fall to the British like an overripe fruit the following day, 
especially since the right wing of I Corps had advanced a considerable distance. 
 
The 104th US Division also benefited from the German withdrawal.1417 Early in the 
morning, after an introductory barrage, the 413th Regiment, supported by B 
Squadron 147th RAC, broke into the wooded country southeast of Zundert and 
slowly advanced almost due north until they came to the Meirseweg, the main road 
leading into Zundert from the east. As it was evident that the Germans had pulled 
even further back the Seagulls continued their advance into the town. Because the 
bridge was blown up, a Bailey bridge was hurriedly constructed to allow the Churchill 
tanks to continue and at six p.m. Zundert was taken. The 414th, coming up the main 
road, had to overcome resistance put up by a German rearguard in a stone factory 
before they could join their comrades in Zundert. The 415th to the left finally 
managed to get into the village of Achtmaal. However, the biggest success that day 
was achieved by the 1st Polish Armoured Division. What happened as the Poles went 
over to the attack on the 27th was nothing less than spectacular. 
                                        
1415 Second Army, Intel Log, 28.10.44, Serial 10. 
1416 War Diary 34th Tk Bde, Appendix G, 07.11.44. 
1417 This section, Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 66-7. 
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Naprzód 
As related above, the main task of General-Major Maczek’s division was to pin down 
the 256. Volksgrenadier-Division and advance in the general direction of Oosterhout 
so that LXVII. Armeekorps would not be able to shift units westward. The Polish 
operation started at eight a.m. and was preceded by a very brief ten-minute artillery 
barrage.1418 Then the cry went up, ‘Naprzód’, and operation ‘Breda’ began.1419 While 
the infantry of  the 3rd Polish Infantry Brigade began the laborious process of 
sweeping the woods north and northwest of Baarle-Nassau the tanks of  the 10th 
Armoured Cavalry Brigade roared northwards. In just three hours the Recce 
regiment, 10 Pułk Strzelców Konnych (PSK), advanced ten kilometres, pushing aside 
the 476 Grenadier-Regiment  in the process and taking Vijfhuizen.1420 The Cromwells 
of 10 PSK raced ahead and at noon had advanced another five kilometres and 
occupied the village of Gilze. The unit then split up, No.1 Squadron moving on to the 
airfield which had been abandoned by the Luftwaffe in the panic of 5 September, 
and No.3 Squadron heading for the main road Breda – Tilburg.1421 Still meeting only 
little resistance the Cromwells rattled on and at two p.m. reached the road. Another 
important German artery was now severed. Still the Poles would not let up. Major 
Wasilewski ordered his regiment to continue as far as the Wilhelminakanaal, five 
kilometres away. The men were in a hurry now as it would soon be dark. Bypassing 
Rijen, which was obviously defended, the Cromwells were forced to take to the 
fields. Unexpectedly they had to contend with a new enemy. The ground became 
softer and softer and after a while six tanks had become completely stuck. 
Fortunately for the Poles the German troops on the other side had no anti-tank guns 
and only fired the occasional MG volley. The Cromwells could not be recovered until 
the following evening. The capture of Reijen was left to the Sherman tanks of 10 
Pułk Dragonów and 24th Ułanów who had followed close on the metaphorical heels 
of 10 PSK.   
 
All in all it had been a heady day for the Poles who covered nearly twenty kilometres. 
What they had achieved was beyond anyone’s expectations. One of the reasons for 
the unexpected success was that the Poles benefited from some very serious errors 
made by their German counterparts. First of all they had advanced into a kind of 
semi-vacuum that had arisen on 26 October when 15. Armee ordered LXVII. 
Armeekorps to move back its left flank in order to maintain contact with LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps.1422 The 719. Infanterie-Division (Generalleutnant Schwalbe) had fallen 
back almost immediately, but without informing its neighbour, the 711. Infanterie-
Division (Generalleutnant Reichert), thus allowing a gaping hole to open up in the 
German front-line. When he found out, Reichert sent the Pionier Bataillon (just two 
                                        
1418 This section, Operational Report CO 1st Pol Armd Div, 40-1, 24 Pulk Ulanow, 51-2, K. Jamar, With 
the tanks of the 1st Polish Armoured Division, Hengelo 1946, 241-4, and Didden and Swarts, Einddoel 
Maas, 178-9. 
1419 Naprzód means ‘forward’ in Polish. 
1420 I Corps, G Log, 27.10.44, Serial 320. 
1421 Peter Grimm et al., Vliegvelden in Oorlogstijd, Nederlandse vliegvelden tijdens bezetting en 
bevrijding 1940-1945, Amsterdam 2009, 263. Gilze-Rijen would be used by 84 Group, Second TAF as 
B.77 from 21 November (Grimm et al, Vliegvelden, 360). 
1422 KTB 88 AK, 22.10.44, C 291. This section, Didden and Swarts, Einddoel Maas, 178-9. 
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companies) to plug the gap at Rijen.1423 This they did, but only in the nick of time. 
No wonder then that Von Zangen was livid with rage as he saw the left flank of 
Sponheimer’s Corps crumbling to dust. He issued a clear order regarding the task of 
rearguards.1424 He also ordered an immediate investigation. If necessary troops that 
had gone back prematurely were to recapture their old positions. In addition, the 
new defence line needed to be built in some depth. Each division was to find at least 
a battalion which could act as a reserve. Most importantly, the rearguards needed to 
‘gain time’ for the rest to set up a proper line of defence.  
 
Von Zangen felt that it was a disgrace that the 711. Infanterie-Division only found 
out its left hand neighbour had gone when it was too late to do anything about it. He 
correctly felt that LXVII. Armeekorps should have informed Reichert in time. 
Interestingly he reserved his biggest blame not for Schwalbe and 719. I.D., but for 
Oberst Franz and his 256. Volksgrenadier-Division who had –probably- neglected to 
take over the sector assigned to them. Von Zangen was not surprised. He wrote, 
‘Wahrscheinlich hatte die 256.V.G.D. ihren Auftrag der –onehin kaum noch 
existierenden – 719.I.D. in der Ausweichbewegung zu übernehmen und Anschluss an 
LXVII.AK. (711.I.D.) zu halten, zu leicht genommen.’1425 Whatever the cause, the 
situation could not be restored and the next few days would reveal how deep the 
Polish attack had interfered with the German withdrawal plans.  
Air support? 
On Saturday 28 October the weather finally cleared and for a change Second TAF 
supported First Canadian Army. The pilots were eager and 84 Group flew a total of 
519 sorties to assist the ground troops. Tragically for the men engaged in fierce 
battle with both elements of Kampfgruppe Chill virtually all attacks were made in 
support of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions because the first priority of 
84 Group was ‘to assist the Army to clear the approaches to Antwerp’.1426 Basically 
this meant that neither the 4th Canadian Armoured nor the 49th (West Riding) 
Division, who could have done with air support received any. Ironically the only two 
air missions on the mainland were in support of Bobforce which did not really need 
it. At nine a.m. twenty-four Spitfires of  222 and 349 Squadrons (135 Wing) took off 
from Merville and flew north. They dropped twenty-one 500-pound bombs on 
suspected strongpoints (711. Infanterie-Division) east of Hoogstraten and then 
strafed them.1427 A doubly pointless exercise, as these positions were not where the 
enemy was offering the most resistance and as they had already been abandoned 
when they were bypassed on both sides by the advancing Allied troops. But even if 
they had been more active, fighter-bombers could not have helped the infantry in 
Bergen op Zoom anyway. To the men on the ground it must have seemed like 
Woensdrecht all over as they tried to break the German grip on the northern part of 
the town. 
  
                                        
1423 Reichert, 29. 
1424 KTB 88 AK, 26.10.44, C 300 and Reichert, 29, footnote by Von Zangen. 
1425 Reichert, 29. 
1426 No. 84 Group, IS 79, 28.10.44. 
1427 Second TAF, Daily Log, 28.10.44. 
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The problem facing the Allied soldiers was the exact opposite of the one in ‘s-
Hertogenbosch four days earlier. There waterways had made it hard to get into the 
city, whereas in Bergen op Zoom it was equally difficult to get out for the same 
reason.1428 Even though their main lateral line of communication, the road to 
Roosendaal, was now severed, III./FJR 6 under Hauptmann Von Hütz, still had roads 
running northward both for supplies and as ways out. Moreover, the Fallschirmjäger 
were dug in behind a natural defence, the Zoom. The main attack was to be 
undertaken by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, who began to arrive 
in the town throughout the morning. Even though their acting CO, Major B. 
Stockloser, considered the canal ‘no great obstacle’ events were to prove him 
disastrously wrong. The Zoom canal was in fact  twenty feet wide and six feet deep 
forming a natural tank trap filled with water. Moreover, the Germans had blown all 
the bridges, except for the main one which they had cratered and blocked with a 
huge concrete Panzersperre, or anti-tank barrier. Undaunted, Major Stockloser 
decided to tackle the barrier head on. While C Company covered them D Company 
was to dash across the bridge and seize the buildings on the other end. The Argylls 
began closing up on the Zoom at two p.m. and immediately ran into trouble. 
Accurate 88 Flak guns firing airbursts, joined by mortars caused havoc in the old city 
streets. On top of that one Canadian 5.5 shell landed on the rear deck of one of the 
South Alberta’s Shermans causing at least a dozen casualties among the tankers and 
the Argylls.1429 Things became steadily worse once the Argylls reached the Zoom and 
D Company found it was impossible to go beyond the buildings occupied by C 
Company and cross in broad daylight. Stockloser realised he would have to come up 
with a new plan.  
 
He decided to send A Company westward to try and cross the Zoom at the coastal 
neck and get behind the German positions in the centre while the Lincoln and 
Wellands created a diversion. The operation duly began at 21.30 hours. It, too, 
failed. Once the Argylls were spotted German machine-guns pinned them down and 
the attempt had to be abandoned. The diversionary attack by the Lincs was not 
really successful either. Nevertheless, A Company managed to cross the Zoom, but 
only thirteen men followed Captain Lambert into a factory on the other side. (Later 
Lambert was awarded a Military Cross for this dash.) The Lincs hit the sector 
defended by 10. Kompanie under Leutnant Georg Le Coutre, who had received 
brand-new Sturmgewehre 44 only days before.1430 These powerful semi-automatic 
guns added enormous firepower to the German defence. Consequently, fighting in 
the factory buildings was ferocious, neither side willing to give in. At one point both 
sides were taunting each other, the Fallschirmjäger shouting ‘Canadian pigs, 
Canadian swine”, to which the Lincs replied, ‘We’re in here. Come and get us.’1431 To 
break the deadlock, the flame-throwing Crocodiles of A Squadron Fife and Forfars 
were ordered to assist, but the Scout car containing the CO, Major H.C. Walker, was 
hit and the support never even made it into the city.1432 The 4th Canadian Armoured 
                                        
1428 This section, War Diaries 10th Cdn Inf Bde, Argylls, Lincs, Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 421-5, and 
Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 103-5. 
1429 Graves, South Albertas, 232. 
1430 Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 104, and Griesser, Die Löwen von Carentan, 234. 
1431 Graves, South Albertas, 233. 
1432 Sellar, Fife and Forfar, 73. 
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Brigade to the east made a little more progress that day, although here, too, German 
resistance was stiff. 
More Sturmgeschütze 
After taking Vijfhoek at four a.m. and cutting the main road north of the village the 
Grenadiers (22nd CAR) had dug in.1433 To their left the British Columbia (28th CAR) 
had been trying to improve their positions along the same road, but had become 
stuck along the railway embankment. Most of the action that day was reserved for 
the Governor General’s Foot Guards (21st CAR) who, with B Company of the Lake 
Superiors, were told to fill the gap between the Grenadiers and the British Columbias 
and perhaps try and cross the road. After passing through Zoomvliet the Shermans 
headed north, but they got stuck once they reached the road Bergen op Zoom – 
Roosendaal. The same small groups of Fallschirmjäger from I. and IV./FJR 6 who 
were blocking the British Columbias also prevented the Foot Guards from proceeding 
any further. As all roads across the railway were blown Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. 
Smith needed to find another route. Since his left hand neighbours were also stuck, 
he decided to use the blocking position on his right occupied by the Grenadiers as a 
new starting line. The Foot Guards retraced their steps to Zoomvliet, No.2 Squadron 
leading, passed through Vijfhoek, and as darkness fell reached a point a few hundred 
metres south of Heerle.1434 The attack on the village proper, together with B 
Company of the Lake Superiors, was postponed until the following morning. Once 
again Kampfgruppe Chill managed to thwart the Canadian intentions, mainly because 
it was ‘making very astute use of SP equipment causing considerable trouble with his 
bold tactics’.1435 Still, in view of the steady Allied pressure, Generalleutnant Kurt Chill 
moved his headquarters back another ten kilometres to the village of Stampersgat 
that day.1436  
 
The same clever use of Sturmgeschütze also effectively held up the Canadian’s right-
hand neighbour, the 49th (West Riding) Division which only very slowly inched closer 
to Roosendaal.1437 Here they were opposed by Kampfgruppe Dreyer, supported by 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 244. Clarkeforce had been ordered the previous day to cut the 
Bergen op Zoom – Roosendaal road in the Wouw area. During the night patrols of 
the 11th Royal Scots Fusiliers found the village occupied. It was clear that it would 
have to be fought over. But battle commenced earlier than anticipated. Like a patient 
predator one of the Sturmgeschütze had been lying up for the night within a hundred 
metres of the laager of the 107th RAC. Once it was light enough the German SP 
went into action and destroyed one Churchill and three other vehicles, forcing the 
others to pull back, covered by M-10s. The British battle group then cleared the 
village of Akker before moving on to the main goal for the day, Wouw. Although the 
Sturmgeschütze continued to harass the advancing infantry and tanks the village was 
cleared at three p.m. The Scots Fusiliers had 46 casualties in the process and the 
Germans were not ready to give up yet. One Sturmgeschütz, southeast of the village, 
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managed to knock out another few vehicles and one tank. The German group then 
pulled back as far as Vinkenbroek, but continued to fire on Wouw. It was the last 
major action for Clarkeforce which was disbanded the following day. Meanwhile to 
the right the 7th Duke of Wellington Regiment (147th Brigade) in vain tried to cross 
the anti-tank ditch south of Roosendaal in two places. Both attacks had to be broken 
off and the 7th DWR was pushed back to its starting point by Hauptmann Mager’s 
II./FJR6.1438 For the moment the main prize still eluded General-Major Barber’s 
division. A new attempt would be made the following day. 
Steaming ahead 
The right flank of I Corps, however, once again performed much better that day. It 
was basically the same story as in Operation Pheasant, where the German pivotal 
position, in this case Bergen op Zoom, held while the centre units were allowed to 
fall back. Early in the morning, the 104th US Division was about to execute divisional 
order number 6, stating that the main goal that day was the town of Rucphen which 
was to be captured by the Mountaineers (414th Regiment).1439 As they were getting 
ready to execute the order a call came from I Corps ordering the Americans to head 
for Breda instead. It seems probable that Crocker was hedging his bets since both 
the Poles and the Americans were closing in on the town on the 28th. It was a race 
between the 104th US and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions about who would seize the 
historical town of  Breda. The Poles faced the 711. Infanterie-Division and opposite 
the Americans was the 245. Infanterie-Division.1440 The Mountaineers received this 
mission at nine a.m. and two hours later moved out of Zundert. Small groups of 
German infantry surrendered and the advance proceeded at a leisurely pace and for 
a moment it looked as if the Americans would enter the historic town first. Then, at 
five p.m., Crocker changed his mind again. The Mountaineers were to go as far as 
Rijsbergen, but then swing north and head for the river Mark, their original 
destination. Following this new Corps directive the other two regiments of the 
Timberwolves began their advance in a north-westerly direction. They continued 
throughout the night and by dawn the following morning were just south of the 
Breda-Roosendaal main road. The Poles had won the race for Breda, but they were 
not there yet. 
 
After the spectacular operation the previous day hopes were high, but Maczek’s men 
soon discovered that they had now hit the outer crust of the main German line of 
defence and, inevitably, the advance slowed down.1441 Because the main road to 
Breda was bordered by woods, Maczek decided to launch the main attack south of 
there, the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade leading the way while the 3rd Polish 
Infantry Brigade followed further south. To the left of the Poles the Sherman tanks of 
the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade rumbled towards Ulvenhout, plugging the gap 
with the Americans. The advance went well and Bavel was captured, but the infantry 
got into trouble when they reached IJpelaar on the outskirts of Breda. There a 
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1439 This section, Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 70-3, Didden and Swarts, Einddoel Maas, 187-
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1440 First Cdn Army, IS 120, 28.10.44. 
1441 This section, Operational Report Polish 1st Armd Div, 41-2, and Didden and Swarts, Einddoel 
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seminary was established in a complex of buildings which not only offered good 
cover for the German defenders, II./Grenadier-Regiment 731 (711. I.D.), but also 
dominated the crossroads and surrounding park. Resistance was fierce and only 
ceased when Polish artillery set fire to the buildings. As darkness began to fall the 
Sherman tanks of the 24th Ułanow entered Dorst. Maczek decided to press his 
advantage. He ordered the battalion to continue another two kilometres at ten p.m., 
together with a squadron of 10 PSK, the Recce Regiment, and seize an important 
crossroads. The tankers reached their objective at three a.m. and dug in for the 
night, pounded by German artillery. The scene was set for the capture of Breda the 
following day. In view of the situation General Von Zangen’s order to LXVII. 
Armeekorps read: ‘schliesst durch Gegenangriff Front bei Roosendaal und wirft mit 
719.I.D. ostw. Breda eingebrochenene Feind ueber alte HKL nach S zurueck.1442  
Infantry versus infantry 
While the Poles stood poised in the early hours of 29 October to take Breda, in 
Bergen op Zoom the Canadians were still stuck, although the moment of truth had 
finally come here, too.1443 Major Stockloser, the CO of the Argylls, realizing that a 
crossing of the Zoom could only be made under cover of darkness, was fast running 
out of options. He ordered his men to give it one more try before dawn. While A 
Company once again tried the land route B Company would explore a frontal 
crossing. The CO of B Company, Major G. Armstrong, actually swam across the Zoom 
to investigate the situation – no mean feat since he had one arm in a cast. At three 
a.m. he reported back to Stockloser and asked for three recce boats. But the attempt 
to ferry his company across using assault boats was a wash-out as the boats were all 
punctured. Amazingly, the outflanking attack by A Company actually managed to get 
to the other side. Apparently their opponents, III./FJR 6, could not believe the 
Canadians would try the same route twice. At five a.m. B Company followed and 
soon after the Argylls were spotted and came under heavy fire from the 
Fallschirmjäger. Around the same time D Company managed to cross the Zoom near 
the bridge itself and three hours later all three companies were entering houses 
along the Halsterseweg, the only escape route for Hauptmann Von Hütz’  men. The 
fighting was extremely heavy and clearing the houses north of the Zoom took most 
of the day. However, by the end of the afternoon the Fallschirmjäger were pushed 
back far enough for the engineers of the 8th Field Company to blow up the concrete 
obstacle after two Churchill AVRE tanks firing 215 mm Petard shells failed to destroy 
it. Once the obstacle was finally out of the way the first Shermans of C Squadron the 
British Columbia Regiment crossed over, followed by infantry from the Algonquin 
Regiment. After occupying all the houses the infantry settled down for the night. 
 
The Lincs, meanwhile, were still trying to oust Leutnant Le Coutre’s 10. Kompanie 
from the factory buildings. To rescue Lambert and his men, still isolated inside one of 
the buildings, Lieutenant-Colonel Cromb ordered first C and then D Company to 
break through to them. The attack went in at eleven a.m. under cover of a smoke 
screen and soon all of D Company was across. Bitter fighting broke out, but from 
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then on there could only be one outcome. The Fallschirmjäger, exhausted though 
they were, undertook a last, desperate counterattack at 14:20 hours in a bid to drive 
the Canadians back. The attack was beaten off and the Fallschirmjäger pulled back. 
For holding out as long as he and his men did, thus allowing III./FJR 6 to fall back in 
good order, Le Coutre was recommended for the Ritterkreuz which was eventually 
awarded on 7 February 1945. The cost of crossing the Zoom had been high for the 
Canadians. The three Argyll companies that made it to the other side, numbered only 
125 men, barely one company and the Lincs had also suffered 38 casualties. 
Moreover, the battle for control of Bergen op Zoom was eventually not decided in the 
town itself, but further north where the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade had a 
pleasant surprise that day. 
 
After having cut the eastern escape route out of Bergen op Zoom the previous day, 
on 29 October Moncel’s brigade was ready for the decisive drive northward towards 
Steenbergen.1444 During the morning B Company The Lake Superiors captured Heerle 
against minor German resistance. The next objective was Moerstraten and 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Smith, the CO of The Governor General’s Foot Guards (21st 
CAR) ordered No.2 and 3 Squadrons to avoid the main road. This turned out to be a 
mistake. As the column set off, one Sherman was knocked out and the attack stalled 
while an artillery concentration was laid on a wood south of Moerstraten. The 
advance then continued, but the terrain was muddy and sticky in the extreme and 
soon ten tanks were bogged down. However, the remaining tanks plodded on and 
around noon Moerstraten was completely cleared of enemy troops, all of them from 
FJR 6. At two p.m. Moncel assigned the Foot Guards a new task. They were to turn 
west and cut the road Bergen op Zoom – Steenbergen, now the only way out for 
III./FJR 6. Using their binoculars the Canadians could see German vehicles still 
moving in and out of Bergen op Zoom. 
 
First to move off were No.2 Squadron and one platoon of B Company the Lake 
Superiors and once again the soil was the big enemy. Tanks and carriers began to 
bog down in large numbers and the advance ground to a halt at a point about one 
kilometre east of the road. As darkness fell the Shermans and the Lake Superiors 
firmed up for the night. Nevertheless, the Brigade diarist correctly concluded that 
‘this day’s ops broke the German resistance in this anchor of his def[ence] in 
BRABANT [capitals in original].’1445 The advance was indeed the straw that broke the 
camel’s back in Bergen op Zoom. Von Hütz’ men who were still in the northern 
outskirts of Bergen op Zoom were now threatened with encirclement.  Since their 
only line of withdrawal was about to be cut, there was no alternative for III./FJR 6 
but to give up Bergen op Zoom and, together with Sturmgeschützbrigade 667, pull 
back as far as Steenbergen. Once again Kampfgruppe Chill had accomplished its 
mission: to delay the enemy advance as long as possible. Even though they were 
now with their backs to the wall, the battle was not over yet. 
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And armour versus armour 
On 29 October Second TAF also offered some assistance to I Corps although the bulk 
of the sorties were still directed at Walcheren or spent on rail interdiction. 
Nevertheless  four sorties, two in the morning and two in the afternoon, covered the 
Roosendaal –Breda road in an effort to help the troops on the ground. Spitfires from 
131 and 132 Wings repeatedly strafed the road and knocked out seven vehicles.1446 
It was of little practical help to the 49th (West Riding) division which was to capture 
Roosendaal, the town it had been closing in on for the last two days.1447 The plan 
that day was for A and C Squadrons 9th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) to join the 
Hallams in a move on the adjoining villages of Boeink and Vinkenbroek, preparatory 
to the attack on Roosendaal itself The Boeink area was defended by the reserve unit 
of LXVII. Armeekorps, Grenadier-Regiment 937 (245, I.D.) whose two battalions had 
now been merged into one due to losses and were assigned to the 346. Infanterie-
Division.1448 They were backed by Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 (and possibly 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 667).1449 The advance of the combat groups would be in two 
stages. First C Squadron 9th RTR and A Company Hallams set off at noon and half 
an hour later were in Vinkenbroek although four Churchill tanks became bogged 
down and two had been knocked out by a Sturmgeschütz. The Squadron leader, 
Major R. Holden, was seriously wounded. The infantry collected about forty 
Grenadiere.  
 
At 12.48 hours the second stage began when A Squadron 9th RTR and B Company 
Hallams left the start line a hundred metres further west. Again the objective, 
Boeink, was soon reached and the infantry began mopping up. But again Jaschke’s 
Sturmgeschütze began to inflict losses on the accompanying tanks. In just fifteen 
minutes A Squadron lost eight of its eleven Churchills for the loss of one German SP. 
Even worse, the 9th RTR suffered twenty-five casualties, nine of them fatal. Even the 
‘super heavy tanks’ were not invulnerable it seemed. In this ‘tank battle’ the Germans 
had come out victorious, partly because of their experienced crews, partly because of 
the open terrain. The Sturmgeschütze had taken up position to the left (north) of the 
attacking force and were therefore ideally situated for flanking shots where the 
armour of the Churchills was thinnest. Also, once again, tank-infantry cooperation 
was far from ideal and the Churchills felt that their ability to manoeuvre was 
constricted because they had been ordered to stay close to the infantry. To Major-
General Barker it must have seemed as if the Germans in Roosendaal would hold out 
forever, but then he received some good news. At 15.45 hours the 1st Leicesters 
launched an attack across the anti-tank ditch using the miniature bridgehead the 7th 
Duke of Wellington Regiment (DWR) had made the previous day. This time the 
attack was successful and together with B Squadron 9th RTR the Leicesters pushed 
back II./FJR 6 and I./GR 937 and expanded the bridgehead until it was half a 
kilometre deep. Brigadier H. Wood (147th Brigade) held an O group at seven p.m. 
                                        
1446 Second TAF, Daily Log, 29.10.44. In the morning twelve Spitfires were from 317 Sqd and two 
from 302 Sqd were engaged. In the afternoon twelve from 302 and twelve from 332 were involved. 
1447 This section War Diaries 49th WR Div,  9th RTR, Hallams. 
1448 49th WR Div, IS 72, 29.10.44 and Von Hobe, 46. 
1449 Soldbuch Gefr. Bormann (private collection) and War Diary 9th RTR, 29.10.44. 
 302 
He decided to order a night attack. The 7th DWR was told to advance into 
Roosendaal. H hour was set for three a.m. 
Right wing 
Next to the capture of all of Bergen op Zoom another pleasant surprise for Crocker’s 
I Corps on 29 October was the capture of Breda by the Polish 1st Armoured 
Division.1450 The loss of Dorst and the crossroads two kilometres west the previous 
evening had caused quite a stir at the headquarters of the 711. Infanterie-Division in 
Teteringen. Generalleutnant Reichert was afraid that his troops in Breda would be 
cut off and he ordered Grenadier-Regiment 744 (Oberst Jobst Von Bose) to drive the 
Poles out of the village. The counterattack took place at nine a.m. Since all of their 
attention was focused on Breda the Polish troops in Dorst were taken by surprise and 
the village was soon back in German hands. But that was the extent of the German 
success that day. Maczek immediately ordered a counterattack and Dorst was 
recaptured by No.3 Squadron 24th Ułanow in the course of the afternoon. In the 
meantime all three battalions of the 3rd Polish Infantry Brigade entered Breda. They 
fanned out towards the city centre seizing street after street. The going was slow, 
but gradually German infantry, few in numbers to begin with, began to pull back 
northward in the direction of the railway station and as night fell most of the city was 
in Polish hands.  
 
To the left of the Poles the Americans also pushed on during 29 October.1451As day 
broke the Old Faithfuls (415th Regiment) were on their objective, the Roosendaal – 
Breda road. To their right the Mountaineers (414th Regiment), coming up from 
Rijsbergen, were supposed to join them. However, their advance got stuck along the 
Turfvaart canal, four kilometres south of the road. There Grenadier-Regiment 936 
(245. I.D.) had set up a strong defensive position supported by the bulk of the 
divisional artillery further north. Even the Churchill tanks of C Squadron 147th RAC 
were unable to break the deadlock until artillery barrages pounded the German 
defences for so long that the blocking position slowly began to disintegrate. At six 
p.m. the 3rd Battalion crossed the canal, soon followed by the other two. Shortly 
after dark the Mountaineers seized the twin villages of Etten and Leur straddling the 
Roosendaal – Breda road and the two American regiments were once more abreast. 
  
At the end of Sunday 29 October the Allies had captured Breda, Roosendaal was 
about to fall and Bergen op Zoom was slowly being encircled.  In view of the rapidly 
deteriorating situation Von Zangen ordered a general withdrawal to Stellung III in an 
attempt for the two constituent Corps of 15. Armee to maintain contact.1452 For 
Reinhard’s Corps the new main line of defence was north of the river Maas, for 
Sponheimer’s LXVII. Armeekorps it ran behind the river Mark (and Dintel as the 
western part is known).1453 This was to be the new main line of defence, except for 
two strong points south of there, in Steenbergen and in Stampersgat (the latter to 
cover the first). The reason for these was that Student, the new Heeresgruppe 
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Oberbefehlshaber, wanted to delay the Allied advance for as long as possible. He 
needed the time to pull back Kampfgruppe Chill in good order as he seriously 
considered sending it to Schouwen-Duiveland to defend that island.1454 However, 
before FJR 6 could be transferred to Walcheren the Allies had landed there and the 
move became futile. The Fallschirmjäger were spared a pointless battle although one 
cannot help wondering how the fighting for Walcheren would have gone with them 
there to bolster the defences of 70. I.D. Von Zangen’s order for the two Korps to 
maintain contact came too late and, as mentioned earlier, the following day 15. 
Armee would be split up after all.  
 
In view of the new order to pull back behind Stellung III, all four divisions during the 
night began the retreat. Farthest east, the 711. Infanterie-Division (Reichert) was 
nearly too late. As it began to fall back from the northern edge of Breda towards the 
river Mark, Sherman tanks of the Polish 1st Armoured Regiment tried to follow them. 
Oberst Von Limburg-Hetlingen , the Kommandeur of Grenadier-Regiment 731, 
alerted two 8.8 cm Flak guns which were also about to relocate. Two tanks were hit 
and the division pulled back in good order except for III./G.R. 731 south of Breda 
with which all contact had been lost the previous day and which was now presumed 
lost and possibly captured.1455 To Reichert’s relief the missing battalion showed up 
early the following morning. It had indeed been virtually surrounded, but escaped 
during the night by moving around the western outskirts of Breda and slowly 
crawling their way north through the Polish outposts. 
Following up 
On Monday 30 October most of LXVII. Armeekorps had pulled back behind the 
security of the river Mark leaving I Corps room to clear the area south of there. The 
same day the Kommandierende General, General Otto Sponheimer, left to undergo 
surgery in Germany as he was suffering from infected gums and cheeks, complicated 
by heart trouble.1456 He was replaced by General Karl Püchler, who knew the staff 
since he had also commanded the Korps for two days at the end of July.1457 Von 
Zangen and Student had every confidence in Püchler whom they described as a ‘Sehr 
active und zielbewusste Persönlichkeit mit klarem Beurteilungsvermögen. (…) 
Besonders hervorzuheben sind seine Zuversicht auch in schwersten Lagen und die 
Fähigkeit, dies auf die Truppe zu übertragen.’ 1458 The new Korps headquarters were 
located in Dordrecht. The general withdrawal was followed closely by Allied troops, 
even though air support was again very limited.1459 In fact only two Spitfire 
squadrons, 331 and 308, attacked targets far behind the front line in the Moerdijk 
bridge area.1460 South of there, after the race for Breda two days earlier, a new race 
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developed between the Polish 1st Armoured and the US 104th Divisions. The 
question was, who would cross the river Mark first?  
 
The Poles marched northward along two different routes and the more spectacular 
was the advance by the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade. The tanks used a new road, 
still partly under construction, running from Breda all the way to Rotterdam via 
Moerdijk. Around noon Prinsenbeek was liberated and about the same time the first 
Cromwells of 10 Pułk Strzelców Konnych (PSK) arrived on the banks of the river Mark 
at Nieuwe Veer.1461 The road bridge had been blown up, of course. Around the same 
time the Americans reached the river, further west. The 415th Regiment during the 
afternoon had entered Oudenbosch from two sides. They were cheered by the 
population and then moved on. At seven p.m. the 3rd Battalion reached the river 
opposite the village of Standdaarbuiten. Amazingly the bridge there was still intact. 
Confusion could be observed on the other side as Germans were shouting and 
running about. Seconds later the bridge blew up, just as Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. 
Kelleher’s men were about to cross it. But the Timberwolves were not about to give 
up yet. 
 
That same day the 49th (West Riding) Division found Roosendaal which had proved 
such a tough nut to crack before, now more like a ripe plumb which easily fell into 
their hands. The 7th DWR reported the city clear of enemy at six a.m., a mere three 
hours after they had launched their advance. Soon more battalions entered 
Roosendaal. Patrols from the 49th Recce and the 1/4th KOYLI reached Kruisland and 
Oud-Gastel respectively, the 2nd Gloucesters followed up, ready to move on. But 
that was as far as they could go, because northwest of Oud-Gastel they suddenly 
faced one of the two German rearguard positions south of the Mark. The defence of 
the village of Stampersgat, where about a hundred men with two Pak, a few mortars 
and a dozen machine-guns plus one Sturmgeschütz had taken up position, was 
typical for this kind of position.1462 The infantry were mainly from II./Grenadier-
Regiment 743 although they were reinforced by Pohl’s men (Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz 
und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring). To their right the Canadians had 
stumbled on the other blocking position, in Steenbergen, this one occupied by 
III./Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 and Sturmgeschützbrigade 667.  Stampersgat was 
vital for Kampfgruppe Chill in Steenbergen as the village held the key to the land 
bridge between the Dintel and the Steenbergsche Vliet. Losing Stampersgat meant 
that the Allies would cut off the troops in and around Steenbergen. This was the 
reason for the prolonged battles in this corner of Brabant. It also explains why the 
4th Canadian Armoured Division was the least fortunate of all Crocker’s divisions on 
30 October. 
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Following Chill  
During the night the tanks of the Foot Guards had struggled through the mud 
towards the Bergen op Zoom-Steenbergen road until they could not go on.1463 At a 
point about a kilometre from there they laagered for the night. The advance was 
resumed at first light and No.1 Squadron took over the baton. Now they found their 
way barred by a canal, Het Bergsewater.  However, at 10.35 hours they found a way 
around the northern end and slowly two troops of Shermans and one platoon of 
motorized infantry continued to edge their way westward.1464 Finally, at 12:30 hours, 
the group reported that they had reached the road at a point near Klutsdorp, only a 
few hundred metres north of the original objective.1465 The column turned south and, 
finally on terra firma, raced to Oudemolen where, within the hour, they made contact 
with patrols of the Algonquins who had come up from Bergen op Zoom.1466 The trap 
on the defenders of Bergen op Zoom had been closed, but it was clear that the 
pigeon –III./FJR 6- had flown the coop. The question was, where to? The Canadians 
were to find out the same afternoon. While the Foot Guards were concentrating in 
Oudemolen No.3 Squadron of the Canadian Grenadier Guards (22nd CAR) and C 
Company of the Lake Superiors set off for Steenbergen along the road from 
Moerstraten. The advance soon encountered the first obstacle, a culvert which had 
been blown. This was quickly overcome, but then, at two p.m., the column arrived at 
a bridge which had also been destroyed. The canal was only a minor one, 
nevertheless the gap was about three metres, just too big for a Sherman to cross. It 
was clear that the infantry would have to establish a bridgehead before anything else 
could be done. Assault boats would have to be brought up and so the group settled 
down waiting for the equipment to arrive.  
 
Meanwhile No.1 Squadron of the Foot Guards, still accompanied by B Company the 
Lake Superiors, also drove north to Steenbergen. They set off from Oudemolen and 
took the road from Bergen op Zoom. The drive went fine until they hit a blown 
bridge over the Ligne river at five p.m. As the lead tanks closed in on the bridge two 
of the Shermans were knocked out by mines. Then two Pak guns, an 8.8 cm 
northwest of Steenbergen and a 7.5 cm Pak near the Cornelius church in Welberg, 
opened fire and destroyed two more tanks. Soon another Sherman and a carrier ran 
on mines. At the same time No.7 and 8 Platoons of the Lake Superiors crossed, 
wading through the water. German guns zeroed in on them and it was instant chaos. 
Eventually the Shermans pulled back to Oudemolen. The only option for the 
Canadians was to admit defeat and pull the infantry back south of the river. The 
column to their right had been more successful. At one a.m. the infantry crossed, 
covered by tanks, and soon the first engineers arrived to start building a bridge. The 
Lake Superiors advanced another four hundred metres and dug in, waiting for what 
daylight would bring. It was now perfectly clear to the Canadians where 
Kampfgruppe Chill had dug in. Elsewhere along the front of I Corps the night had 
been equally restless and with equally mixed results. 
 
                                        
1463 This section, War Diaries 4th Cdn Armd Bde, 21st and 22nd CAR, and Lake Superiors. 
1464 4th Cdn Armd Div, G Log, 30.10.44, Serial 73. 
1465 Ibid, Serial 78. 
1466 Ibid, Serial 87. 
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One crossing 
After hearing that the bridge had been blown, Major-General Allen, the CO of the 
104th US Infantry Division, ordered his 415th Regiment to force a crossing of the 
river Mark before dawn on 31 October.1467 The task to cross at a point about two 
kilometres east of Standdaarbuiten fell to the 1st Battalion under Major F. Needham. 
At 06:30 hours B Company crossed in assault boats, under withering machine-gun 
fire. But the crossing succeeded and soon they were joined by A and C Companies. 
Around nine a.m. most of Needham’s battalion was across. But the infantry were on 
their own. Because a persistent and heavy mist limited visibility the American 
mortars and artillery could offer little support. German observers, on the other hand, 
closer to the actual line, brought down accurate fire and soon II./Grenadier-
Regiment 857 (346. I.D.) and remnants of I./Grenadier-Regiment 723 (719. I.D.) 
slowly squeezed the tiny bridgehead from three directions while Sturmgeschütze 
from Jaschke’s Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 covered them.1468 Early in the afternoon 
the Americans noticed that they also received fire from their rear.  
 
Things quickly began to get worse from then on and at four p.m. Sturmgeschütze 
surrounded the battalion, firing into individual foxholes. American artillery tried to 
help out and the regimental headquarters of Grenadier-Regiment 857 in Noordhoek 
were hit. One of the highest ranking victims was the Kommandeur of 346. I.D., 
Generalleutnant Walter Steinmüller who suffered a concussion and had to relinquish 
command to Oberst Neumann for the next week.1469 The ‘Old Faithfuls’ put up a 
brave fight, but it was only a matter of time before they would be overrun. 
Lieutenant-General Crocker (I Corps) directed the battalion to pull back. But that was 
easier said than done since the way back was cut off. Lieutenant William C. Tufts (C 
Company) led a group of men forward with anti-tank weapons. They managed to 
knock out at least one Sturmgeschütz .1470 The action by Tufts’ groups opened a 
wedge in the German encirclement, allowing most of the battalion to withdraw south 
of the river, most, but not all. Two days later, when the Americans returned to the 
other side of the river, they discovered that sixty-five of their comrades had stayed 
behind, hiding from the Germans and sustaining themselves with sugar beets and 
turnips after their K-rations had run out. At Nieuwe Veer, the 1st Polish Armoured 
Division had also crossed the Mark in darkness. 
And another  
Since the Cromwell tanks of 10 Pułk Strzelców Konnych (PSK) could not cross the 
river in view of the destroyed bridge, infantry was called forward.1471 At seven p.m. 
on 30 October the 8th Rifle Battalion began to arrive at the site of the blown road 
bridge. They immediately came under heavy artillery and mortar fire. Crawling 
forward the Poles explored the site. Even in darkness German soldiers could be seen. 
As the main road was next to the divisional boundary (always a weak spot) between 
                                        
1467 This section, Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 77-80. 
1468 First Cdn Army, IS 123, 31.10.44 and I Corps IS 93, 01.11.44. 
1469 Rehm, 77-8. 
1470 From Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 since we know that Oberleutnant Heinrich Specht who 
commanded 3. Batterie was wounded that day. Van Doorn, Operatie Rebound, bevrijding van de 
Westhoek, Willemstad 1994, 27. 
1471 This section, Operational Report Polish 1st Armd Div, 42, Jamar, With the tanks, 34-5. 
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the 245. I.D. and the 711. I.D. the Poles stood a fair chance of once more punching 
a hole in the German line. Still, the sector west of the bridge and the bridge itself 
were the sole responsibility of Grenadier-Regiment 935 (245. I.D.). Assault boats 
were brought forward while Polish combat engineers studied the canal. They decided 
a bridge could be built at the old ferry site. But first the infantry would have to 
establish a bridgehead there. Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksander Nowaczynski, the CO of 
the 8th Rifle Battalion, ordered No.1 Company to cross first. As soon as dawn broke 
on 31 October Captain Nitka’s company rowed across.1472 Even though dense fog 
covered their approach, the Cromwells of 10 PSK fired incessantly to force the 
Germans to keep their heads down. The Grenadiere were surprised and driven from 
their positions. During the morning No.2 Company crossed the canal soon the Poles 
had a bridgehead. The Germans responded by raining down a hail of shells and 
further crossings became impossible. But Nitka’s men crawled forward and during the 
afternoon had gone forward about one-and-a-half kilometre.1473  
 
Sander became increasingly nervous and he ordered a counterattack which went in 
at six p.m. Grenadiere supported by six Sturmgeschütze, probably from 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 280, tried to crush the Poles.1474 Having no anti-tank weapons 
the Polish infantry was pushed back.1475 The vehement German response is 
understandable. From the Polish bridgehead it was a mere eight kilometres to the 
key road bridge at Moerdijk. A determined Polish attack could easily get there in one 
day and deprive the divisions of LXVII. Armeekorps of the only land link to the north, 
in addition to splitting the Korps sector in two. For the moment the danger was 
averted and the Polish bridgehead was compressed to one kilometre by five hundred 
metres. The German counterattack also meant that No.3 and 4 Companies were 
unable to cross until after midnight. Command over the bridgehead was assigned to 
Nowaczynski’s second-in-command, Captain Gryziecki. Building a bridge and getting 
tanks across would have to wait until the next day, 1 November. 
Fallschirmjäger hold out (once more) 
Meanwhile further west Major-General Harry Foster was unhappy with the fact that 
the advance on Steenbergen seemed to have lost its momentum on 31 October.1476 
Again this was due to Kampfgruppe Chill who would fight its last battle on Dutch soil 
there. One more time it managed to stall the Allied advance to a considerable 
degree, this time with only two battalions. The sector south of the town and west of 
the village of Welberg was defended by Hauptmann Von Hütz’ III./FJR 6 (I. and IV. 
had already pulled back further north to Dinteloord and Willemstad respectively), the 
                                        
1472 I Corps, G Log, 31.10.44, Serial 595. 
1473 4 AGRA, Signal Log, 31.10.44, Serial 546. 
1474 So far it has not been possible to positively identify the parent unit of the German SPs, but it 
seems highly probable that they were from Sturmgeschützbrigade 280, since 244 was still near 
Standdaarbuiten and 667 was in Steenbergen. Moreover, 280 had just received five Sturmhaubitze 
42G to make up for the losses (Klages). Also it is known to have been in Den Hout, three kilometres 
from Wagenberg, only three days later, plus 280 had some DoW’s in Dordrecht (PAJVD). 
1475 Operational Report, 42. 
1476 This section, War Diaries 4th Cdn Arm Bde, 21st and 22nd CAR, Lake Superiors and Algonquins. 
For details, Robert W. Catsburg, Vijf dagen in November, De bevrijding van Welberg en Steenbergen 
in de tweede wereldoorlog, Steenbergen 2009, 28-45. 
 308 
sector around Welberg itself was covered by I./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und 
Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring (Bataillon Pohl).1477 The infantry were 
supported by six or seven Sturmgeschütze from Major Knüpling’s 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 667 who would play a key role in the forthcoming battle.1478 
Their first action was to disrupt the construction of a bridge over the Bergsewater 
south of Welberg. An attempt to use the other, more westerly approach, the road 
from Bergen op Zoom, failed that day, because it was too close to the German lines 
for a bridge to be built there. Therefore, the attack on Steenbergen would have to 
come from the direction of Moerstraten. Early in the morning, as the fog lifted, two 
Sturmgeschütze rolled down the road to Moerstraten and fired random shots at the 
engineers. But the 8th Field Squadron was not so easily deterred. Major Allen, the 
CO, called for volunteers and at 10:17 hours the bridge was completed. Within ten 
minutes the first group of tanks of No.3 Squadron the Canadian Grenadier Guards 
(22nd CAR) crossed it and then headed towards Steenbergen. This advance covered 
about a kilometre before it ground to a halt, mainly because of mines. When a patrol 
from the Lake Superiors discovered a tank wall further up the road it was clear that 
the armour would not be able to get through. Brigadier Moncel –under pressure from 
Foster- decided to order a night attack by infantry, i.e. the Algonquins who had been 
assigned to his brigade for the moment. 
  
The Algonquins were temporarily commanded by Major L.C. Monk, as Lieutenant-
Colonel Bradburn was on a forty-eight hour leave. His plan was for B and D 
Companies to advance straight up the road to Steenbergen while A and C Companies 
secured Welberg as that was slightly elevated ground. The companies assembled at 
the start line around eight p.m. and an hour later the attack went in. The advance on 
the left met with stiff resistance right away, but the Algonquins kept on pushing 
ahead and towards morning they had reached a crossroads about level with 
Welberg. Just before dawn on 1 November the two companies were instructed to 
halt until it was clear how the right flank was doing. There, things had gone horribly 
wrong. The attack had started off alright, a dozen Germans were captured and fairly 
soon A Company reached Welberg which it reported clear of enemy. It was three 
a.m. Then C Company began to deploy into Welberg itself. Suddenly the German 
defenders reasserted themselves and at five a.m. a counterattack began by Bataillon 
Pohl, supported by two Sturmgeschütze. It was beaten off because infantry and SPs 
became separated. But Pohl’s men regrouped for another, more determined, 
attempt. This went in at eight a.m. and the result was mayhem for the Canadians. 
Soon the Algonquins had to pull back. Some platoons became isolated and trapped 
because the enemy covered the only road to safety, the bridge across the 
Boomvaart. All in all twenty-seven Algonquins were taken prisoner including the CO 
of C Company, Major Keith Stirling. As fog once more began to cover the fields the 
Algonquins assembled around the original start-line to await further orders. Von 
Zangen was happy for the moment and he sent Püchler a cable, saying that LXVII. 
Armeekorps ‘stellte Lage suedl. Steenbergen und an Bahn Breda-Dordrecht trotz 
staerkstem Artl.-Feuer im Gegenangriff wieder her. Ich spreche den Korps meine 
                                        
1477 Catsburg, Vijf dagen in November, 3. This disposition suggests that the rest of Kampfgruppe 
Dreyer was north and east of Welberg. 
1478 Catsburg, Vijf dagen in November, 13-4. 
 309 
Anerkennung aus.’1479 He was right to be content, after all, delaying the Allied 
offensive had been the aim all the time. 
Allied plan 
On Wednesdag 1 November 15. Armee finally pulled back behind the river Maas 
except for two bridgeheads. The smaller one, west of ‘s-Hertogenbosch behind the 
Afwateringskanaal, was defended by the 59. Infanterie Division. For the moment it 
was left in peace as the 51st (Highland) Division prepared for its first canal crossing 
to drive the Germans out of it later in the week. The bigger one, behind the Dintel 
and Mark, with outposts at Steenbergen and Stampersgat, still held the bulk of 
LXVII. Armeekorps. The main reason for the existence of these bridgeheads was that 
the mission of the new Heeresgruppe H, led by Generaloberst Student, was 
‘nachhaltende Verteidigung’ north of the major rivers.1480 In other words Student’s 
units would maintain bridgeheads in order to tie as many Allied troops for as long as 
possible. Of the three bridgeheads envisaged, Arnhem and Venlo had proved most 
useful so far. The question for the Allies was how best to deal with it quickly before 
that, too, solidified and became too strong. That afternoon Lieutenant-General John 
Crocker, in command of I Corps, held a conference with three of his divisional 
commanders at his forward headquarters in Roosendaal.1481 He informed Major-
General Allen (104th US), Major-General Barker (49th West Riding) and Major-
General Maczek (1st Polish Armoured) of his plans. At nine p.m. the following day I 
Corps was to make the decisive drive as far as the Hollands Diep (the mouth of the 
river Maas). While Allen’s men were to make the main attack at Standdaarbuiten, the 
49th was to cover this by crossing to their left. The Poles were still heavily engaged 
at Nieuwe Veer and the outcome of the battle there was far from certain. Until that 
was clear the final decision regarding the Polish division would be on hold. During 
the struggle for the Mark bridgehead schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 
would be engaged in battle south of the river Maas for the last time. 
Second Polish attempt 
During the early hours of 1 November the Polish engineers at Nieuwe Veer had 
decided to put together a pontoon as German harassing fire made it impossible to 
construct a Bailey bridge.1482 The engineers decided to build a raft instead. Just 
before four a.m. the raft was ready.1483 First No.1 Squadron of 2 Pułk Pancerny (2 
PAR) under 2nd Lieutenant Wiatrowski crossed, followed by two M-10 Achilles Tank 
Destroyers of the 8th Battery 1st Polish Anti-Tank Regiment under Sergeant 
Franczak.1484 By seven a.m. the armour was in position, just as it was getting light, 
                                        
1479 KTB 88 AK, 02.11.44, C 309. 
1480 Report after interrogation German officers 1947 (NINMH 567/27). 
1481 Meeting described in Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, 80. We may safely assume that Harry 
Foster (4th Cdn Armd Div) was not invited since his division was heavily involved at Steenbergen and 
was still many kilometres away from the Dintel-Mark river line. 
1482 This section, Operational Report, 42, War Diary 2 PAR 31.10-02.11.44 and Jamar, With the tanks, 
252-7. 
1483 Jamar gives ‘four o’clock’, the War Diary gives 03:40 hours. 
1484 All sources agree that two M-10s were ferried across, but there is confusion as to the number of 
Shermans put across, Jamar gives eight, the Operational Report gives ten (possibly eight Shermans 
plus two M -10’s), the War Diary of 2 PAR gives seven and I Corps G Log gives ten (01.11.44, Serial 
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trying desperately to avoid the sticky mud on either side of the roads. At 08:30 hours 
the infantry and tanks attacked, hoping to expand the bridgehead enough to allow a 
bridge to be built. The arrival of the tanks did make a change and initially the attack 
met with some success and some forty Germans were taken prisoner. Then one 
Sherman got stuck and was knocked out by a Sturmgeschütz (Sturmgeschützbrigade 
280). It was a sign of things to come. Early in the afternoon the CO of the 3rd Polish 
Infantry Brigade, Colonel Franciszek Skibiński, conferred with his subordinate 
commanders. He was sorely tempted to send more troops across to force the issue, 
but decided to wait and see how things would develop. Soon it became clear that 
they were not going too well. The main attack took place west of the road and 
railway line, but the more the Poles pushed, the more the Germans resisted. The 
problem was that the Polish armour was confined to the roads which greatly helped 
the German defence. Polish tank losses began to increase and one Sherman after 
another was destroyed by anti-tank guns or Sturmgeschütze. In the midst of this 
fray, Kopka and his small band from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 
appeared on the scene. 
 
The general withdrawal of 15. Armee north of the rivers on 1 November meant that 
all the heavy equipment, communications and staff were moved out of the combat 
zone. This order also affected schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559. As related 
above, 559 had crossed the river Maas using the Capelse Veer ferry and the bridge 
at Keizersveer and was now concentrated south of Utrecht. That is, all of the 
Abteilung except for a small detachment that had been left behind. The two 
Jagdpanther whose firing equipment had broken down were still south of the Maas, 
in Geertruidenberg. The group was commanded by Oberleutnant Franz Kopka. This 
group stayed in Geertruidenberg until 1 November when they were also directed to 
go north of the river. The Polish bridgehead at Nieuwe Veer threatened Moerdijk 
bridge, the only way out for these heavy vehicles. Kopka received orders from 15. 
Armee to proceed first to Dordrecht and thence to Utrecht. The small column of 
vehicles set off from Geertruidenberg during the morning, drove through Made and 
arrived in the next village, Wagenberg, around noon. The German vehicles parked 
for a brief halt. At about three p.m. the group fired off their engines and proceeded 
in a westerly direction.1485 It was now just twelve kilometres to Moerdijk bridge. 
Kopka in his captured Dingo scout car took point, followed by the two Jagdpanther 
and the two halftracks while the Schwimmwagen brought up the rear. After about 
two kilometres the column approached a bend in the road.1486 Turning right (north) 
there Kopka suddenly saw Polish tanks in the distance. Suddenly the second 
Jagdpanther was hit in left hand sprocket. It came to a sudden stop. The crew 
jumped out and hopped on to the halftracks following them. It was the end of the 
involvement of 559 south of the river Maas. 
End of a bridgehead 
Meanwhile the fighting for the Polish bridgehead at Nieuwe Veer was about to reach 
a critical point. From attackers the Poles had turned into defenders and increasingly 
had to call on artillery to help them out. Just before six p.m. the most serious of all 
                                        
1485 De Bevrijding van Terheijden, 1980, 21. 
1486 This section, Kopka, Missbraucht und Gebeutelt, 167-8 and 334-5. 
 311 
German counterattacks began, from the very point where the Jagdpanther had been 
knocked out two hours earlier.1487 Infantry supported by Sturmgeschütze closed in 
on the Polish positions. In sheer desperation Captain Gryziecki called ‘Hullo Orchid X’. 
This was the sign that all the available artillery was to fire on their own line. A 
hurricane of fire rained down and the German attack was broken up. The German 
infantry (from Grenadier-Regiment 935 as well as the Korps reserve, Grenadier-
Regiment 723) suffered heavy losses. But the Sturmgeschütze kept firing and one by 
one the remaining four operational Shermans were knocked out. At the same time 
the decision was made to abandon the bridgehead.1488 A despatch rider was sent to 
Captain Gryziecki who grimly accepted the order. The infantry would cross first, the 
two M-10s last. Once again things went wrong. At nine p.m. the first Achilles crossed 
the Mark when one of the pontoons was hit, sinking the raft. The other M-10 had to 
be abandoned. The following morning the last Polish soldiers left the bridgehead. 
The successful German defence had won LXVII. Armeekorps a temporary reprieve, 
the operative word being temporary. Already Maczek’s division stood poised a few 
kilometres east for the second attempt to cross the river. Meanwhile Kampfgruppe 
Chill in their outpost at Steenbergen, were still engaged in battle. For the umpteenth 
time they would slug it out with units of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division.  
Welberg again 
On 2 November the second attempt by the Canadians to take Steenbergen during 
the night was set to begin.1489 This time the Lincoln and Wellands on the left were to 
head towards Steenbergen along the road from Moerstraten, using the same starting 
point as the Algonquins two days earlier. The Algonquins themselves, meanwhile, on 
the right would try to get into Welberg through ‘the back door’ and sweep into village 
from the less strongly defended southeast. To deal with the threat from 
Sturmgeschütze, like the Poles at Nieuwe Veer, the Canadian infantry was followed 
by M-10 Achilles tank destroyers of the 5th Anti-tank Regiment RCA. To underline the 
importance of the operation the attack was preceded by an intense air raid that was 
observed by both the divisional commander, Major-General Foster, and Brigadier 
Jefferson. Now that the operations against Walcheren had almost run their course 
(Flushing was captured on 1 November, Middelburg four days later), the Royal Air 
Force for once showed up in force again.1490 Throughout the afternoon Welberg and 
surroundings were subjected to air attacks by no fewer than fifty-four Typhoons from 
five squadrons in 146 Wing. While 193, 257 and 263 Squadrons dropped sixty 500-
pounders, 266 and 609 Squadrons fired 126 rocket projectiles on to suspected 
positions.1491 The attacks were devastating and a large number of houses in Welberg 
were reduced to rubble and set alight. Elsewhere on I Corps front, particularly north 
of the river Mark, Typhoons and Spitfires from 84 Group also strafed and bombed 
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positions in preparation for the coming offensive across the Mark. The air raids were 
followed by an intense artillery barrage on Welberg. It was seven p.m. Dusk fell and 
the attack on Steenbergen began.  
 
After an hour the Lincs reached their first objective, west of Welberg, and began to 
dig in. Soon after, a lone Sturmgeschütz began to fire at point-blank range at the 
trenches pestering the Lincs throughout the night. It was not until the following 
morning that two M-10s of  K Troop were able to destroy the German SP. The 
advance of the Algonquins met with mixed success from the very start. A and B 
Companies heading straight for Welberg (via Bocht) ran into serious trouble almost 
from the very start coming under small-arms fire and of course the omni-present SPs 
of Sturmgeschützbrigade 667. Of the four M-10s following A Company, one got stuck 
in the mud while two were knocked out by a Sturmgeschütz. B Company was equally 
unsuccessful and around midnight both companies had pulled back to their starting 
points. At dawn they made a second attempt which also failed. The only positive 
thing was that this effort diverted attention away from D Company which during the 
night had been executing the right hook which carried it into Welberg. Lieutenant-
Colonel R.A. Bradburn, the CO of the Algonquins, decided to reinforce the success by 
sending C Company on a parallel course and by reinforcing D Company with armour, 
both M-10s of C Troop 5th Anti-Tank Regiment RCA and Shermans of C Squadron 
The South Albertas (29th RAC). The M-10 Achilles arrived just before first light on 3 
November, the Shermans soon after. The link-up took time as all the armoured 
vehicles were confined to the few roads that were passable. 
 
The leading platoons now turned west into the village, but their progress was halted 
around seven a.m. by a counterattack. The Fallschirmjäger of I./Fallschirm Panzer 
Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring (Bataillon Pohl) were supported 
by one Sturmgeschütz and a ‘tank’.1492 The Germans threatened to drive a wedge 
between D and C Companies and the Algonquins had to run for cover. Sergeant 
Honey, commanding one of the M-10s in C Troop tried to manoeuvre into a position 
to deal with the German armour. However, his Achilles got stuck and he had to 
dismount. He then spotted a ‘tank’ right ahead of his SP, behind a wooden barn. He 
ran back to his M-10 and within seconds a seventeen-pounder shell smashed straight 
through the barn hitting the Sturmgeschütz . As it began to burn the SP headed back 
to Steenbergen followed by the Fallschirmjäger. The Sturmgeschütz  then took its 
revenge as it fired back and hit Honey’s Achilles, killing the Sergeant. Still, Honey’s 
brave action was the turning point in the battle for Welberg. Slowly the Algonquins 
moved west. But the Germans kept resisting and at ten a.m. two more M-10s were 
knocked out.  
 
However, by noon the village was finally cleared and from then on progress was slow 
but steady. At the end of the afternoon contact was made with the Lincs coming up 
from the west. The Canadians were ready for the next stage, the attack on 
Steenbergen itself. Instead of trying to dislodge the Canadians from Welberg as they 
had done before, Kampfgruppe Chill  now began to pound the Canadian positions 
                                        
1492 Alternately reported as a Tiger (War Diary 4th Cdn Arm Div), which can be rejected out of hand as 
nonsense. The ‘tank’ could conceivably be an older type of Sturmgeschütz or a Sturmhaubitze. 
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with mortar and artillery fire in order to prevent the Canadians from resuming the 
attack on Steenbergen proper. The Kriegsmarine helped out by sending nine gun 
boats of 2. Artillerie-Flottille with 8.8 cm guns.1493 This help was invaluable as Chill’s 
own artillery was running low on ammunition and was also being prepared for 
evacuation. As night fell the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders made preparations for 
the final attack on Steenbergen. In view of recent events the Argylls were 
understandably apprehensive. However, this time the Canadian infantry were lucky. 
As the Argylls were getting ready, sounds from Steenbergen appeared to indicate 
that the Germans were finally pulling out. Kampfgruppe Chill had fought its last 
battle on Brabant soil and as the Argylls and the Lincs moved into Steenbergen in the 
early hours of 4 November, they only captured a few stragglers. The bulk of the 
Kampfgruppe fell back to Dinteloord, the last stop before being ferried to safety. This 
move had become all the more urgent in view of developments elsewhere. In fact 
Kampfgruppe Chill pulled back towards Dinteloord on the orders of Oberbefehlshaber 
West himself. Von Rundstedt conceded that LXVII. Armeekorps had counterattacked 
successfully, but that it was now time to pull back.1494 The die was finally cast, all 
German troops were to be evacuated. All that was left was to delay the Allies until 
that was accomplished.  
Across the Mark 
While the Algonquins were getting ready for the attack on Welberg Thursday 2 
November also saw the planned crossing of the river Mark.1495 The main attack with 
the objective of splitting the German bridgehead in two was to be made by the 104th 
US Division, the Timberwolves, while the 49th (West Riding) Division provided flank 
cover to their left. There the crossing of the river Mark was assigned to the 56th 
Brigade under Brigadier M.S. Ekin. He ordered the 2nd Essex to cross first while the 
2nd Gloucestershires protected the crossing by capturing a crossroads due east of 
Stampersgat which was still in German hands. This battalion had barely recovered 
from the shock of losing their CO, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Butterworth, the previous 
day when a shell struck his command post.1496  
  
The Essex crossed at nine p.m. It was another wet and cold day. In order not to 
alert the Germans Ekin had decided to forego the usual introductory barrage. The 
assault boats went across in silence and the plan appeared to work, but then, just as 
the first troops (C Company) were nearly across a flare went up. Withering fire met 
the Essex, but miraculously most made it to the other side. An hour later the whole 
battalion was across, including two six-pounders and a jeep. The Timberwolves 
crossed around the same time. This attack was preceded by the usual devastating 
artillery barrage and many of the houses in Standdaarbuiten were pounded to 
rubble. But the hail of shells achieved the desired result and soon most of the 
division was across.1497 Soon bridges were built and on 3 November the 
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1494 KTB OB West, 03.11.44. 
1495 This section, Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 247-9. 
1496 He died of his wounds four days later. 
1497 One of the driving forces was Lieutenant Cecil Bolton who, even though he was seriously 
wounded, with his mortar platoon and later a bazooka team, knocked out several machine-guns and 
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Timberwolves expanded the bridgehead as far as the village of Noordhoek four 
kilometres from Standdaarbuiten. That Friday spelled the beginning of the end for 
Püchler’s LXVII. Armeekorps as the Polish 1st Armoured Division crossed the river 
Mark a second time, this time to stay. 
 
Colonel T. Majewski, the CO of the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade, was in charge of 
the operation.1498 He had organised two tactical formations which would cross in 
different places about two hundred metres apart. The crossings took place at six 
a.m. Soon the 1st Podhalanski Rifles north of Ter Aalst had a sizeable bridgehead, 
but the 9th Rifle Battalion at Vrachelen, ran into trouble. A single Sturmgeschütz 
from Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 hammered away at the Polish lines and brought the 
advance to a halt after just one company had crossed. It also destroyed the raft 
intended to send across reinforcements. The Royal Air Force was asked for help. 
Fighter-bombers arrived around 10:30 hours and intervened with a vengeance. That 
day was one of the few occasions on which 84 Group put in a really concerted effort 
to help the advance of I Corps.1499 All of the major towns and villages north of the 
Dintel-Mark line still in German hands were subjected to aerial bombardments and 
strafing. Throughout the morning four of the six Wings, totalling ninety-six Spitfires 
and forty-one Typhoons from twelve different squadrons unleashed a hell of bombs 
and rocket projectiles on German positions.1500 In Stampersgat many civilian lives 
were saved because most of the inhabitants had been evacuated.1501 Elsewhere the 
population was less fortunate. Klundert, in the American zone of operations and the 
key position in the German defences here, was hit hard during the afternoon as 
Spitfires from 66, 127 and 332 Squadrons (132 Wing) and 341 Squadron (145 Wing) 
swooped down and dropped a total of forty-four 500-pounders to which seven 
Typhoons of 257 Squadron (146 Wing) added another ten. The devastation in the 
village was incredible as was the loss of life among the civilians. Elsewhere, in 
Dinteloord, Terheijden, Wagenberg and Zevenbergen many civilians also lost their 
lives. A black pall hung over the German lines as the Poles resumed their attack after 
the air raids.  
 
At noon the 9th Rifle Battalion crossed a the second time about a hundred metres 
east of the first site. This took Grenadier-Regiment 744 by surprise and a 
Sturmgeschütz was knocked out from across the river. Three hours later a Class 40 
bridge was ready and the Shermans of No.2 Squadron 24th Pułk Ułanow drove 
across to the north side. The German infantry fell back on the village of Den Hout, 
but the Poles wasted no time and two hours later they had captured it. The writing 
was clear to everyone. To prevent total collapse Püchler (LXVII. Armeekorps) allowed 
the 711. Infanterie-Division to straighten the line while Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 
would provide the necessary backbone. Meanwhile Von Zangen realised what the 
Allies were trying to do, namely ‘Stoss ueber Klundert bis Hollandsch Diep zu 
                                        
1498 This section, Operational Report Pol 1st Arm Div, 43, and Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 
248-250. 
1499 Details: Second TAF, Daily Log, 03.11.44 and 84 Group IS 85, 04.11.44. 
1500 Breakdown: 146 Wing (193, 197, 257 and 266 Squadrons) with 41 Typhoons; 135 Wing (33, 222, 
349 and 485 Squadrons) with 48 Spitfires, and 145 Wing (74, 329, 341 and 345 Squadrons) with 48 
Spitfires. 
1501 Dellepoort en Nijman, Bevrijding van Oud-Gastel, 28. 
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vertiefen um Korps zu spalten’ 1502 His orders were clear. Püchler’s was told to delay 
the enemy advance for as long as possible ‘ohne dabei wesentliche Teile der 
Vernichtung auszusetzen’.1503  In other words, over the next few days Püchler’s 
divisions were to execute an orderly withdrawal as slowly as possible. Moreover it 
was complicated by the fact that there was only one land route, the road and railway 
bridges at Moerdijk. The rest of the evacuation would, once more, rely heavily on the 
assistance of the Kriegsmarine. 
More devastation 
The Polish attack early on 4 November started at Den Hout and fanned out from 
there.1504 One battle group went to take Terheijden, while the main attack was in the 
direction of Made (the shortest route to the Maas) where it clashed with the bulk of 
Grenadier-Regiment 744 and Sturmgeschützbrigade 280, who were just getting 
ready for a counterattack. The German force had taken up position behind an old 
line of fortifications and their accurate fire brought the Polish attack to a standstill. 
But once more the Royal Air Force showed up in force, in support of the troops of 
the ground. It was the biggest air support so far and a large number of missions 
were flown, both during the morning and the afternoon and all key positions in front 
of the advancing Allied units were plastered with bombs and rocket projectiles. A 
staggering 172 tons of bombs (of all calibres) were dropped on a relatively small 
area.1505 A factory in Zevenbergen, which was used by the 245. Infanterie-Division as 
an ammunition dump, in addition to twenty-eight 500-pounders was hit by especially 
heavy ordnance, four 1,000 pounders. The air intervention was the straw that broke 
the camel’s back for the German defenders, including Kampfgruppe Bieg.1506 The 
previous day they had managed to block the Essex’ advance before pulling back in 
the direction of Moerdijk, which is how they ended up opposite the Polish division.1507 
But even the skills of a Ritterkreuzträger were to no avail. There was no stopping the 
Poles now. 
 
This intervention by the Second Tactical Air Force must have shaken the German 
defenders in Made. Still it was not enough for them to abandon the village and 
eventually the flame-throwing Crocodiles of C Squadron Fife and Forfar Yeomanry 
were asked to support the Poles.1508 The Fife and Forfars tried out a new tactic. No.1 
Troop drove down the main street flaming all the houses causing the German 
infantry to rush out at the back where they were then caught by No.2 and 4 Troops. 
                                        
1502 KTB 88 AK, C 310, 03.11.44. 
1503 Ibid. 
1504 This section, Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 250-2, and Operational Report Pol 1st Armd Div, 
44. 
1505 Details, Second TAF, Daily Log, 04.11.44. In the morning 84 Spitfires and 45 Typhoons came into 
action, during the afternoon 72 Spitfires and 52 Typhoons attacked.  
1506 It appears that Major Bieg, whom we last saw near ‘s-Hertogenbosch, was sent back across the 
river Maas at the end of October to command a new Kampfgruppe composed of four companies, the 
second containing eighty men from 331. Infanterie-Division while the rest of his unit came from the 
remnants of MG Bataillon 14 and 29 Festungs MG Bataillon. Details I Corps, IS 95, 03.11.44, and First 
Cdn Army IR PoW 712. I.D. 26.10.44. Later these two battalions were incorporated in the 712. I.D. 
(Frontnachweiser 10) 
1507 49th Div, IS 75, 03.11.44. 
1508 Details, Sellar, Fife and Forfar, 74. 
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It was a massacre and by the time the village was taken, four p.m., it was ablaze 
from one end to the other. The other Polish battle group meanwhile captured 
Terheijden and Wagenberg. Reichert’s division had suffered appaling losses (in 
addition to the killed and wounded 126 men had been taken prisoner). It pulled back 
a few kilometres and dug in along the railway line Geertruidenberg- Zevenbergschen 
Hoek. The Grenadiere were now just four kilometres from the vital bridge at 
Moerdijk. The first Sturmgeschütze of 280 were sent across to safety that day. 
Eventually thirty-two could be brought back safely.1509  
  
The other divisions in I Corps also continued their advance. The Americans started at 
ten a.m. and advanced in a northeasterly direction, the 413th Regiment on the left, 
the 415th on the right. Their opponent, the 245. Infanterie-Division, was powerless 
to halt the American advance although Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 did everything it 
could to delay the inevitable. In fact, if it had not been for the Sturmgeschütze, 
Sander’s division would have collapsed altogether.1510 By the end of the day the 
Timberwolves were closing in on Klundert and Zevenbergen and they were just a few 
kilometres from their ultimate objective, the Hollands Diep (as the Maas estuary is 
known here). In order to keep the momentum going now that the end was, literally, 
in sight, Major-General Allen ordered the 414th Regiment to carry on during the 
night. However, their left-hand neighbours, the 49th (West Riding) Division, had not 
done so well that Saturday. 
  
The main problem was the inundated terrain which restricted all movement to the 
few dykes. After liberating Fijnaart the Hallams headed west as far as Oude Molen 
while the 1/4th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) advanced along the left 
flank of the Americans, as far as Oude Stoof. At the same time the 2nd Gloucester 
Regiment struck out west from Stampersgat which it had captured the day before. 
The battalion then hit upon groups of Fallschirmjäger whose sole purpose was to 
cover the withdrawal of Kampfgruppe Chill. Because of the flat terrain it took the 
Glosters until four p.m. to break the German resistance. After this the 11th Royal 
Scots Fusiliers took over and they continued to head for Dinteloord. By the time they 
got there (the following day) their opponent had escaped. That night the last 
elements of Kampfgruppe Chill were evacuated from Dinteloord by the 
Kriegsmarine.1511 Fighting a stiff southwesterly wind a small flottila of fifteen boats 
sailed into Dintelsas at 23.35 hours to pick up the last of the Fallschirmjäger under 
Major Pohl.1512 The evacuation was hampered by British artillery fire from 
Stampersgat. Two of the boats, KFK 44 and 46 were hit, and the latter sank.1513 To 
make matters worse for the Germans, the ferry had not arrived and Pohl had to send 
the remaining vehicles across the river Dintel hoping they could still make it to safety 
using the land route. Just after five a.m. the last vessel left the dock and set sail for 
Dordrecht where it arrived two hours later. Even though fifty Fallschirmjäger could 
not be rescued in time and were taken prisoner by the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders of Canada, no fewer than 720 had managed to escape and Kampfgruppe 
                                        
1509 I Corps, IS 98, 07.11.44. 
1510 Hobe, 49. 
1511 KTB F.d. Motorbootverbände 1-15. Nov.44, Anlage 2. 
1512 This included four KFK, ten boats from the river flottilla and a B 37, a ferry. 
1513 KFK = Kriegsfischkutter. 
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Chill would live to fight another day. As mentioned above, as early as 27 October 
Generaloberst  Student (Heeresgruppe H) had intended for FJR 6 to be sent to the 
island of Walcheren to reinforce the weak 70. Infanterie-Division there.1514 However, 
in view of the deteriorating situation there the idea was soon dropped. 
Breakthrough 
On Sunday 5 November the advance of I Corps followed its relentless course and for 
the third consecutive day it was supported by 84 Group RAF, albeit on a very much 
reduced scale as most of the Wings went back to rail interdiction missions. In fact 
only four squadrons were in action that day dropping bombs on or near Dinteloord, 
Klundert and Blauwe Sluis.1515 For the 49th (West Riding) Division the end of the 
campaign was still some way off. The Hallams at Oude Molen had been forced out of 
the village after a fierce German counterattack. However, the attackers’ only 
intention was to gain time for the withdrawal and by noon Grenadier-Regiment 858 
(or rather what was left of it) abandoned the village again and fell back in the 
direction of Willemstad. There, in the old fortress town on the Hollands Diep, they 
would make their last stand the following day. Meanwhile the 11th Royal Scots 
Fusiliers had established contact with the Canadians east of Dinteloord. Reaching the 
river Dintel marked the end of the autumn campaign for the Canadian 4th Armoured 
Division. East of there Klundert proved a tough nut to crack and the 1/4th KOYLI was 
temporarily held up by a group just outside this key village. Then the Royal Air Force 
intervened. Ten Spitfires from 74 Squadron (145 Wing) dropped the same number of 
500-pounders on the centre of the village, obliterating it and killing seventy-five 
civilians in the process. The KOYLIs captured the village, which looked like a furnace 
during the afternoon. And although one KOYLI noted that the‘’bloody Germans had 
set fire to the place’  the truth was that the bombs and Allied artillery had done the 
job.1516 Three kilometres to the east Zevenbergen was also captured at some cost to 
the civilians. 
  
There the Timberwolves could finally finish their part in Operation Rebound.1517 At 
four p.m. the first G.I.s reached the Hollands Diep. In a symbolic gesture the soldiers 
from the 414th Regiment dipped their mugs in the blue-grey water. Around the same 
time the 415th Regiment had begun the attack on Zevenbergen which was in their 
hands as darkness fell. The village had also suffered terribly from the continuous 
Allied barrages. In all eighty-five civilians were killed. The Timberwolves reached a 
small stream, the Roode Vaart, on the west side of Moerdijk. The American advance 
had achieved its purpose. The front of LXVII. Armeekorps was now split in two. In 
the eastern sector the 711. and the 245. Infanterie-Division pulled back towards the 
Moerdijk bridge followed closely by the 1st Polish Armoured Division. However, the 
terrain still favoured the defenders who were dug in behind the railway embankment 
between Zevenbergschenhoek and Hoge Zwaluwe. Sturmbeschützbrigade 244 in 
Zevenbergschenhoek in particular 
                                        
1514 Manuscript Van Hilten, 14. 
1515 Second TAF, Daily Log, 05.11.44. The squadrons were: 74 and 341 from 145 Wing and 302 and 
317 from 131 Wing. 
1516 Quoted in Patrick Delaforce, The Polar Bears, From Normandy to the relief of Holland with the 
49th Division, Stroud 1995.  
1517 This section, Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 253-5. 
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still put up a hell of a fight and the hamlet of Blauwe Sluis remained in German 
hands.1518 It was a minor defensive success that bought the retreating Germans 
valuable time. Afterwards the achievement of 244 was officially recognised when it 
was mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht of 29 November where it said that ‘Die 
Heeressturmgeschützbrigade 244 unter Führung von Hauptmann Jaschke hat in 
zehntägigen pausenlosen Kämpfen an der Westfront die schwerringende Infanterie 
durch besondere Standhaftigkeit unterstützt und bei nur zwei eigenen Ausfällen 54 
schwere und schwerste englische und amerikanische Panzer sowie 12 
Panzerspähwagen vernichtet’.1519  The bridge at Moerdijk now became the 
responsibility of Oberstleutnant L. von Alvensleben.1520 Von Zangen made him 
responsible ‘mit seinem Kopf.’ Von Alvensleben had to see to it that the bridge was 
blown in time so that it would not fall into enemy hands intact.1521 During the night 
the 711. Infanterie-Division moved to the other side of the Hollands Diep across the 
Moerdijk bridge leaving Generalleutnant Sander’s 245. Infanterie-Division inside the 
reduced bridgehead. 
 
In the western sector the bulk of  the 346. Infanterie-Division plus Grenadier-
Regiment 937 (Oberstleutnant Walter Nass of 245. I.D.) and III./FJR 6 (Hauptmann 
Von Hütz) had retreated to Willemstad. As the fall of the town could now only be a 
matter of days the evacuation started that night.1522 After the evacuation of 
Kampfgruppe Chill this was the second time that the Kriegsmarine had to evacuate a 
large body of soldiers. In order to cope with over a thousand men and equipment 
Korvettenkapitän H. Engel, Führer der Motorbootsverbände in den Niederlanden, 
sent a small fleet of no fewer than twenty-one small vessels. It was a mixed bag of 
escort ships, river boats and motor launches plus two big Dutch ferries, the ‘Koningin 
Emma’ and the ‘Willemsdorp’. It was another windy and wet night, but at 01:45 
hours the first boat docked at Willemstad and three hours later the last one arrived. 
Even though shells landed around them, all the vessels were gone again within an 
hour and 1,200 soldiers, light Flak guns, assorted vehicles, horses and even two 10.5 
cm howitzers were brought back to safety. But even then the Germans did not give 
up stalling for time yet. A rearguard, consisting mainly of Fallschirmjäger under 
Oberstleutnant Nass, was left behind in Willemstad and they would play a trick on 
their adversaries the following day. 
Still stalling 
Monday 6 November would see the end of the fighting for the Polar Bears.1523 
Setting off from Oude Molen the 2nd South Wales Borderers via Heijningen arrived in 
Helwijk, just one kilometre from Willemstad. Fearing that an all out attack on the old 
fortress town over completely open terrain would be a costly and bloody operation, 
the divisional commander, Major-General Barker, decided to put an ultimatum before 
                                        
1518 It seems highly likely that by that time Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 had already pulled back across 
the Moerdijk bridge. 
1519 Die Wehrmachtsberichte, Band 3, 351. 
1520 Later the ‘Insel Gruppen Kommandant’ (island commander) at Goeree Overflakkee. 
1521 KTB OB West, 994/44, 03.11.44. 
1522 Details KTB F.d. Motorbootsverbände 1-15 Nov. 44, Anlage 3, and KTB Adm. In den Niederl. 
06.11.44. 
1523 This section, Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 258. 
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the Germans: surrender or be obliterated. His adjudant, Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes, 
was sent to negotiate. His opponent, Oberstleutnant Nass, was an experienced 
commander and not willing to throw in the towel yet. Nass was said to have ‘Gutes 
taktisches Verständnis, sicheres Urteil’ to be ‘Geistig beweglich’.1524 As one of his 
men put it, Nass was a man ‘whose vocabulary has never, at least in military things, 
contained the word ‘impossible’’.1525 Nass thought he knew a way out of even this 
mousetrap and he rejected the ultimatum, but agreed to a truce between two and 
six p.m. to allow the civilians to leave. Unknown to the British Nass was going to play 
a trick on them. While they were busy taking care of the refugees Nass ordered his 
troops to fall back to the harbour. The ruse worked and the evacuation of the 
rearguard took place during the night. Four launches and an unknown number of 
Pionier-Sturmboote picked up 179 men.1526 Because the boats were too small to take 
it aboard all the equipment had to be left behind. The job was finished around two 
a.m. As the last Fallschirmjäger were sailing away the first Lincolns entered the town 
to find it free of enemy troops. With the capture of Willemstad operation Rebound 
was finished and two days later the 49th (West Riding) Division was finally allowed a 
well earned rest and the 18th Canadian Armoured Regiment (12th Manitoba 
Dragoons) assumed control of the division front. Further east the Poles had only just 
arrived at the last main point of resistance, Moerdijk. 
 
After the departure of the 711. Infanterie-Division (except for some rearguards) the 
previous night, the road and railway bridges at Moerdijk were blown between four 
and five a.m.1527 The only German troops left in and around Moerdijk were one 
company from each of the three battalions in Grenadier-Regiment 935 (245. I.D.), 
the bulk of II./Grenadier-Regiment 723 (719 I.D.) and three Sturmgeschütze from 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 244. In addition there was 6./16 Schiffstamm Bataillon 
(Leutnant Hoffner), one of six companies of a naval basic training battalion. While 
the other five companies remained north of the river Waal, this one had been sent to 
Moerdijk in mid October to prevent the bridges from falling into Allied hands 
prematurely.1528 All in all the bridgehead still contained a sizeable force of about 
1,000 soldiers.1529 Casualties soon began to mount. The problem was that it was 
almost impossible for the troops to dig in owing to the wet ground. Moreover, they 
were not only shelled by the Allies, but also had to deal with the occasional shells 
from their artillery north of the river. In addition to blowing up the bridges the 
Pioniere had also destroyed most of the dock area. This led the Kriegsmarine to state 
that, when asked, under these circumstances they could no longer help out, 
especially since the front line was now ’800 M[etres] away’.1530 The latter was not 
true, but it was clear that without proper quays evacuating the troops by water was 
now highly problematical. But things were not easy for their opponents either. After 
                                        
1524 Personalakten Nass, 01.03.44 by Generalleutnant Sander. 
1525 First Cdn Army, IR PoW 245. I.D. 29.10.44. 
1526 KTB Adm. in den Niederl. 07.11.44, 14:43 hours. 
1527 I Corps Ops Log, 06.11.44, Serial 918. This section, Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 259 and 
Operational Report 1st Pol Armd Div, 45. 
1528 First Cdn Army IR PoW German Naval Miscellaneous Units, 10.11.44. 
1529 I Corps, IS 99, 08.11.44. Von Hobe, 53, suggests that GR 936 and I./GR 723 also stayed behind, 
but in that case more soldiers would have been captured. 
1530 KTB F.d.Motorbootsverbände, 06.11.44, 01:00 hours. 
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discovering that the Germans had pulled back to Moerdijk the Poles had followed up, 
capturing Blauwe Sluis, Hoge Zwaluwe and Zevenbergschenhoek and they cleared 
the area as far as the river Maas. They took 93 prisoners, all of them from the 711. 
Infanterie-Division. In addition the 2nd Battery 1st Polish Anti-Tank Regiment 
proudly, but erroneously, reported that it had knocked out a Jagdpanther.1531 
Obviously nobody had claimed the abandoned vehicle until then.  
Blasting away 
On 7 November the Poles finally arrived at the outer edge of the Moerdijk defences. 
In view of the intensive mining and flooding of the fields all movement was restricted 
to the roads. To add to the Polish problems, they found that all three roads into the 
village were blocked by huge concrete anti-tank obstacles. It was clear that the 
regular artillery could not deal with these imposing, two-metre thick walls. For the 
moment the defenders were secure behind these seemingly impregnable barriers. 
After having established that artillery shells could not break down the anti-tank 
obstacles, General Maczek decided upon another approach.1532 He held an officers’ 
conference. He ordered 10 Pułk Strzelców Konnych (PSK) to blast a passage through 
the concrete walls using armour piercing rounds. Once this was accomplished the 
Shermans of 24th Pułk Ułanow would pass through followed by the infantry of the 
9th Polish Rifle Battalion. Led by its commander, Major Wasilewski, the Polish 
Cromwell tanks in pairs began to shell the concrete wall. Two tanks fired 
simultaneously until all their shells were spent after which they made way for the 
following pair. Shell after shell slammed into the concrete walls while the Germans 
replied with mortar and artillery fire. The din was incredible and the initial results 
were disappointing, but slowly parts of the wall began to crumble. It was clear that 
the task would not be completed until the following day. Meanwhile the 
Kriegsmarine, at the request of the 245. I.D. sent a boat (HM 28) to Moerdijk with 
supplies, mainly food, batteries and Panzerfäuste.1533 However, the boat waited 
underneath the bridges in vain, watching for signs from land before turning back to 
Dordrecht.  
 
At ten a.m. on 8 November the gaps in the anti-tank walls were finally wide enough 
for tanks to pass through. All in all 2,500 shells had been fired. Now it was up to the 
Shermans of 24th Pułk Ułanow. Major Wasilewski informed his colleague, Major W. 
Rakowski, second-in-command of the 24th and in charge of the operation, that two 
of the three walls had been breached. Rakowski ordered No.3 Squadron to take the 
direct road straight for the bridges using the middle passage while No.1 Squadron 
hooked around to the right in order to cut off retreating Germans. Assistance from 
the Royal Air Force was requested, but not granted because weather conditions were 
said to be unfavourable.1534 The final attack on Moerdijk began just after noon, 
covered by the usual withering heavy artillery barrage by no fewer than ten 
regiments. Still, the attack by No.3 Squadron misfired almost immediately. The first 
                                        
1531 I Corps Ops Log, 0.11.44, Serial 938. 
1532 This section, Didden and Swarts, Brabant Bevrijd, 259-261. 
1533 KTB F.d.Motorbootsverbände, 06.11.44, 23:30 hours. HM stands for Holland Maas Flottille one of 
the units commanded by the F.d.M. 
1534 There was indeed some ground haze, but Second Tactical Air Force flew plenty of rail interdiction 
missions that same day (Second TAF, Daily Log for 08.11.44). 
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tank went through the obstacle and ran on a mine. It then had to be towed back 
after which the mines were cleared. The second tank came up and burst into flames, 
probably hit by a Pak gun. By the time the third Sherman was able to drive up 
Rakowski cancelled the attack. It was three p.m. and he had just learned that No.1 
Squadron had just reached the area of the bridges. The rest of the Shermans and 
then the infantry came up heading into the village itself. The whole village was 
ablaze and progress was slow. The German defenders would not give an inch and 
capturing Moerdijk took all day. The first to reach the bridges were the 3rd Company 
8th Polish Rifle Battalion. As night fell the Germans still held out in a tiny pocket 
around the harbour area.  
The final evacuation 
While the battle was raging in Moerdijk on the other side of the water 
Generalleutnant Sander and his Ia, Oberstleutnant H.G. Mayer, had a heated 
discussion with Korvettenkapitän Engel about the evacuation of the troops remaining 
in Moerdijk.1535 Engel pointed out that the operation needed to be finished before ten 
p.m. in connection with high tide as the landing craft and barges would no longer be 
able to leave the beach after that. Three landing points which were to be marked by 
lamps were agreed upon, two west of the road bridge, one east of the railway 
bridge, and nine boats and two tugs were assigned the task.1536 Leutnant zur See 
Schmidt was in charge of the operation. The vessels left Dordrecht at 18:45 hours 
and slowly sailed south. As they neared the landing area they received a radio 
message from the 245. I.D. informing them that the landing point near the railway 
bridge was no go as Polish tanks had already captured the area. Then shells began 
to fall around the small fleet. Still the boats persisted and they managed to make it 
to the other sites. But there were no lamps or troops to be seen, except for thirty 
soldiers in a pillbox. After half an hour Schmidt decided to turn back as hanging 
around was far too risky. Back in Dordrecht Schmidt reported to Engel who in turn 
asked Meyer why the 245. I.D. had changed its mind. When he heard the news 
Sander was furious and accused the Kriegsmarine of defeatism which Engel 
vehemently rejected. He agreed to send the fleet back but only after taking on board 
some infantry officers which Sander agreed to. The second trip began just after 
midnight and had to brave squalls of rain and hail. 
  
The round trip took about five hours and this time the boats brought back ninety-
four soldiers and some mortars. The rest of the defenders had already been taken 
off the beaches by Sturmboote from the army that managed to rescue about five 
hundred men in spite of the atrocious weather. One of the boats in the naval flottilla, 
MAL 25, got into trouble as it ran aground at low-tide. Attempts to pull it free failed 
and eventually it was blown up. The crew and the sixty soldiers -among them Oberst 
Neumann, the Kommandeur of 723 G.R. - it had on board, tried to get back crawling 
over the demolished railway bridge. Neumann and twenty-seven of his men made it 
to the northern shore, clambering up and walking along the remaining sections, 
swimming when necessary.1537 As dawn broke Polish soldiers spotted the last 
                                        
1535 KTB Adm.in den Nied., 08.11.44, 14:30 hours. 
1536 Ibid, 09.11.44, 04:45 hours gives eight boats and two tugs. 
1537 Special Interrigation report Schwalbe. 
 322 
stragglers and opened fire on the soldiers hanging between the girders, killing the 
majority. The fighting in Moerdijk had finally ended. The Poles were now on the 
southern shore all along the line and they saw the demolished bridge spans in the 
murky waters of the Hollands Diep. Through their binoculars they could also see their 
adversaries across the water, about a kilometre and a half away. In Moerdijk itself 
the rearguard, 379 soldiers, were taken prisoner. It was 9 November, the conclusion 
of the Allied campaign against 15. Armee.  
 
Twenty kilometres to the east the other German bridgehead -around Heusden - had 
been cleared three days before (Operation Guy Fawkes). In their first canal crossing 
the 51st (Highland) Division fought an enemy force that consisted of the 59. 
Infanterie-Division (mainly from Grenadier-Regimenten 1035 and 1036) and 
Fallschirmjäger-bataillone Gramse and Bloch plus remnants of an SS-battalion, under 
Sturmbannführer Herbert Gillhofer (II./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 22).1538 The 
crossing which was launched on Saturday at five p.m. was successful. The advance 
was carried on during the night and the following day the Scots reached the banks of 
the river Maas. When they entered the fortress town of Heusden the 5th Queen’s 
Own Cameron Highlanders were confronted with a tragedy. During the night a 
Sprengkommando had blown up the town hall, even though they knew that the 
population was in the cellars, killing 134 civilians. It was, at best, criminal negligence, 
at worst a wilful atrocity. At the end of the day another German bridgehead had 
been eliminated. 
Balance 
The battle for the approaches to Antwerp was finally over after the island of 
Walcheren had been captured on 5 November and Moerdijk fell into Polish hands 
four days later. It was the end of a gruelling campaign which had begun just over 
two months before, on 6 September. It had been a costly campaign, for both 
sides.1539 But General Von Zangen could be content. The depleted divisions of the 15. 
Armee had prolonged the inevitable for as long as was humanly possible and, even 
more importantly, had been able to pull back the bulk of the units and most of the 
materiel intact. In view of Germany’s economic position and production problems the 
latter even pleased Hitler himself when Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chef des 
Wehrmachtführungsstabes im OKW, acquainted him with the facts.1540 Von Zangen 
was awarded the Eichenlaub for the successful way he had led 15. Armee during the 
retreat and battles since August. In the final analysis denying the Allies the use of 
Antwerp for as long as possible and gaining time to rebuild units in Germany had 
been the only realistic goal for the German High Command. In that they had 
succeeded beyond all expectations, assisted by Montgomery’s obstinacy, the 
inclement weather, the terrain and the skill of some commanders and units on the 
ground, notably Kampfgruppe Chill. The fact that it was not until 28 November, that 
the first Allied vessel, a Canadian-built Liberty ship, the Fort Catarqui, berthed in 
                                        
1538 Second Army, IS 154, 05.11.44 and IS 155, 06.11.44. 
1539 For 4th Cdn Arm Div alone: Operation Suitcase cost it 945 casualties whereas it inflicted about 
4,000 cas on the Germans, of whom 1,495 were captured. It lost 36 tanks and destroyed seven SPs (I 
Corps Ops Log, 08.11.44, Serial 981). 
1540 Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, 702.  
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Antwerp, eighty-five days after Antwerp was captured by the 11th Armoured 
Division, was in itself a testimony to the tenacity of the German defence.1541  
Conclusion 
During the final fighting south of the river Maas Kampfgruppe Chill contributed to the 
delaying of the inevitable by its protracted and successful defences first in the 
Bergen op Zoom area, one of the two key points in the German defensive system, 
and subsequently at Steenbergen. These engagements enabled 15. Armee to pull 
back intact by and large and set up a new defensive line behind the river Maas. Proof 
of the efficacy of the defensive actions of Kampfgruppe Chill even at this final stage 
of the campaign to clear the Scheldt estuary can be found in the directive (JSM 315) 
sent by the Joint Staff Mission on 23 October 1944, just as Operations Pheasant and 
Suitcase were getting underway.1542 In this directive the JSM ordered General 
Eisenhower to ‘conduct operations with the objective of completing the defeat of 
Germany by 1 January.’1543 They had even prepared a timetable the day before in 
which a Ruhr offensive would start on 15 December resulting in a ‘German collapse’ 
within a fortnight. That the Joint Staff Mission took this best case scenario seriously 
can also be deduced from the fact that in the same document Eisenhower was 
assured that they would ‘give maximum support to this all-out effort’ and ‘Nothing 
will be held back.’ Just over one week later, on 31 October, the optimism had 
evaporated and the Directorate of Military Operations predicted, fairly accurately as it 
turned out, that the war in the West would end on 15 May 1945. One can only 
conclude that the continuing fierce German resistance had finally made the Allied 
planners realize that they would definitely have to start thinking ‘beyond the 31st 
December, 1944.’1544 Whereas for the Allies seizing the area between the Albert 
Canal and the Maas (and Rhine) had been about maintaining the momentum of the 
rapid advance through northern France and Belgium and thus entering the German 
heartland before winter set in, for the German High Command it had always been 
about gaining time.1545 Operationally speaking for them the province of North 
Brabant was not essential territory, it was a bridgehead to deny the Allies the use of 
Antwerp for as long as possible. This is evident from the reluctant authorization Hitler 
gave Von Zangen on 29 October 1944, allowing him to pull his army back, but only 
on condition that he maintain bridgeheads south of the Maas for as long as possible. 
For a while the Allied commanders had expected their successful advance to continue 
whereas the German commanders had feared that the end was nigh. The immediate 
outcome of the engagements discussed above, in fact of the whole autumn 
campaign, was never a foregone conclusion and often could have gone either way. 
That it tilted in the Germans’ favour for a while is a tribute to the fighting qualities of 
Kampfgruppe Chill which had played a key role from the beginning to the very end.  
                                        
1541 Ellis, Victory Volume II, 127. 
1542 The JSM was the tri-service committee in Washington headed by Field-Marshal Sir John Dill. 
1543 TNA, WO 106/4338, 57A, 56B and 55A. 
1544 Ibid, 64A. 
1545 Dr. H. Amersfoort, ‘Noord-Brabant en Operatie Market Garden, September-oktober 1944’, Militaire 
Spectator 163 (1994), 446. 
 324 
PART FOUR, THE WESTERN FRONT 9 NOVEMBER 1944 
 
‘The idea of decisive battle continues in the West.’1546 
 
‘… the seemingly endless habit of the Allies to underestimate the tenacity of their 
opponent.’1547 
 
4.1 The military situation  
 
At the start of November the situation on the western front for the Twenty-First 
Army Group was nothing like what it had been two months earlier. Then the situation 
had been fluid in the extreme, full of potential for Montgomery’s troops and with the 
sword of Damocles hanging over the Reich. Now, at the end of autumn, large sectors 
of the front were static and the approaches to Antwerp had finally been cleared. 
South of the river Maas the left hand sector was covered by the First Canadian Army, 
the right hand one by the British Second Army. Here the British units had recently 
been dealing with a spoiling attack. As Operation Pheasant was gaining momentum 
on 25 October Generalfeldmarschall Model, Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe B, 
looked for a way to relieve the pressure on 15. Armee.1548 His eye fell on the centre 
of the Peel marshes where the 7th US Armored Division (Major-General Lindsay McD. 
Silvester) was known to hold a line of more than thirty kilometres. Model reckoned 
that a diversionary attack there might just do the trick. Von Rundstedt, 
Oberbefehlshaber West, agreed and offered him XLVII. Panzerkorps under General 
Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz. This Korps consisted of the 9. Panzer-Division and the 
15. Panzergrenadier-Division and boasted about 25,000 men, thirty brand new 
Panther tanks and dozens of Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanzer IV. Von Rundstedt had 
only one reservation, it was to be an attack with ‘a limited objective’. Focus of the 
attack was the town of Meijel. The attack by the 9. Panzer-Division began before 
dawn on 27 October and caught the Americans by surprise. After the infantry had 
crossed bridges were constructed, the first Panthers rattled accross and at eight a.m. 
the Germans captured Meijel. From there two routes ran westwards, one towards 
Liessel, the other towards Asten. Silvester ordered his CCR to block both routes.1549 
Now the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division joined in to exploit the gap. As Silvester’s 
division could not hold the attack on its own Field-Marshal Montgomery on 28 
October decided to send both the 6th Guards Tank Brigade and the 15th (Scottish) 
Division, which had just captured Tilburg, to relieve the Americans. These measures 
bore fruit almost immediately. The British artillery in particular proved most effective 
in delaying the German advance and it was stopped about halfway between Meijel 
and Asten, although the Grenadiere managed to capture Liessel the following day. 
Sunday 29 October marked the zenith of the German spoiling attack. Model would 
have liked to press on, but Von Rundstedt was content. Because he was one of the 
                                        
1546 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture, Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, New 
York 2001, 97. 
1547 D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 368. 
1548 This section, unless otherwise specified, Didden and Swarts, Einddoel Maas, 205-213, and Wim 
Klinkert, ‘Opmars naar de Maas’, in Klep and Schoenmaker, De Bevrijding, 223-6. 
1549 American armoured divisons usually deployed their troops in Combats Commands, called A, B and 
R (reserve). 
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few in the know about the coming offensive in the Ardeness he was happy to let the 
matter rest there. He knew that he was going to need Von Lüttwitz’ Korps for a 
bigger job and he also needed a reserve force behind the Westwall. Still Model 
persuaded Von Rundstedt to give him another twenty-four hours. However, the 
attempt to capture Asten failed and the Scottish division retook Liessel on 31 
October. Von Rundstedt ordered his troops to fall back and the attack was basically 
over. Nevertheless retaking Meijel and clearing the area up to the canals over the 
next few days was ‘one of the most difficult and costly actions (…) in North-West 
Europe,’  for some of the units involved.1550 What it taught the Allies was never to 
take anything for granted in this campaign and the clearing of the Peel marshes as 
far as the river Maas was an operation painstakingly planned and executed under the 
appropriate code-name ‘Nutcracker’. In the final analysis the spoiling attack never 
really fulfilled its purpose, because on the very first day the Allies were already aware 
of the nature of the attack because a message of the Heeresgruppe had been 
deciphered. Hence they had never felt the need to slow down the operations against 
Von Zangen’s Armee. All in all the OKW was both content and not with the outcome 
of the autumn campaign. The German high command was happy because, ‘Dadurch 
lag nun eine starkes Naturhindernis vor der 15. Armee,’ but continued to fret, 
because, on the other hand, ‘Gegner hatte Kräfte freibekommen, die er sofort nach 
Osten vorschob, wo nun in Kürze der Grosskampf begann.’1551 So what was the 
strategic situation like in early November 1944? 
 
4.2 The German and Allied strategic positions 
 
During the first week, while the last engagements were being fought on Walcheren 
and in Brabant, Von Zangen’s army was taking up positions north of the rivers Maas 
and Waal. Initially Hitler feared that the Allies might try and outflank the new 
defensive system by capturing the islands north of Walcheren.1552 Since Von 
Rundstedt had no further reserves to cover this flank he ordered preparations for the 
destruction of the docks at Rotterdam to begin immediately. On the 5th, however, 
Hitler was apparently less anxious and he decided that the docks were still useful and 
were to be spared.1553 On 7 November Von Rundstedt issued a new directive to 
Heeresgruppe H which was to take over three days later from Heeresgruppe B which 
was to start planning for the Ardennes offensive (‘Wacht am Rhein’). As related 
earlier Von Rundstedt told the Oberbefehlshaber of Heeresgruppe H, Generaloberst 
Student, to set up a‘nachhältender Verteidigung’,  behind the major rivers (Maas, 
Waal and Rhine) in the Netherlands, while maintaining and/or creating as many 
bridgeheads as possible south of them. Student was told to retain three bridgeheads 
on the left bank of the rivers Rhine and Maas. One was south of Arnhem, one east 
west of Venlo and one south of Moerdijk.1554 The Moerdijk one was annihilated on 
the 9th, but those near Arnhem and Venlo were still in German hands. However, the 
last one was clearly getting the attention of the Allies. It gradually became clear to 
                                        
1550 Patrick Forbes, The 6th Guards Tank Brigade, The Story of Guardsmen in Churchill Tanks, London 
1947, 67. 
1551 Schramm, Kriegstagebuch, 7/I, 413. 
1552 Ibid, 412. 
1553 Ibid, 413. 
1554 Manuscript Van Hilten, 13-4. 
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the Germans that, now that Antwerp and its approaches were finally in the hands of 
the Allies, the next major threat would be a thrust towards the Rhine. The signs were 
there for all to read. The intelligence section of OB West noted that units from the 
First Canadian Army were taking over the Maas-Waal sector, which could only mean 
one thing, that the British Second Army was free for commitment elsewhere.1555 That 
they would focus their attention on the Venlo bridgehead was a foregone conclusion 
for the German commanders. It was indeed the first step of Montgomery’s new plan. 
 
As Montgomery explained to Eisenhower and Bradley during a conference in Brussels 
on 18 October, for him the Ruhr was still the most important objective.1556 The result 
was that, after it had opened up the port of Antwerp, the Twenty-First Army Group 
was to lauch an attack from the Nijmegen bridgehead into the Rhineland. This plan 
was revised by Eisenhower on 2 November in which he told Montgomery’s army 
group first to ‘attack the enemy west of the MEUSE [capitals in orginial].’1557 
Montgomery was also to release the American divisions under his command (the 7th 
Armored and 104th Infantry) right away to the Twelfth Army Group. The Field-
Marshal issued his own directive the same day.1558 Montgomery knew that after 
clearing the Moerdijk and Venlo bridgeheads fewer troops would be needed to cover 
the rivers and he could finally prepare for an attack south-eastwards from Nijmegen 
and northwards across the Rhine to seize the high ground between Arnhem and 
Apeldoorn with a bridgehead over the IJssel river. In essence, Montgomery still 
hoped to capture the Market-Garden objectives, albeit two months late. That desire, 
like the airborne operation, would turn out to be a pipe dream, because of a 
combination of the appaling weather, difficult terrain and stubborn German 
resistance. 
 
In the evening of 14 November Operation Nutcracker, aimed at eliminating the 
German bridgehead around Venlo, was launched. The name was appropriate, 
because because a huge cracker (five Allied divisions plus armoured brigades) was 
used to deal with a small, but particularly tough nut (three weakened divisions).1559 
The initial stage went well and the 51st and 53rd Divisions rapidly covered the first 
few miles after crossing the Wessem to Nederweert Canal. The next canal was also 
crossed fairly quickly three days later. This was quite an achievement in view of the 
terrain, the lack of metalled roads and the atrocious weather. On 20 November the 
15th and 11th Armoured Divisions joined in, followed by the 3rd Division three days 
later.1560 The Germans were powerless to stop the Allied avalanche and on 25 
November the first allied troops reached the banks of the Maas. But then the 
advance began to bog down, usually literally. It took Dempsey’s troops another week 
to eliminate the last three bridgeheads. Finally Montgomery was free to focus on the 
next stage, entering the Rhineland. However, the season had caught up with him. 
                                        
1555 Canadian Report 77, §116. 
1556 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, 167. 
1557 SCAF 118, 02.11.44. 
1558 Directive M 534, 02.11.44. 
1559 Description Nutcracker: Didden and Swarts, Einddoel Maas, 213-8, and Wim Klinkert, ‘Opmars 
naar de Maas’, in Klep and Schoenmaker, Bevrijding, 226-232. 
1560 Kampfgruppe Chill was assigned to 86 AK on 22.11.44, but did not join in the fighting (see 4.3) as 
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The intended starting points were flooded and a new date was set for this operation 
which was given the code name ‘Veritable’.1561 Montgomery expected the operation 
to be launched as soon as possible after 1 January 1945. In the same directive the 
Field-Marshal evaluated the German strength and concluded that ‘his situation is 
such that he cannot stage major offensive operations.’1562 The same day ‘Wacht am 
Rhein’ was launched and in the end it would take until 28 January 1945 before the 
old frontline was restored.1563 Operation Veritable was finally launched eleven days 
later, on 8 February 1945.1564 The penultimate stage of the attack on the Reich had 
finally begun.1565 
 
4.3 Postscript for Kampfgruppe Chill et al 
 
Kampfgruppe Chill and Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 continued to see heavy fighting 
after leaving the Netherlands. On 22 November the Kampfgruppe together with 
Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 were assigned to LXXXVI. Armeekorps (Von Obstfelder). 
On the other side of the river Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connors VIII Corps was 
steadily pushing back Von Obstfelder’s troops in the direction of Venlo on the river 
Maas (operation Nutcracker). For the moment the Kampfgruppe and Jaschke’s 
Brigade were to stay on theright (east) bank of the river, pending developments. The 
same day Generalleutnant Chill left his trusty Kampfgruppe and got sick leave. His 
place was temporarily taken over by another Ritterkreuzträger, Oberst Helmut 
Bechler. Soon after the Kampfgruppe was moved further south and was in the 
Roermond area astride the boundary of two armies, the 1. Fallschirmarmee and 
Gruppe von Manteuffel.1566 On 8 December Chill was transferred to the 
Führerreserve OKH and Bechler took over permanently. Chill was subsequently 
trained as a Kommandierender General and ended the war in command of LV. 
Armeekorps near Pillau in East Prussia. On 9 December the Kampfgruppe, once more 
referred to as the 85. Infanterie-Division, was moved to the Eifel area.1567 The 
Ardenness offensive (operation Wacht am Rhein) was a mere three days away and 
LXVII. Armeekorps and its constituent units were needed further south. Hence the 
Kampfgruppe was to take over a hotly contested area in the Hürtgenwald from the 
89. Infanterie-Division and part of the sector previously defended by the 272. 
Volksgrenadier-Division. It was now under LXXXIV. Armeekorps (General Karl 
Püchler). Its mission was to protect the important Roer dams. Interestingly the 
composition of (Kampfgruppe) 85. I.D. during this period and even as late as 28 
January 1945 was the same as it had been during the second half of the autumn 
campaign. It was still composed of two regimental sized Kampfgruppen. One 
consisted of I., III., and IV./FJR 6, while Kampfgruppe Dreyer was made up of 
II./FJR 6 and I./Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring 
                                        
1561 Directive M 538, 16.12.44. 
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1567 KTB H.Gr.D., 09.12.44, rail transport report, and MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, 602. 
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(Bataillon Pohl).1568 The only difference therefore with the time frame discussed in 
this study being the substitution of Hauptmann Mager’s II./FJR 6 for Batallion Ohler.  
 
By then the Ardennes offensive had run its course and the German troops in the Eifel 
were pushed back towards the Rhine. In the course of the heavy fighting Bechler 
was wounded (4 February 1945) and had to be evacuated. His left hand had to be 
amputated. Soon after he was promoted to Generalmajor. At the end of March the 
Kampfgruppe was virtually annihilated. The OKW decided to form a new division 
from the remnants. It was to be renamed Infanterie-Division Potsdam. This was 
formed up in Döberitz, west of Berlin from 8 April and would be commanded by 
Oberst d. Res. Erich Lorenz. One of the two regiments was commanded by (now) 
Oberstleutnant Pohl. But even as it was being formed the troops were sent west to 
the Harz mountains (where 3./559 had just arrived) to cover the assembly area of 
12. Armee. The division, at most 6,000 men strong, suffered heavy losses and by 
then not many German soldiers saw the point of dying at the last minute. On 20 April 
(Hitler’s birthday) Lorenz disbanded his unit and told his men to give themselves up 
or try to escape. Their comrades in FJR 6 had also been forced to surrender only 
three days before. For the remnants of the Sturmgeschütz company of schwere 
Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559  the war had ended on the same day when Kopka 
officially disbanded the unit and sent the men home. The Jagdpanther company held 
out a bit longer and the last vehicles of 559, escorted by British, were driven to 
training grounds near Oldenburg on 22 May 1945.1569 
 
FJR 6 together with the 272. Volksgrenadier-Division had been responsible for the 
sector covering the important Roer dams, the southern edge of the Hürtgenwald 
where in November the American 28th Division had suffered such appaling losses.1570 
One of the most memorable battles being fought over the Burgberg where the 
Fallschirmjäger had to fight a formidable adversary, the 2nd Ranger Battalion.1571 
Although they suffered serious losses the Rangers managed to capture the 
commanding height on 7 December. Two days later the rest of Kampfgruppe Chill 
joined them. There was also a rare moment when a patrol from FJR 6 and an 
American unit celebrated Christmas Eve together in the Forsthaus in the Kall valley. 
The battles continued into 1945. In the ongoing fighting one of the casualties was 
Hauptmann Rolf Mager, the skilful Kommandeur of II./FJR 6, who died of his wounds 
in American captivity on 1 January. In February the Americans renewed their 
offensive to seize the Roer dams once and for all. Control of the dams meant that 
the Germans could flood the area west of the Rhine at any time. Hence the 78th US 
Division (Major-General Edwin P. Parker jr.) was told that the capture of the dams 
was ‘the most vital on the entire Western front’.1572  The attack was launched on 5 
February and although the division suffered serious casualties they lived up to their 
nickname, Lightning, and three days later Schmidt and the dams were in American 
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hands. The Fallschirmjäger fell back, now chased by two opponents, Parker’s division 
and the 9th Armored Division (Major-General John W. Leonard). After the fall of 
Schmidt Kampfgruppe Chill and FJR 6 each went their own way since Henke’s 
regiment was now assigned to the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division (Generalleutnant 
Richard Schimpf) which was trying to cover the withdrawal to the Rhine. They failed 
and the capture of the Remagen bridge by the 9th Armored Division on 7 March 
sealed the fate of the German troops still west of the river. On 14 March Oberst Fritz 
Hencke and most of the regiment were taken prisoner near Ittenbach. The 
remainder of FJR 6 were then told to fall back north in the direction of the Ruhr area, 
but the situation became increasingly confused and on 17 April the last survivors 
surrendered at a farmhouse near Velbert, north of Wuppertal. The war for our key 
players was finally over. Von der Heydte himself had been out of the war for four 
months by then. He had led a group of Fallschirmjäger in Unternehmen Stösser 
which was designed to secure the north flank of the Ardennes offensive. He was 
captured with a small band of soldiers on 24 December.1573 
                                        
1573 His interrogators were not so favourably impressed by Von der Heydte; they thought that 'though 
he desclaims any party connections [he] is a dangerous character and his soft and alledgedly 
intelligent talk was full of falsity and Nazi propaganda' (I Corps, IS 126, 29.12.44). 
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PART FIVE, CONCLUSIONS 
 
“Battles in fact are chaotic affairs in which personalities and the element of chance play a 
considerable part. Victory goes to the commander who can first create some sort of order 
out of the terror and confusion.”1574 
 
“The German army was a superb fighting organisation. In point of morale, élan, unit 
cohesion, and resilience, it probably had no equal among twentieth-century armies.” 1575 
 
“… time after time they were checked or even induced to withdraw by boldly handled 
packets of German infantry of greatly inferior strength.”1576 
 
“… every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a 
patrol is constantly brought face to face with strategical [sic] considerations.”1577 
 
The time has come to summarize and analyse the findings concerning the efficacy of 
Kampfgruppe Chill, examine the nature of its fighting power, including morale and 
mentality, which might offer an explanation for its extraordinary achievements and 
finally compare it to other Kampfgruppen and the rest of the Wehrmacht.  
 
5.1 Achievements 
 
In each of the Chapters in Part Three the results of the actions of the Kampfgruppe 
have been analysed. In brief they boil down to the following: 
 
 Undoubtedly the single greatest, most important contribution Generalleutnant 
Chill made to the defence of the Reich was to ignore orders from above to fall 
back to Germany and, instead, on 4 September instruct some of his officers to 
start collecting groups of soldiers marching back and assemble these into ad 
hoc fighting groups, thus setting up a security screen behind the Albert Canal, 
just in time to slow down first and then block the British advance when it was 
resumed two days later. This was a major operational blow for the Allies who 
had reckoned on continuing into Germany during the following week. Their 
advance lost its momentum and would not regain it again until the spring of 
1945. 
 
 During the first engagement at Beringen Kampfgruppe Chill deflected the 
Guards attack away from Leopoldsburg, forcing the British to use the only 
other available route north, via Hechtel. This again completely upset the 
British timetable and meant that it took them another five days before they 
had a bridgehead over the next waterway, the Maas-Scheldt Canal. 
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 During the same period of time, Kampfgruppe Chill managed not only to delay 
the capture of Geel by the 50th (Northumbrian) Divison, but even to recapture 
the town, effectively preventing the British from pursuing another avenue 
north and enabling Model to concentrate his limited resources. The successful 
defence also prevented the British from outflanking the defences north of 
Antwerp. This, in turn, vitiated the Allied operations aimed at opening up the 
port which affected their overall operational plan. 
 
 After the 15th (Scottish) Division had taken over from the 50th at Geel, it tried 
to establish a bridgehead north of there at Ten Aard. The successful defence 
put up by Kampfgruppe Chill not only meant that the planned advance 
towards Turnhout (and beyond to Tilburg) could not be carried out, again 
securing the defences north of Antwerp, but it also forced Ritchie (XII Corps) 
to cancel Operation Flood and to use a bridgehead near Lommel instead as a 
starting point for the advance to protect the flank of XXX Corps during 
Operation Market Garden. The consequences were far reaching, since this 
meant that it took XII Corps much longer to advance north, enabling German 
units (59. and 245. Infanterie-Division) to intervene in North Brabant, 
contributing to the failure of Market Garden. 
 
 By seizing control of part of the Allied CL, nicknamed Hell’s Highway by the 
Americans and the Corridor by the British, south of Veghel for nearly two days 
Kampfgruppe Chill held up traffic and diverted Allied units and in this way was 
part of the death blow to Operation Market Garden.  
 
 By successfully blocking the attack towards Tilburg in early October. 
Kampfgruppe Chill again frustrated Allied operational plans to advance in the 
general direction of ‘s-Hertogenbosch. This advance was to enable Second 
Army to break out from the Nijmegen area as well as forcing 15. Armee back 
across the river Maas. Chill’s successful defence again thwarted Montgomery’s 
ambitions to continue the operations into the industrial heart of the Reich and 
hence had both operational and strategic consequences.  
 
 By subsequently preventing the Canadians from seizing the heights near 
Woensdrecht and isolating the German troops on Walcheren, Kampfgruppe 
Chill ultimately forced Montgomery to reconsider his whole operational 
thinking which since early September had been focused on one thing and one 
thing alone: to attack the Ruhr area and isolate it from the rest of Germany. 
 
 Finally, during the final fighting south of the river Maas Kampfgruppe Chill 
contributed to the delaying of the inevitable by its successful defence in the 
Bergen op Zoom area, one of the two key points in the German defensive 
system, and at Steenbergen. This enabled 15. Armee to pull back intact by 
and large and set up a new defensive line behind the river Maas with all the 
consequences this followed from this.  
 
This answers the first question, to what extent did the actions of the Kampfgruppe 
influence the operational (and strategic) levels? The conclusions above bear 
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testimony to the success of Kampfgruppe Chill and confirm what the Intelligence 
officers at SHAEF had found in October, i.e. that ‘The battle group system, in spite of 
its many defects, has been a relatively successful expedient, particularly in the early 
stages of the German attempt at stabilization.’1578 All of the above also points at the 
answer to the second key question, i.e. who decide the outcome of engagements, 
the men at the top or the men in the ranks?  It is clear that in Kampfgruppe Chill’s 
case it was neither the men at the very top, nor the common soldiers, as Tolstoj 
thought, who decided the outcome of battles and engagements. Rather it was the 
men in between, the junior and senior officers on the spot like Chill who made the 
difference between defeat and success. The men in the ranks who were struck by 
panic could be rallied, if necessary at gun point, and the commanders at the 
operational (and strategic) levels were often too late, especially in situations where 
communications with the front had broken down and it was down to the battalion, 
regimental and divisional commanders to influence the course of events. That this 
needs no longer be the case nowadays is due to much improved communications 
where the commanders at the highest level can be informed in real time. Even so, as 
the tragedy at Srebrenica for example has shown, it is still the commander on the 
ground who is face to face with his opponent, that can make a difference.  
 
There is another indication of the success of Kampfgruppe Chill that needs to be 
mentioned here, the loss figures for both the German and the Allied sides, since ‘one 
of the main criteria used to measure the level of development of operational art, 
tactics, command, staff work (…) is the level of losses given a known correlation of 
forces and means in an engagement or battle.’1579 With respect to the correlation of 
forces it is evident from the narrative in Part Three that Kampfgruppe Chill was 
always outnumbered and often heavily. The losses it suffered reflect this disparity. 
Between 4 September and 8 November 1944 the Kampfgruppe lost well over 7,000 
men.1580 The loss of the equivalent of twelve battalions meant that the infantry was 
destroyed twice over and reinforcements were constantly needed. Compared to the 
German losses, 56,200, it is also clear that the Kampfgruppe, accounting for 14 %, 
or one-seventh, of the losses, suffered more than its share which can be explained 
by its role as Eingreifsreserve as this meant that it was always in the thick of the 
fighting. The fact that many counterattacks were undertaken without proper 
reconnaissance or preparations meant that the Allied artillery caused huge losses. In 
turn Chill’s men inflicted nearly 7,000 casualties on the Allied units it fought against. 
At first glance these figures may seem a little disappointing for a military unit that 
fought so efficiently. However, the fact that the Kampfgruppe apparently gave as 
good as it got is an achievement in itself since it fought a numerically superior 
enemy. Moreover, it is surprising in view of the limited supply of ammunition on the 
German side which should have resulted in far fewer Allied victims. Also the 
improvised nature of the unit –whereas the opponents were always regular units that 
had been fighting for a long time- and the lack of armour make these figures all the 
more remarkable. Finally, and most impressively, compared to the overall Allied 
                                        
1578 SHAEF Int notes 31, in: I Corps, IS 83, 21.10.44. 
1579 Valeriy Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: an 
operational narrative, Helion & Company Ltd, Solihull 2011. Losses and casualties are both used here 
to indicate the total number of killed, wounded and missing. 
1580 Details of the casualty figures are given in Appendix 4. 
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losses in this theatre of war and during the same period, 18,000, the casualties 
Kampfgruppe Chill inflicted on its opponents (more than one-third of the total in this 
theatre and during this period) are disproportionally high and are clear evidence of 
the efficacy of the battle group. The huge losses, on both sides, are further 
testimony to the ferocity of the engagements. One thing about the casualty figures is 
surprising, i.e. that overall German losses in Belgium and Northern France during just 
the first week of September – a staggering 82,000 men,1581 far outnumbered those 
in the Falaise pocket in August (55,000 men), which so far have attracted most 
attention and are usually highlighted in the existing literature.1582 These numbers 
suggest that the real blow to the Wehrmacht was not delivered until the following 
month. Whereas the average German loss figure on the Western front for August 
was 150,000, for September it rose to 344,000.1583 These numbers help to explain 
the desperation felt even by seasoned soldiers such Model and Von Rundstedt. This 
total collapse in the west during the first two weeks of September also make the 
success and resilience of Kampfgruppe Chill both all the more remarkable and more 
important. 
 
Although the impact of the successful actions of Kampfgruppe Chill was huge 
Montgomery’s persistent denial of reality and continued obsession with the Ruhr was 
clearly a contributory factor as well. A writer on Montgomery’s operational approach 
concluded that, ‘the six-week delay before opening Antwerp constituted the gravest 
of his errors…’1584 Montgomery himself admitted as much in his memoirs where he 
wrote ‘I must admit a bad mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of 
opening up the approaches to Antwerp (…) I thought that the Canadian Army could 
do it while [italics in original] we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.’ 
Nevertheless, to attribute everything to an erroneous operational approach would be 
a travesty of the actual fighting as the above narrative has shown. Time and again 
the Kampfgruppe, even when facing vastly numerically superior opposing forces, as 
at Beringen, Geel, Ten Aard, Veghel, Woensdrecht and Steenbergen, managed to 
delay or block an advance, sometimes even recapture ground by skilful manoeuvring 
and making full use of the terrain.  
 
The enormous impact this delay had on both Allies and Germans is stressed by the 
eminent German historian John Zimmermann (whose book on the Wehrmacht in 
1944 and 1945 was discussed in Chapter 1.2) when he wrote that the failure to 
reach the Ruhr area in the autumn of 1944 was due to ‘das Scheitern der 
hochfahrenden Pläne Bernard L. Montgomerys beim Unternehmen “Market Garden” 
ebenso (…) wie durch dessen Unfähigkeit, den Hafen von Antwerpen rechtzeitig (…) 
freizukämpfen.’1585 The unexpected and major impact Chill’s battle group had on the 
Allies is irrefutable. Montgomery himself admitted as much when he wrote about the 
                                        
1581 I Corps, IS 77, 11.10.44 and First Cdn Army IS 109, 12.10.44, and Eisenhower Library AAR First 
US Army September 1944.  
1582 E.g. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 558.  
1583 During the first two weeks of September Second Br Army took no fewer than 39,673 POWs 
(Second Army, IS 93-105, 05-17.09.44). For the period 1 September -10 November among the top 
ten of losses among German divisions were 59. I.D. (5,051), 245. I.D. (3,754) and 712. I.D. (3,714). 
1584 Hart, Colossal Cracks, 170. 
1585 Das Deutsche Reich 10/1, 279. 
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first actions of the Kampfgruppe at Beeringen, Geel and Lommel, ‘considerable 
opposition’, ‘well staged counter attacks’ and ‘The enemy was developing more spirit 
in his attacks (…) and had clearly received reinforcements of better calibre.’1586 All of 
the above explains why General Von Zangen in his post-war analysis had no 
hesitation in singling out the Kampfgruppe for his unstinting praise because he 
described it as ‘durch General Chill vorzueglich aufgebaut und im Kampf gefuehrt; 
wertvollsten Verband der Armee’.1587  Having established that the actions of 
Kampfgruppe Chill had a serious impact on the various levels of military decision 
making, the question remains, why it was so effective. 
 
5.2 Analysis  
 
Effectiveness for a military unit equals military power. To try and answer the third 
key question, to find an explanation for why Kampfgruppe Chill fought as well as it 
did, it is necessary to find a framework which defines the military strength, the 
effectiveness of a given unit. The British armed forces doctrine handbook (2010) 
provides one. It states that military power consists of three components, the physical 
component, the conceptual component and the moral one. 1588 The physical 
component is described as ‘the means to operate and fight.’1589 Does a unit have the 
official establishment in terms of men and materiel (German army: Sollstärke) or is 
the actual number of men and weapons (Iststärke) less than that? The conceptual 
component is formed by ‘the ideas behind how to operate and fight,’1590 in other 
words the doctrine and the procedures as established in an army, in this case the 
guiding principles the Wehrmacht established before and during the war. The moral 
component finally, is ‘the ability to get people to operate and fight’.1591 It refers to 
the morale, the leadership and the organisation. Analysing how Kampfgruppe Chill 
scores on these three basic elements should explain what made it such an effective 
fighting force.  
 
5.2.1 The physical component 
 
The physical component of a unit consists of its ‘manpower, equipment, collective 
performance…’1592 The performance has already been discussed above. For the sake 
of clarity I have broken it down into three aspects, the size (manpower), the armour 
(equipment) and the presence of what Shils and Janowitz call a ‘hard core’ of elite 
troops.  
 
5.2.1.1 Size 
 
When examining the size and structure of a military unit one would normally refer to 
both the strength it should have according to the official table of organisation and 
                                        
1586 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, 131-2. 
1587 Von Zangen, MS B-475, 5. 
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1589 Ibid. 
1590 Ibid. 
1591 Ibid. 
1592 Ibid, 2-31. 
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the actual one, the Sollstärke and the Iststärke respectively, then compare the two 
and draw conclusions from that.1593 A given unit may then be found to be 
understrength for example in general or in specific elements. However, this litmus 
test does not apply to a Kampfgruppe since by its very nature that has no 
Sollsttärke, being an improvised, ad hoc unit. The history of Kampfgruppe Chill 
illustrates this perfectly. As we have seen above (cf. 5.2) it ranged in size from a few 
battalions to nearly a division. In order to assess its physical component, since there 
is no Sollstärke to refer to, the only frame of reference are the other Kampfgruppen 
(cf. 1.4). Appendix 2 provides an overview of the structure and size of the battle 
group at various moments during the autumn campaign. Some conclusions can be 
drawn from these figures. The most important one is that overall, even at its 
smallest, the average number of infantry within the Kampfgruppe, 3,600, or seven 
strong battalions, was roughly equal that of a regular infantry division.1594 What the 
unit lacked above all was sufficient artillery and (mobile) anti-tank weapons. This was 
partly remedied by the inclusion of first schwere Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 
and then Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 and 667. It is clear that these SPs played an 
important role.  
 
5.2.1.2   Armour 
 
A key element for the success of Kampfgruppe Chill lay in the self-propelled guns 
(Sturmgeschütze, Sturmhaubitze and Jagdpanther) that supported it during the 
various engagements. The actions that the Kampfgruppe was involved in have shown 
that where properly used, i.e. defensively and not offensively, Sturmgeschütze and 
Panzerjäger, could be very effective in blocking an Allied advance, even if their tanks 
outnumbered the German armour. No wonder that these vehicles made such a 
lasting impression on the German infantry during the final stage of World War Two 
and are described as a ‘Fels in der Brandung’.1595 While the Germans were faced with 
an armoured steamroller that was unleashed on 20 October without any tanks 
themselves, one of the interesting aspects of operations Pheasant and Suitcase is the 
Germans’ ability to deal with 1,600 Allied tanks without any of their own. It is clear 
from the accounts above that, apart from the usual suspects such as the ubiquitous 
8.8 Flak and 7.5 cm Pak guns, and the handheld Panzerfäuste and Panzerschreck, it 
was the Sturmgeschütze which should take most of the credit for this.  
 
An astute analysis written after the war, about the retreat of 245. infanterie-Division 
in the direction of the Maas, concluded that, ’Der eigenen Truppen halfen –ausser 
der sehr tätigen, aber munitionsschwachen Artl. – nur die Stu.Geschütze [underlined 
in original], die überall trotz ihrer –gegenüber den Fd. Panzern – geringeren 
Beweglichkeit an den Brennpunkten auftauchten und Rückhalt gaben.‘1596 Although 
these SPs without turrets were at a disadvantage compared to tanks, they still 
managed to outgun their opponents as is evident from the engagement near 
                                        
1593 In addition there were Gefechtsstärke and Kampfstärke, daily strength of fighting elements and 
strength on the actual front line respectively; cf. KTB 88 AK, 08.09.44, B 262. 
1594 Cf. KTB 88 AK, C 255, 03.10.44, when KGr Chill was at its biggest (10,880) the next biggest 
division (59. ID) had 9,550 men. 
1595 Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, 199. 
1596 Von Hobe, 49. 
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Roosendaal on 29 October where the 9th Royal Tank Regiment lost eleven Churchills 
to one Sturmgeschütz from Sturmgeschützbrigade 244. In ‘s-Hertogenbosch a single 
Sturmgeschütz of schwere Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 fought a duel with an 
M10 Achilles and won. No wonder that the Bundeswehr after the war developed its 
own Jagdpanzer (the Kanonenjagdpanzer), the only NATO country to do so.1597 A 
German POW quoted the acting commander of 559, Oberleutnant Franz Kopka, as 
saying around the end of October 1944 on the eve of the counterattack at 
Wuustwezel that his unit was so weak that it could at best boost the morale of the 
infantry with which it co-operated, but counted for nothing against the overwhelming 
quantity of British armour.1598 Here Kopka was being too modest. As a German study 
after the war put it, ‘Die Sturmgeschütze sind im Bewusstsein der Infanteristen des 
letzten Krieges von mythischen Glanz umgeben. Sie trugen Schwung und Dynamik 
des echten Kampfes in sich, Sie waren vorn, wo Not am Mann war, sie nahmen zu 
jeder Zeit einzelne den Kampf mit einer mehrfachen Übermacht gepanzerter Feinde 
auf. Wo ein Sturmgeschütz vorfuhr, trug es nicht bloss seine Granaten und den Mut 
seiner Besatzung: an ihm richtete sich immer wieder der Kampfeswille der Männer 
auf, die allein mit ihren Körpern und Waffen den Sturm bestehen mussten’.1599 There 
is no doubt that 559 on a number of occasions such as at Beringen, Geel, Goirle and 
Woensdrecht not only assisted in the defence, but indeed formed the backbone of an 
attack. 
 
It is remarkable that the Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther units operated as 
efficiently as they did in view of the heavy losses they incurred, mostly when they 
were used offensively such as at Beringen and Geel. In defence, such as Ten Aard 
and Logtenburg, they performed much better. Still, as described in Part Three, at any 
given time only part of the Sollstärke (authorized strength) was operational. That 
was not unusual during World War Two, however, and a lot of wear and tear was 
quite common for mechanised units. The American 3rd Armored Division for example 
in early September 1944 had only 70 tanks operational of 232 authorized.1600 In all it 
is clear that this armoured support, even though it was limited compared to a tank, 
was a key factor to the successful defence conducted from September to November 
1944. In addition the Kampfgruppe included another key ingredient to success, a 
‘hard core’ of elite troops, which constituted ten to fifteen per cent in a regular 
Wehrmacht unit,1601 but made up half of the battle group. 
 
5.2.1.3 Elite troops 
 
The ‘hard core’ in this case was formed by the Fallschirmjäger. In general in the Heer 
morale was not very high during the autumn campaign. The corporal from 4./743 
Grenadier-regiment (719. Infanterie-Division) already quoted (cf. 2.5), on 15 
September noted an incident which is quite revealing, “Had a set-to with the 
Kommandeur. He takes the bicycles away from my section because he thinks we 
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1599 Buhr, 1. 
1600 Adams, The Battle for Western Europe, 25. 
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may retreat. ‘Position will be held to the last man,’ he shouts at me.”1602 Feldwebel 
W. Krey from Grenadier-regiment 723  (719. Infanterie-Division), part of 
Kampfgruppe Chill for a period, from whose diary was also quoted earlier, gives the 
most telling comments. On 6 September he writes, ‘Just before reaching the 
crossroads Bergen op Zoom – Antwerp – Flushing a convoy comes towards me. As it 
passes I recognise the Kommandeur, Leutnant Hertel. I call out to him, overjoyed at 
having found one of our officers (…) Leutnant Hertel promises to fetch Hauptmann 
Goldheck at once (…) Hours later he returns without the Hauptmann (…) He says 
that they have gone on towards Rosendaal [sic]. I have lost the last vestige of 
respect for them.’ 1603 And even more tellingly, on 27 September, while moving up to 
attack Heesch, ‘Unnecessary marching and countermarching is making the men 
discontented. We have now been two days without food…’1604  Another quote comes 
from the diary kept by Leutnant Heinz Krueger from 2./1036 (59. Infanterie-
Division). On  27 September, when in positions near Liempde, he wrote: “It’s a 
murderous hell every day. After a while one gets fed to the teeth with it. There’s an 
unending succession of low level attacks by aircraft and concentrations of artillery 
and mortar fire…”1605 The Westheer was then, at best, a mixed bag of competent 
and driven units and others that barely held together.1606 What these examples 
illustrate is an army on the verge of losing its cohesion, the linchpin of its operational 
strength, the cohesion within a fixed unit, which sociologists call the primary group.  
 
On the other hand there were the elite units like the SS and the Fallschirmjäger. 
Their esprit de corps was strong even during the autumn of 1944. Their commanders 
made a special point  of this. Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte, although himself a 
devout Roman Catholic, demanded that each of his men give up all external links 
when FJR 6 was being reformed in September 1944. Their only allegiance should be 
to the Fallschirmjägertruppe. He envisioned a kind of medieval order of fighting 
monks. A political belief, Von der Heydte thought, was the reason behind the 
successes of the Waffen SS and the Red Army.1607 His men certainly believed in their 
own superiority, like any other elite troop, and the value of the paratroopers was 
great, ‘Abgestuft in ihrer Bedeutung waren zunächst die Divisionen der Waffen-SS, 
dann die Panzerdivisionen des Heeres wie teilweise auch die Fallschirmjäger der 
Luftwaffe die unverzichtlichen Stützen der Westfront.’1608 Not surprisingly, this sense 
of superiority not only influenced the group cohesion but added an incentive. As a 
psychology textbook puts it, ‘commitment also involves acceptance of team goals 
and willingness to work hard for the team.’1609 Still, the story is more complicated 
than simply stating that FJR 6, I./FJR 2 and Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz- und 
Ausbildungsregiment Hermann Göring were the elite who formed a hard core that 
Chill could depend on. An important caveat is required here, because the 
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Fallschirmjäger of the autumn of 1944 were not of the same quality as their 
predecessors.  
 
In July and August 30,000 soldiers in the Luftwaffe were converted to 
Fallschirmjäger to make up for the losses sustained that summer.1610 They were 
followed by another 40,000 in September and October.1611 The problem was that 
these hastily constituted units with personnel that had only received the most 
perfunctory training and no combat experience, had little in common with the 
original Fallschirmjäger. Special measures were taken to fill the void by taking 
aircrew whose planes were being grounded for lack of fuel, maintenance crews, 
Luftwaffe signals personnel, training units and those just out of hospital and the 
number of soldiers suffering from ear and stomach complaints increased as a 
result.1612 Von der Heydte had only six weeks to reconstitute FJR 6 and he 
complained about the lack of preparation he was given, saying that ‘hunderte von 
Regimentsangehörigen hatten noch nie ein Gewehr in der Hand gehabt und feuerten 
den ersten Schuss ihres Lebens im ersten Gefecht ab!’1613 One veteran remembered 
that the recruits who were seventeen received an extra milk ration.1614 To what 
extent therefore these Fallschirmjäger units can still be called elite, and thus a hard 
core of Kampfgruppe Chill, is highly debatable. In addition, the Fallschirmjäger could 
be quite a handful. They had a negative reputation among the civilian population and 
even Reinhard complained about the somewhat excessive requisitioning carried out 
by them.1615 When officers from other arms commanded the Fallschirmjäger, the 
results were also often less than impressive, since ‘their good intentions and personal 
bravery were no substitute for training and combat experience.’1616  
 
Neither should we forget that even for the battle hardened Fallschirmjäger there was 
a limit to what they could endure. When the autumn campaign was nearing its end, 
some had had more than enough. An Unteroffizier from Mager’s crack unit, II./FJR 6, 
a veteran decorated with the Eisernes Kreuz II, Verwundetenabzeichen and the 
Sturmabzeichen, who surrendered on 29 October told his captors that ‘the troops 
were completely worn out after the frequent calls made upon them…’1617 The NCO, 
described as ‘rather intelligent’, added that ‘for that reason most of the men had a 
‘Passierschein’ tucked away to make escape easier.’ That many of the Fallschirmjäger 
could not cope any longer is also borne out by the fact that during the period 
discussed three Jäger were shot for ‘Fahnenflucht’ (cf. 5.2.3). That is not a lot in 
absolute figures and yet is a relatively high number (0.15%) since for the 
Wehrmacht as a whole (on average ten million men strong) the number was 700 
men a month (0.007%) sentenced to death for the same crime during the second 
half of 1944.1618 On top of that, the Fallschirmjäger from Fallschirm Panzer Ersatz 
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und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring were not considered proper 
paratroopers by the others -or even themselves- and the documentation appears to 
underline this. Members of the regiment, consisting of new recruits and ex-Luftwaffe 
ground personnel all of them aged between 17 and 21 years old, themselves agreed 
that the name was mainly ‘a propaganda device to induce enthusiasm of young 
recruits.’1619 They had not received any training in air-landings or parachutes. 
Nevertheless the Allied interrogators conceded that the men ‘were of a better type 
than those encountered in regular army units.’ All of the above shows that even the 
‘hard core’ did not consist of a group of uniformly driven, indoctrinated and highly 
motivated soldiers willing to fight until their dying breath.  
 
It is finally also worth remembering that the hard core was not included when the 
Kampfgruppe was first formed.  Chill was then in charge of a true hodgepodge of 
troops, many of low quality. This is attested by the evaluation by LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps, ‘Eigene Truppe ist besonders im Abschnitt der 85.I.D. stark 
durcheinandergewürfelt, viele Kampfunlustige Splittereinheiten älterer Jahrgänge 
aller Wehrmachtteile, die junge Mannschaft von Luftwaffeneinheiten sind 
grösstenteils Rekruten, im Gefecht noch ungewandt. Es fehlen tatkräftige Führer, 
besonders Unterführer bei der Truppe.’1620 It is evident that some of the junior 
officers, particularly those from other than front line units, such as airfield or railway 
guards , often older men or barely trained personnel, were found wanting. 
Nevertheless, the officers in charge, Chill, Dreyer, Von Hütz et al were seasoned 
veterans with a firm grip on the situation as is evident from the successful outcome 
of the engagements described above. It is clear that two elements of the physical 
component were key to this success in spite of the constantly shifting composition of 
the battle group, the presence of low grade troops and lack of sufficient artillery or 
anti-tank weapons. The inclusion of  Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther on the one 
hand and a hard core of Fallschirmjäger on the other go some way to explain the 
efficacy of the Kampfgruppe. 
 
5.2.2 The conceptual component 
 
According to a recent definition, ‘At the heart of the conceptual component is 
doctrine, supported by an understanding of conflict and context, education and 
innovation.’1621 As far as doctrine and procedures were concerned there were no 
special rules for Kampfgruppen, the same that went for the Heer as a whole also 
applied to the Kampfgruppe. This meant for example that the tactics employed, such 
as how to deal with enemy attacks, though often effective, were not always refined. 
Officers in the German army were taught that an enemy that had broken through 
‘durch sofort einsetzende kurze Gegenstösse zurückzuwerfen, ehe er in dem 
gewonnenen Gelände Fuss gefasst und sich eingerichtet hat.’1622 These 
counterattacks usually went in without any proper preparations, let alone 
reconnaissance, but as a writer on the Normandy campaign already noted on this 
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tactic, ‘it worked, but it wasn’t fancy…’1623 One important aspect that was drilled into 
German officers was that counterattacks were always to be undertaken ‘gegen die 
Flanke des eingebrochenen Gegners…’1624 This is something we see Chill undertaking 
time and again, at Beringen, Geel, Goirle and Woensdrecht. Only where 
circumstances made a flanking attack impossible, for example at Ten Aard, or where 
another goal was pursued, such as at Veghel, did he adopt other methods. Quite 
often these flanking attacks, though costly, were successful, if not at retaking 
territory then certainly at halting an Allied advance. The danger here was that the 
attackers in turn ran the risk of being enveloped themselves. This could only be 
prevented by a ‘Fesselung’ of the enemy tip before attacking the flanks.1625  
 
The key ingredients to a flanking attack were surprise and celerity.1626 Here the 
presence of armour with its emphasis on mobility was, of course, a prerequisite. That 
is why the use of even a small number of Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther could 
make a difference, as is evident from the counterattacks at Geel, Goirle and 
Huijbergen. Also speedy decision making was something all German officers had 
been thoroughly trained in. Following pre-war manoeuvres they were told that 
‘slowness in arriving at a tactical decision (…) is regarded as a serious fault’ and ‘the 
officer who waited until he had clear information always acts too late.’1627 This 
emphasis on prompt action was further fuelled by the experiences in Russia where 
even a moment’s hesitation could mean the difference between survival and 
annihilation. Together with the (relative) independence of thought it explains why 
Chill and his key officers achieved such results and ‘Das hier demonstrierte schnell 
entschlossene, selbstverantwortliche Handeln, hatte weitreichende Folgen.‘1628 These 
consequences have been listed above (5.1). 
 
Doctrines and procedures were generally followed, as noted above, the 
Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther, however, were often used in roles they were not 
suited for. The guidelines for the Jagdpanther for example, stated that the SPs 
should never be used as tanks because of the lack of all-round firing capability. Also 
the use of a single Jagdpanther was expressly forbidden.1629 The strong point of the 
Jagdpanther was its 8.8 cm gun so that it was expected to open fire early, either on 
soft or hard targets, from a distance of 2,500 metres. This was rarely the case during 
the autumn campaign. For Sturmgeschütze similar restrictions applied, and here too 
it was emphasised that these SPs were not tanks and using them as such meant 
sacrificing a valuable weapon.1630 Above all, close cooperation with all arms, but the 
infantry in particular, was stressed. A number of these tenets were broken during the 
engagements described above, out of sheer necessity. In his analysis of the first two 
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weeks, quoted extensively In Part Three (3.5), Kopka pointed out that the main 
problem was that the infantry commanders he served under all too often kept the 
SPs in the wrong place leading to a scattering instead of a concentration of the 
armoured forces. That the Sturmgeschütze and Jagdpanther nevertheless made a 
valuable contribution albeit at great cost to themselves is abundantly clear. 
 
5.2.3 The moral component 
 
The moral component is concerned with the human element, ‘the least predictable 
aspect of conflict’, but one that ‘wins and loses battles.’1631 Here we find key aspects 
such as morale, cohesion (and within it comradeship, pride, the warrior spirit, 
discipline, integrity and loyalty), leadership and organisation. 
 
5.2.3.1 Morale 
 
The first of the three elements of the mental component is morale. As mentioned in 
the introduction, one question that was on the minds of historians after 1945 was, 
why did the Wehrmacht continue to fight until the very end? For renowned historian 
and Hitler expert Ian Kershaw it is clear why the Third Reich fought until its dying 
breath, Hitler stood in the way of any other solution and ‘Confronting Hitler in any 
organized body, political or military, was completely impossible.’1632 There was no 
alternative, but to go on until Hitler, the sole source of power in the Reich killed 
himself. This offers a plausible explanation of why the elite was powerless to do 
anything else but support Hitler. It does not explain why the ordinary Landser fought 
on till the inevitable end. Several possible answers have been given by scholars (cf. 
1.3). As has already been pointed out in the introduction, the devastating defeat in 
France in the summer of 1944 was a major psychological blow to the German 
soldiers. ‘Frankreich verloren zu haben besiegelte in den Augen der Soldaten die 
totale Niederlage.’1633 Why, in the awareness of being on the brink of defeat did the 
ordinary soldier continue to function as before? The study by Neitzel and Welzer 
discussed in 1.3 provides us with a possible answer. The soldiers functioned as 
before because they were used to obeying orders. It is true that they were 
threatened with a court-martial if they did not, but it is also true that they took pride 
in what they did. Even in the face of defeat, ‘Die Soldaten der Wehrmacht wollten 
vor allem eine: die eigene Aufgabe, welcher Art sie auch immer war, gut erfüllen.’1634 
This applied in 1944 or 1945 just as much as during the period of the great German 
victories. Indoctrination did not come into this. There is no reason to assume that 
the atrocities which Bartov (cf. 1.3) ascribed to a high degree of indoctrination, were 
not also largely the result of a rapidly deteriorating moral framework because of the 
vicious nature of the conflict on the Eastern Front (on both sides). The GI’s who were 
responsible for the massacre in My Lai were certainly not indoctrinated by a barbaric 
regime setting out to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, but still they 
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indiscriminately shot and killed possibly as many as 500 civilians. There is no doubt, 
‘Mit dem Krieg brechen Chaos, Unerwartetes und Barbarei herein.’ 1635  
 
Not only chaos, the unexpected, but a deterioration of the normal moral framework 
are part and parcel of any war. Belief in the superiority of the Third Reich was no 
doubt part of the training, the mindset of the German army, but a soldier trying to 
survive has other priorities. The soldiers in Kampfgruppe Chill, like many of their 
peers, did not believe in the final victory either. When two of them were taken 
prisoner in December by the Americans they told their interrogators that ‘the morale 
of the three combat groups is low: the men are unwilling to fight and want relief.’1636 
The resilience all boils down to that old chestnut, primary group cohesion. Franz 
Kopka, acting Kommandeur of 559, for most of the period described in this study, 
explains how he and his men felt when he disbanded the company on 17 April 1945. 
‘Die ’Zeit der Gemeinsamkeit’ (…) war für die nun zum Teil heimatlos gewordene 
Männer zu Ende, die ’Zeit der Einsamkeit’ begann.’1637 These words, ‘togetherness’ as 
opposed to ‘loneliness’, clearly express a deeply felt, traumatic loss experience and 
not a rejoicing that the end of a struggle for survival was almost over. The idea of 
the group as a surrogate family is confirmed by experiences like this. As John Ellis 
puts it in his excellent study of the fighting man in World War Two, ‘Selflessness, 
pride, mutual respect are still not adequate concepts to fully describe the frontline 
soldiers’ feelings towards one another. In the final analysis one is speaking of an 
identification with and concern for one’s fellows so all-consuming that one can only 
speak in terms of love.’1638 Finally, it should be remembered that the primary group, 
although born out of necessity and no more than a substitute family, also offers to 
young men the promise of exhilarating experiences, ‘The sociality of the primordial 
group is most likely, after all, rooted in the exigencies of defense against animal 
predators. We may enjoy the company of our fellows, but we thrill in the prospect of 
joining them in collective defense against the common enemy [italics in original].’1639 
Defying the odds, taking on the world, has something attractive, heroic even, 
especially for men raised in a tradition of honour as Germans were. 
 
Then, and this is also a principle that applies to soldiers anywhere, there is the fact 
that most people by instinct want to do what is perceived as right, or what they are 
being told is right. Defending one’s country is one of those duties, ‘Wenn der Krieg 
beginnt, so kämpft der durchschnittliche Jüngling oder Mann für sein Land, weil er 
das als seine Pflicht ansieht…’1640 After all, defending one’s country also means 
protecting one’s loved ones. Neither should we forget, that in 1944, unlike in today’s 
world, people only received limited, heavily filtered and biased information about 
events outside. Of course, the ordinary German must have been aware that things 
were going badly, but then had not Hitler helped them out of seemingly desparate 
situations before? Everything was done to encourage the soldiers to do their utmost. 
For example, on 11 October Von Zangen passed on an order from OB West issued on 
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30 September, in which among other things he offered the following rewards for acts 
of bravery: a one week’s stay at the 15. Armee rest camp at Zeist for knocking out a 
tank or shooting twenty enemy soldiers, two weeks for knocking out two tanks or 
killing forty soldiers and twenty days’ home leave for exceptional bravery.1641  
 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this enticing offer had much effect. That 
most German soldiers continued to do their best and did not give up, should not 
really come as a surprise because it stems from a long soldierly tradition which is not 
specifically German, ‘All codes of military justice in the West clearly define cowardice 
as running from formation or abandoning rank, regardless of the situation…’1642 Only 
when the formation as a whole collapsed did the individual soldiers give up. In this 
sense the German soldiers were no different from the small group of British 
infantrymen surrounded at Rorke’s Drift in 1879 who were also heavily outnumbered 
by the Zulus facing them and were in a seemingly hopeless situation, yet fought on, 
because of ‘the training and the regulations of the British army, the fear of and 
respect for their officers, and the camaraderie and loyalty to one another.’1643 Or to 
put it in more basic human terms, an important motive for carrying on was ‘the 
unwillingness as in most armies, to leave close friends and comrades in the lurch.’1644 
In addition there was the fear of what would come after the war was over, fuelled by 
the Morgenthau plan and reports of atrocities committed by the Red Army. The 
spectre of 1918 loomed large. Finally, is not the basic question much simpler: what 
else could the ordinary soldiers have done? The documents that have survived about 
Kampfgruppe Chill bear this out. 
 
The answer to the question of morale within the Kampfgruppe is a somewhat 
complicated one in view of the varied nature of the battle group. In order to get a 
reliable picture therefore the whole time frame needs to be examined. The best 
documentation on the mindset of Kampfgruppe Chill comes from the POW 
interrogations. Unlike for example the OCMH studies, they were not written in 
hindsight and therefore give a fairly reliable picture of how the men in the 
Kampfgruppe felt about the war. The picture varies, no doubt partly because some of 
the men were taken by surprise, e.g. when their positions were overrun, whereas 
others willingly surrendered to the Allied troops and a few even deliberately 
deserted. Still, their testimonies are the closest we can come to what their morale 
was at the time and they give an invaluable insight as to how the men in the 
Kampfgruppe felt and what they thought. That certainly applies to the somewhat 
inauspicious start, when Chill was in charge of a truly mixed bag of men. Near Geel 
and the Maas-Scheldt Canal on 14 and 15 September a number of officers and other 
ranks from Bataillon Pohl were captured. They were interviewed a few days later. In 
the preamble the (Canadian) interrogators state that, ‘they ranged from would-be 
deserters to youthful sailors with fairly marked NAZI [capitals in original]  
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characteristics.’1645 The information the prisoners gave was checked against other 
sources and was ‘considered fairly reliable.’ The sailors, Luftwaffe personnel and 
others who had been marshalled on 4 September and locked in by some Chill’s 
officers in barracks in the Belgian town of Turnhout before being sent to the various 
battle groups set up by Chill on the whole were more angry and upset than inspired 
by suddenly being thrown into the line as infantrymen. In addition the naval men 
had expected to become sailors, not foot soldiers. The fact that they had been issued 
Italian rifles was another slight for them. They especially disliked the way they had 
been treated by the officers who they felt had ‘deserted’ them. Also the fact that 
many had not received any mail since D-Day  put a serious damper on their spirits. 
The older men in particular indicated that they were worried about the future and 
wondered whether the Allies were already in Germany. Finally most of the men taken 
at Geel blamed SS troops on their right for running away.1646 There was another 
reason older soldiers were more negative which is evident from another group of 
prisoners, from Kampfgruppe Buchholz, captured in the same area a few days later, 
who had originally served with Eisenbahn Schützbataillon 484 in France.1647 They 
stated that ‘the retreat from Lille area (…) was most disorderly, reminding them of 
the final phase of the last war.’ What they added, however, was also very revealing, 
i.e. ‘as long as orders were given they will be obeyed.’ On 5 October a group of 
soldiers belonging to Kampfgruppe Dreyer were captured south of Goirle.1648 The 
interrogator noted that now the front had temporarily stabilised the prisoners, who 
had only been with the battle group for the last eight days, were ‘more security 
conscious’ and needed to be pressured to reveal information. Nevertheless, most of 
them admitted that the war was lost.  
 
An officer and four NCOs, all ex-Luftwaffe, captured at the brickworks in 
Hoogerheide four days later quite clearly had another axe to grind.1649 The disgust at 
the way they were treated was represented by a Stabsfeldwebel, who had been 
trained as a pilot, had even soloed and was still turned down by his CO and then 
sent to Kampfgruppe Chill as a rifleman where he had to take orders from a ‘cheeky’ 
Corporal. Another group from Bataillon Ohler, captured on 14 October, provided 
further insight why some of these disgruntled men kept on fighting.1650 They told 
their interrogator that they thought continuing to fight was ‘senseless’, but that their 
company commander, Leutnant Glade, used his MP 40 whenever soldiers tried to pull 
back during an Allied artillery barrage. Another group that was extremely likely to 
desert, apart from the defeatists, the Canadians discovered were the Volksdeutsche, 
often Poles within Chill’s battle group.1651 Many of them had been included in the 
original 85. Infanterie-Division and a number of them were still with the division in 
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early September. After the Kampfgruppe was formed in early September they were 
deliberately kept further to the rear to reduce their opportunity to desert.  
 
In stark contrast to this were two soldiers from Sturmbataillon AOK 15, both 
surprised to find themselves captured one day later.1652 They categorically stated 
that morale in their unit was very good. The next day an officer and five NCOs from 
I./FJR 2 (Finzel) surrendered at Hoogerheide as a result of intense artillery fire on 
their positions. In spite of having been captured, the officer, one Leutnant 
Ackermann (1. Kompanie), boasted of Germany’s secret weapons and the effect on 
the war.1653 He admitted, however, that the majority of the group had never received 
any parachute training. The same optimism was expressed by a Fahnenjunker from 
FJR 6 captured on 3 October, who was described as intelligent by his captors.1654 He 
explained that Germany’s ‘reverses are (…) only temporary if the army can hold out 
long enough to permit the reorganized industry to sup[ply] the t[roo]ps.’ The report 
continued, ‘the new w[ea]p[o]ns are not illusory and PW hinted on [sic] new 
explosives (atoms) but admitted he did not know very many details.’ Other prisoners 
from FJR 6 also thought that morale was still very good within the unit.1655 One of 
them contributed it not to outside circumstances, but to his own sense of 
humour.1656 A group of three senior NCOs from FJR 2, captured in a cellar at 
Hoogerheide on 16 October, were equally sanguine and their morale was good even 
though they had been in constant action since being committed at Beverlo on 7 
September.1657 The same can be said for two prisoners from I./Fallschirm Panzer 
Ersatz und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring (Bataillon Pauls) captured at 
Essen on 22 October after the start of operation Suitcase. They said that even 
though they were unsure about the outcome of the war, morale was fairly good 
mainly because ‘rations were quite good and this kept the morale in balance.’1658 
Another large group of sixteen prisoners from I./FJR 2 taken near Roosendaal five 
days later, were in relatively high spirits.1659 They still hoped and believed in a 
German victory since they were ‘convinced of Germany’s strength and its ability to 
turn the tide with the new weapons…’ In the preamble the interrogator made an 
interesting remark when he said about the group that ‘They were typical German 
soldiers who tried to do their duty.’  
 
Towards the end of the campaign, another Fallschirmjäger from I./FJR 2 was taken 
by surprise when he was tending a wounded soldier in Welberg on 3 November.1660 
This young Jäger (he was eighteen) was on the same wavelength as his comrades 
and believed in German victory because there was ‘nothing else to believe in.’ Morale 
in the unit was good, he said, mainly because they had ‘quite good’ officers. On the 
other hand the statements of two prisoners from Kamfgruppe Dreyer who stayed 
                                        
1652 First Cdn Army, IR PoW Misc. Artillery Units, 16.10.44. 
1653 When asked to give an example, he finally got off his high horse and described a new ’50 man 
tank’ to his interrogator, explaining that it had 2 men inside while 48 were pushing it. 
1654 First Cdn Army, IR PoW Infantry FJR 6, 11.10.44. 
1655 Ibid, 05.10.44, 13.10.44, 16.10.44 and 18.10.44. 
1656 Ibid, 16.10.44. 
1657 First Cdn Army, IR PoW Battle Groups, 18.10.44. 
1658 Ibid, 25.10.44. 
1659 First Cdn Army, IR PoW Infantry, 2 Para Rgt, 27.10.44. 
1660 Ibid, 2 Para Rgt, 07.11.44. 
 346 
back in Steenbergen and were interrogated the same day contradicted this 
picture.1661 They claimed that morale in their unit was very bad and both officers and 
NCOs expressed the opinion that the war was lost, although some of them hoped 
that secret weapons would turn the tide in Germany’s favour. These prisoners, who 
had served at regimental headquarters, said that the worst thing was the Allied 
artillery. It was not just the regular infantry who were prey to doubts about 
Germany’s position, even men from FJR 6 shared these sentiments, and, quite unlike 
their comrades quoted above, three of them felt that the war had been going on for 
long enough and they just wanted to go home.1662 Others professed themselves to 
be anti-Nazi.1663  
 
Not surprisingly Kampfgruppe Chill also numbered a few Fahnenflüchtige some of 
whom, from Bataillon Pohl, were captured near Roosendaal.1664 The story they told 
their captors reads like a thriller. The original group of four first deserted near Boxtel 
on 6 september. Then one them, an SS man, betrayed the others, who had in the 
meantime been joined by another deserter. The five appeared before a court-martial 
and the president sentenced them to death. They were locked up in a cellar. In sheer 
desperation they stood on each other’s shoulders to look out of the window. Then, 
on 12 October, fortune finally favoured them. The guards were called away because 
of a potential Allied breakthrough and they managed to escape. A Dutch policeman 
they encountered by accident came to their rescue and directed them to a farm near 
Roosendaal where they waited until the British captured the area in order to desert a 
second time. Their main reasons for deserting were that they had long periods of 
fighting without rest, that they felt the war was lost, and –interestingly- that they 
had heard no news from home for months and had found out that their outgoing 
mail had been destroyed by their own unit. In a note the interrogator added that the 
ages of the four deserters (18, 27 and 38) showed that ‘not all the younger 
generation were saturated with that desired Nazi zeal.’ Other deserters were not so 
lucky. In all three Fallschirmjäger from FJR 6 were shot for Fahnenflucht during the 
time frame discussed in this study.1665 The story of a deserter from FJR 6 who 
crossed the lines at Woensdrecht on 14 October may provide some insight into their 
motives.1666 He had quite a different story to tell from those who praised the strong 
group cohesion in the regiment. This Jäger from 10. Kompanie complained about 
being pushed to the limits of endurance, adding that his platoon had had no rations 
for five days and were consequently hungry and exhausted. The prisoner told the 
Canadians that he had fainted as a result and was caught by his Feldwebel who 
warned him and reported the incident. When he later learned that his company 
commander (Leutnant LeCoutre) and a Feldwebel were approaching his position he 
was sure he would be shot which was why he deserted.  
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These interviews provide a window into the mindset of the men in Kampfgruppe Chill 
and it is evident from all of the above that morale in the battle group ran the whole 
gamut from a zealous dedication to national-socialism to a willingness or even 
eagerness to desert. Some men said that morale was good within their unit, while 
others from the same outfit complained that it was not.1667 Some praised the bond 
between officers and men, others said that the relationship was poor. In this respect 
the Kampfgruppe did not differ from the rest of the German army in any significant 
way and the answer to the unit’s effectiveness therefore cannot be found here. 
However, the mental component has two other elements, leadership and 
organisation.  
 
5.2.3.2 Leadership 
 
Even though Shils and Janowitz already found that senior commanders like Chill, 
Dreyer and Von der Heydte were too remote for ordinary soldiers to be inspirational 
(which is confirmed in the POW interviews), they were still crucial for the success of 
Kampfgruppe Chill because of their tactical and organisational skills plus the fact that 
company and battalion grade officers tended to copy their superiors.1668 This 
emphasizes the key roles played by them. The German manual for officers, 
Heeresdienstvorschrift 300 Truppenführung, written in 1936 already accurately 
pointed this out. Paragraph 11 succinctly puts it like this. ‘Der wert des Führers und 
des Mannes bestimmt den Gefechtswert der Truppe’.1669 Likewise, Lieb concluded in 
his study that ’Entscheidend für die Haltung der Truppe war das Vorhandensein 
entsprechende Führer, insbesondere der Offizieren und deren Haltung…’1670 In 
addition to group loyalty, skilled officers, ‘the crucial cogs in the military machine’ are 
the second pillar of any effective army.1671 Interestingly Chill, the man after whom 
the Kampfgruppe was named, fits in a category described by Lieb in his study as 
‘energisch, rücksichtslos, ‘osterfahren’…1672 These soldiers were junior officers in the 
First World War and now in their fifties were fighting the Second. In other words, in 
1944 these men were in their tenth year of war which means that for about a third 
of their adult lives they had been actively involved in a war. This made them 
seasoned veterans. But Lieb feels that this could also be why they used all their 
powers to prevent the war, and thus their own careers, from coming to an end. 
Retrospectively the results justify Chill’s decision during the first days of September 
when he formed a core of senior and junior officers to lead the new Kampfgruppe. 
That this was no accidental decision, but one that had been carefully considered by 
Chill is borne out by the statement of his Ia, Oberstleutnant Kurt Schuster, who 
wrote about the creation of the Kampfgruppe on 4 September, ‘Hier bewährte es 
sich, dass die Div. von Anfang an bei hohen Kampfverlusten Einheiten 
zusammengelegt und die freiwerdenden Offiziere in der Div.Führer-Reserve 
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zusammengefasst hatte.’1673 In other words, even before events required him to 
employ them Chill was already aware of the crucial importance of maintaining a core 
of experienced officers. No doubt the fact that many of these senior officers were 
veterans from the Eastern Front was a contributory factor to their efficiency as well. 
 
This efficiency is confirmed by the combat performance in Normandy of the 85. 
Infanterie-Division, which after all was the basis, if a slender one, for the 
Kampfgruppe. The problem here is that the division fought only for a very brief 
period, just one week, before being crushed under the avalanche of Operation 
Tractable (cf. 2.4). After one week in action about a hundred infantry were left. Still, 
during this short period of time the division earned three Ritterkreuze, an amazing 
feat, compared to other infantry divisions fighting on the same front.1674 This, too, 
proves that Kampfgruppe Chill had a high number of excellent and brave officers and 
it is no wonder that two of the three divisional Ritterkreuzträger, Dreyer and Von 
Hütz, played key roles in the actions described above.1675 This is all the more 
astonishing in view of the fact that according to some of his men Von Hütz was in 
some way connected to the plot to kill Adolf Hitler.1676 It is unclear to what extent 
this was true, but the mere fact that this, and the fact that he listened to the BBC 
and refused to give the Nazi salute, was rumoured about him suggests that if not 
anti- he was certainly not pro-Nazi. Nevertheless, he was an excellent and energetic 
officer and that was all that mattered. As organizational psychologists have found, ‘A 
leader who is charismatic and has a profound effect on followers is transformational. 
Such a leader can transform followers’ aspirations, needs, preferences, and values by 
providing a vision of something worthwhile to achieve.’1677 This exactly describes the 
effect the aforementioned officers had on their men. It was not merely through fear 
or by imposing a harsh regime that they got their way, although that too was part of 
the military modus operandi, but they inspired their subordinates to go beyond what 
was expected of them and thus, even while losing a battle, stand their ground 
against all the odds. 
 
Even though Hitler had abolished the principle of Auftragstaktik in 1941 (cf. 1.2) it 
was still in use wherever possible, requiring officers that were not afraid to take 
quick and decisive action. In this crisis, more than ever before did these men 
determine how their units performed. Noted Hitler biographer Ian Kershaw also 
pointed out the vital role played by the officer corps in delaying the inevitable 
because the ‘junior and middle ranking officers were crucial cogs in the military 
machine.’1678 Kampfgruppe Chill undoubtedly prevailed in the face of almost 
impossible odds because of its leaders. Superior leadership compensated for inferior 
numbers and truly made the battle-weary and often inexperienced soldiers of the 
battle group achieve the seemingly impossible. The basic tenet of tactics, superior 
fire and movement were applied by them time and again. There is no evidence to 
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1674 For a complete table of comparison: Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg, 581-3, although he –erroneously- 
does not include 85. I.D. in the divisions that only entered the battlefield in August. 
1675 The third, Oberleutnant Adolf Vogt, had been wounded and was recuperating in a hospital in Jena. 
1676 PoW interview WO 208/603. 
1677 Spector, Industrial Organizational Psychology, 329. 
1678 Kershaw, The End, 394. 
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suggest that the average soldier in Kampfgruppe Chill was braver than their Allied 
counterparts or more skilled, but in addition to other factors mentioned above, it was 
primarily the superior leadership and personal initiative that gave them the edge 
during engagements. This was recognized as early as 1948 when German generals, 
questioned by the British military theoretician B.H. Liddell Hart, said that compared 
to World War One their troops had performed much better, because ‘die 
Beziehungen zwischen Offizier und Mann waren besser’ and, equally important ‘Die 
einfachen Soldaten zeigten immer mehr Initiative und gebrauchten ihre Köpfe besser 
(…) besonders, wenn sie im Kampfe auf sich gestellt waren oder in Kleine Verbände 
fochten.’1679 This leaves the aspect of organisation.  
 
5.2.3.3  Organisation 
 
With regards to the third pillar of the mental component it can be safely stated that 
Chill and the other key officers used the limited resources they had to maximum 
effect. It is clearly evident from the way the Kampfgruppe responded to attacks and 
the way in which it handled attacks and counterattacks, i.e. quickly, resolutely, 
determinedly and effectively, points to a high degree of control and experience. 
Chill’s forward headquarters were always close to the front line and like many 
veteran commanders he liked to lead if not ‘from the front’ then certainly very close 
to the front. That he managed to maintain control was to a considerable degree 
because the divisional staff had remained intact by and large during the retreat from 
Normandy. It arrived back in Belgium with its infrastructure still functioning, enabling 
Chill to set up the Kampfgruppe at such short notice.1680 It is also clear that many of 
the officers that played key roles came from the 85. Infanterie-Division and had been 
specially selected by Chill himself. In the end, the fact that the Kampfgruppe 
performed so much better than the other units in 15. Armee (see below, 5.3.2) is 
evidence of the organisational skills of Chill and his staff.  
 
The answer to the question about the fighting power of Kampfgruppe Chill can now 
be answered. It is evident from all of the above that the explanation for the excellent 
performance of the Kampfgruppe, almost from day one until early 1945 when it was 
finally disbanded, lies in three aspects, the support by ‘hardware’, in this case SPs, 
the superior leadership and the presence of a hard core of elite troops. 
 
5.3 Kampfgruppe Chill as a case study 
 
One of the primary aims of this study was to take Kampfgruppe Chill as a study of 
the Wehrmacht at this stage of the war on a micro level. Having already explained 
why Kampfgruppe Chill was so effective, the time has come to answer the remaining 
two questions: what new light does the performance of Kampfgruppe Chill shed on 
what we know of Kampfgruppen in the west in 1944 and on the Wehrmacht as a 
whole in the same setting?  
                                        
1679 Liddell Hart, Jetzt dürfen sie reden, 514. 
1680 KTB 88 AK, 14.09.44, B 276, shows that the 85 ID still had 705 non-fighting troops (Stab, 
Nachrichten, Nachschub, Kraftfahrpark, Sanität, Verwaltung, Veterinär and Feldpost) as opposed to 
784 fighting troops (infanterie, Pioniere, Artillerie and Panzerjäger) of whom nearly half, 369, were 
artillerymen without guns. 
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5.3.1 Kampfgruppe Chill as a Kampfgruppe 
 
The first of the two questions to be answered is, to what extent was Kampfgruppe 
Chill typical or atypical for Kampfgruppen (in the sense of improvised battle groups) 
in the West? As we have seen (cf. 1.4), there was a huge variety in the size that a 
Kampfgruppe could take, from  that of a platoon to a division. To a certain extent 
Kampfgruppe Chill also varied in size, although not as markedly.1681 When his battle 
group was formed on 4 September Chill controlled only his own infantry (about a 
hundred men) plus about 2,000 sailors, security personnel and ex-Luftwaffe 
personnel. On 29 September, just after the final attack on the Corridor near 
Schijndel, in addition to its core troops1682 (1,020 men), it also controlled various 
Fallschirmjäger battalions1683 (6,318 men), artillery and one company of schwere 
Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, making up a force of no fewer than 10,800 men, 
roughly the size (at least on paper) of the average German division in 1944. For most 
of its existence it controlled six to seven infantry battalions and six batteries plus 
some SPs, usually Sturmgeschütze. As we have seen (cf. 1.3.2) the majority of the 
Kampfgruppen on the western front was either battalion-sized or smaller. This means 
that Chill’s battle group is one of the 11-13% that were bigger and like most of these 
it initially lacked artillery and anti-tank weapon. Although that deficiency was later 
partly remedied it always had fewer guns than a regular infantry division. This means 
that is was atypical for the majority of the Kampfgruppen in the West. That still begs 
the question as to how it performed in comparison to similar sized battle groups.  
 
To assess its effectiveness as a Kampfgruppe it is pointless to compare it to the 
smaller ones and instead a battle group similar to Chill’s needs to be examined. As it 
happens there is one, Kampfgruppe Walther, which also fought over similar terrain 
during the same period. This Kampfgruppe existed for exactly one month, from 13 
September to 12 October, and like Kampfgruppe Chill varied in size and 
composition.1684 At the start it controlled seven infantry battalions (including the 
redoubtable FJR 6), two artillery batteries and the seven operational Sturmgeschütze 
of 2./schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559. However, this relatively strong 
force was split into two by operation Garden on 17 September and for the next five 
days Walther was down to three infantry battalions plus the SS artillery.1685 A week 
later it had absorbed the bulk of 107. Panzerbrigade and some extra infantry and the 
Kampfgruppe was again a sizeable force with five infantry battalions, three batteries, 
Panther tanks and Sturmgeschütze.1686 Once settled around Overloon the battle 
                                        
1681 For a complete overview see Appendix 2. 
1682 Feld Ersatz bataillon 185, Artillerie Regiment 185 and the remnants of Grenadier Regimente 1054 
and 1055 plus the divisional staff. 
1683 I and II/F.Pz.Ers. und.Ausb.Rgt. Hermann Göring, I, II and IV/FJR 6, Fl. Btl. Bloch, Gramse, 
Wittstock, Duchstein and Hanke, 3/Pz.Jg.Abt. 170 and part of Pz.Jg. Abt. 344. 
1684 Data, Schacht, OCMH MS P-188 I. 
1685 I/FJR 18, III/SS PzGr 19, II/SS PzGr 21. (Sixt, Anhang zur P-188, 3) 
1686 I/FJR 18, III/SS PzGr 19, I/FJR 21, I/GR 16, PzGr Btl 107 (Sixt, 4). According to Sixt (6) on 2 
October Fallschirmjägerbataillon Paul was added and a week later Kerutt (I./FJR 18) left.  However, it 
appears that this may be incorrect and that Hauptmann Paul simply took over I/FJR 18 when Kerutt 
was wounded on 13.10.44 (Fallschirmjäger-Suchdienst, Suchliste 1/1968, 1, and Suchliste 5/1967, 1 
(via Peter Vandermissen).  
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group could also call on LXXXVI. Armeekorps artillery including a Werfer battery.1687 
Finally, on 14 October when command was transferred to Oberst Rudolf Goltzsch and 
it was renamed Kampfgruppe Goltzsch (from 16 October: Kampfgruppe 344. I.D.) it 
boasted five infantry battalions, four batteries plus Panther tanks.1688 There are no 
exact figures as to the size of the Kampfgruppe, but it is reasonable to assume that 
the infantry battalions –except for Panzergrenadier-Bataillon 107 which had about 
1,000 men- were of average size (cf. 2.4) so that  Walther commanded five 
battalions or 3,000 men plus.1689 Compared to Kampfgruppe Chill the battle group 
was therefore only slightly weaker in infantry. It was, however, much stronger in 
armour, possessing thirty-three of the best medium tanks of the war at the start. 
Also, the infantry was far more mobile than Chill’s since Panzergrenadier-Bataillon 
107 had its own Schützenpanzerwagen (halftracks). Another similarity is that, like 
Kampfgruppe Chill, its constituent parts came from three different services, the Heer, 
the Waffen SS and the Luftwaffe. This also meant that like Chill Oberst Walther had 
a ‘hard core’ of elite troops. One would expect the two to be equal in efficacy 
therefore. 
 
It is certainly true that Kampfgruppe Walther scored some major defensive 
successes, notably delaying the advance of VIII Corps while pulling back to the Zuid-
Willemsvaart and during the various engagements around Overloon and environs, 
but also had its share of serious defeats. There were five separate episodes in the 
actions of the Kampfgruppe. The first was the failed attempt to eliminate the British 
bridgehead at Neerpelt (13-15 September). This has already been discussed (3.4) in 
detail. The next was operation Garden (17 September). This was a major disaster for 
Kampfgruppe Walther as the ground offensive of XXX Corps sliced through the battle 
group, splitting it wide open. During the next stage (18-21 September) it pulled back 
slowly to the Zuid-Willemsvaart where the last elements crossed on 20 September. 
The next episode began two days later when 107. Panzerbrigade was subordinated 
to Walther and the Kampfgruppe was ordered to attack and seize and destroy Veghel 
bridge in concert with the 59. Infanterie-Division which was to attack from the west. 
Again, as described extensively above (3.4), the attack failed to achieve the 
objective. On 24 September the Kampfgruppe was forced to pull back as it was now 
being threatened from the rear by the advance of VIII Corps and it set up a defence 
in a semi-circle around Overloon. Here the last episode (24 September – 13 October) 
took place. The battle group fought a successful delaying defence, successful 
because it was time consuming, costly and bloody for the Allies, the defenders 
making full use of the fact that the attacks were channelled by the few metalled 
roads which had been turned into killing zones.1690  
 
                                        
1687 Schacht, 21. 
1688 I and II/FJR 21, I and II/FJ Lehr Rgt, Pz Gr Btl 107. (Sixt, P-188 II, 2, 3 and 4.) The Brigade did 
not have StuGs, contrary to what Schacht and Sixt claim, as is explained in 3.4. 
1689 A Panzerbrigade numbered about 2,000 men, 1,081 in the Pz G rBtl alone (Timm Haasler, Die 
Geschichte der Panzerbrigade 105, Den Westwall halten oder mit dem Westwall untergehen, Uelzen 
2005, 2). 
1690 Details: Wim Klinkert, ‘Opmars naar de Maas’, 197-209, and A. Korthals Altes & N.K.C.A in ‘t Veld, 
Slag in de Schaduw, Venlo 1981, 56-127. 
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It is clear that the performance of the two Kampfgruppen, which shared many 
characteristics and were alike in composition, size and strength, as well as operating 
during the same period and over much of the same ground was superficially similar. 
Both fought delaying actions with great success. Still, there were also major 
differences. Unlike Walther’s group Kampfgruppe Chill was employed as an 
Eingreifsreserve and therefore constantly moved from one sector to another. This 
meant that Chill constantly had to create new defensive positions, rearrange his 
troops according to the needs of the situation and adapt his tactics accordingly. 
Kampfgruppe Walther on the other hand, once it had arrived in the Overloon area, 
fought one long delaying action in the same area allowing it to use prearranged 
fields of fire, areas that had been mined earlier etcetera. Also, as an attacking force 
Kampfgruppe Chill tended to be much more successful (Geel, Logtenburg, Goirle), 
even though it was far less mobile, which could be explained by a more skilful 
reading of the tactical situation or – in the case of Kampfgruppe Walther- a more apt 
response on the side of the opponents (Neerpelt, Veghel). Nevertheless, on the 
whole the disparity between the two Kampfgruppen, even though not great, is 
obvious, and a reasonable conclusion to the fourth key question (i.e. to what extent 
is the history of the Kampfgruppe a case study for Kampfgruppen during the same 
time frame and in the same theatre of war?) would be that Kampfgruppe Chill 
because of its excellent commanders exemplified the best tradition of the German 
army, the Auftragstaktik, even though Hitler himself had abolished it three years 
earlier. It also showed what an ad hoc unit was capable of, but it should be added 
that it performed much better overall than might be expected of a divisional-sized 
Kampfgruppe in this theatre of war, the only possible explanation being the officers 
in charge. How it compared to the other divisions in 15. Armee needs to be 
examined next . 
 
5.3.2 Kampfgruppe Chill as a Wehrmacht unit 
 
Shils and Janowitz’ contention about the nature of Kampfgruppen, namely that ‘so 
diverse in age composition and background, and especially so mixed in their 
reactions to becoming infantrymen, could not very quickly become effective fighting 
units,’ is obviously wide of the mark.1691 If that were true Kampfgruppe Chill would 
have been the weakest, most ineffective of all the units in 15. Armee since all the 
others were regular units, often having served together for years and years. 
However, exactly the converse was true. That Chill as an improvised unit would fail 
was precisely what General Reinhard feared as we have seen in Chapters 3.2 and 
3.3. He felt that such an ad hoc unit could never meet the serious threat posed by 
the British bridgeheads south of Geel (cf. 5.2.1). He could not have been more 
wrong. If this is compared to how other units acted within the timeframe discussed 
even in hindsight this is still surprising. One infantry division that was quite similar in 
size to Kampfgruppe Chill was the 59. Infanterie-Division led by Generalleutnant 
Poppe. As noted earlier (3.4) the division boasted 2,600 infantry plus in seven 
battalions and it had six artillery batteries as well as ten 7.5 cm Pak when it entered 
the mainland on 16 September.1692 Following the disastrous attack near Son and the 
                                        
1691 Shils and Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration’, 288. 
1692 KTB H Gr B, 16.09.44, Ia 1601/44. 
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engagements with the US 101st Airborne Division at Best, the division had increased 
to twelve battalions, now including Fallschirm units, two of which were classified as 
‘schwach’ and four as ‘abgekämpft’ as well as eight batteries.1693 After receiving 
reinforcements at the start of October the 59. I.D. had grown once more to a 
respectable 9,626 men, the size of a 1944 type infantry division.1694 Chill’s battle 
group only had 1,174 more men on the same date. On the eve of operation Pheasant 
Poppe’s division numbered an impressive eleven infantry battalions, six of which 
were weak, and it had ten artillery batteries and twenty-two Flak guns.1695 It should 
have been a force to be reckoned with in other words, but the Scottish attack, 
operation Colin, launched on 23 October, showed the division to be a paper tiger 
which was completely powerless to stop the advance (cf. 3.7). Only the arrival of 
Panzerjäger-Kompanie 1363 provided temporary relief before the 51st (Highland) 
Division punched another huge hole and Poppe’s division found security behind the 
Afwateringskanaal where it remained until that bridgehead was also captured by the 
Scots (Operation Guy Fawkes). Most of the other divisions in 15. Armee fared hardly 
any better.1696  
 
The performance of the 59. Infanterie-Division, which was of equal strength to 
Kampfgruppe Chill, shows that the latter was far superior. Poppe’s division was 
roughly the same size as Chill’s battle group, it also had a hard core of 
Fallschirmjäger, albeit a smaller one, was also at times supported by SPs and still did 
not come even close to what the latter achieved. This again confirms the importance 
of the leading officers like Chill, Dreyer, Von der Heydte and others, because they 
were the only real difference between the two units. More than the other two factors 
(hard core and armour) this then appears to have been the decisive factor for the 
success of Kampfgruppe Chill. It also provides an answer to the last key question, to 
what extent the Kampfgruppe was emblematic of the Wehrmacht as a whole. It is 
evident that the battle group can be said to represent those units that showed 
tactical superiority against an enemy that outnumbered them, units that were few 
and far between during the autumn of 1944. It was certainly not representative for 
all those that failed, for various reasons.  
 
The above example also shows quite clearly that the persistent claim that the 
German army as a whole performed better than its Allied counterparts is a fallacy.1697 
Some, like Kampfgruppe Chill, were certainly tactically superior, others, like the 59. 
Infanterie-Division performed very poorly. Sometimes the Wehrmacht outfought its 
enemies, sometimes it did not. So Andreas Kunz (cf. 1.3) is right to call this idea of a 
superior German army a ‘legend’. His explanation, however, that is was  engendered 
by the need of some of Germans to explain why they lost the war, seems very much 
                                        
1693 KTB 88 AK, 24.09.44, B 314. 
1694 KTB 88 AK, 03.10.44, C 255. 
1695 KTB 88 AK, 23.10.44, B 432. 
1696 E.g. the 712. I.D. suffered huge losses during the first serious attack on 22 October, the 245. I.D. 
after conducting a successful defence, mainly thanks to II/FJR 6, did very poorly overall, the 346. I.D. 
was completely powerless to halt the Canadian attack. 
1697 ‘the Germans consistently outfought the far more numerous Allied armies…’, Dupuy, A Genius for 
War, 234-5. 
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to be a case of oversimplification.1698 From my own personal contacts with British 
veterans I know that they, too, felt that individually often, though not always, 
Germans were better soldiers.1699 These Allied soldiers certainly had no emotional 
need to explain why the Germans lost, so there must be another reason. This study 
provides plenty of instances where German commanders operated more skilfully 
tactically than their Allied opponents. Kunz explains occasional German successes 
away too easily by blaming that on Allied ‘Abstimmungsprozesse und 
Nachschubprobleme.’1700 However, that certainly did not apply to most of the period 
covered in this study where the Allied troops were extremely well equipped and 
provided with plenty of fuel and ammunition. Maybe Field-Marshal Alan Brooke was 
right when he said that, ‘The trouble with our boys is that they are not killers by 
nature.’1701 The ordinary German soldier, especially if he had served in Russia, had 
simply had more experience as a soldier as well as learning the hard way that in war 
one either kills or is killed. Probably the biggest difference was that the British 
Tommy or the American GI was fighting a war which he knew was bound to end in 
an Allied victory in the foreseeable future. This offered an incentive not to risk his 
life, while the Landser on the other hand faced an uncertain future and was 
defending his homeland. In view of this the bravery of many Allied soldiers is all the 
more remarkable. 
 
5.3.3 Final Conclusions 
 
The ultimate goal for the Westheer and hence for Chill was to delay the Allied 
advance for as long as possible. The rule book devoted two separate sections to 
‘hinhaltender Widerstand’.1702 The main objective, it said in the introduction, was  to 
delay ‘den Gegner unter für ihn möglichst hohen Verlusten (…) ohne dass sich der 
Widerstand Leistende einem ernsten Kampfe aussetzt.’1703 It is clear that here the 
German commanders were extremely successful during the autumn of 1944 in the 
wake of the seemingly total defeat in France, inflicting serious losses on the British 
army, which could not afford them and had to disband units including an entire 
division, the 50th (Northumbrian), in November 1944. Where Montgomery succeeded 
in ultimately wearing down the German army through his operational concept of 
‘Colossal Cracks’, his opponents still managed to delay the inevitable for as long as 
was humanly possible.1704  
 
In the introduction the various theories about why the Wehrmacht persisted to the 
very end have been discussed (cf. 1.2). It now remains to be analysed what the 
findings on Kampfgruppe Chill (cf. 5.2 and 5.3) as a test case, a Heer in miniature, 
reveal about this last fundamental question concerning the resilience of the 
                                        
1698 Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, 13. 
1699 E.g. Major Eric Mainwaring, in 1944 commanding A company in the 5th Queen’s Own Cameron 
Highlanders (letter to the author, 10.06.85).  He also pointed out the war weariness among many 
Allied veterans. 
1700 Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, 336. 
1701 Quoted in Max Hastings, ‘Their Wehrmacht was better than Our Army’, The Washington Post, 5 
May 1985. 
1702 H.Dv.300/1, § 475-502. 
1703 Ibid, § 41. 
1704 Cf. Hart, Colossal Cracks, 1-13. 
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Wehrmacht. It is quite clear that the findings of Shils and Janowitz about the 
importance of the officers (especially the middle ranking ones), the hard core and 
the social group cohesion, which Fritz called the Frontgemeinschaft, are confirmed. It 
is apparent that even in an ad hoc unit like the Kampfgruppe social cohesion was a 
powerful incentive, suggesting that this phenomenon is not solely dependent on a 
prearranged organisation as exists in regular units which refutes the findings of 
Bartov. Likewise Van Creveld’s conclusions about training, organisation, doctrine as 
well as its emphasis on operational excellence epitomized by the principle of 
Auftragstaktik, are found to be relevant. It is also evident that Rush and 
Zimmermann were correct in pointing out in their studies the crucial importance of 
the fact that after the defeat in France the divisional and corps units by and large 
stayed together. Without the divisional staff Chill and the pool of officers he had 
retained he could never have set up the collection pools on 4 September and created 
the core of his Kampfgruppe. Finally, this study confirms what Zimmermann, Neitzel 
and Welzer found on what is possibly the core explanation for the German soldiers’ 
resilience, namely the deeply human desire to do one’s duty and do that as well as 
possible (cf. 5.2.3). On the other hand there is little evidence that the fear of 
reprisals (Lieb) or ideology (Bartov, Fritz) played a major role. No evidence has been 
found for what Zimmermann posited about the senior officers’ desire to further their 
careers, but neither can this be refuted. His theory that for most soldiers it was 
business as usual is certainly confirmed. Studying the Kriegstagebuch of LXXXVIII. 
Armeekorps for example one can see all the administrative aspects coming back once 
the situation at the front stabilized. Documentation clearly cannot always keep up 
with events at the start of September, but all the trimmings of a well-functioning 
military organisation with its attention for even the most minute details are in 
evidence after the dust of operation Market Garden has settled. Finally, what has 
been found about morale in Kampfgruppe Chill (5.2.3) makes it clear that the whole 
range of emotions from fanaticism to defeatism occurred even in such an effective 
fighting unit where all soldiers, except for a handful of deserters, fought on for as 
long as they could. These testimonies lead to a number of conclusions.  
 
First of all, morale is a highly personal matter, influenced by circumstances and peer 
pressure, but not directed by it. In this respect war is not different from other human 
endeavours, ‘for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.’1705 
Secondly, there is not one single explanation about why the men in the Wehrmacht 
fought on, but rather a mosaic of reasons for their resilience. All of the monocausal 
explanations fail to do justice to the complexity of social interaction, personal 
psychology and the physical circumstances on the battlefield. This study confirms 
what Kunz pointed out in his study, i.e. that there never was such a thing as the 
Wehrmacht and that certainly not all of the soldiers in the Third Reich fought on to 
the bitter end (cf. 1.2). On the other hand, we can deduce from the performance of 
Kampfgruppe Chill that military units can perform well even in circumstances where 
everything works against them. The ultimate lesson that can be drawn from this 
study is that, in spite of a numerical inferiority in every respect, in spite of the 
opponent dominating the skies, in spite of a poor supply situation, necessitating a 
                                        
1705 Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii. 
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serious rationing in use of ammunition,1706 in spite of at least a substantial part of 
the troop having a major morale problem, a unit not only can still function, but even 
stand out for its quality and excellence, provided that the men in charge are well-
trained, skilful, energetic and charismatic leaders.  
 
Based on the above it is clear that Kampfgruppe Chill was not unique as a unit in the 
Wehrmacht, but that it was certainly exceptional. It was not unique since there were 
other divisions and Kampfgruppen that were also successful in fighting the Allies, 
although they were few and far between on the western front in September and 
October 1944. It was exceptional, because it punched far above its weight and 
played a key role in plugging the gap in the German front line that had developed in 
early September and because within 15. Armee it rapidly developed into an 
‘Eingreifsreserve’  that in the end was instrumental in allowing the bulk of Von 
Zangen’s army to pull back safely north of the major rivers in the Netherlands and 
fight another day. The case of Kampfgruppe Chill also shows that the negative 
connotation of the phenomenon of Kampfgruppen we often find in literature on the 
Wehrmacht i.e. weak, disorganised, ramshackle, chaotic, is incorrect. Brigadier David 
Belchem, Montgomery’s head of operations, for example, was not impressed by the 
German deployment of Kampfgruppen. In his memoirs, published in 1977, when 
describing the German army reorganized in early September by using ‘hastily formed 
battle groups’, he added that ‘Such battle groups could not stop our progress, but by 
making full use of the numerous water obstacles they were able seriously to reduce 
the impetus of our advance’.1707 This seems patently wrong in view of the evidence 
given above. As demonstrated in Part Three, Kampfgruppe Chill did much more than 
merely ‘reduce the impetus’ of the Allied advance, on a number of occasions it 
completely blocked it, forcing a rethinking at the operational and –sometimes- 
strategic levels. The battle group was more than just an effective fighting unit, it 
excelled at what it was ordered to do. On a number of occasions it was asked to act 
as a ‘Feuerwehr’  having to take over where regular units failed.  So, in conclusion it 
is safe to say that the British or American intelligence officer who in October 1944 
wrote about Kampfgruppen that they ‘will never compare with divisions or specially 
formed task forces…’ 1708 could not have been further off the mark if he had tried.  
 
5.4 Postscripts 
 
While writing this thesis I came across some aspects of the fighting which were 
remarkable or contrary to what is commonly believed, but are outside the scope of 
this study. I feel that they warrant further research in order to add to our 
understanding of the occurrences described in this study and military operations in 
World War Two in general. 
 
5.4.1 The Royal Air Force 
 
It is a popular notion that the Allied tactical air forces ‘gave close support to the  
                                        
1706 KTB 88 AK, 11.10.44, C 277, where H Gr B instructs the subordinate units to conserve 
ammunition, proscribing exactly how much can be fired from each weapon. 
1707 Belchem, 223. 
1708 SHAEF Int Notes 31, in I Corps IS 83, 21.10.44. 
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Allied armies by protecting them from interference by the enemy’s air forces and by 
attacking the enemy’s ground forces.’1709 Although the former was true, one 
surprising discovery was that, the latter most certainly was not. The Second Tactical 
Air Force did not always support the ground offensive even when it could have 
tipped the balance in the favour of their comrades on the ground. The pictures of 
‘cab ranks’ of Typhoon fighter bombers circling overhead to be called down by a 
Forward Air Controller, may have been true in Normandy, but during the autumn 
campaign Second TAF only rarely intervened in the fierce land battles. From the daily 
logs it soon became clear what they were doing instead. The planes were more 
engaged in rail interdiction than in support of the ground forces even when the need 
was high. This confirms the findings of Brian Reid, who studied operation Totalize in 
August 1944, and noted that ‘air power had not lived up to its advanced billing…’1710 
He attributes this to the ‘limitations of technology’ (meaning that, unlike the Germans 
and the Russians for example, the British never developed ground attack aircraft) 
and ‘the aspirations of the air forces to retain their own independence’.1711 The 
evidence from this study seems to suggest that the latter is the main reason as is 
clear from the doctrine laid down by the man in charge of  Second TAF, Air Marshal 
Sir Arthur Coningham.  
 
Coningham's conviction was that the greatest attribute of air power was its ability to 
speedily concentrate its force. Tactical air power had to be closely coordinated with 
the ground forces, but the army could not command it. Here lay the heart of the 
problem. Coningham stated as much in a pamphlet, FM-100-20, that was widely 
distributed, to every ranking officer in North Africa, so that they would know what to 
expect. FM 100-20 also listed Coningham's priorities for success in use of tactical air 
power.1712 They were in descending order of importance: gain air superiority, use the 
air superiority gained to interdict enemy reinforcements of men and materiel and 
combine air attacks with ground assaults on the front lines. Thus helping the troops 
on the ground always came last as is evinced by what happened during Operations 
Pheasant and Rebound. Any air force officer that did not follow these rules or tended 
to be too sympathetic to the plight of the men on the ground could lose his job and 
sometimes did. Consequently Coningham sacked the CO of No. 84 Group which 
supported the First Canadian Army, Air Vice-Marshal Leslie Brown, on 9 November 
1944 because he was too ‘army oriented’.1713 There may have been other reasons for 
the lack of direct support and quite possibly the staff of Second TAF genuinely 
                                        
1709 Ellis, Victory Volume II, 398. 
1710 Brian Reid, No Holding Back, Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944, Toronto 2005, 409. 
That the RAF has always been very good at PR is also shown by the failed raid on the HQ of 15. 
Armee on 24 October, even today still hailed as a success (cf. 3.7). 
1711 Ibid. 
1712 Also, Vincent Orange, Coningham, A biography of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, London 1990, 
105. 
1713 Angus Brown and Richard Gimblett, In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army northwest Europe 
1942-1945, Ottawa 2009, 65. They erroneously state that No. 83 Group supported First Cdn Army. 
Also Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 192. Coningham’s biographer, Vincent Orange, explains the 
dismissal in a euphemistic turn of phrase stating that Brown, ‘had never convinced the Canadians that 
aircraft were a support, not a substitute for ground action’. 
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believed that rail interdiction was the best way to help the ground troops.1714 
Whatever the reason, this highly selective use of what was a truly awesome weapon 
by that time allowed most of Von Zangen’s 15. Armee to get away twice. Second 
Army correctly noted that ‘The absence of air attacks on the withdrawal routes has 
made an enormous difference, and some of the nine enemy divisions which faced 
the Allied armies when the present operations began may be fit to reappear before 
very long’.1715 It was, in effect, a tragic oversight which was to cost countless Allied 
lives.  
 
On the other hand it should not be forgotten that Second TAF did attain almost 
absolute air superiority which meant that it was virtually impossible for the Luftwaffe 
to intervene, although German planes did attack on rare occasions. An official 
historian of the Air Historical Branch (RAF) explains the lack of ground intervention 
by claiming that there was ‘very little scope for doing so.’1716 He provides some valid 
reasons noting that, unless carefully choreographed (like on 17 September at the 
breakout stage of Garden), air support was conducted on an ad hoc basis with all the 
problems involved in such operations. Also, identification from the air was often a 
genuine obstacle in view of the terrain as was the close nature of the fighting. 
However, when he falls back on the Typhoon’s limited endurance and the weather, 
he does not really have a case. During Operations Pheasant, Suitcase and Rebound 
the planes of Second TAF rarely intervened, although they often took to the air on 
interdiction missions far beyond the battlefield, invalidating the claims of range and 
weather conditions. Also, in the flat and open countryside where these operations 
took place German troop concentrations could easily be distinguished. It seems that 
doctrine, rather than practical obstacles, prevented Second TAF from intervening 
more than they did. All in all it seems that, in view of the way it operated a lot of the 
time, the epithet ‘tactical’ may have been a misnomer for Second TAF. The least that 
can be said is that this aspect of the campaign in the west warrants closer 
investigation. 
 
5.4.2 The Kriegsmarine 
 
The achievement of the Kriegsmarine during the autumn campaign was no mean 
feat and far exceeded what is known so far. During the autumn campaign the 
Kriegsmarine contributed in a number of ways. It is generally recognized that it was 
essential in the rescue of 15. Armee and thus allowed the fighting to continue for 
another two months after the capture of Antwerp by the 11th Armoured Division. 
However, that was not the only contribution the Kriegsmarine made to the land 
campaign. It was again of invaluable assistance to Von Zangen’s army when it 
needed to pull back north of the rivers Maas and Waal, setting up a special staff to 
deal with these crossings which were extremely successful in spite of Allied air 
superiority. This allowed more German troops to resist the Allies in their advance into 
Germany. However, as is evident from the narrative of the fighting, the Kriegsmarine 
also helped out in ways that are deeply buried in the annals of history, such as by 
                                        
1714 D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 222, attributes what he calls the ‘air-ground controversy’ to 
Coningham’s ‘severely bruised ego’. 
1715 Second Army, IS 154, 05.11.44. 
1716 Ritchie, Arnhem, 235-245. 
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having units deployed as infantry at the front, often to the despair of naval 
headquarters, and the assistance rendered by gun boats to beleaguered troops (such 
as Steenbergen). All in all, the contribution of the Kriegsmarine units to the fighting 
in the Netherlands from early September until the end of the war in May 1945 is still 
a chapter in history that needs to be written. 
 
5.4.3 Communications 
 
A somewhat astonishing aspect of the campaign was the total lack of communication 
between troops that were supposed to link up at a certain point. Three examples are 
especially striking. On two occasions Poppe’s 59. Infanterie-Division failed to make 
contact with the 107. Panzerbrigade at Son and Kampfgruppe Walther at Veghel 
respectively, although in each instance they were no more than a few kilometres 
apart. The same lack of contact occurred on 18 September when the American 
Paratroopers after liberating Eindhoven waited all afternoon for the Guards who were 
held up by the German Riegelstellung north of Aalst. Experts in this area offered a 
similar explanation for both sides: due to lack of preparation no frequencies on which 
to establish contact were exchanged beforehand.1717 As for the German side this is 
perfectly plausible. The armoured vehicles used various types of radios, the most 
common being the Funkgerät (FuG) 5 in the Sturmgeschütze and the FuG 7 in the 
Jagdpanther. These all operated on frequencies of 27.2 – 33.3 and 42.1 – 47.8 MHz 
repectively.1718 The infantry on the other hand, using the portable Tornister-
Funkgerät b, c or g, operated on frequencies of 2.5 – 3.5 MHz, a different range 
altogether.1719 A separate model (f),working on frequencies of 27.2 – 33.3 and 
therefore compatible with the armour, had been developed for the Panzergrenadiere, 
but it is highly unlikely that Poppe’s troops had such radios. In addition the ranges of 
the radios varied. The FuG 5 had a range of only 350 metres, the FuG 7 of 470, and 
the portable Tornister up to ten kilometres. It is clear that the very nature of the 
counterattacks at Son and Veghel precluded long and careful planning which 
probably explains why the commanders responsible probably never agreed on certain 
frequencies beforehand.  
 
More surprising than the German failure to make contact is the lack of 
communication between the British ground forces and the American Paratroopers in 
Eindhoven on 18 September. This is all the more amazing as in the planning stage of 
Operation Market Garden a communication network had been set up including five 
American liaison officers, so-called contact detachments in the jargon of the day, 
who had been assigned to work with the Guards and were provided with frequencies 
and sequences beforehand.1720 The after action report itself in its conclusions hints at 
the problems that occurred, finding overall that ‘Cipher delays could be reduced by 
pre-arranged codes (…) further training and improved wireless sets are essential in 
                                        
1717 German communications: Arthur O. Bauer; Allied: Cor van Doeselaar, Fred Marks and Mark 
Roubos. 
1718 Details in Hans-Joachim Ellissen, Die deutschen Funknachrichten bis 1945, Band 3, Funk- und 
Bordsprechanlagen in Panzerfahrzeugen, Telefunken, Ulm 1991 (thanks to Arhur O. Bauer). 
1719 Arthur O. Bauer, Some aspects of military line communication as deployed by the German armed 
forces prior to 1945, Diemen 2004, 6. 
1720 21 Army Group, Operation Market Garden, 17-26 September 1944, 11 and 32-5. 
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order that communication between airborne troops and ground troops following 
them up become more efficient.‘ Even more tellingly it said that ‘US air support 
parties were formed at the last moment, but the Air corps operators had not reached 
a reasonable standard of wireless operating.’1721 After studying the documents, a 
communications expert from the Dutch army arrived at the conclusion that the 
chance of the network operating successfully would only have been 10 to 20 per cent 
both because of the reliance on one frequency (4050 KHz) and the fact that it was 
arranged top down with no lateral contacts.1722 Again, further research seems called 
for, particularly since so far only the communication problems at Arnhem have been 
looked into. 
 
5.4.4 War crimes 
 
One last aspect of the autumn campaign that warrants further research is the fact 
that on the Belgian side of the border, during the first weeks of September 1944, 
German troops committed a large number of war crimes, killing scores of civilians, 
either as hostages or because they were suspected of being resistance fighters, 
whereas on the Dutch side only a handful of such incidents occurred.1723 These 
atrocities have left a deep scar on the Belgian memory of the Second World War. In 
an article concerned with the area around Hasselt and Leopoldsburg the author 
calculates that no fewer than fifty-six Belgians were executed outright there while 
others were sent to concentration camps.1724 The youngest victim was just sixteen 
years old. A possible explanation for this ‘furor teutonicus’ south of the Dutch-Belgian 
border among mainly –but not exclusively- Fallschirmjäger may lie in the fact that 
Belgian armed resistance was much more aggressive than its Dutch counterpart, 
particularly in early September. Whereas the Dutch resistance was much more 
restrained,1725 the Belgian underground fighters on 3 September had been ordered to 
attack German columns and depots.1726 One day later twenty-five SAS agents were 
dropped to assist in these actions (Operation Caliban). All agents wore British 
uniforms, but all were native Belgians, which added to the confusion since their 
actions were interpreted by the Germans as coming from ‘Terroristen’.1727 The day 
Brussels was liberated, at 19.15 hours the BBC broadcast a call for the mobilisation 
of all Belgian resistance fighters, members of the Geheime Leger/Armee Secrète 
(Secret Army).1728 The main mission was to attack German vehicles, blow up dumps, 
confuse the enemy by changing road signs and even take prisoners. All resistance 
fighters were to wear boiler suits with armbands in the colours of the Belgian flag, 
black, red and yellow. Guerrilla warfare in Belgium had been officially declared. 
                                        
1721 Ibid, 115-6. 
1722 Mark Roubos, mail 09.12.2011. 
1723 For example in the author’s town of birth, Waalwijk, where the burgomaster and two young men 
were executed by passing SS-men of II./SS-Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland on 6 
September. 
1724 Jos Bouveroux, Liever het vel van vijf zwarten, Knack Special, 2011. 
1725 E.g. on 8 September national sabotage coordinator Van Bijnen issued an order to stop all acts of 
sabotage for fear of resprisals against the civilian population 
1726 Victor Marquet, History of the Secret Army, Ch. XXXI, quoted in Wuyts, Herfststorm over Hechtel, 
95. 
1727 KTB FJR 24, 07.09.44, quoted in Wuyts, Herfststorm over Hechtel, 99. 
1728 Louche, Heppen en Leopoldsburg, 41 and 50-1. 
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German listening posts intercepted the order from Britain for the Belgian resistance 
to mobilize and passed it on to Heeresgruppe B. Model had earlier ordered his 
commanders to be on the alert and take security measures in his instruction on 
‘Bandenbekämpfung’.1729 He told his commanders with respect to these groups, ‘mit 
allen Mitteln und äusserster Härte nieder(…)kämpfen.’ He urged them to carry out 
this order speedily and energetically. The idea behind the official order and the name 
Secret Army was that the resistance fighters would be protected under the terms of 
the Geneva convention. But Hitler had already decided otherwise. On 30 July the 
OKW had issued instructions that, ‘Those who attack us from the rear at the decisive 
stage of our fight for existence deserve no consideration.’1730 Possibly memories of 
‘Freischärler’ during World War One also still lingered in the minds of the Landser 
which might explain their often outrageous behaviour. 
 
5.5 A final thought  
 
Had the Kampfgruppe Chill not prevented the Allied troops from breaking through, 
Germany could have been entered before winter set in and the Ruhr area encircled 
cutting the Reich off from essential industry. The war in Europe might have ended 
before 1945, the ‘Hunger Winter’ in Holland would not have taken place, and millions 
of Nazi victims would have survived. Tragically for the German people, all the efforts 
made by skilful commanders such as Chill and his men not only served to extend the 
life of a criminal regime, it also added hugely to the suffering of the German people, 
including the military themselves. On 10 May 1945, the Wehrmachtführungsstab 
calculated that the German ground forces (Heer plus Waffen SS and Luftwaffe 
ground units) between 1 September 1939 and 31 December 1944 had suffered 
3,367,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing and POWs). For the last four months 
of 1945 the number rose to another 4,617,000.1731 Even worse, of these casualties 
before the final war year, 1,757,000 were confirmed as killed whereas for 1945 the 
total was 2,007,000.1732 In other words well over fifty per cent more German soldiers 
died during the last four months than in the five years before. Amazing the German 
recovery in the West in September 1944 may have been, a miracle even in the eyes 
of the German High Command, but all it eventually did was prolong the suffering of 
millions of people, the majority of them Germans. On the other hand, this sacrifice 
may have been historically necessary to lay the Nazi ghost to rest once and for all 
and create a foundation for the modern, democratic Germany that we know today. 
 
                                        
1729 KTB 88 AK, C 209, 01.09.44. 
1730 Philip W. Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters, The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe, Washington 
2007, 243. 
1731 OKW, WFSt, Org Abt, 10.05.45, Gesamtverluste (NARA RG 242, T 78, Roll 398. 
1732 The Total number of German military killed during World War Two is now estimated at 5,180,000 
(Das Deutsche Reich, Band 10/2 endplate). 
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Appendix 1:  Structure 85. Infanterie-Division 31.07.1944 1733 
 
Kommandeur: Generalleutnant Kurt Chill 
 
Grenadier-Regiment 1053  
I. Bataillon 1053 (1.- 4. Kompanie) 
II. Bataillon 1053 (5.- 8. Kompanie) 
III. Bataillon 1053 (9.- 12. Kompanie) 
13. Infanteriegeschütz (IG) Kompanie 
14. Maschinengewehr (MG) Kompanie (including Panzerschreck) 
 
Grenadier-Regiment 1054  
I. Bataillon 1054 (1.- 4. Kompanie) 
II. Bataillon 1054 (5.- 8. Kompanie) 
III. Bataillon 1054 (9.- 12. Kompanie) 
13. Infanteriegeschütz (IG) Kompanie 
14. Maschinengewehr (MG) Kompanie (including Panzerschreck) 
 
Artillerie-Regiment 185 
I. Artillerie Abteilung 185 (8 x 10.5 cm leFH) 
II. Artillerie-Abteilung 185 (8 x 10.5 cm leFH) 
III. Artillerie-Abteilung 185 (12 x 8.8 cm Flak)1734 
 
Füsilier-Bataillon 185 
Kompanie 1-2 
 
Feldersatz Bataillon 185 
Kompanie 1-4 
 
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 185 
12 x 3.7 cm (Selbstfahrlafette) 
12 x 7.5 cm Pak  
 
Pionier-Bataillon 185 
Kompanie 1-3 
 
Nachrichten-Abteilung 185 
Kompanie 1-3 
 
Sanitäts-Abteilung 185 
Kompanie 1-2 (motorisiert) 
 
Kraftfahr-Abteilung 185  
 
Fahrschwadron 185  
 
Verwaltungs-Abteilung 185  
                                        
1733 Based on Anlage AOK 15 Ia Nr. 1295/44, 06.02.44, T312, R516, and Schuster, Anlage 1. 
1734 Reid, No Holding Back, 392, has 12 x 15 cm sFH guns which seems unlikely in view of the two 88 
guns remaining on 05.09.44. 
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Appendix 2:  Structure Kampfgruppe Chill 
 
 
Date   Infantry       Artillery  Armour 
 
05.09.441735  
 
Six battalions; 2,400 
KGr Dreyer 
KGr Buchholz 
KGr Seidel 
One battery from AR 
185 with six guns 
(four lFH and two 
88) 
None 
 
12.09.441736 
 
Nine battalions; 5,000 plus 
II/FJR 6, Marschbtl 352, I/FJR 
2, FEB 347, GR 723, KGr 
Dreyer, II/SS Ndl 
 
Six batteries: 3. and 
4./AR 1719, 17. and 
18./SS AEAR, II./AR 
185 
 
sHPzJgAbt 559 
(six Jagdpanther, 
eight StuGs) 
 
17.09.441737 
 
Six battalions; 2,500 plus 
KGr Dreyer: Langlotz, I/FJR 2, 
II/SS Ndl, FEB 347, I/GR 723, 
II/FJR 18 
 
Nine batteries: 
III/HGö, II and 
III/AR 185, 17. and 
18./SS AEAR, 1. and 
4./AR 347  
1./sHPzJgAbt 559  
(two Jagdpanther) 
 
24.09.441738 
 
Seven battalions; 3,023 
KGr Von der Heydte: I, III, 
IV/FJR 6 
KG Dreyer: I/HGö, I/FJR2, 
Ohler, Bloch 
 
Nine (?) batteries: II 
and III/AR 185, 
III/HGö1739 
 
1./sHPzJgAbt 559  
(three Jagdpanther) 
 
03.10.441740 
 
Ten battalions; 5,500 
KGr Von der Heydte: I, III, 
IV/FJR 6, I/FJR 2, Gramse 
KGr Dreyer: I/HGö, Ohler, 
Bloch, Wittstock, Duchstein, 
Hanke 
 
Nine Batteries: I and 
II/AR 185, III/HGö 
 
1./sHPzJgAbt 559  
(three Jagdpanther) 
 
14.10.441741 
 
Six battalions; 3,300 plus 
KGr Von der Heydte: I, III, 
IV/FJR 6, I/FJR 2 
KGr Dreyer: I/HGö, Ohler, Kp 
Balzereit (Bloch) 
Nine Batteries: I and 
II/AR 185, III/HGö 
 
sHPzJgAbt 559 (two 
Jagdpanther, six 
StuGs)  
Stugbde 280 (eight 
StuGs and StuH) 
 
24.10.441742 
 
 
Seven batallions; 3,500 plus 
KGr Von der Heydte: I, III, 
IV/FJR 6, I/FJR 2 
K GR Dreyer: I/HGö, Ohler, 
Bauer 
Ten Batteries: I and 
II/AR 185, III/HGö, 
I/AR 164 
 
Stugbde 667 (thirty-
one StuGs and StuH) 
 
 
                                        
1735 War Diary 50 (N) Div, IS 64, 09.09.44 and First Cdn Army IR PoW Battle Groups 17.09.44. 
1736 KTB 88 AK, A 236, 12.09.44, Tagesmeldung, 12.09.44, B 311, 24.09.44. 
1737 KTB 88 AK, A 330, 17.09.44. 
1738 KTB 88 AK, B 311, 24.09.44. 
1739 B 311 gives nine batteries, but A 439 (23.09.44) gives five and C 243 (28.09.44) gives ten. 
1740 KTB 88 AK, C 256, 03.10.44, C 271, 09.10.44. 
1741 Various sources, cf. Chapter 3.6. 
1742 Various sources, cf. Chapter 3.7. 
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Appendix 3: Kampfgruppe Chill, a chronology 
 
1944 
10 February: creation of 85. Infanterie-Division (Wehrkreis XII, Wiesbaden) around GR 1024. 
From March: Training in the Crecy area in France. 
6 June: division moved to area around Abbeville. 
31 July: division ordered to Rouen area by 15. Armee. 
9 August: first units arrive to take over sector from 12. SS. Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend. 
14 August: Operation Tractable; division shattered, begins to pull back.  
29 August: remaining units back around Abbeville. Order to set up Kampfgruppe together with remnants of 84. 
and 89. I.D. Withdrawal continues. 
3 September: remains arrive in Turnhout area. 
4 September: Chill and his staff start rounding up stragglers in Turnhout (Belgium) and assembling them into 
groups. 
5 September: Kampgruppe Chill is born when Generalleutnant Chill on his own initiative puts the assembled 
troops in position behind the Albert Canal. He divides his battle group into three Kampfgruppen: Buchholz, Dreyer 
and Seidel. All in all he can muster about 2,400 men of all branches of the armed forces.  
6 September: Chill is put in charge, by General Reinhard (LXXXVIII. Armeekorps), of the sector from Herentals to 
Hasselt, hence GR 723 is assigned to him. Heavy fighting at Beringen. Chill is assigned FJR 6, I./FJR 2 and 
s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559.1743 The first two are still on their way from Germany. 
7 September: Chill is assigned FEB 347. He also receives artillery: 17. and 18. SS-Artillerie Ersatz und Ausbildungs 
Regiment. In addition Flieger-Regiment 53 is assigned to him. 
10 September: Kampfgruppe Chill is officially created. The headquarters of the 84. and 89. Infanteriedivision 
return to the Reich. Kampfgruppe Chill involved in fighting at Leopoldsburg and Geel. 
11 September: Chill insists on the use of the word Kampfgruppe instead of 85. ID. 
12 September: the Kampfgruppe pulls back behind the Maas-Scheldt Canal; Chill now responsible for the sector 
from Herentals to Luijksgestel. 
13 September: FJR 6 is now assigned to 1. Fallschirm-Armee. 
15 September: 2./s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559 leaves Chill to become Corps reserve. 
17 September: Market Garden. At the end of the day FJR 6 returns to Kampfgruppe Chill. Dreyer is still involved 
at Ten Aard with 1./559 while FJR 6 in Kempen. Artillery increased to nine batteries.  
20 September: the remnants of 2. and 3./559 end up in Wesel. 
21 September: 1./559 assigned to 59. ID to support attack on Veghel. 
22 September: the Kampfgruppe falls back behind the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. 
23 September: Kampfgruppe Chill under 15. Armee; once again assigned 1./s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559; ordered to move 
north and attack Veghel bridge. 
27 September: 1944 Chill is made responsible for sector between Schijndel and ‘s-Hertogenbosch. 
s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559 is to become Heeresgruppe reserve. 
28 September: all of s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559 and Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon Bloch assigned to Kampfgruppe. 
1 October: first elements alerted for move to Goirle. 
3 October: Kampfgruppe Chill ordered to Goirle; halts attack I Corps. It is from now on composed of two 
Kampfgruppen: Von der Heydte and Dreyer. 
8 October: four battalions (FJR 6 plus I./FJR 2) sent to Woensdrecht. Sturmgeschützbrigade 280 already there. 
11 October: other two battalions (Kampfgruppe Dreyer) follow together with s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559. 
14 October: s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt.559 put into reserve (LXVII. AK) near Zundert. 
27 October: Kampfgruppe Chill falls back behind the river Zoom. Joined by Sturmgeschützbrigade 667. 
29 October: the Kampfgruppe falls back on Steenbergen and Dinteloord and Willemstad. 
4 November: the last elements ferried across the Hollands Diep. 
9 November: the Allies have cleared western North Brabant. 
22 November: Kampfgruppe with Sturmgeschützbrigade 244 assigned to LXXXVI. Armeekorps (Von Obstfelder).  
8 December: Chill is transferred to the Führerreserve OKH; Oberst Helmut Bechler takes over. 
9 December: the Kampfgruppe, once more referred to as the 85. Infanterie-Division, but still composed of the 
two Kampfgruppen (FJR 6 and Dreyer), moves to the Eiffel area. 
12 December: the Kampfgruppe takes over sector in Hürtgenwald, under LXXXIV. Armeekorps (General Karl 
Püchler).  
 
1945 
7 February: FJR 6 leaves to join 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division. 
15 March: 85. I.D. pushed back to the Rhine and virtually annihilated. 
8 April: remnants 85. I.D. are gathered in Infanterie-Division Potsdam (Oberst Erich Lorenz). 
20 April: remnants are disbanded. 
                                        
1743 Bar, of course, II./FJR 6, which acted independently during this period. 
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Appendix 4: Casualties 5 September – 9 November 19441744 
 
A. German casualties: 
 
German total North Belgium:      21,0001745 
German total Noord Brabant (west of Corridor):    35,2001746 
German casualties total:       56,200 
 
Casualties Kampfgruppe Chill:1747         
I/FJR 2:   38 KIA, 10 MIA, 11 DoW, 192 WIA, 663 POW  914 
FJR 6:  389 KIA, 39 MIA, 108 DoW, 1,104 WIA, 1,108 POW  2,784 
HG Rgt:   219 KIA, 23 MIA, 8 DoW, 968 WIA, 158 POW  1,376 
KGr Dreyer: 329 KIA, 7 MIA, 87 DoW, 1344 WIA, 1,054 POW  2,821 
Total:         7,895 
 
B. Allied casualties:         
 
 
Allied casualties overall:      18,8061748 
 
Inflicted by Kampfgruppe Chill: 
7-13 September 1944, Beringen, Leopoldsburg and environs:   4151749 
7-12 September 1944, Geel area:      9181750 
13-20 September 1944, Ten Aard:      9141751 
18-23 September 1944, Kempen:      9301752 
24-25 September 1944, Koevering:      9701753 
5-8 October 1944, Goirle area:      2161754 
9-19 October 1944, Woensdrecht area:     1,8401755 
21 October–9 November 1944, Western Brabant:    6551756 
Total:         6,858 
 
                                        
1744 Casualty figures: Killed in Action (KIA), Died of Wounds (DoW), Wounded (WIA) and Missing 
(MIA). In cases where only the KIA are known the number of wounded was extrapolated by using a 
factor of four (exclusive of DoW) which, is a conservative estimate. Martin (Fifteenth Scottish Division, 
347-354) has an overall ratio (KIA-WIA-MIA) of 1 : 4.9 : 1.3 for the 15th Scottish Div. for this period. 
However, German units had far higher numbers of POWs (MIA) than the Allies. 
1745 Based on 2,400 KIA and 13,000 POWs. Sources: IS First Cdn Army, Second Army and PAJVD, who 
collated these figures from many different sources (cf. note 1741). 
1746 Based on 4,100 KIA and 20,300 PoW (ibid). 
1747 PAJVD, based on information collated over many years from the Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräbefürsorge (VDK), the Wehrmachtsauskunftstelle für Kriegerverluste und Kriegsgefangene 
(WAst), Intelligence Summaries of First Cdn and Second British Army, Red Cross archives, municipal 
archives and War Diaries. 
1748 Based on 1,592 KIA (PAJVD) for British army units (total 11,461). Added were 859 Polish 
casualties (Operational Report 1st Pol Armd Div, 49), 1,391 from the US 104th (Hoegh & Doyle, 
Timberwolf Tracks, 98), 2,600 paratroopers (PAJVD) and 2,495 Canadian casualties (PAJVD). 
1749 Based on 59 KIA for the Guards units, 12 for the 8th Armd Bde units and 2 for the 11th Armd 
units, of course only when they fought in the area. 
1750 Delaforce, Monty’s Northern Legions, 50th Northumbrian and 15th Scottish Divisions at War 1939-
1945, Stroud 2004, 93.  
1751 Martin, Fifteenth Scottish Division, 350 (112 KIA, 644 WIA, 158 MIA).  
1752 Based on 163 KIA and 3 DoW. 
1753 Based on 119 KIA and DoW 101st US Airborne, 36 KIA and DoW 7th Armd Div, and 31 KIA 
various smaller units. 
1754 War Diary 146th Bde, 07-12.10.44; War Diary Sherbrooke Fusiliers, 07-10.10.44. 
1755 Van Doorn, Woensdrecht, 109-119 (372 KIA). 
1756 PAJVD (144 KIA). 
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Samenvatting 
 
Na het ineenstorten van het front in Normandië in augustus 1944, stroomden de 
resten van de Wehrmacht terug door Noord-Frankrijk en België. Begin september, 
met de bevrijding van Brussel en Antwerpen, leek het einde van de oorlog binnen 
handbreik. Nog geen week later was de geallieerde opmars tot staan gebracht. Het 
was voor de Duitse legerleiding het ‘wonder in het westen’. Deze dissertatie zoekt 
naar een verklaring voor de grote rol die de Kampfgruppe Chill bij deze ommekeer op 
5 september en de daaropvolgende vertragende gevechten tot 9 november heeft 
gespeeld. Een deel van de verklaring moet worden gevonden in de historiografie van 
de Wehrmacht aan het westelijk front vanaf september 1944. Tegelijk wordt het 
fenomeen Kampfgruppen onderzocht, waarover nog geen serieuze literatuur bestaat, 
zodat duidelijk wordt, niet alleen hoe de Kampfgruppe zich verhield tot de rest van 
de Duitse troepen in de te onderzoeken periode, maar meer in het bijzonder tot 
andere Kampfgruppen die tegen dezelfde tegenstanders in het zelfde tijdsbestek 
vochten. Door een eenheid te onderzoeken die een wisselende samenstelling had, 
niet evenwichtig bewapend was, en tegen een overmacht moest vechten, hoop ik het 
antwoord te vinden op de vraag, wat de kern is van het goed functioneren van een 
militaire eenheid. Het antwoord richt zich, geheel volgens de ideeën omtrent 
moderne militaire geschiedschrijving, ook op de effecten van het opereren op de drie 
niveaus van militair handelen, namelijk het tactische, het operationele en het 
strategische. Kortom, het verhaal wordt verteld van ‘hoog’ tot ‘laag’. Tegelijk wil deze 
dissertatie het bestaande beeld van de operaties in Noord-België en Zuid-Nederland 
bijstellen, mede door gebruik van andere dan de gebruikelijke bronnen, bij 
landoperaties, zoals die van de Kriegsmarine en de Second Tactical Air Force.  
 
Bij de bronnen deed zich een probleem voor. Zolang de Kampfgruppe Chill viel 
onder de verantwoordelijkheid van het LXXXVIII. Armeekorps (General Hans 
Reinhard) kon ik het Kriegstagebuch (KTB) van dit legerkorps gebruiken. Vanaf 5 
oktober 1944 viel de Kampfgruppe echter onder het LXVII. Armeekorps (General 
Hans von Obstfelder) en het KTB van dit legerkorps is, zoals de meeste Duitse 
verdwenen. Om de bewegingen van de Kampfgruppe toch te kunnen reconstrueren 
moest ik te rade gaan bij de voormalige vijand. Hier bleken naast de gebruikelijke 
War Diaries vooral de Intelligence Summaries, de Intelligence Logs, de Daily Logs en 
de Special Interrogation Reports zeer waardevolle informatie te bevatten. Met name 
over moreel en bewapening was veel te halen uit de verhoren van krijgsgevangen 
Duitse soldaten. 
 
De dissertatie is in vijf delen opgesplitst. In Deel 1 wordt het theoretisch kader 
uiteengezet. Het gaat dan om de definities van de strategische, operationele en 
tactische niveaus (1.1.1), de zogenaamde bruggenhoofdstrategie (1.1.2) en de 
Auftragstaktik, (1.1.3). In 1.2 wordt de historiografie geschetst van de studie naar de 
mentaliteitsgeschiedenis van de Duitse soldaat tijdens de slotfase van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. Een van de vragen die historici bezighield na 1945 was, hoe te 
verklaren dat de strijdkrachten tot het bittere einde bleven doorvechten. Na de 
oorlog passerden diverse theorieën de revue. Deze worden hier in chronologische 
volgorde besproken en geanalyseerd, waarbij opvalt dat de meeste op een enkele 
oorzaak focussen. Tot slot wordt in 1.3 het fenomeen Kampfgruppen onder de loep 
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genomen. Bij het ontbreken van relevante literatuur wordt door de auteur zelf een 
mogelijk raamwerk geschetst. In 1.3.1 gaat het om Kampfgruppen in het algemeen 
terwijl 1.3.2. ingaat op Kampfgruppen in het westen. Deel 2 schildert de situatie tot 
aan het ontstaan van de Kampfgruppe Chill. In 2.1 wordt de militaire situatie eind 
augustus 1944 in beeld gebracht. Vervolgens wordt gekeken naar de geallieerde 
(2.2) en Duitse (2.3) strategieën eind augustus en begin september. In 2.4 wordt de 
voorgeschiedenis van de Kampfgruppe en de carrière van Generalleutnant Chill 
beschreven en 2.5 behandelt de geboorte van de Kampfgruppe op 5 september 
1944. Deel 3 is het narratief van de strijd vanaf het eerste optreden van de 
Kampfgruppe Chill tot aan het afsluiten van de terugtocht van het 15. Armee op 9 
november 1944. Achtereenvolgens gaat het om de strijd in de driehoek Herentals-
Roermond-Maastricht (3.1), de strijd om Geel (3.2), de gevechten bij Ten Aard (3.3), 
de gevechten in het kader van operatie Market Garden, met name het blokkeren van 
de Corridor (3.4), de strijd bij Goirle (3.5), de slag om Woensdrecht en omgeving 
(3.6) en de diverse gevechtshandelingen tijdens de strijd in westelijk Brabant van 
eind oktober tot begin november (3.7). Deel 4 geeft een overzicht van de militaire 
situatie na de terugtocht van het 15. Armee uit Brabant (4.1) en onderzoekt de 
geallieerde en Duitse strategieën (4.2). Dit deel wordt afgesloten met een 
beschrijving van wat er na 9 november 1944 gebeurde met de diverse actoren (4.3). 
Deel 5 begint met een reeks conclusies over het effect van het optreden van de 
Kampfgruppe (5.1) en vervolgt dan met een onderzoek naar de militaire kracht van 
de Kampfgruppe (5.2) door de drie componenten van gevechtskracht te 
onderzoeken, de fysieke (5.2.1), de conceptuele (5.2.2) en de mentale (5.2.3). Tot 
slot wordt onderzocht in hoeverre de Kampfgruppe Chill representatief was voor 
Kampfgruppen (5.3.1) en voor de Wehrmacht in het algemeen (5.3.2). Een naschrift 
benoemt een aantal zaken die tijdens dit onderzoek naar voren kwamen en nader 
onderzoek verdienen, te weten de rol van de Royal Air Force (5.4.1) die minder 
spectaculair was dan wordt gesuggereerd in de meeste boeken, de tot nu toe 
onderbelichte rol van de Kriegsmarine (5.4.2), de gebrekkige communicatie op 
cruciale momenten, zowel aan Duitse als aan geallieerde zijde (5.4.3), en het relatief 
groot aantal oorlogsmisdaden op Belgisch grondgebied (5.4.4). Tot slot wordt de 
buitengewoon hoge prijs gememoreerd die Duitsland betaalde door het volharden 
van de Duitse strijdkrachten (5.5). 
 
Uit de gevechten die de Kampfgruppe voerde kunnen de volgende successen 
worden afgeleid: door zijn kordate optreden op 4 september 1944 heeft 
Generalleutnant Kurt Chill er voor gezorgd dat het gat dat was ontstaan in het Duitse 
front in het westen in ieder geval provisorisch werd gedicht. Dit was een majeure 
strategische tegenslag voor de Geallieerden, met name Montgomery’s 21ste 
Legergroep die een paar dagen later al over de Rijn had willen zijn. De Kampfgruppe 
Chill dwong door haar taaie verzet bij Beringen de Britten een omweg te nemen 
zodat pas vijf dagen later, op 11 september, een brug over het Maas-Scheldekanaal 
in Britse handen viel. Tegelijk blokkeerde de Kampfgruppe een Britse aanval over 
Geel en voorkwam zo dat de verdediging benoorden Antwerpen werd omtrokken. Na 
de terugtrekking achter het Maas-Scheldekanaal blokkeerde de Kampfgruppe een 
aanval vanuit Ten Aard richting Turnhout. Opnieuw waren de gevolgen groot. Via 
deze route had het XII British Corps de flanken van het XXX British Corps tijdens 
operatie Market Garden moeten veiligstellen. Nu was het legerkorps van Lieutenant-
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General Sir Neil Ritchie gedwongen een omweg te volgen zodat het uiteindelijk bleef 
steken in de Kempen. De Kampfgruppe slaagde er op 22 september als enige Duitse 
eenheid in Hell’s Highway te blokkeren. Deze blokkade, die vierenveertig uur duurde, 
was de genadeslag voor Market Garden. Begin oktober voorkwam de Kampfgruppe 
ten zuiden van Tilburg een opmars van het I British Corps richting ’s-Hertogenbosch. 
Deze aanval was bedoeld om Brabant te veroveren zodat de Britten vanuit Nijmegen 
alsnog voor de winter Duitsland konden binnenvallen. Meteen daarna slaagde Chill’s 
gevechtsgroep erin de Canadese opmars bij Woensdrecht te stoppen. Het succes van 
de Kampfgruppe in beide confrontaties betekende dat Montgomery opnieuw zijn 
operationele plannen moest omgooien. Alvorens richting Duitsland te kunnen 
trekken, moest hij eerst de haven van Antwerpen veiligstellen, waarvoor niet alleen 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen en Walcheren dienden te worden veroverd, maar het hele 15. 
Armee terug moest worden gedrongen benoorden de Maas. De Kampfgruppe 
speelde een sleutelrol in het vertragend gevecht bij Bergen op Zoom en 
Steenbergen. Al met al betekenden de Duitse defensieve successen, waarbij de 
Kampfgruppe Chill een hoofdrol vervulde, dat de aanval richting Ruhrgebied niet 
plaatsvond in het najaar van 1944, maar pas in maart 1945. Hierdoor werd niet 
alleen de geallieerde operationele planning (Montgomery), maar ook de strategische 
(Eisenhower) beïnvloed. 
 
Een analyse van het militaire vermogen van de Kampfgruppe Chill laat zien dat 
het succes van de gevechtsgroep verklaard kan worden door drie factoren, het 
voorhanden zijn van een elite van Fallschirmjäger, ondersteuning door mobiele 
wapens, namelijk Sturmgeschütze en Jagdpanther, en superieur leiderschap. Een 
vergelijking met de Kampfgruppe Walther, een geïmproviseerde eenheid van vrijwel 
dezelfde omvang en samenstelling, optredend tijdens dezelfde periode en over deels 
hetzelfde soort terrein, onderstreept met name dat laatste aspect als doorslaggevend 
voor het effectieve optreden van Chill’s gevechtsgroep. Hiermee wordt tevens 
antwoord gegeven op de vraag hoe kenmerkend de geïmproviseerde eenheid was 
voor Kampfgruppen in het algemeen. Alleen al door de grootte (variërend van zes tot 
tienduizend man) was de Kampfgruppe atypisch, aangezien slechts 10 tot 15 % van 
dergelijke eenheden groter was dan een versterkt bataljon. Ook het succes maakt 
haar bijzonder, zellfs in vergelijking met reguliere Duitse eenheden van een 
vergelijkbare omvang en gevechtssterkte, die het vaak lieten afweten (de 59. 
Infanterie-Division bijvoorbeeld). Hiermee is tegelijk aangetoond dat de 
veelgehoorde bewering in de literatuur over deze periode, namelijk dat de eenheden 
van de Wehrmacht altijd beter vochten dan de geallieerde troepen, naar het rijk der 
fabelen moet worden verwezen. 
 
De afgelopen zeventig jaar zijn verschillende baanbrekende studies 
verschenen over de vraag naar het waarom van de Duitse volhardendheid. De 
auteurs komen tot zeer verschillende conclusies, maar de belangrijkste verklaringen 
zijn sociale cohesie binnen een primaire groep, plichtsbesef, de rol van officieren, de 
uitstekende organisatie, nationaalsocialistische ideologie, angst voor represailles en 
de militaire doctrine met haar nadruk op Auftragstaktik. Afgezet tegen de 
bevindingen over de Kampfgruppe Chill, waarbij verhoren van krijgsgevangenen een 
belangrijke bron vormen, kunnen we constateren dat alle monocausale verklaringen 
tekort schieten en dat de belangrijkste verklaring gezocht moet worden in een 
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combinatie van factoren waarvan de belangrijkste primaire groepsbinding, een sterk 
plichtsbesef, naïviteit, doctrine en, bovenal, een sterk leiderschap zijn. Gesteld kan 
worden, tot slot, dat de Kampfgruppe Chill niet uniek was binnen de Wehrmacht in 
deze fase van de oorlog en op dit strijdtoneel, maar wel uitzonderlijk. 
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